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Intangible Cultural Heritage of Dance as a Medium for Intercultural Dialogue: 
Culture Assimilator Reinterpreted 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores two different models in the use of cultural heritage as a medium 
for intercultural exchange. This role of cultural heritage is discussed under a larger 
political framework of intercultural dialogue as a policy approach in managing cultural 
diversity, with specific reference to the 2008 Council of Europe’s White Paper on 
Intercultural Dialogue. This policy approach is analysed here in terms of the goal in 
social cohesion and the liberal, procedural commitment in democracy towards 
cultural and value pluralism, with its relevance discussed in the context of Singapore, 
which claims an approach of ‘communitarianism’ upholding ‘Asian values’. Against 
the background of racism problems in Singapore, the staging and interpretation of 
Indian dance heritage in Singapore will be analysed between a transcultural and a 
multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, the former focusing on creative 
engagement to overcome differences in cultural identity, the latter focusing on 
mutual understanding and respect of differences. As part of the multicultural model, 
one will analyse cross-cultural interaction as ‘critical incidents’ based on the ‘Culture 
Assimilator’ method (otherwise known as the Intercultural Sensitizer) in intercultural 
communication training – which German social psychologist Alexander Thomas has 
repositioned in an intercultural competence framework aligned with systems theory. 
This framework will be adapted to discuss the aspects of open-mindedness and 
empathy in intercultural learning through cultural heritage, and to deconstruct cultural 
differences. 
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Immaterielles Kulturerbe Tanz als Mittel zum interkulturellen Dialog: Culture 
Assimilator neu interpretiert 
ABSTRACT 
Diese Arbeit ist eine Erforschung des interkulturellen Dialogs durch Kulturerbe Tanz 
in zwei verschiedenen Modellen. Dabei soll Kulturerbe im allgemeinen eine Rolle 
spielen im Rahmen des interkulturellen Dialogs als politischer Ansatz in der 
Bewältigung der kulturellen Vielfalt, nach Perspektiven in dem 2008 Europarats 
Weißbuch zum interkulturellen Dialog. Dieser Ansatz berücksichtigt das Ziel des 
sozialen Zusammenhalts sowie das liberalen Verfahren der Engagement in einer 
Demokratie, neben Akzeptanz des Pluralismus in Kultur und Werten. Es steht im 
Gegensatz zu dem politischen Ansatz des ‚Kommunitarismus‘ in Singapur mit dem 
Annahme, die ‚asiatischen Werten‘ unter staatlicher Leitung bevorzugt werden sollen. 
Vor dem Hintergrund des Rassismus als Herausforderung des sozialen 
Zusammenhalts werden die Inszenierungen und Interpretationen vom indischen 
Tanz in Singapur analysiert zwischen den transkulturellen und multikulturellen 
Modellen für interkulturellen Dialog. Ein transkulturelles Modell soll Schwerpunkt 
darauf legen, kreative Auseinandersetzungen zu schaffen, um Unterschiede in 
kulturellen Identitäten zu überwinden, während ein multikulturelles Modell versucht, 
gegenseitiges Verständnis und Respekt  voranzubringen. Bei einem multikulturellen 
Modell kann man die ‚Culture Assimilator‘ Methode in interkulturellen Kommunikation 
nutzen, um kulturelle Überschneidungssituationen im Rahmen interkultureller 
Kompetenz zu analysieren, nach Perspektive des deutschen Sozialpsychologen 
Alexander Thomas in Anlehnung an Systemtheorie. In dieser Arbeit wird die 
Diskussion aber erweitert, um Aspekte der Aufgeschlossenheit und Empathie beim 
interkulturellen Lernen zu untersuchen, im Zusammenhang mit den Bedeutungen 
des Kulturerbes am Beispiel indischer Tanz. Dabei sollen kulturellen Unterschiede 
auch dekonstruiert werden. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 
1.1 Background and Motivation of Research  
‘Intercultural dialogue’ has emerged in the first decade of the 21st century as a new 
policy approach proposed in Europe for managing cultural diversity under the 
growing trends of globalisation. The development of its concept, as witnessed from 
the 2003 declaration by European ministers of education on intercultural education to 
the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, reflects a concern with conflicts that 
have been attributed to differences in value systems, for which key reference values 
such as democracy have been asserted under an “ideology of European 
interculturalism” (Besley and Peters, 2012, pp. 2-4) in fostering shared experience 
and promoting mutual understanding. Plurality in society and apprehension for it 
have characterised contemporary politics worldwide due to reshuffling of cultural, 
religious and social relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall, further heightened by 
the events of September 11th, 2001 (Seymour, 2010, p. 4). 
While the notion of ‘dialogue’ may have multiple cultural origins in the world, from 
Chinese and Indian classical literature to scriptural hermeneutics of the Abrahamic 
religions, it has particularly been venerated as a pedagogical form of philosophical 
discourse in the Western tradition, tracing its roots to Socrates’ dialogical method of 
argumentation (Besley and Peters, 2012, p. 14). Western models of dialogue have 
since developed along different ontological, epistemological and ethical lines of 
inquiry, from religious communion (Buber), philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer), 
rational deliberation (Habermas), radical pedagogy (Freire), dialogical imagination 
(Bakhtin) to liberal learning (Oakeshott and Rorty), which provide useful approaches 
for intercultural understanding (cited in Ibid., p. 22). In cultural policy studies, 
Yudhishthir Raj Isar (2006) has identified six tropes of intercultural dialogue: dialogue 
of or among civilisations; cultural cooperation; multiculturalism; cultural diplomacy; 
inter-religious dialogue; and arts practice. 
The challenge in this thesis, written under the auspices of an international graduate 
school in heritage studies, will lie in a transdisciplinary outlook that takes into 
account how some of the above-mentioned themes and approaches on intercultural 
dialogue are intertwined, from general cultural policy down to arts practice, as it 
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considers the potential and constraints of cultural heritage as a medium for dialogue 
in a culturally diverse society. The practice of heritage involves the use of the past to 
validate the present through an idea of timeless values and lineages (Lowenthal, 
1985); it is most significant that the very notion of heritage has entered the public 
realm from its original sense in a private realm (Lowenthal, 1998). Heritage in plural 
societies has become a site where policies of assimilation or multiculturalism are 
articulated (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 8). In the globalised era today, cultural heritage 
is used not only as an economic resource but also as a potent ‘ideological resource’ 
(Silberman, 2010, p. 1).  
The relevance of cultural heritage to intercultural dialogue may also be argued from 
a perspective of global polity, notably as seen in the legal instruments of UNESCO, 
from the highlighting of ‘outstanding universal values’ in the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention to the hope for dialogue as expressed in the 2003 Intangible Heritage 
Convention. The latter was adopted partly with the consideration that intangible 
heritage, such as oral traditions, performing arts, rituals and craftsmanship, can play 
an “invaluable role […] in bringing human beings closer together and ensuring 
exchange and understanding among them" (UNESCO, 17 Oct 2003, p.2). 
Furthermore, according to the second of five criteria for the Representative List, 
inscription of an element should “contribute to ensuring visibility and awareness of 
the significance of the intangible cultural heritage and to encouraging dialogue, thus 
reflecting cultural diversity worldwide and testifying to human creativity” (UNESCO, 
June 2008, p. 8).  
With the exploration in this thesis of cultural heritage as a site of intercultural 
dialogue, one hopes to provide a unique contribution by reviewing and advancing a 
perspective of social psychology that considers intercultural dialogue in terms of 
interaction between people of different cultural communities “on the basis of mutual 
understanding and respect” (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 10), which involves the 
aspects of one’s knowledge, attitude and action towards the other culture. These 
may easily be glossed as an issue of ‘intercultural competence’ involving cognitive, 
affective and behavioural aspects of intercultural communication. “Building 
intercultural competencies” has incidentally been cited as a major aspect of 
intercultural dialogue in the 2009 UNESCO world report Investing in Cultural 
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Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, alongside specific areas of challenges such as 
interfaith dialogue and reconciliation of conflicting memories (UNESCO, 2009, p. 45).  
But if this renders the impression that the challenge of intercultural dialogue is 
necessarily geared towards a thematic concern with ‘cultural differences’, one should 
note that one of the ‘key competence areas’ for intercultural dialogue as cited in the 
2008 White Paper takes a more universal outlook of empowerment for all – it speaks 
of education for democratic citizenship, involving, inter alia, “civic, history, political 
and human-rights education, education on the global context of societies and on 
cultural heritage […] particularly the capacity for reflection and the self-critical 
disposition necessary for life in culturally diverse societies” (Council of Europe, 2008, 
p. 29).  
It is hence desirable that an ‘intercultural competence’ approach based on an 
intercultural communication framework be critically reviewed in relation to the ideals 
of intercultural dialogue from a political perspective, not to mention the question of 
epistemological approach on culture from a psychological or sociological perspective. 
As a basis for discussion, this thesis will reference a conceptual framework on 
intercultural competence discussed in Germany that is associated with the Culture 
Assimilator approach in intercultural communication, first developed in Chicago in 
the 1960s. Devised as a tool or programme of intercultural training to help overcome 
cultural differences as observed in ‘critical incidents’, the Culture Assimilator found 
its basis in the idea of ‘subjective culture’ as defined by Charles Osgood (1977). This 
refers to human cognitive processes of values, attitudes and norms of behaviour, in 
other words “intangible elements” (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185; cf. Prosser, 
1978, p. 197) as opposed to ‘objective culture’ which refers to artefacts and 
technologies. Following similar arguments, German social psychologist Alexander 
Thomas has defined culture as a form of orientation system regulating one’s psychic 
processes of perception and evaluation as well as one’s ‘internalised dispositions’ for 
action, as may be observed from critical interaction situations (Thomas, 2011, p. 
100).  
For an application to intercultural dialogue imagined as a ‘specific form of 
interpersonal communication’ (Thomas, 2008, p. 14), the intercultural competence 
framework of Alexander Thomas has claimed its relevance by giving primacy to the 
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cognitive aspect of ‘intercultural understanding’. However, such ambition has been 
tentative in terms of philosophical basis, swaying from a leaning towards Ram Adhar 
Mall’s intercultural philosophy of relativism by emphasising communication over 
consensus (Thomas, 2003b, p. 137), to an attempt to tie in with Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, but ultimately reducing the challenge of an ‘ideal speech 
situation’ to one of intercultural competence (Thomas, 2008, p. 27) while issues like 
power imbalance are swiftly left out of the equation since his approach of 
Kulturstandard is not equipped to deal with the complexity of power structures. One 
may add that it also leaves out the ultimate challenge in intercultural dialogue in 
terms of differences in morals and ethics. In short, this framework reduces 
intercultural dialogue to a communication process in terms of attributing others’ 
intentions appropriately, and simplifies the challenge of intercultural dialogue to a 
psychological problem of cognition.  
This thesis suggests that the complexity of intercultural dialogue, even when seen 
from a psychological perspective alone, can be well illustrated with the example of 
dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage. While the choice of dance as a 
subject of investigation is motivated mainly by this writer’s personal affinity, dance 
arguably claims an interesting area in intercultural dialogue as it consists of 
movements and gestures which may be considered as a form of non-verbal 
communication with multiple meanings (Hanna, 1978, p. 89). As an art form, dance 
expressions manage to stir one’s aesthetic emotions through what Susanne Langer 
has described as ‘virtual power’ (Langer, 1953, p. 175). Furthermore, dance as an 
art form is a form of ‘intentional action’ (Best, 1974, p. 193) rather than a form of 
‘internalised disposition’ or psychological phenomenon. It hence poses new 
challenges in cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of communication that 
may otherwise not be taken into account under an intercultural communication 
framework such as the Culture Assimilator. This would also help to provide new 
insights on cultural heritage generally if one considers tangible or intangible heritage 
alike as a kind of ‘cultural tool’ for the ‘performance’ and negotiation of identity and 
values (Smith and Waterton, 2009, p. 292). 
It will be maintained in this thesis that the observation of cross-cultural interaction in 
critical situations provides a useful point of departure for discussion of ‘cultural 
differences’ in dealing with cultural heritage, under the premise of respect for culture 
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diversity. At the same time, one needs to deconstruct any assumption of cultural 
differences that see heritage as strictly tied to particular cultural identities, which 
would tend towards a form of essentialisation. It will also be part of the interest in this 
thesis to explore intercultural dialogue through dance heritage from a perspective of 
transculturalism that emphasises creative engagement (Epstein, 1999b, p. 97) 
instead of mere ‘understanding’. To serve as a case study, this thesis will analyse 
the need for intercultural dialogue as a policy approach in the culturally diverse 
society of Singapore, along with the possibilities in using Indian classical dance of 
the minority community as a medium of intercultural dialogue with the dominant 
Chinese community. The choice is partly motivated by this writer’s place of origin as 
a Singapore citizen and at the same time a personal acquaintance with the said 
heritage as an amateur dancer.  
Singapore in any case provides academic interest per se for three reasons. Firstly, it 
is increasingly facing problems in social cohesion, being one of the top three most 
globalised economies in the world alongside Hong Kong and Ireland (Ernst and 
Young, January 2013, online) and experiencing rapid growths of immigrant 
population adding to its existing multi-ethnic composition. Secondly, Singapore 
provides a curious case as a diverse society which has notably been praised by 
Samuel Huntington for its system of ‘shared values’, under a state ideology 
emphasising Asian values in its economic modernisation, which is “at once evidence 
of a threat to Western universalism as well as reassuringly familiar” (Devan, 2007, p. 
145). The long-time social stability which it has achieved despite its overtly racialised 
model of multiculturalism, with a political rhetoric of ‘multiracial meritocracy’ (Lee, 9th 
April 2009) championed by the one-party state, is a third aspect of interest. 
According to the Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals which dates back to the 17th 
century or earlier, Singapore was founded by Prince Sang Nila Utama from Sumatra, 
back in the 14th century. It attracted migrant populations of Chinese and Indians 
among others after becoming a British colony in 1819. An independent state since 
1965, its resident population consists of 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% Malays, 9.2% 
Indians and 3.3% ‘Others’ according to the 2010 census, a proportion similar to the 
figures of 77%, 14.8%, 7% and 1.2% respectively in 1970 (Singapore Department of 
Statistics, 2010, online). Along with neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore 
illustrates a striking “legacy and challenge of cultural pluralism” (Hefner, 2001, p. 4) 
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and has additionally faced new challenges with immigration in unprecedented scale, 
in parallel to a similar trend of globalisation in Western countries since the 1990s 
(Ibid., pp. 2). In fact, Singapore has seen permanent residents rising to 10.7% of 
total population by 2010, while non-residents have risen to 25.7% of total population 
(Lai, 2012, p. 4). Separate figures have placed Singapore’s population of 
international migrant stock at 40.7% by mid-2010 (UN Data, 2013, online).  
This accelerated immigration, with the inflow of migrant or guest workers for low-
skilled and low-wage jobs on one hand and foreign or global talents for economic 
activities of higher order on the other, reflects a neo-liberal globalisation embraced 
by the Singapore government, out of a motivation of economic opportunism (Tan, 
2012, pp. 85-86). This may be in keeping with the economy bureaucracy in 
Singapore since the People’s Action Party came into power in 1959, which has 
managed to stimulate economic and industrial development mainly by taming an 
erstwhile militantly unionised labour force and luring foreign investors and 
multinational corporations with generous tax incentives, industrial infrastructure and 
political stability (Ibid., pp. 69-70).  
But along with the recent globalisation, Singapore has also experienced a significant 
increase in inequality, as indicated by a rise in Gini coefficient from 0.430 in 2000 to 
0.452 in 2010, which parallels a similar trend in the United States, most European 
Union countries and advanced Asian economies of Japan and South Korea 
Bhaskaran et al, 2012, p. 4). As six economists in Singapore assert in a background 
paper entitled Inequality and the Need for a New Social Compact, such rising 
inequality, associated with problems of wage stagnation, lower social mobility and 
reduced well-being (Ibid., p. 3), is not a simple consequence of globalisation: 
“Domestic policies such as tax, government spending, foreigner worker and 
immigration policies can and do have a significant impact on a country’s inequality 
patterns. (Ibid., p. 5)”   
These problems, along with overcrowding in the island city-state, may be 
exacerbating xenophobic sentiments which have become a regular feature in the 
social media. Following the release in January 2013 of a government white paper 
planning for an increase of Singapore population to 6.9 million by 2030 in order to 
maintain economic growth, a few thousand Singaporeans held an unprecedented 
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protest in Hong Lim Park, the designated Speaker’s Corner in Singapore since 2000. 
Featuring messages on banners such as “Singapore for Singaporeans”, the protest 
has sparked fresh debates on what may constitute xenophobic expressions (Han, 23 
March 2013, online), adding to the existing concerns of racial stereotyping in 
Singapore.  
Singapore has long been claimed as “a place where different ethnic groups live 
together without the strife that has become a normal feature of many other plural 
societies” (Benjamin, 1976, p. 115), with credit attributed to the government’s 
espousal of its multiracial ideology. However, such claims have to be further 
interrogated. One may question first of all the validity of the government’s racial 
classification and examine how national policies in Singapore may have in fact led to 
ethnic groups being “much more ethnically conscious than in a society with a ‘non-
racial’ ideology” (Ibid., p. 119), with a tendency to make social reality fit a 
stereotypical thinking of “an ethnic, or even racial, theory of causation” (Ibid.) as well 
as to show “concern for boundary definition” (Ibid.) between ethnic groups. Secondly, 
one may question if the veneer of such a multiracial ideology may have given an 
impression of social cohesion in Singapore, while the state privileges what John 
Clammer (1993) has described as a “counter-modernisation” form of ideology 
legitimised as a revival of Asian values, by way of privileging an outlook of 
Confucianism, that serves to hide whatever “patriarchal” political agenda behind the 
government’s 1991 White Paper on Shared Values, with precepts such as ‘nation 
before community and society above self’ and ‘family as the basic building block of 
society’ (cited in Lim, 26 March 1999, online). Interestingly, even as the current 
Population White Paper argues based on an economic logic for more new 
immigrants due to low birth rate and the increasing ratio of older Singaporeans, it 
offers assurance on the sustenance of a ‘strong Singaporean core’ with meritocracy 
and respect for cultures identified as key shared values, but more importantly 
legitimises that an agenda of procreation is in line with the logic of traditional values: 
“Strong families are the bedrock of our society, through which we pass on our values 
and sense of belonging from one generation to the next. (National Population and 
Talent Division, Jan 2013, p. 2)”  
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Despite any rosy picture painted of a Singapore society without ethnic discrimination, 
recent scholarship in the 2000s has presented an alternative picture with reports on 
racial attitudes, including a few works focusing on the actual practice of racial 
discrimination or even racially based policies (Gomez, 2010, p. 104). The Indians for 
instance have commonly experienced name-calling with reference to their body, skin 
colour and physical appearance (Velayutham, 2007, p. 4). Such concerns 
culminated in a visit in April 2010 by the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mr Githu 
Muigai, who recommended in his subsequent press statement that Singapore needs 
a “specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in all areas of life, including 
employment, education and health” (Muigai, 28 Apr 2010, online). He also called on 
the Singapore authorities “to review any legislative restrictions that may exist in the 
statute books in order to allow Singaporeans to share their views on matters of 
ethnicity” (Ibid.), an obvious reference to Singapore’s legal provisions under the 
Sedition Act, Penal Code and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, which may be 
used against any expression construed as racist comments or insensitive 
proselytising. He argued that “the protection of racial harmony [should not be] 
implemented at the detriment of fundamental human rights such as freedom of 
expression” (Ibid.), that Singaporeans should be able to share views freely and “work 
together to find solutions” (Ibid.). In other words, one may say that Singapore has 
been lacking in open dialogues on matters of ethnicity, but the absence of public 
discussion on such issues does not imply the absence of intolerance or 
discrimination, which might even be on an institutional level. 
The potential of cultural heritage in strengthening cohesiveness among different 
ethnic or cultural groups in Singapore has been acknowledged to some extent in 
government reports, notably the Renaissance City Report in 2000 which outlined 
strategies in developing the arts and cultural scene in Singapore as a globalised city. 
Much of government support in the cultural industry should be understood as part of 
a framework of ‘cultural economic policies’ for regeneration of cities, a trend of 
cultural policies in Singapore which has already been observed in the 1980s and 
1990s as a response to global capital restructuring (Kong, 2000, p. 4). It is hence not 
surprising that the report declared its first aim in terms of positioning Singapore as a 
cultural centre in Asia and the globalised world, as a conducive environment for 
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creativity; however, this is followed a second aim “to strengthen Singaporean’s 
sense of national identity and belonging” by inculcating an appreciation of heritage 
and sharing stories on Singapore (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 2000, p. 4). 
More recently, The Report of the Arts and Culture Strategic Review initiated by the 
same ministry has outlined a vision to make arts and culture an integral part of the 
lives of all Singaporeans by year 2025, highlighting traditional arts as ‘cultural 
heritage’: “We will be conscious of the cultural diversity around us, and the aspects 
of our culture that unify us all as Singaporean. We will also support the continued 
growth and development of our traditional arts as part of our cultural heritage. These 
shall add to a sense of place, community, belonging and opportunity. (ACSR 
Steering Committee, 31 Jan 2012, p, 16)” Subsequently, from November 2012 
onwards, the arts in Singapore fell under the purview of a new Ministry of Culture, 
Community and Youth, an administrative arrangement which may be interpreted as a 
move to employ arts and culture for the engineering of social cohesion.   
Regardless of the Singapore government’s priority or agenda where cultural heritage 
is concerned, it is of interest from a political as well as a psychological perspective to 
explore what factors may come to play in the possible use of a cultural heritage such 
as dance to promote intercultural dialogue. Cultural shows that feature a series of 
dance or music performances representing the Chinese, Malay and Indian 
communities have long been assumed to help Singaporeans integrate through 
appreciation one another’s traditions, at least in the words of one social affairs 
minister in the 1970s (Benjamin, 1976, p. 121). The question is whether it serves as 
little more than a cliché that helps legitimise an ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’ in 
a grand display of nationalism like Singapore’s National Day Parade, or whether it 
can be fruitfully harnessed for intercultural learning through platforms such as Arts 
Education Programme in the public schools, instead of merely heightening a sense 
of otherness with minority art forms such as Indian classical dance. The significance 
of dance heritage as a site for intercultural dialogue also has to be studied in a larger 
context of government policies in Singapore’s communitarian approach, which will be 
evident as one examines different spheres of social life there ranging from education, 
media, arts to heritage. Social and political stability tends to be maintained based on 
tolerance through division along racial or religious lines, instead of seeking 
intercultural understanding. The limitations of current policies in managing the 
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cultural diversity in Singapore will need to be discussed by considering problems of 
social cohesion that become manifested in racism, stereotyping and discrimination, 
as well as the lack of liberal exchange of views among a plurality of cultural values. 
To summarise it all as a statement of problem, this thesis is motivated by the 
consideration that there is a need for an approach in intercultural dialogue to 
promote mutual understanding and respect among different communities in a 
culturally diverse nation, that maybe concretised with the medium of cultural heritage 
such as dance; this is to be tested on the case study of Singapore, with the specific 
example of Indian dance heritage.  
The hypothesis to be tested in the thesis is as follows: Dance as intangible cultural 
heritage communicates cultural values in its different forms as part of cultural 
diversity; therefore it can be developed as a medium for intercultural dialogue, as 
seen in the example of Indian classical dance in Singapore. The testing of this 
hypothesis may be broken down into a few components, which involve exploring the 
following research questions:  
1) What is intercultural dialogue and why may it be desirable in a culturally 
diverse society generally and in the example of Singapore?  
2) What is dance and how does it communicate cultural values as ‘intangible 
heritage’?  
3) In what ways may cultural heritage be a medium for intercultural dialogue and 
what aspects of intercultural competence may be relevant, as seen in the 
example of Indian dance heritage in Singapore? 
The next section will explain the conceptual framework to be adopted in this thesis in 
order to achieve its aim and objectives in relation to the abovementioned hypothesis 
and research questions. It will also explain the epistemological interests of this thesis 
in its analyses.  
1.2 Epistemology and Conceptual Framework  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how or in what sense cultural heritage may be 
used as a medium for intercultural dialogue in a culturally diverse nation. Spanning 
social, psychological and political perspectives in the development of a conceptual 
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framework, it will culminate in an application of the various disciplines of knowledge 
to dance as a form of cultural heritage, with a specific case study in Singapore 
involving Indian classical dance as a medium for intercultural dialogue, considered in 
two ideal types, namely a transculturalism model and a multiculturalism model. 
These will be analysed within a framework of Systems Theory, grounded in theories 
of social and cultural psychology. 
The wide-ranging scope of disciplinary perspectives here follows the principle of 
transdisciplinarity in research and science, “which becomes operative wherever it is 
impossible to define or attempt to solve problems within the boundaries of subjects 
or disciplines” (Mittelstrass, 2011, p. 331). But its strategy and interest in the 
interrogation of knowledge is ultimately one of ‘politics by other means’, following the 
concern in cultural studies not so much with offering an alternative to or synthesis of 
existing disciplines, as with scrutinising “the functioning of cultural practices and 
institutions in the contexts of relations of power of different kinds” (Bennett, 1998, p. 
27). The thesis also imagines in its horizon a practical application to cultural policy as 
Bennett would propose for the project of cultural studies; whether it takes a more 
critical or a more pragmatic stance ultimately, it would essentially be in keeping with 
a mission of cultural studies situated within an ethical framework (Zylinska, 2005).   
It is not purely incidental that arguments of cultural studies, as represented by Stuart 
Hall (2005), have found their way to heritage studies, identifying the twin challenges 
of democratisation and rising cultural relativism against Eurocentric grand narratives, 
by way of concerns with mainstream and marginalised versions of heritage (cited in 
Ashworth et al, 2007, pp. 49-50). Heritage studies as a relatively new discipline or 
field may trace its practical dimension of heritage management to European models 
in the 19th century, but its first canonical works only emerged in the 1980s, after the 
creation of legal instruments by international bodies such as UNESCO to safeguard 
the world’s heritage in the post-World War II era (Carman and Sorensen, 2009, pp. 
16-17). The political trend of post-colonialism challenging claims about the past, 
along with developments of post-structuralism and postmodernity within the 
academia inspiring critiques of knowledge claims and authority, provided the ground 
for works like Lowenthal’s The Past is a Foreign Country (1985) and Hewison’s The 
Heritage Industry (1987), which challenged the use of heritage as part of dominant 
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ideology, criticising it as a popularisation of the past (see Carman and Sorensen, 
2009, pp. 17-18). By the late 1990s, academic discussions on areas such as the 
value of heritage objects and the ontology of such phenomena were becoming 
increasingly influential on heritage practice itself (Ibid., p. 21). The 2000s then saw 
new areas emerging which “reflect a concern with understanding the potentials and 
roles of heritage in terms of some of the pressing problems the world is 
encountering” (Ibid., p. 23), such as development policies, climate change and 
peace-building.  
Given such trends, a two-prong approach of cultural studies would arguably be 
useful in casting a critical look on heritage as constructed knowledge and at the 
same time keeping a view on the social utility of one’s research with more reflexivity. 
Stuart Hall (1994) has argued for the necessity of two paradigms in cultural studies, 
the structuralist strand of Althusser for a conception of structural complexity in how 
subjective consciousness may be constructed as part of ideology, and the culturalist 
tradition of Raymond Williams for consideration of specificity in meanings, values 
and ideals of cultural practices. In terms of research method, cultural studies needs 
to overcome objectivism by acknowledging subjective elements in the life world and 
treating “culture as a structure or formation that goes beyond, but embraces, 
individual subjectivities” (Johnson et al, 2004, p. 48). It requires reflexivity not in an 
autobiographical sense but in awareness of different aspects of positionality 
including social and cultural, for self-reflection is about the others as well as the self, 
it is about Gramsci’s ‘ensemble of relations’, about how power and inequality are 
negotiated (Ibid., p. 53). As Spivak (2012) notes, there is a habitual belief among 
most people, “even (or perhaps particularly) when they are cultural relativists, that 
creation and innovation are their own cultural secret, whereas others are only 
determined by their cultures” (p. 120). This tendency to think of one’s own culture as 
dynamic and others as static becomes a political problem when expressed by a 
powerful group against the less powerful, and that is exactly why cultural studies had 
to emerge as a subdiscipline in the first place, for “colonisers founded Anthropology 
in order to know their subjects; Cultural Studies was founded by the colonised in 
order to question and correct their masters” (Ibid.). Such reflections will also be 
ultimately crucial in this thesis, as one ponders over evidence of ‘cultural differences’ 
presumed as the practical challenge of intercultural dialogue, under a certain 
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perspective of intercultural communication that channels social psychology into the 
study of cultures.   
Notwithstanding this method of critical enquiry from cultural studies, the conceptual 
framework which forms the basis for discussion in this thesis will engage an 
epistemological commitment to a naturalistic-pragmatic approach (Faye, 2012) in 
human sciences, most specifically in the psychological explanations of culture. The 
mediating factor between these two disciplinary tendencies would be a social 
constructionist orientation in psychology. While constructionist critiques have 
jeopardised the claims in the capacity of positivist science to generate transcendent 
truths beyond history and culture (Gergen, 2001, p. 7), and gone ahead to turn 
psychology on its head by reconfiguring the psyche as socio-cultural, Gergen would 
maintain that constructionist arguments, highlighting that language is not mimetic of 
an independent world, merely remove the privilege of claiming truth beyond 
community, without obliterating empirical science (Ibid., p. 30). He asserts: 
Constructionist metatheory neither denies nor affirms the existence of any 
mental ‘entities’ or ‘processes’. The constructionist question is not whether the 
mind ’really’ exists; constructionism obviates issues of fundamental ontology 
in favour of questions about the pragmatics of interpretation within 
communities.          
         (Ibid., p. 32)  
Arguing for a naturalistic reconstruction of human sciences on art, language, history 
and the like, Faye (2012) grants that it is reasonable if social constructionists hold 
that humans construct their world in response to social interactions rather than in 
relation to objective reality, and humans use given concepts of the world not for any 
instrumental value but to uphold social powers or an established culture (p. 17). 
However, this by no means implies that the construction of scientific concepts should 
not be guided by interactions with an objective reality, he contends (Ibid.). In his 
understanding of naturalisation, “it assumes that phenomena, which are the subject 
for scientific inquiry, all have an origin in the same natural world and that the 
methods of one’s investigation shall be consistent with the cognitive capacities that 
are given to us by nature” (Ibid., p. 32). This means that one can avoid coming into 
difficulty with the mind-body problem in an ‘epistemological dualism’ (Ibid.), but is not 
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to be taken to mean that cultures, norms and meanings can therefore be reduced to 
mental states and hence brain states of individuals, for cultural phenomena are also 
mediated by communication tools such as language (Ibid., pp. 38-39). Where biology 
and neuroscience end, human sciences begin, for the latter deal with human 
thinking, behaviour and expressions which are contingent to nature and evolution, 
and to be explained only in terms of human intentions and meanings constructed in 
social norms (Ibid., p. 43). The thrust of this proposed naturalistic-pragmatic 
approach is that instead of assuming a dichotomy made by Dilthey between 
explanation in Naturwissenschaft and understanding in Geisteswissenschaft, 
interpretation in human sciences can also be epistemically validated by empirical 
evidence through data which may be textual, pictorial, biographical, historical, 
psychological or sociological (Ibid., p. 159). This model is naturalistic in its adoption 
of scientific methods, but also pragmatic since the scientific concepts and theories 
used to explain the object of study are simply considered as representational tools, 
not universal categories of the cognitive mind (Ibid., p. 31). Faye’s unification in 
research practice of human sciences with natural sciences and social sciences is 
incidentally a refutation of Habermas’ tripartite division which assumed three 
incompatible interests (Ibid., p. 20). 
In a somewhat complementary argument on the fission of sciences, Gergen (2001) 
would point out that psychology was once kin to hermeneutics as part of 
Geisteswissenschaft in its search of human meanings, and the demise of its 
humanist discourse on individual intention as well as the rise of behaviourism also 
marked the impoverishment of cherished cultural institutions such as democracy and 
ethics under the dominant discourse, in a psychological profession which “has been 
so captivated by the instrumentalist ethos and its emphasis on problem solving” (p. 
33). Mainstream psychology with its implicit support of an individualist ideology not 
only encouraged an instrumentalist conception which was a perversion of the 
pragmatist tradition, it often produced a standpoint that human relationships are 
artificial by-products of otherwise autonomous individuals, suggesting that the social 
is secondary and derivative (pp. 35-36). In subsequent reconceptualisation however, 
one saw new families of theories, such as Bruner’s work which drew sustenance 
from Vygotsky, Bartlett, Mead and others to propose that “it is culture, not biology, 
that shapes human life and the human mind, that gives meaning to action by 
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situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretive system” (Brunner, 1990, p. 
34; cited in Gergen, 2001, p. 38). In another radical reconceptualisation, Gergen 
would refer to a perspective on the relational constitution of self, whereby one 
replaces psychological states and conditions as explanations for action with a 
“reconstitution of psychological predicates within the sphere of social process” (Ibid., 
p. 41). His own work is based on discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992), 
substituting cognitive for discursive processes in explaining human interaction, 
including consideration of emotional performances as embodied within language as 
well as bodily activities, the latter component based on the work Averill (1982) to 
consider how such performances are embedded in cultural settings.  
This diversity of theoretical possibilities leads us to the question of how culture has 
been dealt with in psychology, over a course of development with much domination 
by the natural science over the human science paradigm. The journey may be traced 
back to Wilhelm Wundt’s publication Völkerpsychologie, where there was already a 
concern with alterity in the psychology of people ‘not quite like us’ (Gergen and 
Gergen, p. 47). Yet interest in cultural context has since waned, with a preoccupation 
with general laws or principles under empiricist metatheory and behaviourist theory 
leading one psychologist John W. Williams to opine with confidence that “[if] modern 
psychology had developed in, let us say, India, the psychologists there would have 
discovered most of the principles discovered by the Westerners. (Williams, 1993, p. 
102; cited in Gergen and Gergen, 2002, p. 47)”. Empiricist psychology did in fact 
give way to a form of culturally based inquiry, namely cross-cultural psychology, but 
an universalising orientation remained, as the vast share of such research attempted 
either to demonstrate cross-cultural universality of various psychological processes, 
or to demonstrate cultural variations in some basic or universal psychological 
process, the latter notably represented by the work of Triandis among others 
(Gergen and Gergen, 2002, p. 47). The approach of Culture Assimilator, to be 
discussed at length in this thesis, belongs to this tradition, as its developers Osgood 
(1977) and Triandis (1972) consider the challenge of ‘critical incidents’ between 
people of different cultural communities as being essentially one of communication, 
in terms of making ‘isomorphic attributions’ on others’ behaviour, in other words 
making appropriate interpretations of others’ intentions which may be due to 
particular cultural contexts. 
22 
 
Cultural psychology, as represented by Bruner among others on the other hand, is 
“the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and 
transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in 
ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion” (Shweder, 1991, p. 73). It is aligned 
with cultural anthropology, in particular the conceptualisation of culture as 
“historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols” according to 
Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 89). The fact that Geertz has referred to meanings and 
symbols as the ‘cultural system’, following the usage of sociologist Talcott Parsons in 
contrast with the social system of norms and institutions, and the personality system 
in terms of motivations (Ibid.), is significant for the discussion here. In a different 
perspective, as with social psychologist Alexander Thomas who has come into 
prominence in Germany in the field of intercultural communication for his adaptation 
of the Culture Assimilator, culture may also be defined as a system of norms and 
institutions internalised for one’s behaviour, effectively taking another component in 
Parsons’ theory of action systems. It begs the questions of how cultural systems and 
social systems should be differentiated, and whether the latter might be too 
deterministic, as how criticism has been levelled against Parsons. Incidentally, a 
more recent perspective in social psychology would be to posit culture as “a set of 
loosely organised distributed knowledge [as opposed to] a coherent system of 
meanings” (Chiu and Hong, 2007, p. 788).  
For the analysis in this thesis, as to how cultures may be understood across different 
communities in an interaction process of intercultural dialogue, one shall adopt a 
conceptual framework based on the Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann, who has 
improved on Parsons’ approach by tackling the question of whether systems are 
open or closed to the environment and in what sense (Holton, 2001, p. 160). More 
specifically, one shall refer to the Luhmann’s theory of self-referential systems as 
applied to the construction of social groups (Hejl, 1987; cf. Frindte, 2001, p. 118, 
cited in Thomas, 2008, p. 20). The concept of self-reference “designates the unity 
that an element, a process or a system is for itself” (Luhmann, 1995[1984], p. 33), 
“independent of the cut of observation by others” (Ibid.). A system may be called 
self-referential “if it itself constitutes the elements that compose it as functional 
unities and runs reference to this self-constitution through all the relations among 
these elements” (Ibid.). 
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Hejl (1987) has subsequently suggested that a social system can be defined as a 
group of living systems, when two conditions are fulfilled: 
1. Each of the living systems must have formed at least a condition in its 
cognitive subsystem, that is comparable with at least a condition of the 
cognitive systems of other group members. 
2. The living systems must (in their perspectives) integrate with respect to these 
parallel conditions.   
(p. 319)  
Or in other words, group members must share some common reality, so as to 
produce an area of meaningful actions and communication with which one can 
integrate (Ibid.).  
Following the above premises, this thesis argues that a cultural community is a type 
of social group, which by reproducing itself through the cognitive process of social 
construction, constitutes a self-referential system which is a closed system in terms 
of its organisation despite remaining open in interaction with the environment. 
Furthermore, observation of a system by another “must employ a difference schema 
whereby the unity of difference is constituted in the observing system and not in the 
observed one” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 35). This suggests that whether a society or 
nation forms a single transcultural system or a multicultural system of subsystems is 
a matter of social construction. The differentiation of a transcultural system from 
what would otherwise be a multicultural system does not preclude its elements being 
part of subsystems in a multicultural system at the same time. This model hence 
accommodates the idea of the plural or postmodern self which may also be 
supported empirically by psychological science. The concept of the transcultural 
incidentally follows the concept of Wolfgang Welsch (1994), while the concept of 
dialogue in a transcultural model in terms of creative engagement and overcoming of 
identity follows the philosophy of Mikhail Epstein (1999).  
With a multicultural model of communities of different cultural values, on the other 
hand, this thesis will argue that the challenge would be in reaching ‘intercultural 
understanding’, whether it be through some form of folk psychology, or with the aid 
of pragmatic knowledge constructed through some modern conceptual tool like the 
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Culture Assimilator in intercultural communication practice. In the constructivist 
perspective of Luhmann (1995), understanding happens by social reflexivity through 
experiencing other systems, “only if one projects the experience of meaning or of 
meaningful action onto other systems with a system/environment difference of their 
own” (p. 73). Understanding involves seeing oneself as ‘alter ego’s alter ego’ in 
every social relation, in order to make others’ behaviour more accessible and easier 
to anticipate (Ibid., p. 88).   
In terms of how another system may be interpreted, it will be argued here that it 
helps to apply the distinction in Archer’s (1996) sociological framework between 
Cultural System and Socio-Cultural System which have too often been conflated (p. 
7), such that the former would require interpretation of meanings and symbols 
whereas the latter would involve the causal explanation of how cultural forms come 
into being. It has to be noted however that with this dualist framework, Archer, 
referring to Sorokin’s idea of logical and causal integration, has argued that the 
systems are too complex to assume logical consistency in the former and causal 
consensus in the latter (Ibid., p. 5) and has criticised the conflation of Cultural 
System integration and Socio-Cultural System integration in Parsons’ theory (Ibid., p. 
35).  
These two levels of differentiation, as in the construction of cultural communities as 
self-referential systems and the interpretation in external observation of cultures as 
systems of meanings or products of social systems, will be applied to heritage 
generally and to dance heritage specifically as possible ways of understanding as 
part of intercultural dialogue. This in principle completes the conceptual framework of 
analysis in this thesis for intercultural dialogue. Additional components would include 
political significance in the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as a policy, the 
psychological aspects and bases of ‘intercultural competence’ in interaction and the 
semiotic structure of heritage such as dance in the communication of cultural values. 
The aim of the thesis in short is to analyse how a cultural heritage such as dance, 
which communicates cultural values, may be used as a medium for intercultural 
dialogue in two different models of namely transculturalism and multiculturalism, 
considering the case study of Singapore involving the heritage of Indian classical 
dance.  
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Objectives: 1) To analyse the policy approach of intercultural dialogue in terms of its 
liberal values, and to analyse the social and psychological dimensions of relevant 
‘intercultural competence’, for application to the case study of Singapore as a case 
study of a culturally diverse nation.  
2) To analyse the social and psychological processes in which values are 
communicated through the material or experiential aspects of cultural heritage, with 
a specific consideration of dance as a form of cultural heritage.  
3) To test the concepts for an approach in intercultural dialogue, based on models of 
multiculturalism as well as transculturalism, considering the medium of dance 
heritage, using the example of Singapore involving Indian classical dance.    
1.3 Working Definitions of Main Concepts 
This section serves to elucidate some main concepts with their working definitions 
before one proceeds to the thesis proper, and also to provide an overview of the 
chapters in their actual sequence. The main concepts which still need to be clarified 
in connection to the theoretical framework described above are namely culture, 
cultural values, community, heritage and intercultural dialogue.  
Given that ‘culture’ is a most contested word and that much of this thesis will involve 
coming to terms with the question of why it should matter to the modern or 
postmodern world, it is necessary to rehearse its discussion in cultural studies before 
coming to a working definition in the main psychological and sociological framework 
here. Raymond Williams (1961) has identified three major modern senses of the 
word ‘culture’ – the ‘ideal’ as in certain universal values, the ‘documentary’ as in the 
body of intellectual and imaginative work, and the ‘social’ as in a particular way of life 
“which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also 
in institutions and ordinary behaviour” (p. 57). The last sense mentioned would cover 
what Parsons would mean by culture in a structure of social actions, whereas the 
second sense provides the focus of a culturalist paradigm in assessing artistic work 
in relation to particular traditions and societies. Terry Eagleton (2000) however 
discerns the complications in an all-embracing notion of ‘culture’, as he traces how 
the word developed from its Latin etymological roots in rural labour, denoting a 
dialectical relationship with ‘nature’, to the French notion of ‘civilisation’ in terms of 
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political, economic and technical life, and the German notion of ‘culture’ with “a more 
narrowly religious, artistic and intellectual reference” (p. 9). “As a synonym of 
‘civilisation’, ‘culture’ belonged to the general spirit of Enlightenment, with its cult of 
secular, progressive self-development” (Ibid.), suggesting an utopian telos, he notes. 
Whereas ‘civilisation’ would play down national differences, ‘culture’ would tend to 
highlight them, hence giving rise to a tension (Ibid.). Culture assumed its meaning as 
a distinctive way of life from the German Idealists onwards, as Herder attacked 
universalism of the Enlightenment and insisted that culture should refer to a diversity 
of specific forms of life (Ibid., p. 12). But in such a sense of plurality, culture denotes 
both fact and value in a “fusion of descriptive and normative” (Ibid., p. 13), which 
suggests that plurality is a value in itself, rendering the concept powerless against 
racism or capitalism which can also claim heterogeneity (Ibid., p. 15).  
Eagleton hence argues that the idea of ‘culture’, for all the three aspects that 
Williams observes, lacks a sense of agency and collective project that ‘civilisation’ 
provides awareness for (Ibid., p. 28). In its specialised sense in reference to the arts 
for instance, it appears to suggest that intellectual activity in science, philosophy, 
politics and economics cannot be regarded as creative or imaginative, “that ‘civilised’ 
values are now to be found only in fantasy” (Ibid., p. 16). He thus criticises the idea 
of freedom that postmodernism appears to celebrate, whereby “the whole point of art 
was its pointlessness” (Ibid.), “[a]rt could now model the good life not by representing 
it but simply by being itself […] offering the scandal of its own pointlessly self-
delighting existence as a silent critique of exchange-value and instrumental 
rationality” (Ibid.). This question of whether or how the arts can avail itself to social 
significance is also one that is asked in this thesis of cultural heritage.   
In the unified theorisation of culture and agency in social structure according to 
Archer (1996), the Cultural System (CS) also exerts causal influences on Socio-
Cultural (S-C) level although the CS is understood here as the register of 
propositions or ‘libraries’ of what exist in a given social unit at a particular time (pp. 
275-277). In the interpenetration of systems, the material interest groups which may 
be dominant also “become subject to some form of situational logic in the cultural 
domain” (Ibid., p. 285) in a struggle of belief or ideology, as “no structural advantage 
which is gained from culture ever comes for free” (Ibid.). In her concept of the 
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Cultural System, Archer refers to what Popper (1978) denotes as ‘world 3’ 
knowledge, as in the world of the products of the human mind, including religious 
myths, scientific conjectures or artistic expressions which may be embodied in 
physical objects. Luhmann (1999) has a corresponding perspective of culture, which 
does not follow Parsons’ perspective in terms of a component of action, but instead a 
historical perspective associated with symbols and signs (p. 32). He speaks of 
culture as “Gedächtnis sozialer Systeme” (Ibid., p. 47) or the memory of social 
systems, in other words of societies or communities, which provides meaning in the 
recursive social communication, not simply as an archive whereby everything of the 
historical past is saved in proper order, but involving constant renewal from moment 
to moment with no fixed corpus of signs (Ibid., p. 45).  
For the purpose of this thesis, culture may hence be summarised as the knowledge 
of a community at any given time in the form of symbols, meanings or values, be it in 
religion, science or the arts, which provides meaning in social interaction, 
communication or action. This may also be appreciated as an elaboration on Max 
Weber’s definition of culture as “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the 
world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” 
(1949, p. 81); a definition which suggested, namely, that culture is a value concept 
(Koch, 1993, p. 130). 
Indeed as one proceeds to seek a definition of ‘cultural value’, one has to trace its 
study in sociology back to Weber in order to consider how subsequent approaches 
to the topic have diverged in sociology as well as cross-cultural psychology. Weber 
has suggested that there is no ‘objective’ scientific analysis of culture, as “[a]ll 
knowledge of cultural reality… is always knowledge from particular points of view” 
(Ibid.), including the attribution of universal ‘cultural values’ consciously or 
unconsciously to relevance of knowledge (Ibid., p. 82). He hence proposed to 
construct ideal types as a means to reveal cultural phenomena in their conditions 
and significance (Ibid., p. 92), for which the term ‘value’ finds meaning as an ideal 
type which allows the enumeration of Wertbeziehung or value relation, for example 
in conflicting interests of agriculture (Ibid., pp. 107-108). The concept of ‘value 
relation’ which Weber took from neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert provided a 
philosophical basis for methodology of the historical sciences (Bruun, 2001, p. 149). 
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Weber’s concept of value rationality has been a subject of much speculation and 
debate among scholars due to its fragmentary nature, which also gave room for 
Parsons to take this legacy of German sociology to a different direction from Weber’s 
investigation on the distinctiveness of western modernity (Oakes, 2003, pp. 27-28). 
Weber has identified six value spheres, namely modern economy, politics, 
intellectualism, religion, aesthetics and erotic love, but these do not admit the 
possibility of some fundamental value from which others can be derived, nor any 
form of hierarchy, such that any position presupposes a plurality of conflicting values 
and axioms as a consequence of Eigengesetzlichkeit or autonomous logic in each 
value sphere (Ibid., pp. 29-30). Weber, influenced by Kantian rationalism and 19th-
century romanticism in his value commitments (Koch, 1993, p. 124ff), also critiqued 
modern institutions by creating a fourfold typology of rationality in social life, namely 
the ‘practical’, ‘theoretical’, ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’, some of which could in turn be 
configured with anthropological characteristics of individuals in four types of social 
action, namely traditional, affectual, value rational and means-end rationality. Of 
these, formal and practical rationality are associated with means-end calculation, 
and only value-rational action, oriented to substantive rationality, has the potential to 
introduce methodical ways of life, as only substantive rationalities place 
psychological premiums on ethical action (Kalberg, 1980, p. 1165). With Parsons’ 
adaptation of the social action typology, however, the ethical question of value 
rationality soon turned into one of value orientation into a psychological question of 
value orientation.   
Subsequently, theorists in social psychology and intercultural communication have 
viewed ‘values’ as “the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to 
evaluate people (including the self) and events” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 1, online). Under 
this view, values refer to criteria for action, rather than qualities inherent in objects 
(Ibid.). This dates back to the definition of value in the 1950s by anthropologist Clyde 
Kluckhohn: “A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or 
characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from 
available modes, means and ends of action. (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 395; cited in Hills, 
2002, online)” He argued that people typically feel their own cultural beliefs and 
practices are normal and natural, whereas those of others are strange, inferior or 
abnormal. Based on his ideas, Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck (1961) 
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developed their Values Orientation Theory. They came up with questions on five 
different aspects of universal problems and conditions, to which preferred solutions 
or views would indicate the values espoused by a society: Time (past / present / 
future); humanity and natural environment (mastery / harmonious / submissive); 
relating to other people (hierarchical / collateral / individualistic); motive for behaving 
(being / being-in-becoming / doing); nature of human nature (evil / mixed / neutral; 
mutable / immutable) (see Hills, 2002, online; Neuliep, 2012, p. 71).  
Since then, there have been other theories developed in cross-cultural psychology 
as based on the idea of the psychic unity of mankind. Social psychologist Milton 
Rokeach (1972) for instance has argued that values are beliefs relating to ‘modes of 
conduct’ and ‘end-states of existence’: “To say that a person ‘has a value’ is to say 
that he [or she] has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or 
end-states of existence” (pp. 159-160; cited in Gudykunst and Kim, 2003, p. 60). 
Rokeach’s Value Survey involves 36 concepts, whereby respondents have to rank 
18 end-states of existence as ‘terminal values’ and 18 modes of conduct as 
‘instrumental values’ in terms of importance in life, as a means to measure personal 
and social values among various groups (Brathwaithe and Law, 1985, p. 250).  In 
another model, Schwartz has developed a value structure theory of 11 distinct 
motivational value types based on three universal human requirements for response: 
biological needs of individuals; need for social coordination; survival and welfare 
needs of groups (see Neuliep, 2012, p. 71). 
One theorist who deserves mention on the topic of cultural values is Elizabeth 
Anderson (1993) with her discussion on pluralism in value and rational action. 
Among other things, she has made an important distinction between the activities of 
valuing and evaluation: “In evaluation, people determine how far something meets 
the particular standards they set for it. In valuing something, people meet certain 
standards for caring about it, although they may be unaware of, may not endorse, 
and may not try to govern their actions by those standards. (p. 5)” This would have 
implication on the observation of others’ action as basis for discussion of cultural 
values. 
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The concept of ‘community’ has been discussed in different senses from a myriad of 
perspectives cutting across sociology, anthropology and political science. The first 
clear sociological definition emerged in 1915 when it was coined by C.J. Galpin in 
relation to delineating rural communities in terms of trade and service areas 
surrounding a central village (Harper and Dunham, 1959; cited in Smith, M., 2001). 
Since then the concept has been approached in range of different ways, including 
first of all a territorial sense, as in ‘locality’; secondly, in terms of shared common 
characteristics such as ethnic origins, religious beliefs, or even common interests as 
in occupations or cyber-communities; and thirdly, in either a strong form of 
‘communion’ or a weaker sense of attachment to a place, group or idea (Crow and 
Allen, 1995, Hoggett, 1997, Lee and Newby, 1983, Willmott, 1986; cited in Smith, M., 
2001).  
The idea of locality, as one sense in the idea of ‘community’, has generally been 
associated with “a set of close-knit social relationships based on strong kinship ties 
and length of residence” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 343). Much sociological research 
on localities has been influenced by an assumption of social change from simpler, 
more direct and strongly bonded social relationships, for example in the ideal types 
of Tonnies’ (1955) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, used to emphasise the difference 
between small and relatively isolated integrated communities based on primary 
relationships with emotional bonding, and more anonymous and instrumental 
secondary associations of the modern urbanity (Ibid.). Appadurai makes a distinction 
between ‘locality’ and ‘neighbourhood’, viewing locality as “primarily relational and 
contextual rather than as scalar or spatial” (1996, p. 178), and seeing it as a complex 
phenomenological quality, while using the term neighbourhood to refer to “social 
forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is variably realised” (Ibid., 179). He 
argues that the production of locality, as a structure of feeling and as a property of 
social life, is increasingly a struggle, due to factors such as the modern nation 
defining all neighbourhoods under forms of allegiance and affiliation, and the growing 
disjuncture between territory and collective social movement (Ibid., p. 189). The 
trends of globalisation have also made the imagination of community, as locality, 
seem problematic.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, different cultural communities will be assumed as 
constituting their own cultural systems in meanings and values. This is particular 
relevant when considering a communitarian perspective that communities should be 
characterised by “strong bonds and the moral voice” (Etzioni, 1998, p. xiv) as the 
essence. Coming to the case study of Singapore as a ‘multicultural’ society, the 
concept of community will also relate specifically to the idea of ‘ethnicity’, which also 
connotes a kind of social identity as it refers to “an aspect of social relationship 
between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of 
other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction” (Eriksen, 2002, 
p. 12). Ethnicity in this case is constructed under a certain ideology of multiracialism, 
relating to a form of shared characteristics as well as interests. One may concur with 
the position of Benedict Anderson (1991) that “all communities larger than the 
primordial village of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” 
(cited in Featherstone, 2003, p. 346). Another useful perspective on community to be 
referred to will be that of social anthropologist Anthony P. Cohen, who deals with 
community as being symbolically constructed, whereby boundaries of communities, 
be it physical, religious or linguistics, may be considered “as existing in the minds of 
the beholders” (1985, p. 12), seen in very different ways not only by people on either 
side but also by people on the same side. Cohen incidentally also considers the 
social and psychological effects of rituals in strengthening a sense of identity and a 
sense of place (Cohen, 1985, p. 50), which may serve as a useful reference in 
considering the social functions of intangible heritage such as the performance of 
dance.  
Heritage in the framework of this thesis will be considered as objects, sites, 
performances or other expressions which embody certain cultural values or 
meanings and provide a sense of the past to a community. This will be further 
elaborated with reference to recent literature in heritage studies.  
Last but not least, some clarification would have to be reiterated with regards to 
‘intercultural dialogue’ and related concepts to be discussed in this thesis, to 
distinguish between the reference to an ideal state and the referring to a social 
process in a scientific perspective, which may yet be used to justify the agenda of 
particular ideals. If one is to encapsulate intercultural dialogue as a process of where 
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cultural differences may be overcome through interaction and open exchange, it may 
be argued that it involves not only the ‘understanding’ of cultural differences but also 
the overcoming of perceptions of cultural differences. In either case, one would still 
face the dilemma between privileging the individual freedom in interpreting or 
adopting cultures and respecting of the rights of communities with their particularities 
in culture, not to mention an assumption of overriding interest in social cohesion 
which may be played either way. Hence intercultural dialogue as an ideal state would 
still have to dissected; in fact, the dilemma as described above is also one found 
between liberal multiculturalism and communitarianism. That suggests that 
intercultural dialogue may be better understood as an ideal of normativity proposed 
for a democratic process of discourse exchange to overcome differences.    
Where public policies go, ‘intercultural dialogue’ has been declared as a new 
alternative in building inclusive societies, placed in contrast to the older policy 
approaches of ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’ which have been deemed 
problematic or inadequate (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 9). But one has to be careful 
with falling into a false trichotomy here, for these concepts are not all mutually 
exclusive. The concept of assimilation in a socio-political sense has long referred to 
normative expectations and public policies associated in a negative sense with 
“harshly homogenising state projects” (Brubaker, 2001, p. 533) such as the 
Americanisation movement after World War I or the imperial effort to ‘Germanise’ a 
Polish-speaking borderland. The tendency is to see assimilation as social process at 
an aggregate level rather than at the level of individual persons (Ibid., pp. 542-543). 
However, one may also understand ‘assimilation’ in a psychological sense in terms 
of a learning process which involves the assimilation of objects or events into a 
scheme of action (Piaget, 1967, p. 14; cited in von Glaserfeld, 1996, p. 103), which 
may be developed as an approach of liberal learning on the basis of individual 
freedom. What it may in reality imply in an intercultural context, involving an 
intangible cultural heritage such as dance, would be part of the task in this thesis to 
explore, as it evaluates and critiques an approach of intercultural competence such 
as the Culture Assimilator, within a larger framework of cultural and socio-cultural 
systems.  
Considering intercultural dialogue as the pivotal theme, the thesis proper basically 
consists of two halves in overview. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 serve to configure the 
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general conceptual framework of intercultural dialogue, by providing a theoretical 
discussion on the concepts of culture and intercultural dialogue, centring on the 
perspective of social psychology, and introducing the ideal types of multiculturalism 
and transculturalism as two possible models in which intercultural dialogue as 
interaction between people of different communities may take place. Chapters 5 and 
6 serve to apply this framework to heritage studies, and then to the specific example 
of dance as a form of cultural heritage, by analysing the multicultural and 
transcultural models of intercultural dialogue in contrast. The following is a more 
detailed account of the chapters to come: 
Chapter 2 discusses how culture is defined in a wide range of perspectives from 
anthropology, sociology, social psychology and cultural studies. It will identify the 
functionalist perspective in Talcott Parsons’ General Theory of Action Systems as a 
key moment when the question of cultural values in sociology, discussed by Weber 
in terms of ‘value rationality’, becomes relegated to a question of social behaviour, 
as a subcomponent of action systems in terms of ‘value orientation’ whereby modern 
and traditional values are postulated as oppositional. It will then demonstrate the 
pitfalls when such conception of culture as ‘orientation system’ is inherited by 
practitioners in the field of intercultural communication to study cultural differences, 
legitimised as a form of intercultural psychology.  
The last section of the chapter will consider the challenges posed by globalisation, in 
which culture may be used as an ideological legitimation of power as Wallerstein 
argues in his World System Theory, while consciousness cultural differences may be 
heightened through interpenetration of globality and locality as Robertson points out 
with the example of religious fundamentalism. Perspectives of cultural studies and 
postcolonial studies will help to problematise the construction of culture that sets the 
Self against the Other. Such inputs incidentally reflect the relevance of an 
intercultural studies that incorporates an understanding of the phenomenon of 
globalisation, beyond a paradigm of intercultural communication that may emphasise 
on surveying cultural differences. 
Chapter 3 comprises two parts, as it considers intercultural dialogue from the 
perspectives of political theory and social psychology. Firstly, it analyses intercultural 
dialogue as an ideal state or normative expectation, in comparison with older policy 
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approaches of assimilation and multiculturalism, in terms of its goal in social 
cohesion, as well as its liberal values of liberty and pluralism. Following Parekh’s 
(2000) argument that multiculturalism be understood not as a form of identity politics 
but as a form of value pluralism, one may consider ‘multiculturalism’ as a basis for 
intercultural dialogue. This view of multiculturalism may be seen as an expansion 
and modification from Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition. The call of assimilation 
on the other hand may be seen as suffering the contradictions of modernity, between 
the principles of equality and freedom and the function of nation-building. A 
discussion on the false dichotomy between liberalism and communitarianism will 
also be included here.  
In the second section, intercultural dialogue is considered as a social process of 
interaction between people of different communities. It examines the assumption that 
intercultural dialogue may be understood simply as a specific form of intercultural 
communication, according to Alexander Thomas in Psychologie des interkulturellen 
Dialogs (2008), which outlines the state of the art in Germany and beyond on the 
topic. While Thomas references the theory of Symbolic Interactionism based on the 
work of G.H. Mead (1968), the theory of Communicative Action by Habermas (1996), 
and the theory of Self-referential System by Luhmann (1981), his own approach for 
intercultural dialogue ultimately falls back on an intercultural competence framework 
which hinges on the idea of appropriately attributing intentions in any kulturelle 
Überschneidungssituation – translated here as ‘cross-cultural’ situations due to an 
assumption here of cultural systems being distinctly different, as opposed to having a 
more dynamic relation. It will be argued that such critical incidents, which have been 
the source of primary data in the Culture Assimilator method of intercultural training 
since 1960s, would remain useful as a reference in discussing the challenge of 
differences in normativity. However, its use as a basis to postulate contrasting 
Kulturstandards (Thomas, 2011) or ‘cultural standards’ would be problematic as it 
omits other important perspectives, such as cultural psychology and moral 
psychology.   
His listing of aspects in intercultural competence also needs further elucidation, not 
to mention missing the imagination of intercultural learning in terms of liberal learning 
following the philosophy of Dewey or Oakeshott. A premise based on ‘intercultural 
35 
 
understanding’ also misses the perspective of intercultural dialogue as 
transformative practice like what Levinas has proposed in the Self towards the Other.    
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of transculturality according to Welsch (1994) who 
suggests that the imagination of cultures as closed spheres is fictional and not useful 
for dialogue. Social psychology may in fact provide evidence of the plural or 
postmodern self in a globalised society. In any case, a transcultural model of culture 
may be accommodated alongside a multicultural model if one adopts a constructivist 
perspective in Luhmann’s Systems Theory. Hall (1996) has also argued that identity 
is contingent and always constructed through relation to the Other, relating it to 
Lacan’s mirror phase as well as Althusser’s notion of interpellation in the structure of 
ideology. 
One moves on to a view of race-based classification as legitimising tool of 
colonialism and capitalism, which may be illustrated in the example of the ideology of 
‘multiracial meritocracy’ in postcolonial Singapore. It may be argued that Singapore 
is lacking in an approach of intercultural dialogue, based on the lack of social 
cohesion in its ‘multiracial’ society and the lack of liberal democracy with its state-
dominated ‘communitarian’ policies, which may be observed in different spheres of 
social life. It will be maintained that Singapore’s ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ 
should not be understood merely in terms of a conviction in communitarianism but in 
terms of neo-liberalist policies for economic globalisation. The notion of nationalism 
will also be analysed with reference to the thoughts of Gellner (1983), Chatterjee 
(1986) and Hobsbawm (1992) among other perspectives.  
Chapter 5 reviews the more recent scholarship in heritage studies to explore the 
questions of what constitute heritage and how heritage is relevant to identity politics 
but also provides a medium for intercultural dialogue. First of all, it considers heritage 
as comprising the aspects of ideals or values as well as materiality (Davison, 2008), 
tracing it back to Tylor’s study of objects of material culture as manifestation of 
culture. It will be maintained, following Tilley (2006), that values and social relations 
do not exist prior to cultural forms, though the relationship between these tangible 
and intangible aspects in heritage may be understood with the concept of 
objectification (cf. Byrne, 2008) derived from Hegel, as the embodiment of an idea in 
material form. The process of objectification may be described as a result of 
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habitualisation and institutionalisation, from a perspective of social construction 
according to Berger and Luckmann (1967). But an intangible heritage such as dance, 
with its performative nature, cannot be reduced to a passive form of habitualisation, 
but instead has to be understood as analogous to rituals which are communicative 
action forms of symbols (Luckmann, 2007).   
Another aspect of heritage is the sense of the past that it embodies, sometimes 
criticised as “a travesty of history” (Lowenthal, 1996, p. 121), as it privileges the 
material and aesthetic aspects of culture (Kuutma, 2009). From a psychological 
perspective, heritage practice may be understood as active form of remembering 
(Wertsch, 2002, cited in Smith and Waterton, 2009, p. 293). The political interest in 
heritage practice may be seen in heritage policies in plural societies which range 
from an assimilation model to the melting model, the mosaic model and so on 
(Ashworth et al, 2007). From a survey of relevant literature in heritage studies, the 
existing concepts for intercultural dialogue have been more centred on the 
overcoming of differences in cultural identity than on the idea of liberal learning, even 
where a transcultural model goes. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on dance as heritage, beginning with a 
review of how dance has been analysed through the course of development in social 
anthropology. It will then discuss the virtual power of dance in transmitting cultural 
values and meanings as a form of cultural heritage, based on a semiotic approach, 
also incorporating Turner’s (1982) perspective of dance as ritual drama reflecting 
social relations. Finally, it will consider the political use of dance in the representation 
of national identities.  
Chapter 6 will apply concepts of intercultural dialogue, as differentiated into the 
transcultural and multicultural models, to the case study of Singapore, considering in 
particular the use of Indian classical dance as a medium. For the transcultural model, 
it will be based largely on the perspectives of creative engagement by Epstein’s 
(1999), who emphasises not only the fluidity of cultural identities akin to what Homi 
Bhabha calls the ‘third zone’, but also a principle of self-differentiation following 
Derrida. Applying these notions to the field of dance, the chapter will then review the 
imagination of intercultural dialogue in the works of various dance scholars, including 
Lengel (2005) who focuses on the transcending of cultural identity, and Foster (2009) 
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who discusses pedagogical practices for dancers in the appreciation of ‘world dance 
forms’. It will also note how a theatrical practice of ‘interculturalism’ employing forms 
of dance heritage may indirectly serve a state ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ in the 
case of Singapore.  
Coming to the multicultural model, the chapter will borrow the idea of critical 
situations from the Culture Assimilator method of intercultural training, in order to 
highlight potential conflicts that may be heighten a sense of cultural differences 
between the Chinese and Indian communities through the exoticised heritage of 
Indian classical dance. Possible themes of cultural differences, based on dimensions 
of cultural values discussed in the paradigm of intercultural communication, will 
however be deconstructed. In the last section, one will discuss the concept of 
intercultural learning considering psychological aspects of ‘intercultural competence’ 
in empathy and open-mindedness 
Chapter 7 as the conclusion will recapitulate the arguments in the foregoing chapters 
and propose recommendations for further research on intercultural dialogue and 
cultural heritage in policy studies. 
In short, it is hoped that this humble effort of a doctoral thesis, coming first and 
foremost from the perspectives of intercultural studies, will contribute to an 
expanding scope of knowledge in heritage studies, based on the interest in a 
‘zukunftsorientierte’ or future-oriented concept for the interpretation of cultural 
heritage in a globalised world (Albert, 2000, p. 21). In keeping with the 
interdisciplinary research at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-
Senftenberg, a new paradigm for heritage studies has been thus outlined in 
Understanding Heritage - Perspectives in Heritage Studies, the first in a series of 
publications: “Heritage today, more than ever, is understood for its relevance to 
human development. As such, the protection and use of heritage is conceived as a 
potential that shapes identities and builds peace (Albert, 2013, p. 14).” The analysis 
in this thesis may hopefully help to suggest some trails for further research on the 
challenges in heritage policy towards peace and harmony.       
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2. CONCEPTS OF CULTURE IN MODERNITY AND BEYOND 
This chapter aims to explore the concept of culture from some of the major 
perspectives under anthropology, sociology, psychology and cultural studies, in 
order to prepare for discussion in the later chapters with regards to the main concern 
of this thesis, namely the challenges of intercultural dialogue (Chapter 3), for which 
one may involve dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage (Chapter 5) as a 
medium (Chapter 6). The chapter here will begin in Section 2.1 with perspectives on 
culture in the discipline of anthropology as a study of cultural variation. This is 
presented in a roughly chronological order, or more importantly in order of the 
theoretical development, explaining each approach as a reaction to whatever 
previous perspective that may be deemed problematic or inadequate, ending with 
some considerations of how the Cultural System may tend to be isolated from a 
larger social framework in anthropological studies. 
In Section 2.2, we shall turn to a particular perspective on culture as ‘orientation 
system’, which may be understood as reflecting an interest in the rationalisation of 
the modern society, in contrast to the study of culture in terms of the diversity of 
traditional societies. This will involve a functionalist perspective embedded within a 
framework of intercultural competence that may be legitimised with the discipline of 
social psychology, which has to be understood in context with the origins of such a 
perspective on culture in classical and modern sociology as represented by the work 
of Talcott Parsons, to be discussed in Section 2.2.1. It will be demonstrated that the 
study of ‘intercultural psychology’ in Germany, as represented by the work of 
Alexander Thomas, exhibits particular assumptions of cultural differences in its 
theoretical framework due to specific research interests. It will also critique the 
limitations of Parsons’ framework on how the Cultural System relates to social 
action. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion in Section 2.3 on the need for 
intercultural dialogue to overcome cultural differences. This is contextualised under 
the trends of globalisation, caught between modernity and postmodernity, which 
presents issues not only of conflicts that are heightened through a sense of global 
consciousness but also of the use of culture as an ideological tool by those in 
political power. Citing the World Systems Theory in particular, it will present an 
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alternative perspective on the placing of Cultural System in relation to the Social 
System. The discussion will also point to the need of perspectives in cultural studies, 
which serves to re-examine the normative structure in concepts of culture.   
2.1 What is Culture? – Perspectives in Anthropology    
This section will provide an overview of some theoretical perspectives on culture in 
various schools of thoughts in anthropology, including culture as learned capability, 
culture as personality, culture as structural system, culture as social life, culture as 
adaptive system and culture as system of meanings. These perspectives have been 
informed by different approaches of other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology 
and semiotics.  
While anthropology is clearly not the only discipline studying culture and society, 
what makes it unique would be its production of knowledge on actual cultural 
variation in the world and the methods and theoretical perspectives it uses which 
enable practitioners “to explore, compare and understand these varied expressions 
of the human condition” (Eriksen, 2004, p. 7) One may understand anthropology for 
a start as “the comparative study of culture and society, with a focus on local life” 
(Ibid., p. 9; cf. Vivelo, 1978, p. 4), though the study of local life in traditional societies 
through ethnographic fieldwork is no longer its main method as it used to be 
(Eriksen, 2004, p. 8). 
Anthropology has seen many shifts in its long development since the mid-19th 
century, with the object of its study being humankind in all his biological, historical, 
linguistic and cultural diversity, as it spanned a range of approaches from the natural 
scientific and positivistic to the historical and hermeneutic (Gable and Handler, 2008, 
p. 26). In practice, it developed as the science of people set apart from the Western 
civilisation, ‘the people without history’ (Wolf, 1982; cited in Ibid.). The discipline was 
notably institutionalised in North America as containing the sub-fields of archaeology, 
linguistics, and physical and cultural anthropology, whereas in Great Britain and 
Europe, social and cultural anthropology or ‘ethnology’ tended to be imagined as an 
independent branch of sociology (Kuper, 1973; cited in Ibid., p. 26).  
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The difference between the two outlooks is significant, as practitioners of the British 
tradition often eschewed the word ‘cultures’ in favour of the word ‘societies’ when 
they referred to ‘primitive’, ‘rural’, ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘non-Western’ societies (Gable 
and Handler, 2008, p. 33). Being ‘social anthropologists’, they tended to divide 
human actions into the social and the cultural. The social generally takes 
precedence as it pertains to interests, goals and organisation; whereas the ‘cultural’ 
is associated particularly with things or practices that were ‘not obviously useful’, 
such as games, art, myth, beliefs in spirits and practices of ritual and ceremony 
(Ibid., p. 34). This reflects a perspective characterised by the discourse of 
functionalism (Ibid.) which also forms a main theoretical reference in this thesis.  
A most classic definition of culture in anthropology, one which would also be cited in 
a discussion on cultural heritage by Jokilehto (2005, p. 4) of ICCROM, has been that 
by Edward Burnett Tylor in Primitive Culture (1871). Culture according to Tylor refers 
to “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, 
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” 
(Tylor, 1871; see McGee ed., 2011, p. 30). It has to be noted, however, that ‘culture’ 
is used here as a synonym for ‘civilisation’ in “its various grades” (Ibid., p. 31), 
whereby Tylor considers it the task of ethnography to study ‘laws’ of human thought 
and action between civilisation of the ‘lower tribes’ and civilisation of the ‘higher 
nations’ (Ibid.).   
The concept underlying Tylor’s definition here is one of culture as learned or 
acquired behaviour and capabilities. On a positive note, that implies an acceptance 
of human diversity by understanding culture as a result of nurture rather than nature, 
under Tylor’s belief in the psychic unity of mankind (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 28). 
Yet it also betrays an assumption in the progress and evolution of mankind, which 
would immediately be deemed problematic today and can best be appreciated as a 
reaction back then to the humanist and pessimist view of Matthew Arnold, who 
thought that despite the advance of civilisation in steel and railroads as part of the 
industrial revolution, ‘culture’, as that inward cultivation, ‘sweetness and light’, had 
declined (Arnold, 1868; cited in Ibid.). Tylor not only maintained that humanity has 
progressed in the material as well as the moral realm, he also considered ‘primitive 
41 
 
religion’ and ‘superstition’ as doomed under inevitable progress of civilisation (Gable 
and Handler, 2008, p. 28). 
But this evolutionist bias also has to be understood in the context of Tylor’s attempt 
to demonstrate that man’s spiritual or cultural life, encompassing religious belief, 
custom and art, is also a subject for scientific study, that it is also governed by the 
same natural laws of progress, just as man’s material life in which cultural elements 
come to a specific group through alternative processes of independent invention, 
inheritance and transmission (Stocking, 1963, pp. 4-5). Believing in a diffusionist 
view, that civilisation is more often propagated than developed, Tylor used a 
comparative method to classifying groups of arts, beliefs and customs as cultural 
elements, just as one would catalogue species of plants and animals, in order to 
reconstruct some order of historical evolution (Ibid., p. 5). He also placed different 
races in a hierarchy of culture in terms of scientific knowledge, moral principles and 
the degree of social and political organisation (Ibid., p. 6). In summary, Stocking 
notes that the limitations of Tylor lie on one hand in him taking a humanist idea of 
culture to fit into a framework of progressive social evolutionism, and on the other 
hand in his purpose in analysing evolution which resulted in a tendency to place 
great emphasis on artefacts or objects of material culture as cultural manifestations 
(Ibid., p. 9). One may say that a comparative method in itself is in keeping with the 
idea of scientific study, but his assumption in the diffusion of culture from particular 
centres of civilisation is problematic, as with such interpretations of archaeological 
evidence based on an interest in demonstrating a hierarchy in evolution. 
Such humanist and evolutionist notions of culture in terms of civilisation or progress 
in scientific and aesthetic knowledge were soon replaced by the argument of Franz 
Boas that human society is marked by a plurality of distinct cultures or notions, a 
position which made him a major force in anthropology despite not having developed 
a culture concept specifically (Stocking, 1968, p. 199; cited in Ulin, 2001, p. 27). 
Boas, who helped to develop the methods of the four-field approach in American 
anthropology, used these methods to counter racist attitudes and social inequality of 
late 19th-century American society, by demonstrating convincingly that there was no 
inherent relation between race, language and culture, and hence no inferior races, 
languages or cultures (Ulin, 2001, p. 28).  
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Where epistemological foundation is concerned, Boas was very much led by a 
concept of psychological law and methods of natural sciences (Ibid.), for instance in 
his suspicion that the cultural background of the human subject was an irreducible 
factor in the perception of colours (Ibid., p. 29). Whether Boas’ epistemology was 
based on a radical monism for the psychological subject, rather than on a Hegelian 
philosophy of social life constituted through an intersubjective process, may be left 
open as a question, according to Ulin (Ibid., pp. 30-31). But Ulin observes that Boas 
had difficulty in resolving the contradictions between universal psychological laws 
and the formative activity of human co-subjects, for instance between an assumption 
of the unconscious nature of linguistic phenomena like grammatical conventions and 
the question of how possibility of interlocutors reflecting on such formal properties 
may come about  (Ibid., p. 31). For Boas, the simple answer to throwing light on 
differences in cultural phenomena would also be history (Ibid., p. 32). However, he 
rejected taking into consideration the native’s point of view in a historical 
reconstruction, arguing that explanation of customs given by the native is generally a 
result of speculation and by no means true (Boas, 1940, p. 563; cited in Ulin, 2001, p. 
32). He hence established the task of ethnology as the inductive collection of data 
and their interpretation based on cultural context, oriented towards discovery of 
psychological laws; yet he was unable to develop general laws as such or to reveal 
the substantive nature of such laws (Ulin, 2001, p. 33). Ulin hence concludes that by 
removing self-understanding from the meaning of human actions and by obscuring 
the intersubjective nature of cultural phenomena, Boas’ approach is one as an 
anthropologist as well as a natural scientist (Ibid.). 
With evolutionists like Tylor, the methodological assumption was that in order to 
understand people of other cultures, one “must attribute to them aims and motives of 
the sort that we, too, have” (Cook, 1999, p. 53), and hence Tylor would assume that 
the myths were produced with the same motivation that led to sciences in the 
modern society and therefore would soon be replaced as reason prevails (see Ibid., 
pp. 53-54). But Boas would argue against the assumption of evolutionists that the 
same phenomenon is always due to the same causes, citing the example of how 
similar geometrical designs in primitive art may originate from naturalistic forms, from 
technical motives or from symbols (see Ibid., p. 59). Cook (1999) suggests that the 
common description of Boas as a cultural or moral relativist is not accurate although 
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he criticised the placing of cultures in hierarchy; Boas only cautioned against 
committing a projection error that “ the conduct which is condemned in our culture is 
the same conduct that is condoned in some other” (p. 66), for example in assessing 
the motive for performing a human sacrifice, which may be very different in 
motivation for conduct one may declare as murder (ibid., p. 69). It may help at this 
juncture to clarify that cultural relativism may refer more specifically to a point of view 
in which one realises “the problem of finding valid cross-cultural norms” (Herskovits, 
1958, p. 270; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 36), or the proposition that “the rightness of 
what is done by another people follows from their view of things, not from ours” 
(Redfield, 1962, pp. 458-459; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 38). Cook (1999, p. 74) cites 
Boas in writing that “the study of human cultures should not lead to a relativistic 
attitude toward ethical standards” (Boas, 1938, p. 202). However, that still leaves a 
difficulty as to how one may gain access to the meaning of conduct in another 
cultural setting without finding analogy in one’s own culture (Lukes, 2008, p. 74) 
Boasian anthropology, with its emphasis on viewing cultures holistically within their 
own contexts (Ibid., p. 37), has in any case been associated with the legacy of 
cultural relativism, notably in the work of Ruth Benedict, who represented a 
perspective on cultures described as personalities. In Patterns of Culture (1934), she 
writes of culture not only in terms of patterns in customs but also as ways of thinking, 
as notably expressed in her metaphor of vision (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 31). 
She describes culture as a lens through which people see the world: “No man ever 
looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs 
and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his philosophical probing he cannot go 
behind these stereotypes; his very concepts of the true and the false will still have 
reference to his particular traditional customs. (Benedict, 1934, p. 2)” According to 
her, a culture becomes integrated over time through key values, though it may also 
fail to integrate aspects of collective experience (Ibid., pp. 223-226). She claims that 
one is thus able to describe the pattern of a culture as a scientist, as she imagines 
culture as being animated by an organising energy to ‘integrate’ the multiplicity of 
people’s experiences as a coherent way of life (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 31). 
She has analysed the ‘primitive cultures’ of the Zuni, the Dobu and the Kwakiutl and 
labelled them with catchwords of personality types like ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’, 
words borrowed from Nietzsche. Like other scholars of the ‘culture and personality’ 
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movement, she attempted to find general traits, and culture in this way is seen as a 
closed system that houses finite personalities (Handler, 1986; cited in Ryang, 2004, 
online). But if one presumed that the major tenet of cultural relativism was to abstain 
from value judgment, Benedict was certainly unable to prevent such intrusions, as 
she would describe the Dobu as “lawless and treacherous” while praising the Zuni 
for their peaceful mode of interaction and freedom from a sense of sin (Selznick, 
1992, p. 113; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 41). 
The next major perspective on culture comes from structuralism, an approach 
derived from linguistics. The influence of structuralism on anthropology first surfaced 
in the work of Boasian anthropologist Edward Sapir, who developed linguistic 
anthropology and imagined cultures as non-rational and arbitrary systems of 
structuring the world in abstract thoughts. He eventually propagated a position, along 
with his protégé Benjamin Lee Whorf, that language as a system of abstractions of 
categories allows the human mind to make sense of an infinitely complex natural 
world, hence language influences cognitive processes, as a logical or deductive 
system that is arbitrary from the point of view of others (Sapir, 1921, Whorf, 1956; 
cited in Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 30). Interestingly, whereas their assumptions in 
structuralism would emphasise that different societies live in distinct worlds due to 
different language habits, a different perspective in anthropology would emphasise 
the universal properties despite such differences, as one sees in the work of Levi-
Strauss. 
Levi-Strauss views cultures as symbolic systems that are creations of the mind, 
whereby the interest for him lies in discovering the underlying ‘deep structure’ of 
cultural domains, such as myths, art, kinship and language, or in other words the 
basic principles of the mind that generate a variety of cultural elaborations (see 
Keesing, 1974, p. 78). Levi-Strauss holds that the physical environment provides 
humans with the raw materials which universal processes of the mind elaborate into 
diverse but formally similar patterns based on logic of binary contrast, relations and 
transformations just as in the logic of languages (Ibid.) The social significance of this 
view lies in the rejection of a contrast between the modern and the ‘primitive’ mind, 
for Levi-Strauss, as evident in his works like The Savage Mind (1966). Arguing 
against Malinowski’s assumption from a functionalist perspective that ‘primitive’ 
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people are determined by the basic needs of life such as subsistence and sexual 
drives and all their social institutions, beliefs and mythologies may be explained 
along such utilitarian or emotional terms, Levi-Strauss seeks to demonstrate with a 
more universalist outlook that these people are perfectly capable of ‘disinterested 
thinking’ by intellectual means, just as what a scientist would do (1995, pp. 16-17).  
He prefers to emphasise on the general opposition of Culture versus Nature that 
would correspond to a general distinction of humanity from animality, latent in men’s 
customary and attitudes and behaviours (Leach, 1974, p. 36). His structuralist 
perspective may be appreciated as an attempt to conceptualise socio-cultural 
phenomena in terms of meta-linguistic levels of analysis and at the same time in 
terms of an ethical-moral study (Nutini, 1971, p. 540), but he has been heavily 
criticised by anthropologists who see a lack in an empiricist approach (Ibid., p. 543). 
Leach (1974) for one has questioned Levi-Strauss’ assumption in his model of 
metaphors and metonymy based on a belief in the collective unconscious of the 
human mind, that cultural categories can simply be read as symbols by the human 
brain like how it can listen to both harmony and melody in music at the same time (p. 
53). He has also criticised Levi-Strauss for being ahistorical, evading any relation 
between myth and history in his analysis of the structure of myth, searching, like 
Freud, for principles of thought formation universally valid for all human minds (Ibid., 
p. 55).  Leach would however acknowledge the contribution of Levi-Strauss, despite 
relying on an inadequate linguistic schema of Jakobson based on binary distinctive 
features (Ibid., p. 113), for bringing to bear a “truly poetic range of associations” (Ibid., 
p. 119) in the course of his analysis, which may well reveal something about the 
structure of aesthetic perception.  
It is worth highlighting that the word ‘culture’ here takes on a universal sense as an 
analytical category, whereas in Benedict’s conception, ‘culture’ tends to refer to a 
bounded body of beliefs and practices (Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 39). Yet despite this 
difference of usage, both refer to psychological perspectives, with Levi-Strauss 
expressing his debt to Boas in the emphasis of unconscious mental processes in the 
shaping of perceptions and conceptions (Ulin, 2001, p. 34), whereas Benedict’s 
interest lies in cultures in terms of differences in personalities. Boas, Benedict and 
Levi-Strauss may hence be seen as forming the same lineage not simply in terms of 
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similar relativist outlook but in attempting to explain cultural variation in terms of 
psychological laws or differences. 
Not all anthropologists, however, would consider culture as a key concept for 
analysis of differences among societies, at least not if the focus is on psychic 
processes. Radcliffe-Brown, a pioneering figure in social anthropology, has 
remarked that some anthropologists tend to use the word ‘culture’ as equivalent to 
what he would call “a form of social life” (Kuper ed., 1977, p. 14). He suggests: “In its 
ordinary use in English ‘culture’, which is much the same idea as cultivation, refers to 
a process, and we can define it as the process by which a person acquires, from 
contact with other persons or from such things as books or works of art, knowledge, 
skill, ideas, beliefs, tastes, sentiments (Ibid.).” His perspective of culture as ‘learning’ 
may hence call to mind Tylor, except the emphasis is on culture as a process rather 
than as a grade in capability. He argues that ‘culture’ or ‘cultural tradition’ considered 
as entity is simply some aspect of social life, the continuity and change of which 
would be the subjects of social anthropology (Ibid., p. 15).  
Somewhat similar to Malinowski, who imagined anthropology as a natural science 
and took the idea of homeostasis or balance from the biological concept of natural 
system to explain cultural phenomena in terms of function in the total social system 
(see Ulin, 2001, p. 36), Radcliffe-Brown adopted a functionalist perspective, under 
influence of Spencer and Durkheim. However, in applying principles of structural 
functionalism to study ‘primitive’ societies, he established a science of social 
anthropology as a kind of comparative sociology (Kuper, 1977, p. 2) which set him 
apart from Malinowski, who was not only ahistorical in his methodological procedure 
but also reduced constituents of social life to biological needs instead of normative 
regulation (Ulin, 2001, p. 38). Radcliffe-Brown’s analysis is aimed at relating various 
institutions or established norms of a society to each other, thus revealing “both their 
formal inter-relationships (or structural relationships), and the mutual impact of their 
activities (or functional relationships)” (Kuper, 1977, p. 4). This would further require 
comparative research, Radcliffe-Brown argues, in order to establish the ‘laws’ of 
functional relationships (Ibid.). He defines ‘function’ as “the total set of relations that 
a single social activity or usage or belief has to the total social system” (Ibid., p. 43). 
While his earlier work on Andaman Island myth and ritual has been more simplistic, 
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with a focus on the way in which ‘sentiments’ considered as structurally requisite 
were maintained in individuals (Ibid., p. 3), his later work shifts away from such 
simplicity. Apart from seeking a ‘fundamental law of social statics’ to advance the 
understanding of social life among human societies through typological studies (Ibid., 
p. 16), he also discusses the study of ‘social dynamics’ to make generalisation on 
how social systems change (Ibid., p. 17). Citing what Spencer terms ‘co-operation’ 
as a feature of social life whereby conflict may be restrained or regulated, Radcliffe-
Brown (1952) calls this “the institutional aspect of social adaptation” (p. 9), whereas 
the process in which an individual acquires habits and mental characteristics would 
be called “cultural adaptation” (Ibid.). ‘Cultural adaptation’ is thus set in contrast to 
‘cultural tradition’, which he refers to as a process of continuity constituted by the 
“transmission of learnt ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (Ibid., p. 5). Radcliffe-
Brown would even extend a similar principle to the study of plural societies or what 
he termed as ‘composite societies’, arguing that their processes of change should 
not be simplified as “one in which two or more ‘cultures’ interact, which is the method 
suggested by Malinowski” (Ibid., p. 202), but rather considered in terms of “the 
interaction of individuals and groups within an established social structure which is 
itself in process of change” (Ibid.).  
The dominant concept of culture in American anthropology since the 1960s is that of 
culture as a system of symbols and meanings, as popularised by Clifford Geertz. 
This is a perspective that may be understood as a strategic position in relation to the 
development of sociology up until to its time. Geertz, along with David Schneider, 
has used this notion of ‘cultural system’, borrowed from the usage of the term by 
functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons – whereby this was considered as a 
separate component in social relations, distinct from the ‘social system’ as a system 
of norms and institutions, and the ‘personality system’ as a system of motivations 
(Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 43). Where this new perspective on culture departs from 
Parsons is an approach of analysis that aims to abstract the symbolic meanings of 
human action out of the social interaction, rather than to consider the cultural system 
merely as a particular level of abstraction of social relations (Ibid., pp. 43-44). 
Rejecting a positivist approach associated with sociology, Geertz (1973) cites the 
methodology of Verstehen in Max Weber’s interpretive sociology instead as an 
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integral part of the tradition of social anthropology (p. 88). He goes as far as saying 
that a good interpretation of anything from a history, a ritual to an institution can take 
one “into the heart of that of which it is the interpretation”. He hence writes in The 
Interpretation of Cultures: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Ibid., p. 5)” Adopting a semiotic 
view of culture, Geertz argues that “culture is not a power, something to which social 
events, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed” (Ibid., p. 14), that culture 
consists neither of socially established structures of meaning nor psychological 
phenomena alone (Ibid., p. 12-13). A cultural analysis to him should look at 
“symbolic dimensions of social action” (Ibid., p. 30) and his method in ethnography is 
that of a ‘thick description’ to uncover the context of cultural processes (Ibid., p. 14).  
One may say that the most radical move in the approach represented by Geertz is to 
render the elusive concept of culture a fixed locus and a degree of objectivity (Ortner, 
1994, p. 374). The focus of Geertzian anthropology is not in distinguishing and 
cataloguing symbolic types or in observing how symbols perform practical operations 
in the social process such as initiation rites, but in dealing with the question of how 
symbols as vehicles of culture shape the ways social actors, see, feel and think 
about the world (Ibid., pp. 374-375). In contrast to structuralist anthropology as 
represented by Levi-Strauss, Geertz’s interest lies more with the ‘ethos’ aspect of 
culture rather than the ‘world view’, more with affective dimensions than with the 
cognitive (Ibid., p. 375). Another major contribution of the Geertzian framework was 
in studying culture ‘from the actor’s point of view’ rather than as some abstractly 
ordered system, such that the principles of relations are derived from how people 
operate within institutional orders and have to interpret their situations in order to act 
coherently (Ibid.).  
If one were to apply the umbrella term ‘symbolic anthropology’ to both Geertz’s and 
Schneider’s theorisation of cultural systems of meanings and symbols, as well as  
the structuralist approach of Levi-Strauss and his followers, there is yet another 
model that emerged around the 1960s and 1970s. This is the influential work of 
Victor Turner, who has a profoundly different approach to the symbolic aspect in 
social action. Trained in British structural functionalism under Max Gluckman, a 
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strand influenced by Marxism, the analytical question of society for Turner is not how 
solidarity is reinforced, as how Durkheim or Radcliffe-Brown would have emphasised, 
but rather how integration of society is constructed and maintained above all the 
conflicts and contradictions (Ibid., p. 376). Symbols are of interest to Turner, not as 
vehicles of culture in a society with integrated ethos and world views, but as 
operators in the social process, which under certain contexts, such as in rituals, can 
produce social transformations (Ibid.). Ortner would argue that the British dimension 
of symbolic anthropology, as represented by Turner, contributes a sense of 
pragmatics of symbols to the field, whereas the American counterpart in comparison 
is underdeveloped in its sense of the politics of culture (Ibid., p. 377). Another way to 
appreciate Turner’s approach is to consider his place in the performative turn of 
social sciences, whereby he considers social life as being full of ‘social dramas’ 
(Turner, 1982, p. 11). Turner’s perspectives will be discussed at length in Chapter 5 
of this thesis in reference to dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage, in the 
sense of being a ritual.  
In reaction to the concept of culture as system of symbols and meanings, 
scholarship in social sciences around the 1980s has found a perspective of culture 
as practice, in which they object to a portrayal of culture as being coherent, uniform 
and static and prefer to see it as a sphere of practical activity “shot through by willful 
action, power relations, struggle, contradiction, and change” (Sewell Jr., 1999, pp. 
44). This was also transferred to anthropology, as represented by the remark of 
Sherry Ortner (1984) on the turn to politics, history and agency, and to adopt Pierre 
Bourdieu’s key term ‘practice’ for the new emerging sensibility (Ibid., p. 45). Bourdieu, 
both sociologist and anthropologist, was interested not only in the agency of the 
individual, but also in how power differences in society distributed opportunities 
unequally (Eriksen, 2004, p. 69). He hence refers to knowledge taken for granted as 
doxa and embodied knowledge as habitus, in a theorising which been important in 
several subfields of anthropology (Ibid.) There has since been theoretical discussion 
on how a concept of culture as system of symbols and meanings seems at odds with 
a concept of culture as practice (Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 46). But it has also been argued 
by Marshall Sahlins (1985) that practice and system imply each other (cited in Sewell 
Jr., 1999, p. 47). Sahlins maintains that society as a symbolically constituted order 
may be seen ontologically as a cultural formation (see 2004, p. 139) but one may in 
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turn conceive of agency as “constituted by a cultural order of which it is an 
idiosyncratic expression” (Ibid., p. 156), hence allowing one to understand history in 
a dialectic manner. 
The question of what should constitute as the cultural system as opposed to socio-
cultural systems is one that has long posed a challenge in conceptualisation of 
culture. If one may summarise according to the classification of Keesing (1974), 
there is culture on hand as ideational system, such as structural system according to 
Levi-Strauss, symbolic system according to Geertz or cognitive system according to 
Goodenough in cognitive anthropology; on the other hand, there is culture as 
adaptive system, based on foundations laid by Leslie White and recast by Sahlins 
among others, not to mention Harris’ cultural materialism, whereby scholars 
generally see cultures as systems of socially transmitted behaviour patterns “that 
serve to relate human communities to their ecological settings” (p. 75). In Keesing’s 
perspective, what the cultural adaptionists refer to as culture are sociocultural 
systems, “the social realisations or enactments of ideational designs-for-living in 
particular environments” (Ibid., p. 82), such as settlement patterns or subsistence 
technology. He acknowledges that the distinction he is making does not quite 
correspond to that made by Harris among others between the economic domain of 
subsistence, technology and social organisational of production, and the ideational 
realm of religion, ideology, law, art and so on (Ibid.). Keesing suggests that culture 
be conceived as “an ideational subsystem within a vastly complex system, biological, 
social and symbolic” (Ibid., p. 94), without further resolution except to hope for 
insights from “an emerging understanding of mind and brain” (Ibid.). 
At this juncture it is also good to reflect on the limitation of ethnographic fieldwork in 
understanding culture. While there may have been a dominant view that 
anthropology involves the practice of ethnography on local life to understand what 
Malinowski calls “the native’s point of view” (Malinowski, 1922, p. 25: cited in Gable 
and Handler, 2008, p. 32) through fieldwork at the ‘natural habitat’, this conception 
has been challenged from the positions of various approaches, which emphasise the 
reality of social processes as opposed to the ethnographer’s interpretations.  
Ingold (2008, p. 70) observes that Radcliffe-Brown has long asserted the distinction 
between ethnography and anthropology. This was done by citing the distinction 
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between the idiographic and the nomethetic, first coined in 1894 by German 
philosopher and historian Wilhelm Windelband, which Radcliffe-Brown explained as 
an inquiry that aims to document facts of past and present lives for the idiographic, 
as opposed to a nomethetic inquiry which aims to produce general propositions or 
theoretical statements (Ibid.). Likening social structures to structures of living 
organisms, he has argued for collection of data for comparative study the same way 
one does for “a typical typological classification” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1953, p. 109; cited 
in Ingold, 2008, p. 76). More importantly, he emphasised that the concrete reality to 
be studied by the social anthropologist “is not any sort of entity but a process, the 
process of social life” (1952, p. 4; cited in Ingold, 2008, p. 77).  Furthermore, 
Radcliffe-Brown’s understanding of social reality was apparently historical, with an 
idea of continuity through change, though this perspective was often overlooked 
(Stanner, 1968, p. 287; cited in Ingold, 2008, p. 77).   
James Clifford has also criticised the construing of ethnography as ‘fieldwork’ which 
involves “centering the culture around a particular locus, the village, and around a 
certain spatial practice of dwelling/research which itself depended on a 
complementary localisation – that of the field” (Clifford, 1997, p. 20, emphasis in 
original). Whereas Malinowski has defended his style of dwelling and research as a 
relatively unobtrusive way of sharing the life of locals under study, one may ask 
questions like who is really being observed, who is localised and what the power 
relations are (Ibid.). The term ‘field’ or the idea of ‘real fieldwork’ conjures “mental 
images of a distinct place with an inside and outside, reached by practices of 
physical movement” (Ibid., p. 54), but the “boundaries of the relevant community 
have been […] constituted by struggles over the term’s proper range of meanings” 
(Ibid.).  
George Marcus (1995) has further argued for multi-sited ethnography against the 
long-standing mode of single-site ethnographic practices, as he considers that 
“[c]ultural logics so much sought after in anthropology are always multiply produced” 
(p. 97) and hence need to be contextualised in terms of macro-constructions of some 
larger social order, such as the capitalist world system. The claim in multi-sited 
ethnography is that “any ethnography of a cultural formation in the world system is 
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also an ethnography of the system” (Ibid., p. 99) and therefore cannot be understood 
through the old conventional single-site research.  
Following Appadurai’s (1996) perspective that communities and commodities have 
been deterritorialised through global flows, there has also been much interest in the 
study of transnational diasporas, but Ghassan Hage (2005) has cast doubts as to 
whether there is necessarily a strong sense of transnational community among 
migrants (p. 467). In any case, he advocates the use of reflexive ethnographic 
analysis to capture the complexities of realities, with a double gaze on “both people’s 
experiences and the social environment in which this experience is grounded” (Ibid., 
p. 474). 
In Section 2.3, we shall further examine the processes of globalisation in order to 
scrutinise the relevance of culture in a modern world of interconnected societies. In 
the following section, however, we shall look at another perspective of culture that 
attempts to incorporate its psychological aspects into a social structure.  
 
2.2 Culture as Orientation System – a Concept emerged of Modernity 
Society  
2.2.1 Culture as value orientation in action following Talcott 
Parsons’ framework 
This section will provide theoretical background on a general concept of culture as a 
system of value orientation, which is associated with the General Theory of Action 
Systems formulated by sociologist Talcott Parsons, consisting of culture, personality 
and social system as three frames of reference for social action. Parsons’ study of 
value orientation under this framework will be traced back to the epistemological 
perspectives of Max Weber as part of a sociology of value that contrasts 
rationalisation in the modern society with traditional values such as religious values.  
The significance of Parsons in his study of culture and society may be appreciated 
first and foremost in terms of his contribution to functionalist perspectives by 
expanding on the principles of a social system to study social action, and secondly in 
terms of his interest in studying patterns of social values that characterise ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’ societies (Holton, 2001, p. 154).  
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The quintessential functionalist is sociology has arguably been Durkheim, if one 
considers the defining features of the approach in structural functionalism as 
including the following:  a view of society as a system, an assumption of tendency 
towards system equilibrium, an interest in how social order is possible, a view of 
structures in terms of their contributions to perpetuation or evolution of society, and a 
view of consensus or commonalities as basis of social order, distinguishing between 
consensus as normal modus operandi and deviance as pathological but natural  
(Pope, 1975, p. 361). In Durkheim’s view, the boundary that demarcates a society 
must be social, not to be explained otherwise by biological, geographical or 
psychological facts, and the boundary is moral in nature (Cuff, Sharrock and Francis, 
2006, p. 63). He hence set about answering the question as to how social order is 
achieved in an industrial society as opposed to pre-industrial societies which were 
held together by common ideas and sentiments, shared values and norms – a basic 
question previously confronted by Comte, Spencer and Tönnies and only partially 
resolved (Lukes, 1985, p. 141). Instead of exaggerating the role of consensus and 
conformity like Comte, or assuming a harmony of interests like Spencer, or 
attributing to regulation from the State like Tönnies and Comte, Durkheim’s main 
thesis was one of ‘division of labour’ replacing the role previously taken up by the 
conscience commune (Ibid., p. 147). He therefore emphasised on the positive effects 
of social institutions. 
The work of Talcott Parsons in structural functionalism follows basic principles as 
well as concerns of modernisation based on an evolutionary perspective similar to 
Durkheim, but he has developed a much more sophisticated analysis on different 
value systems with the help of pattern variables, in contrast to Durkheim’s simple 
dichotomy between traditional and modern societies (Parsons, 1967, p. 32). 
Although Durkheim also expressed an interest in comparative studies on social 
structure – somewhat like what Radcliffe-Brown did, he lacked the depth in probing 
crucial problems of comparative morphological classification which his contemporary 
sociologist Max Weber achieved, Parsons points out (Ibid., p. 33). Durkheim also 
relied on a concept of solidarity that was simplistic and sometimes inconsistent, 
emphasising on a primary core of the social system that is maintained at the general 
level of an institutionalised value system, and enforced through political order or 
other means (Ibid., p. 32). Parsons in contrast would investigate problems of the 
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greater social structure relating to other dimensions such as culture and personality 
(Ibid., p. 33).  
Nevertheless, Parsons has adopted some of the basic premises used by Durkheim, 
such as the concepts of institution and internalisation.  Parsons defines an institution 
as “a complex of institutionalised role integrates which is of strategic structural 
significance in the social system in question” (Parsons, 1951, p. 39), to be 
understood as “a complex of patterned elements in role-expectations which may 
apply to an indefinite number of collectivities” (Ibid.). Similar to Durkheim, Parsons 
considers that the ‘sentiments’ which support common values are generally learned 
or acquired, and as culture patterns, they have to be internalised as “genuine need-
dispositions of the personality” (Ibid., p. 42). Parsons considers it noteworthy that 
Durkheim as a sociologist discovered the same basic phenomenon of internalisation 
and interpenetration of personality and social system, which Freud and George 
Herbert Mead did independently (1967, p. 27). However, Parsons (1951) would 
emphasise in his theoretical framework that the basic theorem of institutional 
integration explains very little, and is meant rather to provide a point of reference for 
analysis of complex behavioural processes (p. 43).  
While the emphasis in Parsons’ research has in fact shifted through his career, one 
may summarise the two core theoretical issues in his work as being the problem of 
social action and the problem of social order (Alexander, 1983; cited in Holton, 2001, 
p. 153), the former asking why human actors act in a certain way and what 
consequences follow, the latter asking how a multiplicity of social actions may 
produce coordination, whether by compulsion or by consensus. Here Parsons’ 
sociology has been a subject of controversy which may for a start be interpreted in 
two ways: the first regards him as contributing to a voluntaristic theory of action, 
where the agency of the social actor assumes primary theoretical position; the 
second regards him as contributing to a deterministic theory of the structure of social 
systems, where the structure of social relations assumes primacy (Turner, 1991, p. 
xxii-xxiii). This is ultimately an age-old problem of agent and structure, for which 
Giddens (1984) would argue that Parsons offered no final solution, whereas 
Alexander (1985) would argue that Parsons had made an attempt to reconcile the 
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contradictions and this legacy may be advanced through a ‘neofunctionalism’ (cited 
in Turner, 1991, p. xxiii).  
One important theoretical background to Parson’s interest in researching on social or 
cultural values is his attempt to go beyond the dimension of a utilitarian assumption 
lying at the heart of neoclassical economic theory, which took the ends of social 
actions as being unknowable apart from the logic of actors implementing means to 
achieve ends in the most efficient or rational ways (Holton, 2001, p. 153). Therein 
lies the motivation behind his most deterministic perspectives set to writing (Ibid., p. 
154) as seen in The Social System (1951) which details his General Theory of Action 
Systems. According to him, a social system “consists in a plurality of individual 
actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or 
environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the 
‘optimisation of gratification’ and whose relation to their situations, including each 
other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and 
shared symbols” (Parsons, 1951, pp. 5-6). In this conception, a social system is only 
one of three aspects in the structure of social action, the other two being personality 
systems of individual actors and their cultural system influencing their action (Ibid., p. 
6).  As part of an elaborate outline of modes and types of action-orientation, culture 
patterns and institutions, he identifies three types of culture patterns, namely belief 
systems, systems of expressive symbolism and systems of value-orientation 
standards (Ibid., p. 57). The obligations to acceptance of such culture patterns are 
defined by ‘cultural institutions’, which consist of cognitive beliefs, systems of 
expressive symbols and private moral obligations (Ibid., p. 58). He also devises five 
groups of pattern variables in value-orientation, namely universalism-particularism, 
ascription-achievement, specificity-neutrality, affectivity-neutrality, collective-self 
(Ibid, p. 105), whereby his conception of modernity can easily be discerned (Holton, 
2001, p. 154) in the second term of each pair listed here. 
Parsons owes his study of social action and value-orientation to Max Weber, who 
completed his formulation of a theory of action in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
(Economy and Society), where he distilled his ideal types of orientation into four 
fundamental types, to be used for the investigation of all societies and civillisations: 
instrumental rationality, value rationality, affectual action and traditional action 
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(Whimster, 2001, p. 59). Parson’s own early classic The Structure of Social Action 
(1937) subsequently incorporated Weber’s theory of social action (Ibid.). Parsons, 
who on his part helped to cement Weber’s reputation in American social science with 
his translation of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930), was 
furthermore instrumental in provoking a debate on the constitution of modernity 
through his own interpretation of Weber’s views on religion and the rise of capitalism 
in the West (Ibid., p. 60). Parsons framed the issue in the terms of his own social 
system theory to explain what he regarded as the progressiveness of Western 
civilisation (Ibid.). Parsons (1966) thus constructed a unilinear evolutionary theory 
based on his interpretation of selected writings by Weber, whereas Weber has 
adopted a ‘developmental’ view of history as Entwicklungsgeschichte in many other 
writings, as observed by Roth (1987) and Schluchter (1981), whereby Weber 
recognised that although the impetus to rationalisation and intellectualisation may be 
assumed as universal, the processes of rationalisation have taken different paths in 
different societies (see Keyes, 2002, pp. 235-236) One may interpret Weber as 
arguing in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism that ‘ultimate’ meaning 
can never be attained by means of reflection and rationalisation, but only through 
non-rational acceptance of propositions embedded in the salvation ethic of religion, 
whereby salvation is more psychological than cognitive (Ibid., 241-242).   
While there have since been other interpreters of Weber’s theory on value, such as 
Arnold Brecht with his account of Weber’s canon in terms of ‘scientific value 
relativism’, or Gunnar Myrdal’s approach to premises of value based on Weber’s 
value orientation, it is still Parson who has remained the pivotal figure with his 
reading of Weber through Durkheimian lenses (Eliaeson, 2005, p. 6) For that reason 
it is also important to disentangle what some would consider as Parsons’ own 
American triumphalism or conservatism (Holton, 2001, p. 153) in his evolutionary 
perspective from Weber’s pessimist view of rational knowledge as ‘disenchantment’ 
through science (Gane, 2002, p. 21). He not only cites Weber’s achievement for 
viewing the development of Western civilisation through analyses that transcend 
ideological positions such as the socialistic or Marxian perspectives, but goes further 
by arguing in reference to America that “the designation of its social system as 
‘capitalistic’, even in Weber’s highly sophisticated sense, was grossly inadequate” 
(Parsons, 1967, p. 101). Parsons prefers to refer to ‘capitalism’ or ‘economic 
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individualism’ in a neutral sense as a utilitarian system (Ibid., p. 100) and classes 
Weber as being aligned with the ‘utilitarian’ tradition, especially with British economic 
theory, against Marxism (Ibid., p. 91). He interprets Weber’s Wertfreiheit or value 
freedom in social science not only as “freedom to pursue the values of science […] 
without their being overridden by values either contradictory to or irrelevant to those 
of scientific investigation” (Ibid., p. 86), but as implying that “a science need not be 
bound to the values of any particular historic culture” (Ibid.).  
Parsons has since been criticised by O’Neill (1995) for not being value-neutral, as 
his framework assumes “that the social system actually regulates individual 
conformity without class or psychological conflicts” (p. 35) in its schematic tabulation 
of societal inputs and outputs, for the functions of pattern-maintenance in normative 
culture and values, along with functions of personal goal-attainment, adaptation and 
integration. With a bias towards social control that treats threats to the social system 
as ‘deviance’ rather than elements of political revolution, using a medical metaphor 
whereby social control function is seen as the maintenance of health through 
conformity, the Parsonian social system “is in fact a thoroughly moral system” (Ibid., 
p. 41), O’Neill argues. Holton (2001, p. 157) has also cited that Parsons’ assumption 
of convergence between culture and capitalism may be countered by Daniel Bell’s 
observations in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976). 
Sympathisers of Parsons, however, have considered his work as a progress from 
Weber for constructing a unified framework. In the perspective of Schluchter (1981), 
Weber’s philosophy of value might have considered it a task to establish an orderly 
conceptual scheme of values, but had no means for justifying a rank order of 
hierarchy (p. 17). Instead, Weber simply pointed to a basic experience rooted in 
history of mankind that is especially true of modernity, namely the possibility of 
divergent ultimate evaluations, an experience of not only value differences but value 
collision and value conflict, which no rational or empirical scientific procedure can 
reconcile (Ibid.). Schluchter hence interprets Weber’s theory of value as one custom-
made to the requirements of Kulturwissenschaft as an historical social science, 
whereby rationalism and rationalisation become essential subjects of investigations 
only because the development of values towards rationality produces tension and 
the awareness of tension by destroying the primeval naiveté of human beings about 
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themselves and the world. He concludes that the viewpoint selected by Weber does 
constitute a sequence but the sequence provides precondition for identifying 
analogous developments in other cultures and hence Weber’s sociology “offers 
neither a comprehensive typology of world history not a universal theory of evolution 
but a developmental history of the West” (Ibid., p. 26).  
Schluchter sees it as a weakness in Weber’s typology of four action types that it 
blurs the difference between structurally possible orientations and their development, 
by including ‘traditional action’ (Ibid., p. 130). He hence sees an improvement in 
clarity with Parsons’ alternative in distinction of the cognitive, evaluative and 
expressive spheres, leaving out traditional action, but assigning instrumentally 
rational action, where success of action is primary, to the cognitive sphere; value-
rational action, where value of an action is dominant, to the evaluative sphere; and 
affectual action, where affects and sentiments predominate, to the expressive sphere 
(Ibid., p. 129). However, Schluchter’s analysis of Weber’s action types has also been 
criticised. Döbert finds it problematic that Schluchter applies the means-ends 
considerations, as the epitome of rationality, to affectual behaviour which for Weber 
is non-rational, when the means-ends consideration should only be a characteristic 
of instrumentally rational action (Döbert, 1989, p. 216; cited in Etzrodt, 2005, p. 92). 
Allerbeck disagrees with Schluchter applying the means consideration to traditional 
behaviour and applying means-ends consideration to affectual behaviour, arguing 
that traditional behaviour should be regarded as unmotivated, and that affectual 
behaviour should, following Alfred Schutz’s distinction of because- and in-order-to-
motives, be separated from instrumentally rational and value-rational action by the 
category of intentionality (Allerbeck, 1982, p. 673; cited in Etzrodt, 2005, p. 92).  
But the crucial point here is how Parsons subsumes instrumental action under the 
cognitive sphere and how he considers the agency in value-rational action. It may 
appear that Weber in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wisseschaftlehre has been 
ambiguous in considering value-rational action as referring to ‘commands’ and 
‘demands’, to the ‘norm’ as evaluation of action as value judgment, such that it is not 
always clear whether judgment is made based on the actor’s value or on judgment 
by other members of society (Etzrodt, 2005, p. 97). Parsons hence attempts to 
resolve it by considering that other persons’ sanction is only one aspect of normative 
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or moral action, as he emphasises more that the actors internalise the norms of their 
social group (Ibid.). However, as Kalberg highlights, while the value content of value-
rationalisation processes varies widely across a secular and religious spectrum, a 
key point for Weber is that only substantive rationalities place ‘psychological 
premiums’ on ethical action, whereby Weber defines an ethical standard as “a 
specific type of value-rational belief among individuals which, as a consequence of 
this belief, imposes a normative element upon human action that claims the quality 
of the ‘morally good’ in the same way that action which claims the status of the 
‘beautiful’ is measured against aesthetic standards” (Weber, 1968, p. 36; cited in 
Kalberg, 1980, p. 1165). In Weber’s view of man, action cannot be understood 
simply as an adjustment to given realities, be it daily routines or bureaucratic statutes 
and human action beyond routine and adaptive behaviour cannot be assigned a 
residual status, for action motivated by values and resistant to environmental 
moulding by interests, according to Weber, has been of great historical consequence 
(Kalberg, 1980, p. 1170). Kalberg has cited Tenbruck (1975) in support of his 
interpretation of Weber: “His entire oeuvre testifies to his conviction that a 
comprehensive and continuous rationalisation of reality cannot arise out of interests” 
(p. 689; cited in Kalberg, 1980, p. 1171).  
Parsons (1937, p. 294) however would dissent from Weber’s view that the pursuit of 
ultimate ends lead not to a single good but to a kind of value pluralism (cited in 
Turner, 2007, p. 43). Parsons subsequently manufactured out of the writings of 
Weber and Durkheim a sociological conception of values as action explanations, 
such that “values could no longer be understood as individual choices, as they were 
for Weber (and more generally for the economists), but had to be understood as 
something distinctively ‘sociological’, namely as the contents of a central value 
system which played the role in regulating action that the conscience collective had 
played for Durkheim. (Turner, 2007, p. 46)”  
In short, Parsons has adapted Weber’s idea of culture from one in terms of value 
rationality to one in terms of value ‘orientation’, and taken an approach of his own 
that takes its point of departure from Weber’s interest in explicating the relationships 
among cultural values and beliefs, social structure and actors’ psychology, by 
applying an elaborate framework of a systems theory. Parsons’ approach would be 
60 
 
much appreciated by fellow functionalist Luhmann; however, Luhmann would argue 
that Parsons’ attention to relations between system and their environment was not 
probing far enough, for there remains the question of whether systems are open or 
closed to an environment, and in what sense (Holton, 2001, p. 160). In contrast with 
Parsons’ idea of openness in to physical and metaphysical environment, Luhmann 
takes a more complex perspective in which he sees social systems as causally open 
to wider environments but cognitively or operationally closed, as what he refers to as 
‘self-referential systems’ (Ibid.). 
Parsons’ concept of the social system itself, including all social aggregates small and 
large, has also been criticised for being ambiguous and “incongruent with the 
classical concept” (Zafirovski, 2001, p. 241), for in classical sociological theory as 
with Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, the social system would refer to a societal 
system, equivalent to the larger society and not its parts (Ibid.). In comparison, 
Sorokin’s concept of social system as an integral and dynamic cultural-societal 
complex would be more in keeping with the classical tradition, specifically in dealing 
with the socio-cultural system qua society, rather than referring to social groups 
(Ibid., p. 242). Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics (1941) is also remarkable for 
representing an endeavour to explore the factors, patterns and effects of socio-
cultural change, whereas Parsons with The Social System (1951) simply denies the 
possibility in exploring dynamics at its time of sociological knowledge (pp. 239-240).  
In short, Zafirovski would argue with a comparison in theory and methodology that 
contrary to conventional assumptions, Sorokin’s work is far from inferior to that of 
Parsons, and may prove to be superior in many respects in terms of empirical and 
historical grounding (Ibid., p. 239). Parsons may be criticised for depending on 
‘ambiguous psychologism’ (Savage, 1981, p. 193; cited in Zafirovski, 2001, p. 245) 
and his incorporation of neoclassical economics whereby social institutions and 
norms are treated as nothing more than outcomes or aggregations of voluntaristic 
individual actions (Frohock, 1987; cited in Zafirovski, 2001, p. 246). Zafiroski 
suggests in reference to such limitations of Parsons’ theoretical methodology, 
especially in his naïve acceptance of postulates in neoclassical economics, may well 
be dictated by pragmatic-institutional factors. The success that Parsons enjoyed with 
such a unified theoretical system, instead of Weber’s original view of social science 
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as proliferation of paradigms for general sociological theory, reflects a particular 
ideology at Harvard (Zafirovski, 2001, pp. 230-231). In contrast, his contemporary 
Sorokin, whose theoretical methodology of integralism was more dynamic and 
pluralist, also devoid of the individualistic-utilitarian bias (Ibid.), never enjoyed as 
much intellectual influence.   
Parsons’ framework of culture as value orientation, incorporating psychologism into a 
functionalist perspective leaning towards collective goals in the modern society, 
would eventually leave a legacy with much influence also seen in intercultural 
communication, for example in Hofstede’s model in dimensions of cultures. This may 
be attributed to the ease in application of Parson’s definition of culture, referring to 
“patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of 
action, internalised components of the personalities of individual actors and 
institutionalised patterns of social systems” (Parsons, p. 327), whereby culture is 
seen as providing the normative standards in communication and interaction 
processes (Ibid.). Such a perspective lends itself well to application in intercultural 
communication, a variant of which will be discussed in the following section in 
association with perspectives of social psychology.   
 
2.2.2 Culture as Orientation System in Intercultural Psychology of 
Alexander Thomas 
This section will examine a perspective of culture based on a school of intercultural 
psychology that is propagated in Germany by social psychologist Alexander Thomas. 
His concept of culture as ‘orientation system’ may be understood as a combination of 
basic functionalist perspectives on social systems according to Parsons and 
Luhmann, with an idea of culture as schema of action based on cognitive psychology 
and cross-cultural psychology. 
Thomas describes culture in his definition as a ‘universal’ phenomenon, implying that 
he believes in the psychic unity of mankind, but argues that different social groups or 
communities have their own ‘cultures’ in terms orientation systems for thoughts and 
actions, cultivated by means of specific ‘symbols’ such as language, gestures, rituals, 
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values and norms, which are transmitted through the processes of socialisation and 
enculturation (Thomas, 2011, p. 100; 2005a, pp. 22-23; 2003a, pp. 436-437).  
While such equating of culture with a system of value-orientation clearly dates back 
to Parsons, this conceptualisation of culture, set within a framework of intercultural 
psychology, is more specifically designed to serve the needs of intercultural 
communication, targeted at a form of ‘intercultural learning’ which involves 
assimilating the orientation system of a different culture into one’s schema of action 
(Thomas, 2003a, pp. 436-437).  
The central features of one’s psychic processes in such an orientation system, from 
the level of perception to the level of action, are regulated by what Thomas would 
term as Kulturstandards or ‘cultural standards’ (Ibid; 2011, p. 100), a hypothetical 
construct of ‘internalised dispositions’ in the evaluation and control of actions, as 
may be observed in critical interaction situations through differences in expected 
behaviours between people of different social groups or communities (Ibid., p. 108).  
The term ‘cultural standard’ here appears to be borrowed from cognitive 
anthropologist Ward Goodenough for Thomas’ theoretical framework of intercultural 
learning (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 214), though Thomas’ understanding 
of culture is probably closer to Parsons’ idea of culture as normative standards. 
Thomas uses this term as a main concept in his framework of culture, which adopts 
the methods of ‘Culture Assimilator’, a form of intercultural training programme first 
developed in Chicago in the 1960s, whereby critical interaction situations are 
compiled as the basis for training manuals to help people adjust to a different cultural 
environment (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185).  
Goodenough (1957) has said that “[a] society’s culture consists of whatever it is one 
has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members. 
Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, 
behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organisation of these things. (p. 167; cited in 
Keesing, 1974, p. 77)”. He has also said that culture “consists of standards for 
deciding what is, […] for deciding what can be, […] for deciding what to do about it, 
and […] for deciding how to go about doing it (Goodenough, 1961, p. 522; cited in 
Keesing, 1974, p. 77)”. His widely cited assertion has contributed to development of 
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the concept of ‘cultural schema’ as first referred to by Ronald Casson (1981; cited in 
Quinn, 2011, p. 36).   
The importance of cultural schema theory in helping to explicate the phenomenon of 
intercultural communication has incidentally been highlighted by Nishida (2005, p. 
402). In the words of Taylor and Croker (1981), a schema refers to “a cognitive 
structure that consists in part of a representation of some defined stimulus domain. 
The schema contains general knowledge about that domain, including specifications 
of the relationships among its attributes, as well as specific examples or instances of 
the stimulus domain…” (p. 91; cited in Nishida, 2005, p. 402).  
However, Thomas speaks of schema in his framework only specifically in relation to 
observable action as Handlungsschema or schema of action. He hence cites the 
definition of culture as a ‘field of action’ according to cultural psychologist Ernst E. 
Boesch. Boesch has said: “Culture is a field of action, whose contents range from 
objects made and used by human beings to institutions, ideas and myths. Being an 
action field, culture offers possibilities of, but by the same token stipulates conditions 
for, action; it circumscribes goals which can be reached by certain means, but 
establishes limits, too, for correct, possible and also deviant action. (Boesch, 1991, p. 
29, cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 36; cf. Thomas, 2011, pp. 99-100)” 
Boesch compares culture as a field of action to a biotope, in terms of a subjective 
environment that corresponds to a system of symbols (Boesch, 1980, p. 34). He 
postulates that action derives its symbolic qualities from three systems of reference: 
the ‘cultural’, constituted of meanings based on regional and historical variations; the 
‘biographical’, constituted by the personal history of actions in a cultural field; and the 
‘anticipatory’, aimed at future states of the individual (Boesch, 2001, pp. 479-480).  
With such variability of inputs, Boesch’s framework of a symbolic action theory 
creates much methodological complexity in interpretation (Ibid., p. 482). 
Alexander Thomas however cites Boesch’s perspective on culture as a field of action, 
not to explore the complexity with cultural symbolism and personal motivation, but 
merely to emphasise how culture provides orientation in possible actions as well as 
sets the limits for proper actions (Thomas, 2011, pp. 99-100). His own model for the 
interpretation of actions simply makes a conceptual distinction between ‘central 
cultural standards’, postulated as regulating a wide scope of thoughts, values and 
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action, and ‘peripheral cultural standards’, postulated as existing only for certain 
situations or functions (2011, p. 108). Apart from the ease in application, he argues 
that theoretical support for such a model may be found in the Field Theory model of 
Kurt Lewin, which sees the human personality as consisting of central and peripheral 
layers, like an onion (Thomas, 2004, p. 153)   
The approach of Thomas as social psychologist comes from his research in 
Kulturvergleichende Psychologie - which he treats as synonymous with ‘cross-
cultural psychology’ in the English-speaking world. He has cited, among other 
definitions, that the discipline is “concerned with the systematic study of behaviour 
and experience as it occurs in different cultures, is influenced by culture, or results in 
changes in existing cultures” (Triandis, 1980, p. 1; cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, 
p. 33). 
Thomas has been known in the German-speaking world of cross-cultural psychology 
since the 1980s for his work on intercultural interaction, especially from the 
perspective of cultural exchange programmes (Trommsdorff, 1986, in The German 
Journal of Psychology 10, p. 258). Incidentally, it has been remarked that the 
development of cross-cultural psychology in the German-speaking world has not 
corresponded with international development; the 1993 first edition of 
Kulturvergleichende Psychologie edited by Thomas was apparently the first 
introduction as such to the field in the German language, whereas In journals such 
as Psychologische Rundschau or Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, articles have 
appeared only sporadically that deal with questions of cross-cultural psychology 
(Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 41). 
The interest of Thomas however lies most specifically in intercultural psychology, a 
field which he legitimises in his study Psychologie interkulturellen Lernens und 
Handelns (Psychology of Intercultural Learning and Action) based on the following 
justifications: firstly, the epistemological interest on human behaviour in international 
and intercultural encounters; secondly, interest on the part of politicians and 
pedagogues among others on intercultural learning and exchange in general; and 
thirdly, the increasing social need for intercultural competence in communication and 
cooperation with people of different cultural backgrounds (Thomas, 2003a, p. 435).  
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His conception of ‘intercultural psychology’ corresponds to in a very general sense 
with the characterisation of the same field by Berry et al, except for two key 
differences. These would lead to the result that his interest centres on the 
assumption of distinct cultural differences as the object of study, which provides the 
basis for the training of intercultural competence, whereas the latter would be more 
interested in how one’s behaviour may be the result of different cultural influences. 
Firstly, his emphasis is on challenges of encounters among people of different 
national cultures, eg. Germans on the one hand versus French, US Americans, 
Nigerians, Chinese or Indians on the other (Thomas, 2011, p. 105). The latter would 
however consider intercultural psychology “as doing cross-cultural psychology at 
home in culturally diverse societies, where numerous cultural groups have come to 
live together” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 2002, p. 346). Secondly, Berry et al 
would not treat such cultural groups as ‘independent’ from one another and would 
not ascribe cultural influences on behaviour to one specific culture (Ibid.), whereas 
the distinctness among cultures would remain the working assumption in the model 
of Alexander Thomas as it seeks to investigate such cultural differences as the 
challenge to be overcome. The postulation of different cultural standards internalised 
by members of different cultural groups lies at the heart of Culture Assimilator 
training which has been a major part of Thomas’ research work. 
Their difference in approaches is evident even as one considers how the two relate 
to the larger umbrella of cross-cultural psychology, which has its raison d’etre in the 
interest “to extend the range of variation of psychological functioning” (Adamopoulos 
and Lonner, 2001, in Matsumoto ed., 2001, p. 15). According to the definition by 
Berry et al (1992), it is “the study of similarities and differences in individual 
functioning in various cultural and ethnic groups; of the relationships between 
psychological variables and sociocultural, ecological, and biological variables; and of 
changes in these variables; and of changes in these variables” (Berry, Poortinga, 
Segall and Dasen, 1992, p. 2; cited in Ibid., p. 15, emphasis my own). In what may 
be generally accepted as standard methodological protocol, cross-cultural 
psychology according to Berry et al involves selecting some psychological principle, 
test or model in an originating culture and testing it in one or more other cultures to 
discover new factors or elements (see Adamopoulos and Lonner, 2001, Ibid., p. 15). 
Thomas on the other hand emphasises that what lies at the centre of cross-cultural 
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psychology always involves cultural differences: “Im Mittelpunkt der 
kulturvergleichenden Psychologie stehen stets psychologisch bedeutsame kulturelle 
differenzen.” (Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 32) Noting different streams of 
development in cross-cultural psychology since the 1980s in addition to Berry’s 
approach which relates to socio-political or cultural contexts (Ibid., p. 50), he has 
highlighted the approach of Triandis’ in the 1980s with the “individualism-collectivism” 
construct, and the study of cultural values among different countries by Hofstede 
(1980), particularly in their contribution towards analysis of intercultural learning and 
action processes (Thomas, 2003a, pp. 446-458).   
In 2003, a discussion of intercultural competence by Thomas in the journal Erwägen 
– Wissen – Ethik attracted much academic debate among experts in psychology, 
linguistics, pedagogy, sociology and philosophy. In 2008, he was editor of a book 
entitled Psychologie des interkulturellen Dialogs, in which he discusses intercultural 
dialogue as a form of communication to be studied based on principles of 
communication psychology, and he emphasises on intercultural competence as 
condition for intercultural dialogue.   
While the concepts of intercultural dialogue and intercultural competence in 
Alexander Thomas’ framework will be further examined in Chapter 3, this section will 
proceed to analyse his concept of culture in relation to its theoretical bases in social 
psychology. It would help to begin by understanding his epistemological perspectives 
in social psychology, in comparison with others. Social psychology has been defined 
as “the scientific investigation of how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of 
individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 5; cited in Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 4). As a sub-discipline of 
general psychology, it may also be considered as much influenced by cognitive 
psychology, and additionally related to other scientific disciplines such as sociology 
and social anthropology in its concern with explaining human behaviour (Hogg and 
Vaughan, 2008, p. 5). 
Thomas (1991) however sees social psychology as an interdisciplinary field between 
psychology and sociology generally, and summarises the central questions in social 
psychology research thus: “How do real or imagined persons or groups influence 
perception, thoughts, judgment, sentiments, learning of one in action? What 
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influence does a particular social environment have on the individual’s behaviour? 
How does one in action attempt to influence his social environment?” (p. 4; 
translated and abridged) He argues furthermore that there are two fundamental 
tasks of social psychology: On one hand, to provide insights on factors influencing 
social interaction, how individuals influence the environment and how individuals’ 
behaviour and action are influenced by the environment; on the other hand, to 
develop training methods for individuals to realise oneself in social situations, or for 
integration within groups or in whatever social contexts (Ibid., pp. 9-10). If this 
suggests there is a strong component of practical applications in Thomas’ 
perspective of social psychology, he has in fact highlighted its relevance for social 
integration. He describes the aim of social psychology as one of promoting the 
chances for self-realisation, development of the strength of the ‘I’ (a term borrowed 
from Mead) as individual on one hand, but also on the other hand the identification of 
individuals within society, and promotion of a conscious and reflexive ‘integration’ 
(Ibid., p. 11).  
One may appreciate the importance of social psychology as Thomas’ theoretical 
basis for his research in intercultural communication, if one begins by considering his 
key concept of communication as social interaction. Citing Watzlawick’s (1967) 
axiom of communication that “one cannot not communicate”, he has argued that as 
soon as people take notice of one another, a system of social interaction is formed, 
whereby some message will be ‘sent’ even if one chooses to ignore a call for social 
interaction (Thomas, 1991, p. 54).   
While communication may generally be understood as a specific form of interaction, 
which carries the sense of an exchange of information, Thomas argues that a 
general division between interaction and communication is arbitrary and would not 
be scientifically fruitful as a perspective (Ibid., p. 55). There have been different 
models of studying communication. Lasswell’s (1948) model sees the process of 
communication as consisting of sender, information, receiver, sign/signal, channel, 
intention and effects; the model of Shannon and Weaver (1949) considers 
communication as involving the central processes of encoding and decoding 
between sender and receiver, along with other components such as communication 
channel, noise and feedback. Thomas would cite here also Watzlawick’s axioms of 
communication, one of which being that communication has a content aspect as well 
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as a relationship aspect. The concepts of ‘interaction’ and ‘communication’ are 
equally important according to Thomas, under a conception of social system that is 
to be understood not merely as a structure but also in terms of processes that render 
an impression of a structure (Thomas, 1991, p. 56). He cites Katz and Kahn (1966) 
in their perspective of a social system as a system of events with nothing more than 
a functional structure (p. 31, cited in Ibid.).   
What Thomas maintains is that interaction involves more than an anticipation of 
reaction from another to one’s action, for one might also then anticipate a physical 
‘reaction’ from an inanimate object such as a chair following one’s physical action; 
strictly speaking, there has to be an inseparable dialectic relation, though the 
interaction may only be empirically investigated in terms of the action and reaction, 
whereas what causes the relation and what exactly happens during the process of 
interaction would be missing from the investigation (Thomas, 1991, p. 56).  
Arguing that a cybernetic system is developed through such dialectic relationships 
(Ibid.), he cites Graumann (1972, p. 1115) who considers interaction as constituting 
of the psychological concept of motivation, whereby people are able to regulate or 
control one another through ‘reward’ or ‘punishment’ (cited in Ibid., p. 57). This, 
Thomas comments, is a concept of interaction that may be understood in association 
with the sociological concept of ‘social control’ (Ibid.). One may see tendencies in 
interaction and communication of exercising control through sanctions as well as 
through exchange of material and immaterial ‘goods’; whether one considers 
interaction in terms of ‘control’ or in terms of ‘exchange’ is just a matter of analytical 
difference, he suggests (Ibid.). However, Thomas (Ibid., p. 58) cites the argument of 
Stendenbach (1963) in suggesting with regards to the process in interaction that 
‘gratification’ may not necessarily be gained through exchange with others, but rather 
through fulfilment of an internalised norm within the society.   
In fact, Alexander Thomas places much emphasis on behaviour of individuals based 
on norms and roles in a social system of groups or communities. He argues that a 
‘group’ should not necessarily be understood exclusively as a small group, though 
social psychology tends to deal with the environment of small groups, as Witte (1979) 
has discussed (Thomas, 1991, p. 93).  
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A social norm may be defined as the common and shared expectation of members in 
a social group, community or culture on how one should behave in a particular 
situation and how one should think (Thomas, 1991, p. 72, 91). There are two 
characteristics about norms, firstly that they are experienced by a person as 
something external and not created by oneself; secondly that that these social norms, 
which according to Thomas’ interpretation has also been discussed by Durkheim 
under the term of ‘social facts’, exercise a kind of compulsion on one’s thoughts and 
behaviour through expectations, whether one recognises the norms or not (Ibid., p. 
73). Norms come about through agreement in ways of behaviour in interaction 
between members of a social group, and norms in turn influence one’s behaviour 
(Ibid., p. 78).  
Thomas considers social groups and societies alike as social system, whereby a 
system is to be understood as any conceptual, physical or behavioural entity 
consisting of mutually dependent elements (Thomas, 1991, p. 93). Apart from Talcott 
Parsons’ model of social systems, he cites the perspective of NIklas Luhmann (1971) 
that a system is to be investigated as a combination of processes that maintain 
boundaries and continuity, that a system serves the reduction of complexity, through 
stabilisation of a difference between the internal and the external, and everything in a 
system, from differentiation to hierarchy and so on, may be analysed functionally as 
reduction of complexity (pp. 10-11, cited in Thomas, 1991, p. 93).  Thomas also 
highlights the perspective that social systems are action systems imbued with 
meanings, citing Luhmann who has said that the boundaries of a social system are 
not of a physical nature, but boundaries within which meaningful contexts are 
relevant (1971, pp. 11-12, cited in Thomas, 1991, p. 94).  
Another perspective on social systems as highlighted by Alexander Thomas is that of 
social systems as open systems. He argues that the model of a closed system would 
suggest the tendency towards homogeneity and balancing of power, like in the case 
of entropy according to the second law of thermodynamics, which would not be 
suitable in social sciences since it suggests a cancellation of differentiation, leading 
to a breakdown of the system (Thomas, 1991, p. 95). He cites Katz and Kahn (1966), 
social psychologists in the study of organisations, as saying that in order to survive, 
open systems have to hold back the process of entropy, by taking up more energy 
from the environment than what they consume, something which cannot be 
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maintained indefinitely in a biological organism, whereas social systems are not so 
constrained, as they are not dependent on physical constants likewise (pp. 21-22, 
cited in Ibid., pp.95-96). Thomas adds that the taking up of information from the 
environment is also important for the survival of an open system (Ibid., p. 96). 
The open systems perspective was founded by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
(1956). In contrast to physical structures, social organisations may be considered as 
loosely coupled rather than highly responsive systems, with Buckley (1967) noting 
that “the interrelations characterising higher levels come to depend more and more 
on the transmission of information” (p. 47; cited in Scott, 1981, p. 103). Although 
open systems are capable of self-maintenance with throughput of resources from the 
environment, it does not mean they have no boundaries; indeed energies are also 
devoted to boundary maintenance just as they are devoted to activities that span 
boundaries (Scott, 1981, p. 109). Buckley (1967) hence distinguishes between two 
basic sets of system: Morphostasis, referring to processes that tend to preserve or 
maintain a system’s form or structure, such as socialisation and control activities in a 
social system; and Morphogenesis, referring to processes that elaborate or change 
the system, such as growth, learning and differentiation (pp. 58-62; cited in Ibid., p. 
110).  
In Luhmann’s perspectives of social system, what is important is not simply the 
aspect of self-maintenance as an open system but also the aspect of self-
referentiality for which a system is closed. Alexander Thomas would highlight 
Luhmann’s Theory of Self-referentiality in his discussion of intercultural dialogue, 
emphasising that social systems come about not through the creation of a 
commonality as such but through communication between people (Thomas, 2008, p. 
17). However, Thomas’ understanding of culture ultimately appears to share more 
perspectives with organisation theory in the consideration of social systems as open 
systems, along with a general functionalist perspective that may be traced back to 
Talcott Parsons.  
Thomas considers that whenever people form a social group through free will or 
coercion, when they think, feel and act as members of the group, and such social 
framework has significance to their lives, then they would develop a specific system 
of meaning and orientation, and one may consider that they are forming a specific 
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‘culture’ (Thomas, 2005b, p. 35). In the sense of social psychology, even two 
persons in a relationship may arguably be considered as forming a small social 
group, with common norms and values (Ibid., p. 36).  
Thomas extends this basic conception of culture as meaning and orientation not only 
from small groups to communities or societies, but also to organisations and the 
level of nations. According to him, what marks ‘culture’ at a national level is that it is 
considered as a form of collective consciousness that is more abstract than the 
experience of daily life (Ibid., p. 34). Thomas defines national culture as the culture 
that is developed in the course of history by a great number of people who belong to 
a nation by birth or feel belonging to it, who consider it as binding and constitutive of 
one’s existence; it embodies the transmitted values, norms, customs, laws, practices 
and ethical or moral systems of conviction such as religion, as well as world views 
thus derived (Ibid., p. 33).  
He also extends this to an international context, whereby encounters with culture 
may apply in different fields, be it politics, economics, art, science, cooperation for 
development, or working with youth, and at different levels: he postulates a model 
whereby the individual in an international context has to deal with three intertwining 
levels of culture: group culture, organisational culture, national culture (Ibid., p. 40).  
Thomas’s view on culture is hence best summarised in his own definition:  
„Kultur ist ein universelles, für eine Gesellschaft, Organisation und Gruppe 
aber sehr typisches Orientierungssystem. Dieses Orientierungssystem wird 
aus spezifischen Symbolen gebildet und in der jeweiligen Gesellschaft usw. 
tradiert. Es beeinflusst das Wahrnehmen, Denken, Werten und Handeln aller 
Mitglieder und definiert somit deren Zugehörigkeit zur Gesellschaft. Kultur als 
Orientierungssystem strukturiert ein für die sich der Gesellschaft zugehörig 
fühlenden Individuen spezifisches Handlungsfeld und schafft damit die 
Vorraussetzungen zur Entwicklung eigenständiger Formen der 
Umweltbewältigung.“  
(Thomas, 1993, p. 380; also cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 36; 
cf. Thomas, 2011, p. 100) 
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(Translation: “Culture is a universal, but for a society, organisation and group very 
typical, orientation system. This orientation system is cultivated from specific 
symbols and further transmitted in each society. It influences the perception, 
thoughts, values and action of all members and thereby defines their belonging to 
the society. Culture as orientation system structures the specific field of action for 
individuals who feel belonging to a society, and thereby creates the conditions for 
development of one’s own ways of handling the environment.”) 
The study of culture in Thomas’ framework involves the methods of the Culture 
Assimilator, through interviews with informants with critical interaction situations 
which have caused irritation due to behaviour in a host culture that is beyond the 
expectations of one socialised in a different culture.  
According to Thomas (2011, pp. 109-111), the researcher may typically collect up to 
200 critical interaction situations from 30 informants, and reduce similar cases to 
between 50 and 70 types of situations. After that, one seeks opinions from between 
4 and 10 ‘external experts’ familiar with either or both cultures, on questions like: 
1) How do you explain the course of the situation? 
2) How should one behave in such situation to avoid misunderstanding? 
3) How typical are such situations for encounters with the target culture? 
4) Are there particular political, religious or social reasons that lead to such 
specific forms of thinking and action? 
5) Can you recommend literature with regards to these themes? 
Thomas adds here that the study of cultural standards as such should also be 
combined with cultural history, considering that cultural standards are not developed 
as a form of collective consciousness but through a history of development (Ibid., p. 
112). But the ultimate aim of such research is to help train intercultural competence 
for one to function in a different culture. One way is by generating cultural standards 
for different national cultures, for example characterising Chinese as placing 
emphasis on strategies and tactics and maintaining ‘face’, Italians as family oriented 
and identity-conscious, relative to Germans being rule-oriented, internalising control 
and emphasising time planning (Ibid., p. 113). Another way, as practised by other 
proponents in intercultural communication, is to produce ‘Culture Assimilator’ training 
manuals which describe critical interaction situations along with a multiple choice of 
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possible explanations on why one behaves in a certain way, which the reader may 
reflect on. 
Thomas’ concept of culture observed in terms of cultural standards may be criticised 
by some as following similar assumptions of cultural coherence among other 
scholars, from Kluckhohn’s (1949) characterising of an “internal coherence” in 
culture, to Hofstede’s (1984) concept of culture as “collective programming of the 
mind”, as Rathje (2009, p. 84) has cited. This is however not surprising, given that 
Clyde Kluckhohn was concerned with developing categories of binary distinctive 
features to study value systems, a work carried on by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred 
Srtrodtbeck; Hofstede was in turn influenced by this and the separate approach on 
value orientation in the work of Parsons and Shils. While one may argue for the need 
of newer perspectives on culture that take account of phenomena of transculturality 
or hybridity, as Rathje does (Ibid.), one also needs to understand Alexander Thomas 
from the context of his epistemological interests and practical applications based on 
the field of intercultural communication.  
When criticised in the Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik journal (2003) for the assumption of 
cultural coherence, in his citing of a situation of misunderstanding between a 
German interviewer and a Chinese subject as an example of different cultural 
orientation systems, Thomas’ response was simple: of course there are more than 1 
billion individuals in China with their own individuality, but his example was not 
meant at all to discuss differences between northern and southern Chinese, or 
differences between Han and non-Han Chinese, it is just to demonstrate cultural 
influences on a communication situation (Thomas, 2003b, p. 223). His concept of 
culture is ultimately meant to be part of a framework revolving around the concept of 
intercultural competence (to be dealt with in the next chapter of this thesis) for 
practical applications. 
Thomas’ definition of culture may in fact be better appreciated in relation to 
applications in international and intercultural cooperation, in addition to Parsons’ 
theory on value orientations and the social system as a major source that he draws 
on. Described in terms of an orientation system with cultural standards that may be 
typical for a “society, organisation and group” (Thomas, 1993, p. 380), it is meant to 
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cover cultural differences on the levels of ‘national culture’ as well as ‘corporate 
cultures’ (Thomas, 2005b, pp. 32-42).  
Given the influence of Parsons in organisational theory, it is also not surprising if one 
sees resemblance between Thomas’ definition of culture relating to cultural 
standards, and some other definition cited in organisational theory. Kunda (1992) for 
example has defined culture in terms of “a learned body of tradition that governs 
what one needs to know, think and feel in order to meet the standards of 
membership. … When applied to organisational settings, culture is generally viewed 
as the shared rules governing cognitive and affective aspects of membership in an 
organisation, and the means whereby they are shaped and expressed. Of particular 
concern have been the shared meanings, assumptions, norms and values that 
govern work-related behaviour; the symbolic, textual, and narrative structures in 
which they are encoded; and – in the functionalist tradition – the structural causes 
and consequences of cultural forms and their relationship to various measures of 
organisational effectiveness. (Kunda, 1992, p. 8; cited in Pfeffer, 1997. p. 121)”  
Thomas’ conception of social systems as open systems also bears an apparent 
alliance with organisational studies that is relevant to intercultural communication. 
The relevance of this to intercultural competence will be evident as one recalls his 
assumption of culture as being ‘universal’, such that in contrast with investigation in 
culture psychology, differences across cultures in his perspective would hinge on 
socialisation and intercultural learning. Thomas regards the process of socialisation, 
in a community of any respective culture, to involve the task facing an individual, 
through interaction with other persons, to develop his or her patterns of behaviour so 
that these would be socially relevant (Thomas, 2005a, in Thomas, p. 23). When the 
social learning processes are successful in some particular area of activity, then the 
schemes of perception, thoughts, judgment and behaviour would be so developed 
and internalised that one no longer needs to think about the functions, dynamics and 
consequences in one’s action (Ibid.). But when one encounters unexpected 
reactions in the social environment, then one would require new processes of social 
learning, whereby one looks for explanations, methods, norms and rules that will 
provide one with orientation in the new environment (Ibid.). While that is the simple 
principle, Thomas’ ‘philosophy’ of intercultural learning also assumes that with the 
adaption into another orientation system, one would be able to work based on an 
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intention of respect and appreciation of cultural differences, in order to enable 
productive cooperation (Ibid., p. 31). 
Alexander Thomas’ focus in intercultural psychology is in short premised on a 
predetermined task of highlighting cultural differences based on observation of 
cross-cultural interaction situations, under an epistemological framework which sees 
the training of intercultural competence as ultimate goal. With such an approach, 
there may be a greater tendency to explain behaviour in terms of ‘central’ or 
‘peripheral’ cultural contexts, rather than considering situational contexts which are 
factored in under a ‘contextual’ school of thought in cultural anthropology which 
considers intercultural interactions as ‘intercultural events’ or ‘intercultural 
performances’ (Roth, p. 125).  
The strength and limitation of such a paradigm may be summarised with what 
Moosmüller (2004) says of the discipline of intercultural communication: whereas 
ethnology would not provide definitive answers on the relation between culture and 
individual actions, intercultural communication has proceeded on a pragmatic and 
perhaps oversimplifying manner to find answers for itself (Moosmüller, pp. 45-46). 
He cites the Swedish ethnologist Tommy Dahlen as commenting that one basic 
problem with intercultural communication may be that it is founded more on the 
needs of praxis than on pure intellectual curiosity, hence there may be a tendency to 
exaggerate cultural differences (Ibid., p. 53). However, it has been suggested by 
Roth (2004) that the usual approach of intercultural communication in investigation of 
intercultural interactions may in fact be expanded by including not only situational 
factors but also more elements or sectors of cultural systems (p. 121), the latter 
referring to material culture, myths or stories and so on according to him.   
In fact, in a critique of Thomas’ concept of culture in Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik, Allolio-
Näcke, Kalscheuer and Shimada (2003) have similarly pointed the way to an 
alternative model whereby culture needs not be considered as rigidly separated set 
from action as such, conceived as something abstract and floating apart from man, 
imagined as a stable orientation system with one-dimensional influence on actions (p. 
151). They cite scholarship in cultural psychology such as Ratner (1996), who has 
proposed to consider culture not simply as shared conceptual understandings, but 
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also as socially organised human activity which influences psychological functions (p. 
407).  
Despite shortcomings of this approach in cross-cultural psychology, this thesis will 
incorporate in Chapter 3 a consideration of how a study of cultural differences under 
an approach like the Culture Assimilator may still be adopted as a useful heuristic 
tool for the development of intercultural dialogue.   
 
2.3 Globalisation and Need for Intercultural Dialogue  
2.3.1 Processes of Globalisation as World System of Economy 
without Cultural Integration 
Globalisation poses new challenges for the study of culture to traditional or 
mainstream frameworks of anthropology and sociology as presented in the previous 
two sections, as it implies a breaking down of cultural boundaries hitherto assumed, 
and demands an understanding of societies across the world as part of one single 
system. This section will hence provide a more comprehensive perspective by taking 
into account the reality of globalisation as a composite phenomenon of cross-border 
movements and interconnectedness in the world involving economic, political, social 
and cultural processes. The focus in this subsection will be on the primacy of 
economic forces in globalisation as an expansion of modernity, whereby the 
predicament may be seen in terms of a loss of cultural values instead of the conflict 
in one ‘culture’ versus another. 
In addition to Clifford’s criticism of fieldwork-based anthropology in its spatial practice 
and Marcus’ advocacy of a multi-sited ethnography, Abu-Lughod (2006 [1991]) has 
cited the existence of ‘halfies’, people with mixed national or cultural identities due to 
migration, overseas education or parentage, in her attack on anthropology for 
continuing to privilege “the study of the non-Western other by the Western self” (p. 
467). To mitigate the construction of the ‘other’ and the highlighting of differences 
among cultures imagined as coherent, timeless and discrete, she has suggested 
contesting the discursive formation of culture through a strategy of Bourdieu in 
shifting attention to practice, tracing connections of communities in history and 
transnationalism, and writing against homogeneity in culture through subversion in 
‘ethnographies of the particular’ (Ibid., pp. 472-473).  
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Meantime on the sociological front, Archer (1991) has presented a case for 
accepting that “the globalisation of society means that societies are no longer the 
prime units of sociology” (p. 133; cited in McGrew, 1996, p. 499) as global processes 
become constitutive of social reality worldwide. The task of international sociology 
would hence be to specify global mechanisms in regional circumstances, without 
falling into any ‘false universalism’ of modernisation theory or postmodernism, Archer 
argues (1991, p. 138). She has separately criticised Parsons’ assumption of a 
normative functionalism whereby integration of social systems simply follows as a 
result of value orientations are institutionalised in role expectations (1996, p. 33). 
With similar concerns, Luhmann (1998) has pointed out that there is a differentiation 
between the global and the regional societies in goals or norms, despite the fact that 
the political system of the state has become a worldwide system; the observation of 
such divergence provides a better perspective, he argues, than an old contrast 
between tradition and modernity that privileged European rationalism as if it is not a 
tradition itself (pp. 807-808).     
Among several major theoretical perspectives to be discussed, this sub-section will 
focus on the world system of economy as the main logic of globalisation, in order to 
consider how globalisation as an expansion of modernity does not imply cultural 
integration among communities, but may instead tend towards value conflicts among 
different forms of living. It will follow arguments that globalisation is not a simple 
process that leads to cultural homogenisation, but instead involves the continuing 
use of cultures as a form of social control by nation states, as both Wallerstein and 
Hannerz would suggest. Furthermore, culture may also be devalued with the 
‘irrationality’ of modern rationality under globalisation that Ritzer (1993) calls 
‘Mcdonaldisation’, in an adaptation of Weber’s perspectives on modernity. In all of 
these arguments, culture is not to be understood as a separate and autonomous 
system along with the social system influencing human action, as Parsons suggests, 
but placed under a larger framework as being constructed and shaped within the 
social system.  
Tracing contemporary scholarship on the phenomenon of globalisation through what 
he identifies as three waves of thinking, Holton (2005) has pulled together a 
definition of globalisation under the ‘third-wave’ thinking which he considers most 
comprehensive and also balanced or neutral. This definition involves three different 
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aspects: firstly, the ‘intensified movement of goods, money, technology, information, 
people, ideas and cultural practices across political and cultural boundaries” (pp. 14-
15); secondly, the “inter-dependence of social processes across the globe, such that 
all social activity is profoundly interconnected rather than separated off into different 
national and cultural spaces” (Ibid., p. 15); thirdly, “[c]onsciousness of and 
identification with the world as a single place” (Ibid.), in the forms of cosmopolitanism, 
religion or environmentalism. 
Holton associates first-wave thinking on globalisation with the belief that increased 
mobility of capital and labour was rendering national economies outmoded, 
threatening the sovereignty of nation-states (Ohmae, 1990, 1996; cited in Holton, 
2005, p. 6), or that global corporate power was creating globalised mass markets 
and threatening to undermine local culture through homogenisation (Sklair, 1991; 
cited in Holton, Ibid.). On the edge of this are scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein 
who explain cross-border interdependencies with the world-system theory, but they 
may not adopt a similar concept of ‘globalisation’ for analysis (cited in Holton, 2005, 
p. 7).  
The second wave according to Holton was marked by scepticism of first-wave 
thinking, for example in Hirst and Thompson (1996) who used evidence in the 
operation of multi-national companies to argue that nations remain alive and well 
instead of being taken over by an emerging transnational global order (cited in 
Holton, 2005, p. 8). There were also criticisms against assumptions of global cultural 
homogenisation, for instance in Huntington (1996) who insisted that the challenge 
was rather one of wars between civilisations (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 9). 
In the third wave, there was a rethinking of the core concepts or very definition of 
globalisation, as advanced by Hay and Marsh (2000), who saw globalisation as a 
trend with a range of processes such as cross-border interconnection and inter-
dependence, but a trend reversible by counter-trends  (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 10). 
Globalisation in this perspective is seen as the explanandum, that to be explained, 
not the explanans, the explanation of observed change; in other words, it is an effect 
and not a cause (Ibid.). Another important position in third-wave thinking is to be 
critical of both first-wave assumptions and second-wave scepticism, by taking 
globalisation as trans-nationalism seriously while being aware of its limits. This is 
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represented by David Held and his associates with the idea of ‘global 
transformations’ (Held et al, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002), where globalisation is 
seen as a fluid set of processes amenable to intervention by human agency and re-
shaping of social institutions (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 11).  
Holton (2005) in his definition of globalisation has meant to articulate a similar 
position, that globalisation is a set of processes too complex to be embraced by a 
single explanation and human agency along with institutional attempts also matter in 
shaping change, for “globalisation is not an irresistible, uncheckable, and completely 
irreversible force transforming social arrangements in an unparalleled way” (p. 188). 
By emphasising the dimensions of consciousness and agency in his definition for 
globalisation, he is effectively incorporating the World Culture Theory of Robertson 
(1992) with its emphasis on global consciousness (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 14), and 
indirectly also conceding the World Polity Theory which considers postulates a 
“system of creating value through the collective conferral of authority” (Meyer, 1980, 
pp. 111-112; cited in Lechner, 2000, online) with the nation-states constituted as 
rationalised actors (Meyer, 1997, p. 153; cited in Lechner, 2000, online), except he 
replaces it with perspectives on global interdependence by David Held (1995; cited 
in Holton, 2005, p. 14). Out of the three most important perspectives on globalisation 
which have been cited by Lechner and Boli (2000, pp. 49-51), it is Wallerstein’s 
World Systems Theory which Holton (2005) turns out to reject, on account of what 
he considers an “over-deterministic approach to analysis centred on a single 
systems logic” (p. 57) and a “downplaying of social action and analysis of the 
strategies and impact of social actors” (Ibid.).  
This thesis will however emphasise the merits of Wallerstein’s approach based on 
the premise, first of all, that the explanation of the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ in 
all its different dimensions of human society, is not the purpose in his theory. The 
approach remains useful in analysing how the structure of the modern world system 
provides insights on the understanding of cultural values as part of the social system, 
which is one basis for a framework to be clarified as part of this thesis. Secondly, the 
immediate incorporation of global consciousness and human agency in a description 
of ‘globalisation’ under Holton’s third-wave thinking may tend to obscure whatever 
problems that the structure of the world’s capitalist economy poses generally, be it 
problems facing cultural diversity, religious harmony or environmental protection. It 
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may be more fruitful to consider these aspects, as potential reactions to the 
dominant logic of globalisation in capitalistic economy, only on the second instance, 
which will be done here in the subsequent subsection. 
This subsection will meantime continue to seek refinement of the concept of 
globalisation by considering the first two aspects cited by Holton, beginning with a 
characterisation of globalisation in terms of cross-border movements of people, 
goods and ideas. This has posed a difficulty as to when globalisation may be dated 
back to, for human beings have been a ‘travelling species’ since their forebears left 
Africa, as Kwame Anthony Appiah (2003, p. 192) has pointed out (cited in Holton, 
2005, p. 28). Hence Holton argues that movement across borders alone may be a 
necessary rather than sufficient indicator of globalisation, a crucial indicator having to 
include the element of interdependence between distanciated social organisations 
and also the sense or imagination of the world as a single place (Ibid., p. 30). 
Whereas anti-global critics would interpret the interdependence in globalisation as 
passive or involuntary, one taking into account the role of the global imagination like 
Holton may include pilgrims, explorers, colonists and environmental activist all as 
part of globalisation as long-distance trade or cultural exchange (Ibid.). It would be 
maintained here however that Wallerstein’s perspective may be more purposeful by 
distinguishing between mechanisms in world empires of the ancient world which 
relied on military and political bonds, and those in the capitalist world-system today, 
except that Janet Abu-Lughod (1993) has produced an alternative account of 
continuities and discontinuities in world-system development predating the post-1500 
European colonial system in Wallerstein’s account and avoiding a fundamental 
dichotomy between East and West in world domination (cited in Holton, 2005, pp. 
34-35).  
A support for the interpretation of cross-border movements being involuntary rather 
than free may come from observation of trends in migration, where the “uneven 
development of global capitalism sets the parameters of both migration processes 
and development prospects in the South or Third World (Munck, 2008, p. 1228). The 
World Migration 2005 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 
2005, p. 13) has indicated that all 190 or so sovereign states in the world are either 
migrant sending, receiving or transit points, with 190 million people living outside 
their country of birth, a figure double to that in 1980 (cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1229). 
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However, Munck points out that this figure is still less than 3 per cent of the world’s 
population, up only slightly from 2.5 per cent of total world population classified as 
international migrants in 1960 (Ibid.). What this suggests that it is necessary to 
examine more closely why people move or do not, in connection with the question of 
migration being part of the global process of capital accumulation and labour 
exploitation (Ibid.). Citing an OECD report by Harrison, Britton and Swanson (2004, p. 
4), he notes that only a quarter of international migrants go from the global South to 
the global North (OECD countries), while not quite two-thirds of migrants move within 
the global South, though media attention appears to focus exclusively on the 16 per 
cent moving across the South-North divide, giving an unbalanced impression for the 
understanding of global migration (Munck, 2008, p. 1230). And despite a focus on 
the mobility of the new transnational capitalist and professional classes, the 
International Labour Organisation has declared in the Stopping Forced Labour report 
(ILO, 2001): “Although universally condemned, forced labour is revealing ugly new 
faces alongside the old. (cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1234)” Based on the definition of 
forced labour in the IOM convention as all work or service that is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty and not offered voluntarily, it is estimated 
that there are 12.3 million people submitted to forced labour worldwide, of which 2.45 
million are trafficked for the purpose (Andeers, 2006; cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1235).  
Unfree labour has continued to play a role in the development of global capitalism, in 
which regard David Harvey has argued that the world is living through a new 
primitive accumulation of capitalism that he calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
(cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1235). There has generally been governance deficits in 
international migration, with slow progress attributed by Stephen Castles to “the fear 
of labour-recruiting countries that regulation will increase the costs of migrant labour 
and put social obligations on receiving countries” (2008, p. 19; cited in Munck, 2008, 
p. 1238). Meantime, migration is not only a matter of economic process dictated by 
market forces but a key element influencing the politics of culture, as host societies 
are becoming increasingly fearful of the presence of migrant communities, especially 
those with unfamiliar cultures, and the arrival of migrants may suddenly prompt a 
rediscovery of national identity or cultural traditions (Munck, 2008, pp. 1231-1233)  
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When it comes to cross-border movements of goods and ideas, the concern is often 
one of cultural homogenisation. The threat, which some may choose to describe as 
‘cultural imperialism’, would be one “rhetorically depicted as involving the high-tech 
culture of the metropolis, with powerful organisational backing, facing a defenceless, 
small-scale folk culture” (Hannerz, 2000, p. 331). But this ‘cultural imperialism’, as 
Hannerz argues, has more to do with the market today than with any empire, as 
“[h]omogenisation results mainly from the centre-to-periphery flow of commoditised 
culture” (Ibid.). The use of the term here dates back to a heavily criticised theory of 
cultural imperialism, referring to "how an ideology, a politics or a way of life is 
exported into other territories through the export of cultural products" (Sturken and 
Cartwright, 2009, p. 397). This has been expounded notably by communication 
theorists Armand Mattelart and Herbert Schiller, who argued that television has been 
a means through which world powers invade the cultural and ideological space of a 
country with images and messages (Ibid.). Armand Mattelart, together with cultural 
critic Ariel Dorfman, demonstrated in How to Read Donald Duck (1972) that Disney 
characters and stories, ostensibly targeted merely at child audiences, actually play a 
role in promulgating US imperialism in Latin America. But this use of the term 
'imperialism' has been lambasted for its ambiguity, as it may refer freely to a political 
system or an economic system, without being clear as to patterns of colonial 
attitudes and practices or the system of economic relations in global capitalism 
involved (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 4). Tomlinson also criticises that Dorfman and 
Mattelart offered a notion of the manipulative power of the media text by assuming a 
similar interpretation by child or adult audience, without demonstrating how the 
cultural goods supposedly transmit the values they contain (Ibid., p. 44).   
Hannerz (2000) would instead postulate four different frameworks involved in the 
process of ‘cultural flows’. Apart from the market framework, in which cultural 
commodities are moved amid competition among the agents which keep innovating 
to foster new demand, there is a state framework whereby citizens may be provided 
with ‘good culture’ that meet sanctioned intellectual and aesthetic standards, there is 
a third framework in ‘form of life’ through everyday practices in production and 
reproduction of meanings, and there is a fourth framework of movements that may 
be transnational (pp. 333-335). There may furthermore be two tendencies in the 
longer-term reconstruction of peripheral cultures within the global world, of which the 
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‘saturation tendency’ would be a version of the global homogenisation scenario, 
whereby peripheral culture gradually assimilate the imported meanings and forms as 
transnational cultural influences “unendingly pound on the sensibilities of the people 
of the periphery” (Ibid., p. 335). Yet there may also be a ‘maturation tendency’, 
whereby the periphery reshapes metropolitan culture through some phases, until 
metropolitan forms become hybridised, as local cultural entrepreneurs master the 
alien cultural forms to create new forms that are “more responsive to, and at the 
same time in part outgrowths of, local everyday life” (Ibid., p. 336).       
However, Hannerz says that such a creolisation scenario is open-ended and may 
even be paradoxical: “When the peripheral culture absorbs the influx of meanings 
and symbolic forms from the centre and transforms them to make them in some 
considerable degree their own, they may at the same so increase the cultural 
affinities between the centre and the periphery that the passage of more cultural 
imports is facilitated. (Ibid., p. 337)” What the ‘end state’ might be, is in his 
perspective difficult to say. Noting that Hannerz has chosen not to commit to any 
speculation by ruling out the possibility of a global culture emerging, Tomlinson 
(1999, p. 72) argues for a more nuanced view not along the line of a monolithic 
global culture but more of a globalised culture (Ibid). Referring to Raymond Williams’ 
dictum that ‘culture is ordinary’ (Williams, 1989; cited in Ibid., p. 19), Tomlinson 
argues that one may understand culture as “the order of life in which human beings 
construct meaning through practices of symbolic representation” (p. 18), as 
“practices which do not directly hinge on a relationship between a ‘reader’ and a 
‘text’ ” (p. 20). With this perspective, the concern in globalisation is more centred on 
the question of how it alters the context of meaning construction through  
connectivity in communication (Ibid.) or ‘cultural flow’, lifting context out of the 
confines of territory, to constitute what one may call a globalised culture beyond the 
framework of national cultures (Ibid., p. 105).  
The second element of globalisation according to Holton (2005) is interdependence, 
an aspect referring to human activity transcending borders through agency of global 
entrepreneurs or regulators as well as social movement activists and cultural 
practitioners, involving formally organised undertakings or those embodied in 
networks (p. 15). This is well encapsulated in Giddens’ (1991) description of 
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globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice versa” (p. 64). He characterises it as a dialectical process, since 
local happenings as such may move in a reverse direction from the very distanciated 
relations that are shaping them (Ibid.) 
The new efficient manner in which communication takes place in the globalised 
world, hence facilitating such interdependence in economic, social or cultural 
organisation, has also been characterised by David Harvey (1996) with the idea of 
time-space compression. He links the globalisation of time and space with the 
dynamics of capitalist globalisation, whereby new technologies both speed up the 
tempo of life and reduce spatial barriers to economic activity for production and 
exchange (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 82). He traces these technological inputs to the 
common use of the minute and second from the 17th century, together with the time-
conscious regime of industrial production and work discipline (cited in Ibid). In the 
spatial dimension, they are associated with advances in transportation and 
communication, what Harvey refers to as ‘the annihilation of space by time’ (cited in 
Ibid., p. 83). From Harvey’s neo-Marxist perspective, the power of new geographies 
now deploy such new forms of space-time, stemming from processes of capital 
accumulation that prompts shorter time-horizons for decision-making, shorter 
product and fashion cycles, and even changes the structures of feeling to favour the 
short-term and ephemeral. 
One most controversial question on the globalised world economy pertains to the 
patterns and distribution of global inequality, as to whether it is falling or rising with 
trends of globalisation. The 2003 Human Development Report of the UNDP has 
indicated for instance that 54 countries in the 1990s became poorer than they were 
in 1990, with life expectancy shrinking to 34 and an increased hunger rate to 21 
(cited in Holton, 2005, p. 162). Such states of affairs have led to much discontent 
founded on the view that globalisation is to blame, a view reinforced by images of 
low-wage workers in sweatshops manufacturing goods for multi-national 
corporations, and buttressed by an “intellectual assumption […] that the dominant 
forces affecting economic well-being are exogenous” (Holton, 2005, p. 163). Holton 
however raises question as to whether endogenous explanations may be replaced 
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entirely, citing civil conflict in more than half of the world’s poorest countries in the 
1990s according to World Bank (2003) report (cited in Ibid.) as example. He argues 
that in some of such countries like in sub-Saharan Africa, the problem may even lie 
in too little involvement by external global actors in capital, technology, education 
and human rights, rather than too much (Ibid.). In any case, the World Bank has also 
pointed out in the 2003 report that the average income in the richest 20 countries is 
already 37 times greater than in the poorest 20 nations, with the gap between rich 
and poor countries doubling in the past 40 years (cited in Ibid., p. 164).  
In terms of the world’s income distribution across the world’s populations, the 
proportion of people living on less than $2 were well over 80 per cent in India and 
Ethiopia at the close of the 20th century, whereas in China, Nigeria and Indonesia it 
was nearly 60 per cent, and in Mexico and Turkey over 40 per cent (WB, 1999-2000; 
cited in Ibid., pp. 164-165). East and South Asia still comprised two-thirds of the 
world’s very poor (Ibid.; cited in Holton, 2005, p. 165). As for global inequality 
patterns between and within nations, analyses by Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999) 
and O’Rourke (2002), which take into account GDP per head and population levels 
of different countries, have shown that world inequality has increased since 1820, 
with more rapid increases evident between 1820 and 1910, and again between 1960 
and 1980s, both periods of expanding free trade and global market integration (cited 
in Holton, 2005, p. 166). However, Holton (Ibid.) argues that caution needs to be 
exercised as two forms of inequality are at play, whereby within-country inequality is 
likely driven by internal political factors and only between-country inequality is likely 
to be stronger measure of effects of economic globalisation.  
According to the World Systems Theory, global inequality may be explained in terms 
of an all-powerful global economy dominating politics and culture while creating and 
reproducing inequality, notwithstanding how inconclusive the interpretation of 
statistics may be in supporting a single explanation. Holton meanwhile insists on 
several possibilities, arguing that some causes of inequality may be less to do with 
globalisation than with protectionism of rich countries, or with local injustice and 
corruption (2005, p. 183). But one may counter this with a defence that the World 
Systems Theory that does not completely eliminate the role of nation-states in 
perpetuating inequality. Holton appears to be assuming a dichotomy between 
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globalisation and nation-states as causes for inequality, ignoring possibilities such as 
what Sklair (2000) calls a transnational capitalist class.  
The argument in this section is not to claim any single causal logic as the 
explanation for all the various processes of cross-border movements and 
interconnections discussed above as ‘globalisation’. The central question is rather 
how such globalisation, as an expansion of modernity (Giddens, 1991, p. 63) where 
economic processes take primacy, is posing a dilemma in the conflicts of value, in 
addition to being linked to issues of human rights and inequality. Giddens considers 
modernity as inherently globalising due to the basic characteristics of 
disembeddedness and reflexivity in modern institutions (Ibid.), whereby 
‘disembedding’ refers to the lifting out of social relations from local contexts, through 
mechanisms such as the modern money economies (Ibid., pp. 21-25), whereas 
‘reflexivity’ refers to a characteristic in human action which is originally integrated 
with the organisation of the community in traditional cultures (Ibid., p. 37), replaced in 
modernity by a new reflexively applied knowledge which has loses the old certitude 
(Ibid., p. 39). These lead to a problem in modernity which may also be discussed in 
Weber’s terms as one of disenchantment through rationality. 
Weber’s tragic view of modernity, in terms of the differentiation of culture into a 
disorder of irreconcilable and competing value positions at the same time that 
rational or scientific knowledge leads to increasing sameness of modern life, has 
been set in contrast to greater optimism in Lyotard’s postmodern view of culture as 
comprising an infinite number of local narratives instead of one grand or 
metanarrative. Charles Turner (1990) is to be credited here for analysing how 
Lyotard and Weber diverge over the issue of cultural differentiation: Weber according 
to him has come from a neo-Kantian philosophy in treating individual value spheres 
as potential sites for reconstruction of an ethical ‘totality’, and is hence unable to 
embrace pluralism in the multiplicity of local narratives as Lyotard does by way of 
Wittgensteinian language games (pp. 108-115; cited in Gane, 2002, pp. 95-96). 
Gane (2002) however highlights the affinities between Weber’s and Lyotard’s 
position despite apparent differences, for instance in their move away from any 
narrative of historical progress and any idea of totality underlying the concept of an 
epoch. Lyotard in particular has claimed that modernity is not a historical entity as 
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such but the expression of an ethos, and neither do modernity and postmodernity 
mean a succession of historical periods, for the postmodern epitomises the 
experimental moment as Lyotard (1984) has proclaimed: “A work can only become 
modern if it is first postmodern. (p. 79; cited in Gane, 2002, p. 97)” 
More importantly, as Gane argues, Weber and Lyotard are both critical of the 
instrumental reason bearing on Western and modern culture. Against Turner’s 
perspective, he contends that for Weber it is not a question that the universal has to 
be extracted or that there is no way for conflicts between values to be resolved, but 
rather a neo-Kantian statement on the divide between ideal-typical constructs and 
empirical reality, such that there are possibilities in practice for compromise but one 
is forced to choose between values that are irreconcilable (Gane, 2002, pp. 99-100). 
It is on this finer point that Weber is at odds with Lyotard, who suggests that 
rationalisation and modernisation are nothing but metanarratives and hence 
instrumental reason may be dissolved into different positions which are individually 
determined, whereas Weber himself sees the very freedom of the individual in value-
rational action limited by the force of instrumental reason (Ibid., pp. 101-102). 
Hence Bauman (1995) would attest to Weber’s observation of modern 
‘disenchantment’, whereby one is constantly partial, “decrying and disavowing old 
strategies [yet extolling] the need for strategy and the promise that the right strategy 
will be eventually produced” (p. 21); citing at the same time Lyotard’s observation of 
modern narrative as an idea living in the future yet to be implemented (Ibid.). He 
adds that modern civilisation “is only ostensibly purpose-oriented […] and always 
has been not action-oriented, but ability-to-act-oriented” (p. 23), such that modernity 
easily falls into a ‘globality’ of consuming whatever out there in the global economy 
(p. 24). 
Giddens (1991) identifies capitalism, along with the nation-state, as the main 
element promoting the expansion of modern institutions (p. 62). Picking up on this 
main line of argument and avoiding complication with other dimensions that Giddens 
has included as part of the processes of globalisation, the remaining focus in this 
subsection would be to adopt a perspective of the World Systems Theory of 
Immanuel Wallerstein, in order to examine the effects of the world system of 
economy on cultures in the nation-states. Under Wallerstein’s framework, culture, 
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despite being mostly regarded as epiphenomenal, has also been presented as an 
empirical aspect of the world systems order (Wallerstein, 1979; cited in Robertson, 
1991, p. 65).  
Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory basically refers to the substitution of the 
national state with the ‘world-system’ as the standard unit of analysis, following a 
new perspective that began in the 1970s as an attempt to combine “concern with the 
unit of analysis, concern with social temporalities, and concern with the barriers that 
had been erected between different social science disciplines” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 
16). A major source in this new approach is historian Fernand Braudel’s idea of 
structural time, what he termed as longue durée in the 1958 article ‘Histoire et 
Sciences Sociales. La Longue Durée’.  
Wallerstein highlights the significance of this new historical approach by tracing the 
disciplinary divisions in social sciences back to the 19th century. History was then set 
apart as the study of the past, whereas the study on social reality of the modern time 
was differentiated among the three social spheres of the market, the state and the 
civil society, which consequently fell under the economists, the political scientists 
and the sociologists respectively (Ibid., p. 4) The 19th-century also saw the 
emergence of anthropology as the study of ‘primitive’ peoples assumed as having no 
history, and that of Oriental studies, involving philological skills, to deal with ‘high 
civilisations’ such as China, India, Persia and the Arab world (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Since 
the revolutionary movements of 1968, however, social scientists began to raise 
issues on epistemologies in the older structures of knowledge, not to mention 
discovering the histories of hitherto neglected groups such as women, minority 
groups, indigenous populations and so on, Wallerstein argues (Ibid., p. 16). 
Braudel’s perspective came into the fore here as he criticised the traditional 
idiographic, empiricist and political historiography as mere ‘event-dominated’ or 
episodic history, just as he criticised the purely nomothetic work of many social 
scientists as being mythical in their search for timeless truths (Ibid., p. 15). For a new 
approach in between these two extremes, Braudel insisted on two other social times 
that had been neglected, namely structural time as long-lasting basic structures of 
‘historical systems’, and the cyclical processes within these structures in terms of 
expansions and contractions of the world-economy as medium-term trends (Ibid.). 
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Adopting this perspective in world-systems analysis, the national states are hence 
replaced by ‘historical systems’ as the object of study. Three variants of historical 
systems are identified: minisystems, world-empires and world-economies - 
categories apparently derived from economic historian Karl Polanyi, who 
distinguished between three forms of economic organisation, namely “reciprocal (a 
sort of direct give and take), redistributive (in which goods went from the bottom of 
the social ladder to the top to be then returned in part to the bottom), and market (in 
which exchange occurred in monetary forms in a public arena)” (Ibid., p. 17). These 
three forms marked the development from simple societies of agriculture or hunting 
and gathering, through empires which required payment of tributes as ‘protection 
costs’, to the world-system today dominated by market trade, with multiple polities 
and cultures (Wallerstein, 2000, pp. 57-58).  
This world-system of capitalist economy is furthermore analysed as being marked by 
“an axial division of labour between core-like production processes and peripheral 
production processes” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 17), which tends to group together 
around particular countries such that one may for simplicity speak of core and 
peripheral zones or even core and peripheral states (Ibid.). Wallerstein emphasises 
that the ‘core-periphery’ is a relational concept, not terms applying to a reified pair 
(Ibid.).  
Combining the above perspectives in the world-systems analysis, Immanuel 
Wallerstein (2000) traces the current capitalist world system back to the 16th century, 
when the European world-economy did not transform into a redistributive world-
empire but instead into a capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 58), with 
firm connections eventually established in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The 
Europeans developed an occupational and geographic division of labour in which 
capital-intensive production was reserved for core countries, whereas peripheral 
areas provided low-skilled labour and raw materials and the semi-periphery acted as 
a buffer, in a model which, Wallerstein argues, already started in an early prototype 
with northwest Europe marked by industries like textiles, shipbuilding and metal 
wares, Eastern Europe as peripheral areas specialising in export of grains, wood, 
cotton and sugar, while Mediterranean Europe emerged as the semi-peripheral are 
specialising in high-cost industrial products such as silk (Ibid., p. 59). He names 
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three major mechanisms that have enabled such economic systems to retain relative 
political stability in terms of systemic survival: firstly, concentration of military 
strength in the hands of the dominant forces; secondly, the pervasiveness of an 
ideological commitment to the system, meaning the degree to which the staff or 
cadres of the system “feel that their own well-being is wrapped up in the survival of 
the system” (Ibid., p. 62); and finally, the existence of a majority of the semi-
peripheral “middle stratum” as part of “three kinds of states, with pressures for 
cultural homogenisation within each of them” (Ibid.), next to the upper stratum of 
core-states and lower stratum of peripheral states.  
Despite faulting it for concentrating too heavily on the factor of economic influences 
on modern transformations and missing out on other dimensions, Giddens (1992) 
has credited this model of the core, semi-periphery and periphery for helping to 
explain massive imbalances in the world capitalists economy, and managing to 
break away from limitations of orthodox sociological thought which tends to focus on 
‘endogenous models’ of social change (p. 69).  
Under the logic of such a world-system, cultural integration is not required for the 
system to function and hence ‘culture’ in various forms, is subordinate to the greater 
order and tied up with racism, sexism and a deceptive form of universalism, for “the 
world-economy is a complex of cultures – in the sense of languages, religions and 
ideologies – but the complex is not haphazard” (Wallerstein, 1984, p. 14; cited in 
Holton, 2005, p. 56). Wallerstein (1990) argues that ‘culture’ in the view of 
anthropologists, as a collection of traits, behaviours, values or beliefs among people 
which are neither universal nor idiosyncratic, is “a way of summarising the ways in 
which groups distinguish themselves from other groups” (pp. 31-32). Culture in this 
usage is normally attributed to nations, ‘tribes’ or ‘ethnic groups’, but he questions 
the evidence that any group has a ‘culture’ as such, for it “is surely not that all 
presumed ‘members of any of these groups act similarly to each other and differently 
from all others” (Ibid., p. 33) One may at most argue for significant relationship 
between group ‘membership’ and certain behaviour or value preferences, but this 
would not get one very far in historical analyses (Ibid., p. 34).   
There is also a second usage of the word ‘culture’ according to Wallerstein, but this 
refers to certain characteristics within the group as opposed to other characteristics 
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within the same group, such as the higher arts as opposed to popular or everyday 
practice (Ibid., p. 32). But he argues that both concepts are nothing but some kind of 
idea-system under the capitalist world-economy that is derived from “our collective 
historical attempts to come to terms with the contradictions, the ambiguities, the 
complexities of the socio-political realities of this particular system” (Ibid., p. 38). The 
reality is one of transformations under the world-economy, which may be conceived 
of as changes from a local and traditional culture to a world-wide modern culture, but 
may also be conceived as one of populations within certain geographical boundaries 
under the pressure to give up their ‘culture’ to adopt that of the Western powers (Ibid. 
36). The concept of culture in the first usage is hence simply an “assertion of 
unchanging realities amidst a world that is in fact ceaselessly changing” (Ibid., p. 39), 
whereas culture in the second usage is merely the “justification of the inequities of 
the system” (Ibid.). Wallerstein questions the point in using the proclamation of 
culture to assert a universalist theme such as the ‘high values to the human 
personality’, as political intellectual Rex Nettleford in Jamaica has done with the 
assertion of ‘blackness’ as national culture to fight against claims of the privileged 
view representing a ‘higher culture’ (Ibid., p. 41). The difficulty for him is where one 
draws the line between ‘race consciousness’ and racism, seeing many clear cases in 
the world where the assertion of the particularist ‘culture’ of the national majority to 
the exclusion of the minorities may be seen as oppressive (Ibid.). In short, he sees 
the construction of culture as an ideological battleground of opposing interests within 
a historical system (Ibid., p. 39), where culture may be used as a legitimation of 
power in the absence of monarchical-aristocratic systems, and patriotism based on 
the idea of culture may be reinforced or transformed into racism against immigrants 
(Ibid., p. 47).  
‘Culture’ may also be used in a universalist sense to help legitimise polarisation in 
the world, according to Wallerstein, whereby states which make little progress in 
copying the universal culture of the modern world may be blamed for “being ‘racist’ in 
rejecting universal ‘modern’ values” (Ibid., p. 49). In short, the premises of ‘culture’ 
help to befuddle realities of a globalised world under its power structure. The realities 
of globalisation, as one may point out here, not only include that of inequality under a 
capitalist economy, but also what Ritzer (2004) has identified as another of the 
“major motor forces” (p. 162) in globalisation, namely McDonaldisation. 
92 
 
McDonaldisation, refers to a process in which the principles analogous to the fast-
food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society 
and the rest of the world (Ibid. p. 1), based on dimensions of success such as 
efficiency, calculability, predictability and control (Ibid., p. 12) Part of the groundwork 
for McDonaldisation has been laid down by the idea of the automobile assembly line 
which helped lower prices, increase sales and increase profitability for the Ford 
Motor Company through greater efficiency (pp. 33-35). With the worldwide diffusion 
of such practices through globalisation, even the ways in which social life throughout 
the world is organised has been McDonaldised, according to Ritzer (Ibid., pp. 160-
161) As an amplification of Weber’s theory of rationalisation, which discusses how 
people’s value systems have been replaced in the modern world by institutionalised 
rules to decide or dictate their choices, McDonaldisation with its bureaucracy implies 
a form of control that places even greater emphasis on the optimal choice in 
operation, by favouring efficiency and quantity over quality of work (Ibid., pp. 25-26). 
Countering criticisms against the World Systems Theory for being one-dimensional 
in the explanation of ‘globalisation’, one may point out Kellner’s (2009, p. 2) 
observation that globalisation may be understood as a more neutral replacement 
term for modernisation with its positive and legitimating discourse. Globalisation 
theory such as Castell’s and Appadurai’s effectively switches the theoretical frame 
from analysis of capitalist mode of production to analysis of technological 
developments, and by producing visions of new freedoms through media and 
communications technology, may indirectly support an “emancipatory vision of 
neoliberalism” (Ampuja, 2012, p. 297). One may thus fall to the ideology of 
neoliberalism, the dominant political and economic dogma since the Reagan and 
Thatcher revolutions in the early 1980s and the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, with all its 
defence of private property and competitive market in the name of individual freedom 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 3; cited in Ampuja, 2012, p. 296).   
In short, globalisation does not imply a simple case of homogenisation in cultural 
manifestation, as localities may also incorporate global culture into their own forms of 
life to create some hybrids. Yet as part of a condition of modernity, it produces a 
globalised culture where traditional practices are disembedded from their earlier 
contexts and a new form of rationality becomes privileged.  ‘Cultures’ in some reified 
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forms may be used meantime as an ideological tool to legitimise the power of the 
privileged, diverting attentions from realities of change or inequality. It would hence 
be arguably more pertinent to consider culture as everyday practices of people under 
the social system, reacting to changing contexts of a local-global relationship. 
However, the rise of a new global consciousness also tends to divert from such 
social consciousness to the heightening of problems associated with cultural 
differences, an issue which will be explored in the following subsection.  
 
2.3.2 Consciousness of Cultural Differences with Intensification of the 
Global-Local Relationship 
This subsection will consider another perspective on globalisation, not in terms of 
what one may argue as the main logic behind cross-border movements and 
interdependence in the modern world, but instead of the how it may be imagined 
within a ‘global consciousness’ as discussed in Robertson’s World Culture Theory, 
which argues that there is not only a unifying trend of universalism but also 
increasing differentiation through a simultaneous process of particularism.  
By focusing on the cognitive aspect of culture, Robertson provides an interesting 
perspective on how consciousness of cultural differences may be heightened 
through global-local interpenetration. He hence argues for the importance of cultural 
studies in analysing how culture is represented and how it may be othered, beyond 
the question of structure and agency in Archer’s sociological analysis of culture. 
Archer on her part has made major arguments in questioning the myth of cultural 
integration; crucially, as will be discussed in this section, she has raised questions on 
how a culture should be observed and understood, as she differentiates between a 
cultural system of meanings in its own and a socio-cultural system in which ‘culture’ 
would be understood in terms of the social life.   
Cultural studies would provide further perspectives on culture, not as social life to be 
observed in a positivist sense but as a set of ideals in value systems, and a related 
concept of ‘development’. Additionally, one may consider culture under an 
institutionalised model of Meyer’s World Polity Theory on globalisation, which 
Robertson also aligns with. Meyer challenges modernisation theory with a cognitive 
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model, a perspective which would eventually lead us to the question of whether the 
issue of ‘cultural values’ should be studied as part of psychology or as part of ethics. 
Robertson (1992) uses the concept of globalisation to refer “both to the compression 
of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (p. 8), 
with his interest focusing on ‘global consciousness’, tracing its notion back to 
McLuhan’s imagery of the global village in the 1960s. In contrast with the 
perspectives of Wallerstein and others discussed in Section 2.3.1, he does not 
approach globalisation in terms of circumstances of economic factors and processes, 
or any related problems in modernity related to the capitalist system, as he prefers to 
emphasise that the reflexive character of modernisation makes it more fluid and 
‘subjective’ (Ibid., pp. 8-13). He criticises Weber in his ‘iron cage’ argument for 
“denying that the charismatic glorification of reason had helped to create definitely 
modern forms of economic and political individualism” (Ibid., p. 24). To Robertson, 
Weber had a tendency to see culture in a negative sense in terms of struggles 
between nations on the preservation of societal values, whereas Durkheim would be 
more open to is today termed as globalisation, as he spoke of the transcendence of 
national societies as ‘international life’  (Ibid., pp. 23-24). 
In Robertson’s view, there were already openings to the theorisation of globalisation 
available in the founding period of sociology, since ‘nationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ 
were a Janus-face problem facing classical sociologists simultaneously (Ibid., p. 15). 
He therefore tries to redefine its germination in a history of sociology which has been 
divided by Albrow (1990, pp. 6-8) under a scheme of five stages, namely 
universalism, national sociologies, internationalism, indigenisation and globalisation 
(cited in Robertson, 1992, pp. 16-21). The stage of universalism refers to the 
aspiration of early sociology to provide a science of humanity based on timeless 
principles, as seen in Comte or Marx; national sociologies to Albrow were 
characterised by intellectual hegemony of national cultures, such as Durkheim 
claiming a ‘French-rational’ synthesis of German idealism and British empiricism; 
internationalism started after World War II as represented by Parsons’ modernisation 
thesis; indigenisation was a phase centred on the Third World; and globalisation 
according to Abrow marked the interaction between nationalism and internationalism 
(Ibid.) Robertson finds Albrow’s characterisation of the stages helpful to some extent 
but needing modification, particularly with regards to the significance of Durkheim, 
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who should be credited for being concerned with the generalised theme of 
universalism and its relationship with particularism. This involves a relationship 
between moral relativism and a humanity-oriented moral universalism in Durkheim’s 
concept (Ibid., p. 23), which Robertson would adapt for delineation of the global 
circumstances.   
A more contemporary source for Robertson in developing his model of globality was 
social anthropologist Dumont. Dumont argued that the discipline of anthropology was 
simultaneously committed to the ideas of the ‘unity’ of mankind and the uniqueness 
of individual societies, and he attempted to resolve the contradiction by arguing that 
the world in its totality should be regarded as consisting of worldwide relationships 
between societies on one hand and self-contained ‘windowless monads’ on the other 
(Ibid., p. 25). The model of ‘global field’ that Robertson subsequently formulates 
would be more multifaceted, as he considers not two but four major aspects, namely 
national societies; individuals, or selves; relationships between national societies, or 
the world system of societies; and in a generic sense, mankind, or humankind (Ibid.).  
Despite the ‘totalising’ tendency in this model, Robertson maintains that it does so 
partly in order to understand different kinds of orientation to globality, as it is 
conceived as an attempt “to make analytical and interpretive sense of how quotidian 
actors, collective or individual, go about the business of conceiving of the world” 
(Ibid., p. 26). Despite such focus on the consciousness of the actors as its reference 
points, however, Robertson insists that trends towards unicity of the world is 
inexorable, for even protectionism today are ‘self-consciously’ situated within a 
system of global economy and regulations (Ibid.). He adds that the model is a 
flexible one, set out in synchronic terms but also applied diachronically, to take into 
account changes in each of the four major components, in tandem with shifts in 
relations between them (Ibid.). He argues that in order to have a ‘realistic’ view of the 
world as a whole, one has to accept in principle the ‘relative autonomy’ of each of the 
four components but at the same time “acknowledge that each of the four is in one 
way or another constrained by the other three” (Ibid., p. 28). Ultimately, he does not 
completely deny the dynamics of capitalism or other driving forces of globalisation 
but considers such perspectives a well-trodden ground and the interest in his 
approach is therefore to demonstrate discontinuities and differences in culture, as 
opposed to the traditional sociological view of culture as integrating (Ibid., p. 29). He 
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uses the concept of ‘relativisation’ to indicate the increasing challenges presented to 
the stability of particular perspectives on the overall globalisation processes; 
application of the model hence involves the view “that processes of differentiation of 
the main spheres of globality increase over time” (Ibid.). He describes the world as 
being engaged in a ‘postmodern game’ of constructing histories and inventing 
traditions, as a world of ‘reflexive interlocutors’ (Ibid., p. 31). 
Robertson takes the position that in a world that is increasingly compressed, and in 
which its most powerful components, namely the nationally constituted societies and 
the inter-state system, are increasingly subjected to circumstances of multiculturality 
or polyethnicity, “the conditions of and for the identification of individual and 
collective selves and of individual and collective others are becoming ever more 
complex” (p. 98). While acknowledging that personal and collective identity is largely 
constructed, Robertson argues that there are nevertheless dominant ways in which 
this is done in any given period and place, and what happens as the world becomes 
more compressed is that the bases of ‘doing identity’ are increasingly shared, 
perhaps at the same time colliding (Ibid., p. 99). His argument would hence be 
directed towards the aspect of difference as well as the aspect of homogeneity, and 
his thesis is that with the late 20th century, the world has witnessed and participated 
in “a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of 
particularism and the particularisation of universalism” (Ibid., p. 100; emphasis in 
original).   
Robertson notes that Wallerstein has also insisted correctly on the simultaneity of 
particularism and universalism, but thinks he has not addressed the issue of 
interpenetration far enough, and objects to Wallerstein (1984, p. 167) grounding the 
relationship in “the genius and the contradiction of capitalist civilisation” (cited in 
Robertson, 1992, p. 100). Robertson prefers to see a differential spread of capitalism 
which may be explained by its accommodation to how the problematic between the 
particular and the universal is worked out (Ibid.). To put it in another way, the 
contemporary market involves an increasing interpenetration of culture and economy 
(Ibid.).  
Robertson further emphasises that the universalism-particularism issue has been a 
basic feature of the human condition to begin with, citing the example of how Japan 
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acquired the theme of universality through its encounters and modifications of 
Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism (Ibid., pp. 101-102). Secondly, he argues 
that in more recent world history, this issue has come to constitute something like a 
‘global-cultural form’, whereby the global and the local have been tied together as 
one experience with both the expectation of particularity and the expectation of 
universality (Ibid., p. 102). What contemporary globalisation has achieved is a form 
of institutionalisation of the two-fold process, such that any resistance can be 
regarded as opposition not only to the world as one homogenised system but also, 
he believes, to the conception of the world as a series of culturally equal and 
relativised ways of life (Ibid.). Robertson has made an alignment here with a main 
thesis of the World Polity Theory, as he argues that globalisation involves not only 
the institutionalised construction of the individual, but also the worldwide 
institutionalisation of ‘the life course’, which according to John Meyer consists of two 
dimensions, namely ‘aspects of the person that enter into rationalised social 
organisations’ and the public celebration of the private or subjective individual 
(Meyer, 1987, pp. 243-244; cited in Robertson, p. 105).  
Robertson has however been criticised for treating social circumstances generally on 
too abstract a level as such. The essential character of the globality which Robertson 
addresses in his model, as Friedman (1994) observes, is in fact simply “the universal 
as a more or less concrete experienced representation” (p. 196), heightened by 
interconnections among proponents of a global arena through mechanisms of 
technological speed-up which Harvey has expressed in more precise terms as time-
space compression, referring to transport, communication and money economy 
(Ibid.). But there is a lack of clear limits in the framework, so much so that it yields an 
impression of discussion on a spiritual level, under some “understanding that we are 
all part of something bigger” (Ibid.), as Friedman remarks disapprovingly. The 
linkages among the four components in globalisation that Robertson emphasises are 
apparently just cognitive or discursive in nature, rather than economic and political 
processes in any historical perspective; the relativisations in this case might also 
simply be explained away as processes of differentiation or separation in modernity 
(Ibid., p. 197). Friedman would summarise the four different terms simply as identity 
space of modernity, involving the processes of identification, whether it is of the self 
or of ‘the other’ in the larger system (Ibid.). Robertson in any case is not suggesting 
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that the world is becoming more identical, but simply that there are two 
interpenetrating processes, namely the universalization of particularism and the 
particularisation of universalism (Ibid., p. 198). The inadequacy may be seen when 
local or localising phenomena of ethnicity, nationalism and indigenous movements 
may all simply be understood as standard global products without specification of 
social contexts (Ibid.).  
Robertson’s approach has been interpreted partly as reflecting his previous work on 
sociology of religion, and partly as being influenced by Parsons’ account of social life 
embodying values and norms, except the system metaphor with its empirical 
difficulty has been abandoned and replaced by an account in terms of ‘forms of life’ 
in the global field (Holton, 2005, pp. 62-63). While concurring with Friedman on the 
limitations of this approach which underplays economic and political processes, he 
acknowledges Robertson’s attempt to bring some balance with a cultural approach, 
striking for not treating the cultural domain as a unifying normative force in a quasi-
Parsonian manner but rather playing out cultural issues in their complex interactions 
(Ibid. p. 63). The idea of global-local interpenetration appears to provide some 
insights, he argues, for instance on a topic drawn from the sociology of religion, 
namely the revival of fundamentalism, whereby Robertson demonstrates how local 
knowledge is affected by global relationships in frames of reference on intercultural 
exchange and conflict (Ibid., p. 65). However, Holton also points out from a 
theoretical point of view that Robertson is dealing with ontological rather than with 
epistemological issues and his arguments lack a philosophy of history (Ibid., p. 66).   
Where the cultural domain is concerned, Robertson has also contributed to the 
discussion on globalisation by evaluating relevant concepts of culture in the 
development of sociology. Robertson attributes the revived interest in culture, as part 
of a focus on globalisation, to the long decline in sociological interest for it after the 
period of classical sociology, or after around 1920 (Ibid., p. 32). While there were 
some efforts in thematising the issue of culture by Talcott Parsons and his followers 
in between, not much appeared to be done for a long time thereafter, he says (Ibid., 
p. 35).  As reflected in what one likes to call ‘cultural analysis’ (Wuthnow et al, 1984), 
the subject of culture as typically treated in American sociology textbooks is often set 
in isolation from political ideology, religious doctrine and other ideational matters, to 
be limited instead to the idea of culture being a ‘product’ of social interaction, 
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Robertson observes (1992, p.35). Citing examples such as Parsons, Geertz, Sahlins 
and Bourdieu, Robertson argues it is not that the study of culture has made no 
headway, but that little of the vast amount of work done has been admitted as being 
relevant to ‘normal sociology’ (Ibid., pp. 35-36). Culture as a field of inquiry has 
generally been of interest to sociologists, it seems, only when it is of use in 
accounting for variation within the domain of social structure and social action, even 
described as a form of ‘tool kit’ (Swidler, 1986; cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 37). 
Otherwise, whatever historical study of the structure and transformation of 
civilizational patterns of ideas and symbols has largely been marginalised, 
encouraging “the retreat of sociologists into the present” (Elias, 1987; cited in 
Robertson, 1992, p. 37).  
Robertson sees the concern with culture amplified through a realignment of 
relationship between sociology and anthropology, whereby social and cultural 
anthropologists since the 1970s have increasingly incorporated so-called ‘modern 
societies’ in their purview, including what he would term as the global field (1992, p. 
41). Part of the growing concern with culture in sociology actually came from the 
contribution of Marxist theories, in relation to phenomena of nationalism and 
ethnicities, or in terms of cultural hegemony holding back economic forces; even 
Wallerstein has thus taken a cultural turn (Ibid., p. 42).   While some regard culture 
as epiphenomenal, others regard ‘the problem of culture’ as inherent to capitalism, 
the latter represented by Baudrillard with the argument that commodification has 
rendered capitalism a fundamentally cultural phenomenon (Ibid.). The politicisation 
of religion has provided a separate development that helped correct the anti-cultural 
bias in modern sociology (Ibid.).  
Much preoccupation in sociologists’ debates on culture has been along the lines of 
whether culture is determined or determinative (Robertson, 1992, p. 45). On this, 
Archer argues in her major work on culture and agency (1988) that the major 
sociological problems centred on culture can only be amply dealt with through 
careful analytical recognition of the relationship of autonomy as well as 
interdependence between culture as the objective existence of thoughts and beliefs, 
and culture as a factor of action (cited in Ibid., p. 37).  
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The dualistic approach in which Archer systematically analyses the place of culture 
in social theory is significant as it resolves to maintain a distinction between social 
integration and system integration in discussing culture as a system (Archer, 1996, p. 
xvi). It is consequently also relevant in the consideration of how a culture may be 
understood by people of a different group, in a globalised world whereby awareness 
of ‘cultural differences’ is heightened.  
Her perspectives on culture as a system on its own avoids assumptions of a ‘Myth of 
Cultural Integration’ whereby every element is interdependent with every other in a 
coherent organisation (p. 2), and also avoids cultural conflations of various types. 
Archer criticises the insistence in functionalist thought on an internal logic of culture 
combined with the idea of a Parsonian value system for action that guarantees 
societal integration (p. 3). She also criticises similar assumptions on cultural 
coherence that may be present in a humanistic strand of Marxism with regards to 
‘hegemonic culture’ (Ibid.). The confusion in the myth of cultural consistency implicit 
in a general view of culture as ‘a community of shared meanings’, she argues, 
relates to logical consistency and causal consensus (Ibid., p. 4). Logical consistency 
refers to “the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture” 
(Ibid.), components as in ideational elements such as knowledge, belief, norms, 
language and mythology; whereas causal consensus refers to “the degree of social 
uniformity produced by the imposition of culture […] by one set of people on another” 
(Ibid.). The two aspects which may easily be conflated are in fact logically and 
empirically distinct and may vary independently of one another (Ibid.). Here she 
credits Sorokin for making a distinction between functional integration in causal 
interdependence which he repudiates, and ‘logico-meaningful integration of culture’, 
which she considers still problematic but providing a starting point for examining the 
systemic level (Ibid., pp. 26-27).    
Archer’s improved dualistic perspective involves a fresh discussion of a Cultural 
System (CS) in terms of characteristics proper to it as being distinct from the Socio-
Cultural (S-C) level (Ibid., p. 104). Archer (Ibid.) says that a Cultural System is to be 
treated as co-terminous with what Popper (1978) denotes as ‘world 3’ knowledge, to 
be distinguished from that for ‘world 1’ as the physical world or ‘world 2’ as the 
mental world, referring to the world of the products of the human mind, such as 
languages, stories, religious myths, scientific conjectures, artistic expressions or 
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works of engineering, which may be embodied or physically realised in world 1 
physical objects (pp. 144-145). In Archer’s definition, a Cultural System at any given 
time is “constituted by the corpus of existing intelligibilia – by all things capable of 
being grasped, deciphered, understood or known by someone” (Archer, 1996, p. 
104). It follows that there is only one such stem at any time (Ibid.). 
In Archer’s analytical framework, the Cultural System not only has an objective 
existence and autonomous relations among its components such as beliefs and 
values, but contradictions also exist in it independently of people’s awareness (Ibid., 
p. 107). This is a very interesting position, for there would be objection to this view 
from people who deny the existence of contradictions as part of systemic properties 
in a cultural system, preferring to consider these as entirely derivative from the 
Socio-Cultural level (Ibid. p. 108). Winch (1958) would argue that “the logical 
relations between propositions […] depend on social relations between men” (p. 126; 
cited in Ibid.), an argument that denies the ontological status of the Cultural System 
by collapsing it with the Socio-Cultural realm (Archer, 1996, p. 108). 
One critique that may be levelled against Winch’s position is that while there is plenty 
of variation in social relations between men, no one has provided a convincing 
demonstration of the same variability in logical relations (Ibid.). Secondly, the 
intelligibilia is not necessarily the dependent variable of the Socio-Cultural System as 
assumed a priori (Ibid.). Finally, Archer argues that since meaning can be separated 
from use generally, not just used by certain people, meanings have to be granted 
ontological status (Ibid., p. 109).  
With this distinction made between the Cultural System and the Socio-Cultural 
System, a problem also arises as to what ‘intercultural understanding’ should involve 
as the object of understanding and how it should be conducted. While 
‘understanding’ a Cultural System would centre on a system of meanings or 
ideational elements, ‘understanding’ a Socio-Cultural System would centre on the 
interpretation of action or behaviour against rules or standards in social life. The 
latter also summarises an approach that Winch represents.  
Winch represents an idea of a social science which believes that the identification of 
regularity or uniformity in human behaviour is different from making generalisations 
in the natural sciences, because “to investigate the type of regularity studied in a 
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given enquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which judgments of 
identity are made in that enquiry. Such judgments are intelligible only relatively to a 
given mode of human behaviour, governed by its own rules (Winch, 1958, pp. 83-84: 
cited in MacIntyre, 1970, p. 114). His view of understanding and explanations in the 
social sciences may be summarised in a two-stage model, whereby an action is first 
“made intelligible as the outcome of motives, reasons, and decisions” (MacIntyre, 
1970, p. 115), then it is “made further intelligible by those motives, reasons and 
decisions being set in the context of the rules of a given form of social life” (Ibid.; 
emphasis in original). What Winch asserts roundly in short is that “all behaviour 
which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-
governed” (Winch, 1958, p. 52; cited in MacIntyre, 1970, pp. 118-119). What Winch 
does not seem to consider, however, is that the concept of a rule may be so broadly 
applied that different senses of rule-governed become confusing, not to mention the 
question of whether an account of meaningful action may be plausibly applied to all 
actions, MacIntyre comments (1970, p. 119).  
On the question of ‘understanding’ a different culture, there is yet another dilemma 
which is the problem of whether its rationality should be elucidated on its own terms 
or whether one elucidates it in a logical structure of one’s own culture. This is where 
there has been a stand-off between the positions of Winch and MacIntyre. MacIntyre 
argues in the paper Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing? (1970) 
that when one detects some ‘incoherence’ in the standards of intelligibility in a 
society, and attempts to show why it is tolerable to the society’s members, one is 
already invoking one’s own standards (cited in Winch, 1970, p. 98). Winch (1970) 
however argues that one may well be simply “doing something in which members of 
the studied society exhibit no interest, because the institutions in which such an 
interest could develop are lacking [… or perhaps] the development of techniques of 
inquiry and modes of argument [of our society is] not to be found in the life of the 
studied society’ (p. 98). Winch is incidentally making most of these arguments in the 
context of his paper Understanding a Primitive Society citing the example of the 
African Azande’s ‘irrational’ belief in witchcraft (Ibid., p. 79). His argument ultimately 
is that one is required “to consider the relations of a set of rules and conventions to 
something else” (Ibid., p. 105), whereby in the example of Zande magical rites it may 
be related to “a sense of the significance of human life” (Ibid.), with one fundamental 
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aspect being social relations (Ibid.). Hence Winch ultimately returns to social 
relations as the basis for understanding an alien culture.  
With Winch’s notion of social determination of culturally specific criteria, he has been 
criticised by Luke for being relativistic in his notion of understanding social life, as his 
criteria of truth and rationality are regarded as internal to the language games shared 
by a speech community (see Ulin, 2001, p. 93). In Luke’s perspective, criteria of 
rationality and reality and not norms but standards by which intelligibility and validity 
of particular beliefs are judged, standards which cannot be viewed as social facts in 
the Durkheimian sense, for that would reduce them from a transcendental to a 
conventional status in nature (see Ibid.). While accepting the contention in the 
Durkheimian tradition that interaction of institution and individual is a non-intentional 
social fact, Luke improves over the reification of social institution under this tradition 
as something leading lives of their own apart from human actors (see Ibid., p. 91). 
However, by divorcing universal standards of logic from the intersubjectively valid 
language in which they are objectified, he faces a problem in making a transition 
from a priori criteria, which would be present in cognitive structures before 
sociocultural learning processes, to intersubjectivity in social life, whereas Winch is 
able to explain criteria of logic as arising from modes of social life (Ibid., p. 93-94).  
If considering the challenge of dialogue or exchange with another culture in the 
globalised world simply in terms of ‘intercultural understanding’ would fall into a trap 
of relativism, one may also consider the challenge from the perspective of a 
universalist project as a form of ‘learning’ or ‘civilising’. It is useful here to consider 
‘culture’ in a different perspective beyond the sociological and anthropological, 
namely that of cultural studies, which Robertson (1992) sees as missing from 
Archer’s analysis, and deems resourceful as commentary on the global world, with 
its fluidity in the concerns with culture as representation as well as resistance (pp. 
47-48). One perspective missing in a sociological analysis but highlighted in the 
subsequent discussion here, would be the negotiation of culture as ‘ideal’ for 
normativity.   
Cultural Studies according to Stuart Hall (1994) emerged as “a decisive break: with a 
certain kind of technological evolutionism, with a reductive economism and an 
organisational determinism” (p. 521), as seen in the key works of  
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Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson (Ibid.).  In a dialogue with different positions 
on culture, Williams engages with the ‘idealist’ and ‘civilising’ definitions of culture, 
but also, in reaction to Marxist perspectives on superstructures, offers a ‘radical 
interactionism’ (Ibid., p. 524). He represents a paradigm which conceptualises 
culture as being interwoven with all social practices, and which instead of adopting a 
base-superstructure formulation between ideal and material forces, favours a 
formulation of dialectic between social being and social consciousness (Ibid., p. 527). 
Hall summarises the paradigm thus: “It defines ‘culture’ as both the meanings and 
values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of 
their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they ‘handle’ and 
respond to the conditions of existence; and as the lived traditions and practices 
through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in which they are embodied. 
(Ibid.)”  
What Hall calls the ‘culturalist’ strand in Cultural Studies was followed by a 
structuralist paradigm linked to perspectives of Levi-Strauss and Althusser (Ibid., pp. 
528-529). This arguably marks an advance over culturalism in its conception of the 
necessary complexity of the unity of a structure (Ibid., p. 533), but Hall argues that 
neither of the paradigms would be self-sufficient, as culturalism helps to consider the 
specificity of different practices, and together these two paradigms confront “the 
dialectic between conditions and consciousness” (Ibid., p. 538). Hall himself has 
incorporated both intentional and constructionist perspectives on the production of 
cultural meanings, whereby it depends on the practice of interpretation in encoding 
and decoding (Hall, 1980) but these codes operate as social conventions even as 
meanings are constantly changing (Hall, 1997a, p. 62).  
Cultural Studies would also be concerned with the issue of cultural differences. 
Stuart Hall has referred to the structuralist perspective in discussing the common 
fascination with ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’, citing Derrida’s argument that few binary 
oppositions are neutral (Hall, 1997b, p. 235). From the perspective of a postcolonial 
theory such as that from Robert Young (1995), culture may be considered as a 
dialectical process in the history of difference, of defining itself against what is 
constructed as outside itself, yet absorbing the excluded as part of its internal 
intensions (see Bennett, 1998, p. 78). Young argues that culture has always marked 
cultural difference through producing of the other, as it is a process of “inscribing and 
105 
 
expelling its own alterity” (1995, p. 30; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 78). For Young, 
culture also tends to be set in opposition, such as culture itself versus nature or 
anarchy, high culture versus mass culture, or national versus regional culture (1995, 
p. 29; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 91).  
Robertson shares similar concerns on ‘othering’, as he sees cultural studies as being 
useful in challenging the ‘traditional’ procedures of disciplinary inquiry, “declaring 
these to be conventions which are permeated by all sorts of substantive assumptions 
and preferences” (Robertson, 1992, p. 164), but he emphasises that it needs not 
reduce issues of ‘fundamentals’, or questions of ‘ultimate values’, to discourse, ideas 
of power or mode of production (Ibid., p. 165). He argues that the issue of 
fundamentals as such involves a significant degree of reflexivity, such as on how 
traditions may be invented, as well as of choice, in terms of rationality in optimisation 
or preferences (Ibid., p. 167). Sociology has traditionally operated along an antinomy 
between the idea of choice in utilitarian terms and in matters of ‘ultimate values’, 
“[owing much to] Max Weber’s distinction between instrumental (or formal) and 
substantive (or value) rationality” (Ibid.), as consolidated in Parsons’ action theory 
and added to Habermas’ critical theory (Ibid.), as he highlights.  
In more current practice of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies, however, 
there has been “an anti-foundational, ‘going native’ shift, which often involves an 
‘essentialisation’ of ‘the Other’ ” (Ibid.), with Abaza and Smith (1990, p. 211) noting 
an increasing claim for ‘indigenisation’ of social sciences (cited in Ibid.). Robertson 
also cites a similar phenomenon of essentialisation in the academic specialisation of 
intercultural communication, a field founded on anthropology, psychology and 
linguistics. There might be a vested professional interest in accentuating difference, 
as the rapid expansion of this applied science marks a “concrete site of practical 
communications between cultures” (Ibid. p. 172). Such phenomenon is tied to 
globalisation as space-time compression, similar to tourism, which is a phenomenon 
of global capitalism also involving some form of otherness, whether imagined as 
authentic or otherwise (Ibid., p. 173). Such issues of otherness and authenticity also 
complicate the matter as one comes to the interpretation of cultural heritage.  
Going beyond the issue of othering, Bennett (1998) would emphasise the opposing 
nature of culture as denoting a normative divide (p. 91), involving a hierarchical 
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ordering of relations between different spheres of culture that results in some 
‘strategic normativity’ (Ibid., p. 92). He attempts to recover what he discerns as “the 
normative aspect of the concept of culture as a way of life” (Ibid.) which has been 
inherent in Raymond Williams’ work, in order to argue for its retention to help 
address concerns in cultural policy studies. He argues that the break from the 
Arnoldian legacy as accorded to Williams’ concept of culture has in fact been 
exaggerated, that Williams’ concept remains inextricably normative when considered 
alongside Tylor’s ‘anthropological’ concept of culture (Ibid., p. 88). To Bennett, one 
needs to look past the issue of Tylor’s Eurocentrismin the evolutionary ranking of 
cultures under the process of ‘civilisation’, in order to appreciate how his perspective 
allows him address “the reforming mechanism that is at the heart of Arnold’s concept 
of culture” (Ibid., p. 94), whereby Arnold’s interest consisted in identifying ideal 
norms of human perfection for emulation (Ibid.). In Williams’ (1965) breaking down of 
culture into three general categories, he has also notably begun with an ‘ideal’ 
definition that follows Arnold’s concept of human perfection in terms of universal 
values. While Williams then introduces a ‘documentary’ definition of culture as the 
body of intellectual and imaginative work, followed by a ‘social’ definition of culture 
as a particular way of life expressed also in institutions and ordinary behaviour, 
Bennett points out that Williams has in no way suggested that the documentary or 
ideal definitions should be displaced (Bennett, 1998, p. 65). While Williams tried to 
distance himself from the view that social and cultural development can be equated 
with realising of some absolute values of human perfection, what he was doing 
effectively was to move away from Arnold’s perspective towards Tylor’s, Bennett 
argues, citing Williams’ suggestion to think of development not as “human perfection, 
which implies a known ideal towards which we can move, but human evolution, to 
mean a process of general growth of man as a kind” (Williams, 1965, p. 59; cited in 
Bennett, 1998, p. 96).  
In his later work Marxism and Literature, Williams (1977) would introduce the 
concept of residual culture, as distinguished from the archaic, Bennett (1998, p. 96) 
also cites. Bennett considers the distinction as structurally the same as the 
distinction Tylor (1874) made between survival and revival. Tylor considers as 
‘survivals’ those processes, customs, opinions and so on which have been carried 
on by habit into a newer condition of culture, whereas Williams considers as ‘archaic’ 
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that which is an element of the past (Ibid., pp. 96-97). However, there is also some 
important difference, as ‘revivals’ for Tylor comprises cultural forms and practices 
fallen into disuse but reactivated in an imaginative way, whereas ‘residual’ for 
Williams refers to traditions which have had a continuing active existence, and the 
concept serves to identify sources and resources of cultural innovation that may help 
prod a culture beyond the grip of ossification and hence to undo the hegemony of 
dominant culture through creative force (Ibid., p. 97-98). The key of the difference 
lies in the fact that Tylor had no need to identify such mechanisms to destabilise the 
ossification of dominant culture, as he was writing from a bourgeois and colonial 
perspective whereby the dominant culture was inherently dynamic, Bennett says 
(Ibid., p. 99). 
Bennett considers that such normative structure of the concept of culture, as a 
legacy of Arnold and Tylor, and via additional work by Williams, has entered 
contemporary discourse in cultural policy. He cites Our Creative Diversity, the 1995 
report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, which has proposed 
to expand the concept of cultural policy beyond a narrow focus on the arts, to be 
“directed at encouraging multi-cultural activities” (World Commission, 1995, p. 18; 
cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 105). While Bennett characterises this promotion of 
creative diversity as “a reformist program for cultural policy that is wholly at odds with 
the universalist aspirations of Tylor” (1998, p. 105), he observes that its mechanism 
also involves a normative division of culture into two spheres, with “the organisation 
of a hierarchical gradient between the two to specify the directions in which the 
reforming impetus of culture must flow” (Ibid.). Here, the division is between ‘tolerant’ 
and ‘intolerant’ cultures, whereby the latter refers to “some cultures that may not be 
worthy of respect because they themselves have been shown to be intolerant, 
exclusive, exploitative, cruel and repressive” (World Commission, 1995, p. 54; cited 
in Bennett, 1998, p. 105).  The crucial difference with Tylor in this mechanism, 
however, is to be seen in a shift in the idea of cultural development, from one 
seeking to erase cultural diversity, to one dedicated within limits to the promotion and 
celebration of diversity (Bennett, 1998, p. 106). With this, Bennett argues that culture, 
if seen as a reformer’s science, is one that is not neutral. 
The normative aspect of culture in terms of institutionalisation has also been 
discussed, in relation to challenges of globalisation, under the perspective of the 
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World Polity Theory, for which “world-society models shape nation-state identities, 
structures, and behaviour via worldwide cultural and associational processes (Meyer 
et al, 2000, p. 90)”. This has argued that “realist models can account for a world of 
economic and political absorption, inequality, and domination”, but “do not well 
explain a world of formally equal, autonomous, and expansive nation-state actors” 
(Ibid.: 91). An example cited of world society models taking concrete form in state 
policies is the way many countries have structured their mass schooling systems 
around a 6-year primary/3-year junior/3-year senior secondary model following 
UNESCO statistic reports on enrolments in such a structure. World society models 
also specify standard cultural depiction of national identity: “Methods of constructing 
national culture through traditions, museums, tourism, and national intellectual 
culture are highly stylised. Nation-states are theorised or imagined communities 
drawing on models that are lodged at the world level. (Ibid.: 88)” 
Meyer (2010) places the new institutionalisms on a continuum from more realist to 
more phenomenological models, whereby actors in realist models are assumed to 
have boundaries and closely integrated internal structures independent of their 
participation in institutions, whereas in phenomenological models such as that of 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), “actor agency, boundaries, and internal structures are 
legitimated by the wider institutional system and vary with its variations” (p. 3). It is in 
the latter, he says, that the institutional system, including “the organizations and 
cultural meanings that write and rewrite the scripts” (Ibid., p. 4), becomes central 
while actors may be seen as more derivative. Following an argument of Olson (1965) 
that rational action based on self-interest tends to have difficulty producing collective 
action compared to religious action, Meyer infers that much of the highly collective 
action in the postwar world “has some religious characteristics” (Ibid., p. 7). He 
further argues: “Contemporary phenomenological institutional theories recover the 
old institutionalist conceptions of people and groups as highly embedded in wider 
cultural material. The important change is that contemporary institutional schemes 
operate by building their cultural material into the roles and identities of persons and 
groups now conceived as highly legitimated and agentic actors. (Ibid., p. 15)”  
‘Culture’ as discussed under Meyer’s perspectives of World Polity Theory refers 
largely to the level of the nation-state as actor which is seen as “embedded in and 
constructed by an exogenous, and more or less worldwide, rationalistic culture” 
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(Meyer, 1999, p. 123). He adds: “Culture in this sense is less a set of values and 
norms, and more a set of cognitive models defining the nature, purpose, resources, 
technologies, controls, and sovereignty of the proper nation-state. (Ibid.)” This 
theoretical perspective serves to explain isomorphic change in constitutive and 
organisational structures of contemporary nation-states (Ibid.) in a way that eschews 
flaws of Modernisation Theory on development. Modernisation Theory as 
represented by Rustow (1967) has been met with objections for its methodological 
procedure in which the traditional is simply defined negatively as opposed to the 
modern, such that all past societies are placed in a single category of 
underdeveloped communities, and not only is there an overt ethnocentrism when 
modernisation is rendered synonymous with Westernisation, there is an assumption 
that only one ‘destination’ is possible, namely the industrial-capitalist, whereas 
communism for instance would be characterised as a ‘disease of the transition’ by 
Rostow (Bernstein, 1971, pp. 145-146).  
Meyer (1999) however  simply sees a form of ‘modern culture’ as emphasising “a 
social world made up of bounded, purposive, and rational actors” (p. 124), privileging 
individuals, nation-states and formal organisations and deemphasising other kinds of 
social units such as tribes, clans, families, ethnic groups and communities (Ibid.). 
Noting that the term ‘culture’ in the usage of modern social science and modern 
rationalistic culture would tend to be reserved for the primordial and particular, set 
apart from the rules of modern rationality; whereas the modern system is believed to 
have transcended culture, Meyer considers that this reflects a fundamental myth 
which is precisely “the grounding culture of the modern system” (Ibid., p. 138). 
Meyer considers world polity at a collective level as organised through a set of 
consultants rather than a set of agents, whereby the discourse is oriented towards 
higher goods, such as scientific truths about nature and environment or national 
economic development, moral laws on human and group justice and so on (Ibid., p. 
128). He suggests referring back to Mead (1934) in the view that the social world is 
made up of actors as well as the Others who, in Meyer’s interpretation, “advise 
actors what to do” (Ibid.), such that in the modern world, actors are rationalised as 
with the Others “who speak for the rationalised ideals of the universal scientized truth, 
law, and moral order and apply these considerations to the proper interests and 
needs of the actors” (Ibid.). 
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We return hence to the question of how culture should be understood and observed. 
On one hand, there may be an approach of studying culture as a system of symbols, 
through interpretations in the manner of Levi-Strauss or Geertz. On the other hand, 
there is an approach of cognitive anthropology which involves the perspective of 
culture as a kind of schema, notably adopted in cross-cultural psychology. A theory 
of culture as schema, like what is defined by cognitive anthropologist Roy D’Andrade 
in terms of a cognitive structure in identification of objects and events, and as a kind 
of all-purpose problem-solving device, has in fact been criticised with regards to its 
explanatory power (Lindholm, 2007, pp. 257-258). Lindholm sees a contradiction 
here “between an instrumental image of human beings […] as problem solvers and 
the quasi-Weberian notion that cultural schemas themselves define what life’s 
problems are” (Ibid., p. 258). The idea of schema tells nothing of impulses that drive 
human desires, nor explains why certain schemas are more likely to be master 
motives than others (Ibid.). It also portrays models of cultural learning without 
factoring individual distinctions, except to return to old notions of socialisation and 
internalisations (Ibid.). Such a cognitive model leaves out the possibility of 
unconscious motivations conflicting with conscious or standard cultural motivations 
(Ibid., p. 260). 
Unlike in cross-cultural psychology (as discussed in Section 2.2) which generally 
presumes universal psychological process, such that culture is viewed merely as a 
site of variation, the perspective in cultural psychology would be to deem culture as 
the site of birth for psychological processes, and hence its investigation would be 
inseparable from anthropology as what Bruner argues (Gergen, 2002, p. 48). In this 
view he is joined by cultural anthropologists such as Shweder, who proposes that the 
mind “cannot be extricated from the historically variable and culturally diverse 
intentional worlds in which it plays a co-constitutive part” (Shweder, 1990, p. 13; 
cited in Gergen, Ibid.). Many cultural psychologists hence cite the work of Vygotsky 
who proposes that every process in the development of higher mental functioning 
occurs twice, “first on the social level, and later, on the individual level” (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 57; cited in Gergen, Ibid.). Theory and research have subsequently moved 
in more radical direction, locating processes of thought, memory and emotion within 
the very processes of social interchange (Gergen, 2002, p. 61). Gergen cautions in 
any case that “[t]raditional research in both cross-cultural and cultural psychology 
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tends to appropriate ‘the other’ – making him or her intelligible in terms of the home 
culture. (Ibid., p. 59)” 
As partly mentioned in the previous sections, the aspect of history has also to 
various extents been considered in Boasian anthropology, in Weberian sociology 
and in cross-cultural psychology as explanation for cultural variations. Where 
psychology is concerned, Gergen (2001) has noted an increasingly prevalent trend 
of research whereby mental states and expressions considered as effects of 
particular historical conditions, as in historical contexts are viewed as shaping the 
content, character or expression of psychological processes such as the cognitive, 
emotional or motivational (p. 85). He cites a wide range of works such as Elias (1978) 
on the civilising process and Kessen (1990) on processes of child development 
situated within historical milieus.  
The factoring of history in relation to cultural difference in heritage will be further 
explored in Chapters 5 and 6. One has to note however of different basic positions in 
anthropology with regards to the relevance of historical ‘development’, as identified 
by Shweder (1984) from the perspective of cultural psychology, namely universalism 
which emphasises likeness, and developmentalism as well as relativism which 
emphasise differences (p. 59). Among them, there are also different positions with 
regards to mental processes and debates over rationality, of which those associated 
with a view of enlightenment generally tend towards discovery of universals, “the 
idea of natural law, the concept of deep structure, the notion of progress or 
development, and the image of the history of ideas as a struggle between reason 
and unreason, science and superstition” (Ibid., p. 28). There are two camps here 
under the enlightenment view, namely universalists and developmentalists, divided 
on the question of whether valid knowledge of what reason dictate is equally 
possessed by all – universalists such as Hobbes and Voltaire would argue that moral 
virtues are not only dictated by reason but also obvious to reason, whereas 
developmentalists such as Tylor, Frazer and Piaget hold that all peoples have 
normative standards, but knowledge of proper standards and “knowledge of those 
norms worthy of universal respect, is achieved by only a few cultures” (Ibid., p. 31). A 
similar argument has been made by Kohlberg (1981) with specific reference to 
morality from the perspective of psychology (Ibid.; cf. Gergen, 2001, p. 185). 
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On the other side of the debate over rationality, according to Shweder, is a romantic 
perspective as represented by Levy-Bruhl, Whorf, Schneider, Sahlins and Geertz 
among others, with a central tenet “that ideas and practices have their foundation in 
neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of 
deductive and inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor 
irrational but rather nonrational” (Ibid.; emphasis in original). The nonrational position 
in this ‘romantic rebellion’ would be associated with an interest in investigation of 
culture as “the arbitrary, the symbolic, the expressive, the semiotic” (Ibid., p. 38). 
Symbols, following the argument of Peirce (1955), may be understood as bearing no 
intrinsic relationship to properties of their referents, unlike icons which bear 
resemblance and indexes which are co-occurrent with referents (cited in Shweder, 
1984, p. 46; cf. Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 661). From a functionalist perspective, 
one may also make a distinction between the expressive function of actions and 
instrumental function of actions as Parsons (1968) has made (cited in Shweder, 
Ibid.).  
Jaeger and Selznick (1964) have in fact proposed a formulation of culture that would 
bridge the gap between perspectives of social science and the humanities by 
arguing within a normative theory of culture for the centrality of expressive 
symbolism, such that elements of culture, which range from language, norms, values, 
knowledge, religion to art, contribute to the order of ‘symbolic-meaningful systems’ 
(pp. 654, 668). Against what they consider a crude anthropological definition by 
Kroeber of culture as “that which the human species has and other social species 
lack” (Kroeber, 1948, p. 253; cited in Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 654), they 
highlight a humanist view of culture as that which is normative and evaluative, 
committed to a view “that at least some universal values exist and that objective 
judgments of value may be warranted in inquiry” (Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 654).  
A normative view of culture to them takes the idea seriously “that culture is an 
adaptive product, a result of individual and social striving for symbolically meaningful 
experience” (Ibid., p. 666) such that culture being “a problem-solving achievement, it 
cannot be uniformly successful” (Ibid.). In short, they tend towards a 
developmentalist view of culture, while acknowledging an ‘unevenness of 
socialisation’ (Ibid., p. 656) and the consideration of culture as a ‘product of 
adaptation’ (Ibid., p. 659).  
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But further to this, they consider man as existential and creative, both “meaning-
seeker and meaning-maker” (Ibid.). Here, they draw on the philosophical perspective 
of Dewey’s pragmatism for a normative theory of culture that would take into account 
the continuity of culture as well as high culture including aesthetics (Ibid., p. 654). 
They cite: “For Dewey experience and meaning are emotional as well as cognitive. 
Meaning is not to be taken in a rationalist sense, as a product of merely cognitive 
awareness and interpretation. Meaning is meaning for the organism in its subjective 
wholeness, as a responsive unity. (Ibid., p. 660).” Citing also Dewey’s argument that 
the expressive act tends to assume the features of aesthetic or artistic forms, they 
further argue that “there is a tendency for the vehicles of symbolic meaning, the true 
artefacts of culture, to take on aesthetic form” (Ibid., p. 664).   
They add that the relation between moral orders and the development of culture is 
complicated: “To the extent that symbolisation of persons and groups occurs, there 
is cultural enrichment. But symbolisation can be demonic and go hand in hand with 
cruel and inhuman moral systems. Moral enlightenment often depends upon the 
weakening of symbols, upon making profane what was formerly sacred, upon taking 
people for what they are and not for their symbolic status and value. … On the other 
hand, a moral order may be weak and precarious if it does not produce cultural 
symbols, and is not sustained by them. (Ibid., pp. 666-667)” 
The aspects of moral value and aesthetic value as part of culture as a system of 
symbolic meanings would tend to be neglected under a perspective of culture as an 
internalised schema of orientation for action. How such shortcomings may be 
corrected will be further discussed in the following Chapter 3 on intercultural dialogue 
and in Chapter 5 on cultural heritage.  
This chapter has begun by considering a range of perspectives on how culture may 
be understood based on different schools of anthropology, such as culture as social 
life and culture as system of meanings. It then turned to the question of how cultural 
differences may be surmised, by analysing one particular approach of cross-cultural 
psychology with applications in the field of intercultural communication. One 
observes a tendency here, as illustrated in the case of German social psychologist 
Alexander Thomas’s framework, of inheriting the concept of culture as value 
orientation from the action theory of sociologist Talcott Parsons, only to reduce 
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cultures to schemas of behaviour instead of rational choices. In this final section of 
the chapter, one takes into account the challenges of globalisation based on 
Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and Robertson’s World Culture Theory. This 
raises the question of the extent to which a focus on ‘cultural differences’ is useful, 
whether it might encourage racism through stereotyping and lend itself to nationalist 
propaganda, when the real focus should be on a negotiation between universalism 
and particularism. According to Meyer, modernity may be considered as just another 
culture in terms of its cognitive model, rather than privileged as fundamentally 
different from particularistic cultures; world polity would hence be simply a question 
of institutionalisation. 
Whereas Parsons’ incorporation of value orientation in his action theory may be seen 
as an attempt to integrate the more voluntaristic or subjective factors of human 
action along with the structural factors under a grand theory with a rigour worthy of 
positivism, an application of such a framework of culture as orientation system as 
propagated in the field of intercultural communication is expressly geared towards 
pragmatic applications in international situations, whereby postulated ‘cultural 
standards’ help provide a sense of control in dealing with a different socio-cultural 
environment. Cultural studies however presents a different endeavour, one that can 
be free from assuming Wertfreiheit of positivist science in dealing with the question 
of cultural values. Zylinska (2005) has argued that cultural studies has always been 
an interdisciplinary project situated within an ethical framework, what with Stuart 
Hall’s conviction of intellectual work as political practice or Tony Bennett’s proposal 
for applications in cultural policy (pp. 28-29), with a particular duty towards the 
‘others’ or the marginalised (Ibid., p. 35).  
If the real subject in studying cultural differences is not to solve the puzzle of random 
face-to-face situations per se but to understand cultural values in terms of the 
rationality embedded and institutionalised in a community, then a reduction of these 
to psychological processes would not be adequate. It has been written a century ago 
in Ethics, a treatise by Dewey and Tufts (1908): “To study choice and purpose is 
psychology; to study choice as affected by the rights of others and to judge it as right 
or wrong by this standard is ethics. (p. 3)” Bauman (1995) has similarly argued that 
ethics is “more than a mere description of what people do” (p. 10) for it is meant to 
say “what really ought to be done so that the good be served” (p. 11), such that “the 
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need for ethical experts depends little, if at all, on whether the experts can or cannot 
deliver on their promise [but] solely on the condition in which one cannot do without 
seeking such delivery” (Ibid., p. 12).  
A two-prong approach will hence be adopted in the discussion of intercultural 
dialogue in the following chapter, considering both the question of pluralism in ethics 
as well as the aspect of social psychology in the actual processes of interaction 
between people of different cultural communities. 
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3. INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND THE CULTURE ASSIMILATOR 
The preceding chapter has examined different concepts of culture which have been 
developed in accordance with different epistemological interests and theoretical 
bases under the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, psychology and cultural 
studies, with subsequently divergent approaches in observation and analysis. 
Considering the phenomena of globalisation which have not only manifested in 
migration trends and long-distance connectivity but also in a global consciousness 
that heightens the sense of cultural differences, a main challenge in promoting 
‘dialogue’ across cultures would be to distinguish among various concepts of culture 
and to specify their usefulness and limitations.  
Understanding a culture as a system of meanings in terms of its internal logic and 
contradictions would be different from understanding a culture as a system of value-
orientation for social action, which would again be different from understanding the 
causal explanations of how ‘cultural patterns’ in social behaviour come about through 
domination by one set of people over another. Such distinctions would be crucial to 
the question of how ‘intercultural dialogue’ may be imagined if it is framed as 
‘understanding’ between different cultural communities, as will be discussed in this 
chapter. The common problem of conflation between the Cultural System (CS) and 
the Socio-Cultural System (S-C) has already been discussed within Archer’s (1996) 
dualist framework. Perspectives of cultural studies have turned our attention to 
issues not only of power structures, but also the positioning of culture as ‘strategic 
normativity’ as proposed by Tony Bennett (1998) oriented towards relevance in 
cultural policy. This opens the way to a discussion on developmentalist views of 
culture, which may be traced back to Tylor and Arnold, and begs us to reflect on 
what capabilities or competence may be relevant to the ideals of intercultural 
dialogue. 
This chapter will build on the abovementioned frameworks in the study of culture for 
an exploration of intercultural dialogue, to analyse how or whether some of 
challenges in the common underlying aims of intercultural dialogue in cultural policy 
– identified here as social cohesion and liberalism in value pluralism - may involve a 
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challenge between social integration and cultural integration, as well as a dilemma 
between universalism and relativism. With such difficulties in mind, the second half 
of the chapter will then turn to the psychological aspect in social interaction, to 
examine the potential and limitations in the consideration of intercultural dialogue as 
a form of intercultural communication, for instance with the application of the Culture 
Assimilator training approach as interpreted by German social psychologist 
Alexander Thomas’ framework of intercultural competence. The critique of such 
communication approaches will provide the point of departure for further exploration 
on how competence may be developed for intercultural dialogue, considering that 
democratic participation has also been cited as a key aspect in the European policy 
framework. This would also involve the question of what ‘intercultural learning’ may 
entail as part of a liberal education.  
3.1 The Goals of Intercultural Dialogue based on Council of Europe’s 
2008 White Paper - “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” 
3.1.1 Intercultural Dialogue as a Means to Social Cohesion 
This section will begin by discussing the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the 
current European policy approach as a means of dealing with cultural diversity that 
would help ensure social cohesion (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 4, 8, 13). 
Intercultural dialogue under this framework is considered as a new and better 
approach, set in contrast to the older approaches of assimilation and 
‘multiculturalism’, for achieving inclusive societies with a diversity that 
“unprecedented and ever-growing” (Ibid., p. 9). The implications of these three 
concepts will be compared in this subsection and it will be argued that they are not 
entirely exclusive and antithetical to one another, but may each be understood in 
different senses at the level of public policy, of normative expectations or of informal 
practice.  
The notion of intercultural dialogue, as defined in the Council of Europe’s White 
Paper on Intercultural Dialogue – “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” (2008), 
refers to “a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views 
between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It 
requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and 
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capacity to listen to the views of others. Intercultural dialogue contributes to political, 
social, cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse 
societies.”  Intercultural dialogue thus elaborately described appears to encompass 
several purposes, including “the overriding objective to promote full respect for 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Ibid.). But as it has been observed, 
the emphasis appears to be one of social cohesion (Igbino, 2012, p. 167), 
considering its significance in the sense of how it has been deemed more favourably 
than the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ which was an earlier approach towards diversity.  
The concept of social cohesion may be traced back to Durkheim, who saw it as an 
ordering feature of society and defined it in terms of the interdependence between 
members of the society, shared loyalties and solidarity (Jenson, 1998; cited in 
Berger-Schmitt, 2000, pp. 2-3). Aspects often mentioned in description of social 
cohesion include the strength of social relations, shared values, feelings of a 
common identity or sense of belonging to the same community, trust among 
members of society, as well as the extent of inequality and disparities (cited in 
Berger-Schmitt, 2000, p. 3). In the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, the 
term ‘social cohesion’ is used to refer to “the capacity of a society to ensure the 
welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation [… in] a 
mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by 
democratic means” (Ibid., p. 11). This may be placed against a broader range of five 
dimensions for social cohesion which Jenson (1998) has identified, namely 
belonging or isolation, inclusion or exclusion, participation or non-involvement, 
recognition or rejection of differences, legitimacy or illegitimacy or institutions as 
mediator in conflicts (cited in Berger-Schmitt, 2000, p. 3). One may then understand 
the definition in the White Paper as primarily emphasising ‘inclusion’ in equal 
opportunities of access as opposed to disparity; the next aspect in the definition 
apparently refers to a sense of ‘belonging’ through shared values specified in terms 
of freedom and democracy. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘social cohesion’ will be 
used to refer more specifically to a general sense of solidarity or belonging through 
shared values, for which the question would be the extent to which cultural heritage 
may serve to mitigate differences among communities, on top of more general 
questions such as equality in social opportunities.  
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Such interest for the question of social cohesion in Europe should come as no 
surprise considering that ‘intercultural dialogue’ has been articulated on a level of 
regional politics in Europe since the 2005 Faro Declaration on the Council of 
Europe’s Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue, out of concern for the ‘clash 
of civilisations’ and the determination to strengthen social cohesion (Council of 
Europe, 2005, p. 3). It was as part of a follow-up to this strategy that the 2008 White 
Paper on Intercultural Dialogue was eventually produced. The white paper explains 
‘intercultural dialogue’ as a new policy approach in dealing with the existence of 
different cultures in society, as opposed to older approaches like ‘assimilationism’ or 
‘multiculturalism’. Assimilation is described as “unity without diversity… an enforced 
homogenisation" (COE, 2008, p. 14), whereas multiculturalism is described as 
advocating “political recognition of what was perceived as the distinct ethos of 
minority communities on a par with the ‘host’ majority” (Ibid., p. 18).  Intercultural 
dialogue, in contrast, is imagined as an approach that “operates at all levels – within 
societies, between the societies of Europe and between Europe and the wider world. 
(Ibid., pp. 10-11)” 
In the course of this section, one will begin by taking these three models of policy 
approach at face value as markedly distinct from one another, but slowly progressing 
into analysing the underlying concepts of ‘assimilation’ and ‘dialogue’ on a deeper 
level, in order to disentangle their social processes from related ideologies.  
Evidently, the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the 2008 white paper does not 
refer simply to a social process of interaction as such, but to an ideal state. It is also 
not free of implicit cultural values or political ideology, even though it lays claim to 
universality in its European standpoint. The Faro Declaration in 2005 has already 
reaffirmed a “vision based on the principles of the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (COE, 2005, p. 3). The subsequent 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue again emphasises “the universal values of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (COE, 2008, p. 18), which are upheld 
as “a condition for intercultural dialogue” (Ibid., p. 19). There is an insistence that 
such democratic values are universal and “not distinctively European” (Ibid., p. 14). 
The only instance where negotiation may be permitted on the issue of universality, is 
limited to the context of higher education and research, whereby the university is 
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characterised by ‘universality’ in the sense of “commitment to open-mindedness and 
openness to the world, founded on enlightenment values” (Ibid., p. 31).   
There has been criticism that this management philosophy of ‘intercultural dialogue’ 
is ultimately a colonial model of dialogue, as it tends to dismiss the viewpoints of 
other cultures or even subcultural elements within its own community, as it lays down 
the rules as precondition for participation in dialogue with the dominant culture 
(Igbino, 2012, p. 165). In a diversified society which makes the White Paper 
necessary in the first place, there may be various philosophical positions on the 
meanings of democracy and different interpretations on democratic values and 
principles which exist outside the purview of the European political traditions, but 
such contestations are easily precluded in a policymaking process underpinned by 
the White Paper, given such an assumption of universalism of meanings which are 
translated into legal terms (Ibid.). 
In order to judge whether this new model of managing diversity is indeed a 
progressive solution, it would ultimately require a comparison with earlier models 
such as ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’, along with related issues of social 
integration. It would also help to interrogate the general meanings of a term like 
‘intercultural dialogue’ in order to understand in what ways it may relate to ideas of 
liberalism or of pluralism, but this will  be left to the next section.  
Assimilationism has been discussed as a kind of social ideology, often linked to the 
‘melting pot’ metaphor popularised in the USA since early 20th century. It relates to 
the sociological paradigm which has provided the most prominent perspective on 
immigrant group adaptation, namely the classic assimilation theory dating back to 
the Chicago School in the 1920s. This theory sees immigrant and majority groups as 
following a ‘straight-line’ convergence, becoming more similar over time in norms, 
values, behaviours and characteristics, the assumption being that immigrants 
residing the longest time in the host society as well as members if the later 
generations would display greater similarities with the majority group, compared to 
immigrants who have spent less time (Brown and Bean, 2006, online). Sociologist 
Milton Gordon (1964) postulated several stages of assimilation that follow acquisition 
of culture and language, such as identification with host society and ending of 
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prejudice and discrimination. But other theoretical models since then have factored 
in ethnic disadvantages and other social contexts.  
In intercultural communication research, concepts of sociology and anthropology 
have been employed to analyse individual experiences in adaptation. Assimilation 
may be seen as an end-state in the process of cross-cultural adaptation, the term 
‘adaptation’ referring to “the dynamic process by which individuals, upon relocating 
to an unfamiliar cultural environment, establish (or re-establish and maintain a 
relatively stable, reciprocal, and functional relationship with the environment” (Kim, 
2002, p. 260). Whereas ‘acculturation’ has been defined as a process in cross-
cultural adaptation, whereby “individuals acquire some (but not all) aspects of the 
host culture” (Ibid.), the term ‘assimilation’ is used to emphasise “acceptance and 
internalisation of the host culture by the individual” (Ibid.). Most theories in 
intercultural communication on adaptation are framed in a way such that models and 
research findings “would help ease the transition and facilitate the eventual 
functioning in the new environment” (Ibid., p. 268). The common premise underlying 
this is an affirmation of adaptation, seeing it as desirable, a position that some 
scholars would see as reflecting an assimilationist ideology (Ibid.). 
Different immigration policies also reflect different beliefs or assumptions on the 
process of ‘assimilation’. Some have claimed that it would imply that all parties 
involved abandon certain elements of their culture and identity while retaining others, 
which then amalgamate with elements of other immigrant and non-immigrant 
cultures, giving rise to an entirely new culture, in a process described as the ‘melting 
pot’ (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003, p. 7). Others consider assimilation to be more 
unilateral and claim it would come down to conformity to mainstream or dominant 
cultural patterns (Ibid.)  
The assimilation model is discussed as a policy approach to immigration especially 
in relation to the concept of integration, whereby ‘integration’, sometimes 
alternatively replaced by the concept of ‘social cohesion’, refers to a characteristic of 
a society in terms of how closely and intensely groups and individuals as its 
constituent parts relate to one another (Ibid., p. 6). Entzinger and Biezeveld have 
identified four dimensions to integration, namely socio-economic; cultural; legal and 
political; and the attitude of recipient societies towards migrants (Ibid., p. 5).   
122 
 
France is usually cited as a prototype for the assimilation model (Ibid., p. 14), a 
model in which the permanent nature of immigration is not disputed, unlike the 
Gastarbeiter system in Germany till 1998, but immigrants are expected to assimilate 
to their hosts. Some have disputed the characterising of the French approach as an 
assimilationist model, since private association and cultural practice are guaranteed 
and second generation immigrants may “contest what it means to be French and 
organise to push ‘French’ culture in a pluralistic direction” (Bloomfield and Bianchini, 
2004, p. 57). However, a crucial point is that immigrant communities are not 
recognised as relevant entities by the public authorities (Entzinger and Biezefeld, 
2003, p. 14). On a political level, members of parliament do not represent any 
specific group other than the entire abstract body of all members of the nation, and 
no political community or ethnic group can be recognised as such in the public 
domain; on a social level, the migrant population is also encouraged to internalise 
French norms and values and to mix with the general population (Schnapper, Krief 
and Peignard, 2003, pp. 16-17).  
Many original French citizens argue that being French entails “learning the French 
language, adopting French cultural and societal norms, being able to accept a strictly 
secular state and developing the desire to integrate on a psychological level” 
(Vladescu, 2006. p. 5). But in the process of assimilation, instead of addressing 
politically sensitive issues of race, religion and ethnicity, the French government has 
taken a different approach such that its national census does not enquire on religion 
or ethnicity for the reason that this type of information would be considered 
inappropriate for the state to have (Ibid., p. 8). In 2006, the French government also 
passed a law prohibiting headscarves from being worn by Muslim girls in public 
schools, along with prohibition of the Jewish yamaka and Christian crosses deemed 
too large. Such measures in banning display of religious identity have since fuelled 
debates as to whether it serves to promote assimilation of the Muslim minority into 
such a secular society, or becomes a form of discrimination that pushes younger 
Muslims into embracing more racialised Islam that is even more difficult to reconcile 
with European values (Ibid., p. 9).   
Based on such observations, that there is neither legal representation of any minority 
ethnic or religious community in the public sphere, nor social norm of asserting the 
individual’s minority identity socially, one may argue that the French approach is 
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more assimilationist than pluralistic. One may even argue that there is an attitude 
among the French, as reflected in the laws, of a “conviction that possessing the 
French nationality and adopting a French identity are privileges and that those 
people lucky enough to arrive in such a developed and cultured part of the world 
should strive to do what they can to imitate the native culture and customs” (Ibid., p. 
6), which implies a belief in assimilation that requires abandoning of one’s minority 
identity.   
In contrast to this assimilationist model or what one may prefer to characterise as 
‘civic integration’ (Bloomfield and Bianchini, 2004, p. 50) in France, there is the 
model of multiculturalism most notably in Canada, as constitutional in its law, as well 
as what may be characterised as ‘corporate multiculturalism’ (Ibid.) in Britain and the 
Netherlands. One has to disambiguate here between a ‘multicultural’ and a 
‘multiculturalist’ society, for one refers to a fact of diversity while the other refers to a 
normative response to that fact, as Parekh (2000, p. 6) points out. A multicultural 
society refers to one that includes two or more cultural communities. There can be 
two different ways for the society to respond to the diversity, “it might welcome and 
cherish it, make it central to its self-understanding, and respect the cultural demands 
of its constituent communities” (Ibid.), in which case it is multiculturalist, or "it might 
seek to assimilate these communities into its mainstream culture either wholly or 
substantially" (Ibid.), in which case it is monoculturalist in orientation and ethos. The 
ambiguity may be dated back to a definition of multiculturalism in the Oxford English 
Dictionary tracing back to a 1957 article about Switzerland, as “[t]he characteristics 
of a multicultural society; (also) the policy or process whereby the distinctive 
identities of the cultural groups within such a society are maintained or supported” 
(cited in Eriksen, 2006, online). Parekh remarks that the “failure to distinguish 
between a multicultural and a multiculturalist society has often led to an agonised but 
largely unnecessary debate about how to describe a society” (Ibid.). Conservatives 
in Britain have resisted calling the country multicultural for fear that it would “imply 
that its traditional culture should not be given pride of place, that the minority cultures 
are equally central to its identity” (Ibid.).   
The existence of various practical and theoretical understandings of multiculturalism 
across national and local contexts has often made general discussion of the concept 
difficult. In Germany for instance, the terms ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have 
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often been used in loose connection with each other without concrete definitions 
(Klopp, 2002, p. 23). In one view, ‘multiculturalism’ is depicted as a lifestyle or image 
without committed political belief or practice, let alone any programme or policy; 
detractors refer to multikulti as merely a form of superficial pandering to folklore and 
traditions of other cultural groups (Ibid., p. 25). Some, from the left, criticise 
multiculturalism as a “misguided focus on cultural practices and categories to the 
exclusion of economic factors in addressing societal problems (Ibid.). Left 
proponents of multiculturalism, on the other hand, regard it variously as a description 
of reality, as a progressive non-nationalist possibility for German society, or even as 
a radical social utopia (Ibid.). 
In this thesis, multiculturalism is to be discussed in terms of a policy approach in 
dealing with diverse communities or populations, including issues of identity and 
rights. Multiculturalism may be enshrined constitutionally, as in the case of the 
multiculturalism law in Canada which proclaims: “The recognition and strengthening 
of multiculturalism as an expression of the cultural and ethnic diversity of Canadian 
society and as confirmation of the freedom of all members of Canadian society to 
preserve, strengthen, and share their cultural inheritance” (Ibid., p. 24). But in the 
second instance, we shall also consider multiculturalism on a social level as a 
perspective on human life based on convictions of cultural pluralism, as discussed by 
Parekh (2000).   
We shall now compare criticisms against the models of assimilation with criticisms 
against multiculturalism, starting with the former. As Glazer (1993) has noted, 
assimilation, in what was the dominant liberal view until at least the 1950s in the 
USA, was deemed desirable for contributing to the reduction of racial discrimination 
and prejudice (p. 133). However, the word has since fallen out of grace: “Neither 
liberals nor neoliberals, conservatives nor neoconservatives, have much good to say 
about assimilation.” (Ibid., p. 123) While social mechanisms underlying a belief in 
assimilation have not simply gone away, the social scientists no longer expect 
natural effects of assimilation manifesting in the ethnic and racial reality, while the 
failure in incorporation of the African American community under the banner of 
‘Americanisation’ – which for decades referred exclusively to the concern for 
immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe to acquire the English language and 
American customs,  has led to criticism on the ideology of assimilation (Ibid.). As with 
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the Hispanics and the Asian Americans, the African American community has come 
to see it as their own choice as to how they will define their place in American society, 
be it the choice of resistance against forces of assimilation or the choice of opposing 
stronger tendencies of multiculturalism (Ibid., pp. 135-136).  
Brubaker (2001) however has suggested that ‘assimilation’ as a concept should not 
be consigned to the dustbin of history (p. 533) along with the earlier, ‘assimilationist’ 
theoretical understanding of assimilation as being inevitable and desirable (Ibid., p. 
541). He suggests that there may in fact be a ‘return of assimilation’, not in the sense 
of a “return to the normative expectations, analytical models, public policies, or 
informal practices” associated with the ideal of Anglo-conformity or Americanisation 
movement after World War I, or with similar practices especially language policies in 
France or Germany (Ibid., p. 541), but in the abstract sense of the word ‘assimilation’ 
as a general process of becoming similar (Ibid., p. 542). He argues that this 
designates a direction of change rather than a particular degree of similarity, unlike 
the meaning of the transitive verb to ‘assimilate’, which in a biological sense is to 
convert something into a substance of its own nature, such as food into blood, to 
absorb something into a system (Ibid.). The word ‘assimilation’ used in this 
‘assimilationist’ sense has been discredited due to association with negative 
connotations of homogenising state projects, in the case of Germany suggesting 
forcible Germanisation (Ibid., p. 533). A more current term used in the European 
context is integration (Ibid., p. 540), which often refers to much the same thing 
although it may also refer to socio-economic dimensions instead of mere cultural 
dimensions (Ibid., p. 544). But Brubaker proposes to retain ‘assimilation’ as a useful 
concept to observe how the idea may have shifted in public discourse, in public 
policy and in scholarly research (Ibid., p. 535).    
One sociologist and philosopher who has critiqued the assimilationist ideology is 
Zygmunt Bauman. He traces the term ‘assimilation’ with its biological sense to the 
16th century when it referred to the acts of absorption and incorporation performed by 
living organisms, when it unambiguously “stood for conversion, not a self-
administered change; an action performed by a living organism on its passive 
environment” (Bauman, 1991, p. 103; emphasis in original). The contemporary and 
metaphorical use of the concept since the 19th century captured a drive to uniformity 
and coincided with rising nationalism in the modern states which formed a new type 
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of power dismantling local or corporative mechanisms in traditional ways of life, 
according to Bauman (Ibid., p. 103). Just as modernity may be understood as a time 
“when order – of the world, of the human habitat, of the human self, and of the 
connection between all three – is reflected upon” (Ibid., p. 5; emphasis in original), 
when “the substance of modern politics […] is the effort to exterminate ambivalence” 
(Ibid., p. 7), assimilation in the modern state is a “declaration of war on semantic 
ambiguity” (Ibid., p. 105) as it assumes authority in classifying things that do not fit 
into its scheme as being foreign, and it assigns the superiority of one form of life and 
the inferiority of another (Ibid.).  
Bauman sees the liberal call to assimilate, being a specifically modern component of 
nation-state policies, as suffering from tension like the contradictions within 
modernity itself, whereby principles like equality of opportunity and freedom of self-
constitution are upheld on one hand, yet the function of ‘nation building’ as an 
artificial production of collective identities is also part of the task of the modern 
nation-state (ibid., pp. 68-69). On the surface, the liberal message of cultural 
assimilation is an open invitation to all minorities or newcomers to escape any stigma 
– a social institution which has been analysed by Erving Goffman, a word which 
originally denoted bodily signs that mark inferiority or wickedness of character, used 
as “a convenient weapon in the defence against the unwelcome ambiguity of the 
stranger” by emphasising difference (Ibid., p. 67). Yet it becomes a contradiction as 
the nation-state holding the task of homogenising its territory has to reaffirm 
indirectly “the superiority and the benevolence of the native rulers” (Ibid., p. 70).  
However, in a transformed concept of ‘assimilation’ as proposed by Brubaker (2001), 
one may see a shift in focus from one on the end state of complete absorption to one 
on the process of becoming similar in certain respects (p. 542); one may shift from 
seeing populations of immigrant origins as mouldable objects to seeing them as 
active subjects (Ibid.); from thinking in terms of homogeneous units to thinking in 
terms of heterogeneous units (Ibid., p. 543), and so on.     
The concept which has been readily contrasted with assimilation is multiculturalilsm, 
a term much contested and over-used with the turn of the new century. What 
constitutes multiculturalism is often confusing due to its use in both an analytical and 
a normative sense, the boundary of which is not clearly demarcated (Hage, 2008, p. 
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490). Multiculturalism, whether as political policy or as social reality, has been 
criticised in the West for everything, “from a cultural relativism that valourises ‘value-
less’ if not outright ‘evil’ and destructive cultural traditions such as female 
circumcision, to ghettoisation and social fragmentation via the promotion of anti-
democratic and intolerant customs and practices” (Ibid., p. 489), not to mention being 
accused of allowing terrorism to flourish (Ibid., p. 490).  
Hage (2008) traces the emergence of multiculturalism in the Western developed 
nation-states to a trend of migrants from elsewhere, whose cultural impact was 
minimal until the 1950s, such that ‘assimilation’ to dominant European cultures was 
assumed (p. 491). With the growth in numbers and other factors however, the 
migrants developed a more communal or ‘ethnic’ mode of inhabiting their host 
societies, projecting their cultures into the social and physical public spaces (Ibid.). 
Against views of social policy in multiculturalism as a matter of voluntary ‘choice’ and 
critics calling for a ‘return’ to assimilation, Hage argues that “it was not because of 
multiculturalism that people strived to maintain their cultures; rather, it was because 
people were striving to maintain their cultures that multiculturalism was needed” 
(Ibid.). He cautions against attributing too much potency to a multicultural policy in its 
effect on social life, arguing that it is minimal compared to the factors of major social, 
political and economic transformations, such as the decline or diversification of 
western empires in cultural dominance, or the effects of globalisation as ‘time-space 
compression’ allowing migrants to remain connected with home cultures (Ibid., p. 
492). He hence emphasises, somewhat echoing the view of Parekh (2000), that 
multiculturalism is not simply the existence of cultural diversity in the form of 
communal ethnic groups, but a sensibility or mode of evaluating cultural differences 
thereof (Ibid.). That would suggest that the use of ‘multiculturalism’ to refer a kind of 
value pluralism as a basis for intercultural dialogue, which is to be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
3.1.2 Intercultural Dialogue as an Ideal of Liberalism and Value 
Pluralism 
 
This subsection will discuss intercultural dialogue in terms of an ideal that 
emphasises on the procedural commitment of liberalism in equal respect of views, 
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which may accommodate some substantive commitments underlying value pluralism. 
An understanding of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as a liberal approach for an open 
‘exchange of views’ shall begin with an interpretation of the common meanings of the 
word ‘dialogue’ itself and a consideration of the range of different paradigms that 
may be relevant. The bulk of the subsection will then focus on Bhikhu Parekh’s 
political theory of value pluralism and intercultural dialogue based on the positive 
value of cultural diversity, contextualised with communitarian and liberal arguments 
among political theorists, as represented by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka on the 
issue of multiculturalism as a politics of recognition and difference. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, a dialogue is “a discussion between two or more 
people or groups, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject 
or resolution of a problem” (2012, online). A more elaborate look at the functions of 
dialogue in daily life may include conviviality function, meant for sheer pleasure of 
company, or to overcome emotions such as fear, anxiety or boredom; practical 
deliberative function, to perform an action together or arrive at a decision for some 
practical course of action; and function of gaining knowledge, to articulate and 
communicate knowledge (Rao, 2010, p. 166). Based on such categorisation, one 
may already differentiate between possible social value of intercultural dialogue 
imagined as deliberation and conflict resolution, and the alternative value of it in 
gaining of knowledge, more specifically “as an effective form of self-reflection, and 
thereby of liberal education” (Ibid., p. 175).  
However, the range of paradigms for dialogue in the Western philosophical 
discourse has been much more complicated than what such a categorisation may 
suggest. Since the days of ancient Greece when Socrates first defined the dialogical 
method of argumentation, dialogue has taken many different forms and significance, 
including religious communion (Buber); philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer); 
rational deliberation (Habermas); radical pedagogy (Freire); ‘dialogical imagination’ 
(Bakhtin); ‘awakening of consciousness’ (Bohm); and dialogue as conversation and 
medium of liberal learning (Oakeshott and Rorty); the use of a philosophy of dialogue 
to promote intercultural understanding being a relatively recent development (Besley 
and Peters, 2012, p. 14). 
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How intercultural dialogue is defined naturally reflects what one considers as the 
challenge of cultural differences and what the goal of dialogue is. Some may define it 
as a form of liberal learning as mentioned above. Others may see it as a negotiation 
of cultural values in the spirit of pluralism (Parekh, 2000). In the context of the 
Council of Europe’s white paper, it refers to a particular policy approach with an 
implied association with the goal of social cohesion (Igbino, 2012, p. 167) as 
mentioned earlier. The latter two views are most relevant to political concerns 
regarding diverse social and cultural groups.  
Parekh has discussed concerns of cultural pluralism under the moniker of 
‘multiculturalism’, coming from the concerns of “how societies can be held together, 
develop a common sense of belonging, and reconcile the demands of political unity 
and cultural diversity” (Ibid., p. 12). His theoretical framework may be understood 
along two threads, one is a philosophy of cultural pluralism based on a critical 
appraisal of development in Western philosophy from monism to pluralism, the other 
involves his conceptualisation of human nature and of cultural communities, whereby 
a case for cultural diversity is made. 
Parekh hence in the first instance bases his own theorising of what he calls 
‘multiculturalism’ much on the philosophy of cultural pluralism, which he traces to 
ideas of Vico and Herder that required modification. Vico saw it as a rationalist 
fallacy to think that a society may be fully understood in terms of a universally shared 
human nature, for human nature is a product of history, developed and expressed 
differently in different epochs and society. The limitation in his perspective according 
to Parekh was that he valued cultural diversity, yet saw it as a transitional stage to 
what would ultimately be a culturally homogeneous world (Ibid., p. 55). Herder saw 
each culture as a product of the collective efforts of the relevant volk, as a unique 
expression of the human spirit, to be judged by its own standards. The problem 
Parekh sees is that he thus essentialised cultures as self-contained, each of them a 
‘harmonious whole’ on its own (Ibid., p. 73) and hence teetered over the edge of 
cultural relativism as he could not explain how one can understand other cultures or 
communicated across cultural boundaries, and neither could he give any ground for 
condemning practices like slavery if it is accepted by members of the society (Ibid., p. 
75).  
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Parekh criticises such limitations of relativism, for its “ignores the cross-culturally 
shared human properties and is mistaken in its beliefs that a culture is a tightly 
integrated and self-contained whole, can be neatly individuated, and determines its 
members” (Ibid., p. 127). At the same time, he faults monism for a substantive view 
of human nature that is untenable in the assumption that moral values are derived 
from human nature and cannot be reconstituted (Ibid.). He also sees a problem in an 
idea of minimum universalism that assumes universal values as being uniform in 
how different cultures relate to them, and therefore never coming into conflict. In brief, 
Parekh hence concludes that “a dialectical and pluralist form of minimum 
universalism offers the most coherent response to moral and cultural diversity” (Ibid.), 
and he calls it ‘pluralist universalism’ (Ibid.).   
It should be noted here that ‘cultural pluralism’ as coined by Parekh does not carry 
the same connotations as terminology like nationalism, ethnicity, communalism or 
identity politics which have often been used interchangeably with it (Toffolo, 2003, p. 
4). If there is a tendency by some to equate multiculturalism with the assertion of 
minorities, especially non-whites, on their own specific cultural values and special 
rights, Parekh refutes that, for he insists that no majority culture should be uncritically 
accepted in the first place, as he suggests that multiculturalism is about involving 
different cultural communities in exchange, and building “proper terms of 
relationships” (Parekh, 2000, p. 13). His idea of cultural pluralism takes objection 
against privileging a perspective of liberalism, which to him is  
“a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man, society and the world and 
embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life” (Ibid., p. 14). Parekh’s idea of 
cultural pluralism may be compared with Isaiah Berlin’s ‘value pluralism’ in terms of 
its opposition to monism, with a departure in view from Berlin’s arguments for 
liberalism. The notion of value pluralism as advanced by Berlin basically refers to an 
idea of ‘incommensurabillity of values’ which is yet compatible with a conception of 
the common good (Crowder, 2008, pp. 925-926) 
Berlin has argued against the wish to found ethics on any objective basis, as he 
asserts that normative statements on values, unlike logical or descriptive statements, 
are neither subjective nor objective, but are sui generis in nature (Cherniss, 2006, p. 
xlii-xliii). He insists that values are human creations and he considers any form of 
essentialism claiming that human nature is unalterable, or that values are facts which 
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can be discovered through knowledge of human nature, as posing a threat to human 
liberty (Ibid., p. xliv). Based on the argument that choosing between different ends is 
an inescapable characteristic of the human condition, he further concludes that a 
political order which acknowledges and protects this freedom would be the most 
legitimate kind of state and hence value pluralism entails liberalism (Talisse, 2012, p. 
33). This reasoning of his may in fact be criticised, for the inference from an 
inescapability of choosing between different incommensurable goals to the value of 
freedom in choosing is a weak one; one may also be indifferent to the choosing if 
what matters is not the preference of one option over another, the need to value 
freedom in choosing thus becomes psychological rather than logical (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the idea that pluralism is therefore anti-authoritarian is also problematic, 
for monists who defend autonomy and individuality are most likely to defend 
liberalism, whereas a pluralist ruler may still limit the ideas of the good life to just a 
few choices such as religious devotion and loyalty to tradition and the regime would 
still be illiberal (Ibid., pp. 35-36). 
In contrast to this, Parekh believes in the possibility of a cultural pluralism that 
“neither confines multiculturalism within the limits set by liberalism and suppresses or 
marginalises nonliberal values and cultures, nor confines liberalism within the limits 
of multiculturalism and emasculates its critical and emancipatory thrust” (2000, p. 
340). He attempts to offer a coherent theory to justify moral and cultural diversity that 
does not depend on naturalism or culturalism alone (p. 114). He starts with a 
minimalist view of human nature with properties that are universal in the sense of 
being shared by all human beings in all eras and societies (p. 115), such as common 
physical and mental structure and capacities such as rationality and self-reflection (p. 
116). He then adds that “human nature does not exhaust all that characterises 
human beings as a species” (p. 118) for they are also shaped by their geography 
and history in a dialectic of human struggle as well as “culturally embedded in the 
sense that they are born into, raised in and deeply shaped by their cultural 
communities” (p. 120). Hence human nature “is also culturally reconstituted and 
diversified” (p. 123), and furthermore human beings should be cherished for their 
sense of self-worth and self-respect with the ability to enter moral relations and their 
individual and collective achievements, and should be accorded a dignity above the 
status of animals (p. 130). Given differences in history and traditions, Parekh argues, 
132 
 
“it is both inevitable and desirable that different societies should differently interpret, 
prioritise and realise great moral values and integrate them with their own suitably 
revised thick and complex moral structures” (p. 141). One is hence able to attain 
higher levels of moral universality, except that all too often governments and 
dominant political groups “might misuse their legitimate interpretative freedom to 
undermine these values” (Ibid.). 
The remaining challenge for Parekh is then to justify the positive value of cultural 
diversity. He cites four arguments based on his interpretation of the cases made by 
John Stuart Mill, Humboldt, Herder as well as Berlin, Raz and Kymlicka. The first 
argument would hence be that “cultural diversity increases the available range of 
options and expands freedom of choice” (p. 165), but that gives little reason for one 
to value cultures of indigenous people or minor religious communities such as the 
Amish or the Gypsies which present no realistic option to most (Ibid.). The second 
argument would suggest that human beings have a right to their culture since they 
are culturally embedded, and hence cultural diversity is “an inescapable and 
legitimate outcome of the exercise of that right” (p. 166), but this only demonstrates 
the ‘inescapability’ and not ‘desirability’ of cultural diversity as the dominant culture or 
wider society may not wish to make accommodation with its institutions (Ibid.). 
Thirdly, from the perspective of romantic liberals such as Herder and Schiller, 
cultural diversity “creates a rich, varied and aesthetically pleasing and stimulating 
world” (Ibid.), yet the problem as Parekh points out is that cultures are more than 
mere objects of aesthetic contemplation, they are also moral systems which can lead 
to conflicts. Finally, cultural diversity may be linked to individuality and progress from 
the perspective of Mill, Humboldt and others, such that “it encourages a healthy 
competition between different systems of ideas and ways of life [and] facilitates the 
emergence of new truths” (Ibid.). Parekh criticises this however for being an 
instrumentalist view that does not appreciate intrinsic value of cultural diversity (Ibid.).   
Parekh concedes that a convincing case for cultural diversity would ultimately need 
to include the abovementioned arguments, but suggests it can be best approached 
from a different perspective, whereby one recognises that “no culture embodies all 
that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities” (p. 
167) and hence different cultures “correct and complement each other, expand each 
other horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfilment” (Ibid.) 
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Furthermore, cultural diversity may also be considered “an important constituent and 
condition of human freedom” (Ibid.). Parekh uses a similar line of argument for the 
case of intercultural dialogue, citing that while the “constitutional, legal and civic 
values represent society’s public culture” (p. 269), such operative public values do 
not form a coherent whole and “lose much of their meaning when dissociated from 
the procedures and practices in which they are embodied” (Ibid.). Hence they cannot 
be static but have to respond to changes in circumstances, and they necessarily 
would be interlocked in different interpretations in public discourse (Ibid.). In short, 
Parekh’s concept of multiculturalism is concerned more with value pluralism than 
with a politics of recognition for cultural identities; it is not an approach that is 
imagined as diametrically opposed to the approach of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as 
proposed in the Council of Europe’s 2008 white paper, but rather one that takes 
value pluralism as a basis for intercultural dialogue that would further shape a 
common multicultural society. Intercultural dialogue as discussed by Parekh involves 
the evaluation of values and practices across cultures, at the level of public 
discourse (p. 268-269), that may appeal to particular cultural contexts as well as to 
universal values (p. 293).   
But the tenability of value pluralism as such still needs to be further elaborated 
through comparison of communitarian and liberal principles in the political structure, 
as these may involve different priorities across value spheres. Parekh’s position has 
also been read by Amitai Etzioni (2009) as a form of ‘radical multiculturalism’, 
ascribed with a view that the state should abolish particularistic values of nations and 
adopt a normative neutrality, and that may be criticised for impeding state-wide 
policy formation (cited in Hand, 2011, pp. 350, 353). Elsewhere, Parekh has been 
criticised by Morgan (2002, p. 274; cited in Sackville, online) for being guilty of a form 
of monism himself in proposing a solution that can only be fully justified when one 
accepts his account of a culturally open way of life, which is similar to the monistic 
liberal. One might add that classical liberalism has “often treated forms of cultural 
plurality as acceptable in the purely private domain, but not in the public square” 
(Young, C., 2003, p. 240). But most importantly, what has led to the state framing of 
cultural pluralism as a ‘problem’ is “the incurable propensity of ruling institutions to 
engage in projects of codification of group identities and simplifications of patterns of 
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collective consciousness” (Ibid., p. 246), not to mention that the state is never 
culturally neutral (Ibid., p. 245).  
In terms of outlook, Parekh’s position has been interpreted as coming from a 
postcolonial perspective in seeking to develop a model of constitutional and political 
dialogue (Song, 2010, online) by way of his historical approach in considering the 
development of pluralism in the Western world beginning from Vico and Herder, in 
place of monism in the Western tradition from classical Greek rationalism and 
Christian universalism to monism of liberal thinkers such as Locke and J.S. Mill. His 
manner of reasoning thus forms an independent approach in the arguments for 
multiculturalism, next to justification based on communitarianism or liberalism (Ibid.).  
Issues of values as well as rights will have to be factored in as one proceeds here to 
analyse this idea of value pluralism further by considering the communitarian 
arguments for multiculturalism, encapsulated in the thoughts of Charles Taylor, as a 
counterweight to monist values of liberalism, before considering how liberal 
arguments may in turn be worked into multiculturalism as represented in the 
thoughts of Will Kymlicka. One may begin here with Locke’s conception of the 
‘rational’ man and society, grounded on the assumption that God created human 
beings with equal dignity and rights, in particular the right to labour with nature and 
satisfy needs with its products and the duty to develop natural resources to the full 
and to maximise conveniences in life (Locke, Second Treatise, 1963, pp. 33-34; 
cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 36). Parekh criticises Locke’s bias in his ideal of a civilised 
society, whereby the English colonisation of America would be justified in Locke’s 
argument that the Indians did not enclose the land and lacked the desire to 
accumulate wealth, hence failing to produce an international market for maximisation 
of the earth’s potential (Parekh, 2000, p. 37). 
Mill’s liberalism would differ from Locke’s, by being a utilitarian rather than natural-
law theorist, teleological rather than deontological, secular rather than Christian, and 
instead of prescribing the moral minimum in the value of civil society, he would 
advocate a substantive view of the good life (Ibid., p. 40). By upholding the ideal of 
individuality, self-determination and autonomy, Mill arguably made a powerful case 
for diversity through an appreciation of the richness and complexity of human nature, 
except that his conception of diversity remained embedded in an individualist vision 
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of life (pp. 41-44). He maintains that “the free development of individuality is one of 
the leading essentials of well-being” (1978, p. 346), for which he recognises the 
intrinsic worth of individual spontaneity. He does not deny that one has to be trained 
and taught in the youth of human experience, but argues that the “traditions and 
customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience 
has taught them [but] their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have 
interpreted it rightly” (pp. 347-348), or secondly “their interpretation of experience 
may be correct, but unsuitable to him” (p. 348), and thirdly even if the customs may 
be suitable, merely conforming to them “does not educate or develop in him any of 
the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being” (Ibid.).  
Mill’s emphasis on individuality somehow led him to the conviction that a more 
civilised nation or group has the right to rule over primitive societies or absorb inferior 
groups. He believed for instance that the Breton and the Basque stood to benefit by 
being “bought into the current of ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated 
people” (Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, 1964, p. 363; cited 
in Parekh, 2000, p. 46) under French nationality, and similarly the Welshman or the 
Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation, for gaining access to a 
superiority in artistic, philosophical and other achievements. This seems to be the 
extent of neutrality one would have to go in order to guarantee individual autonomy 
for general happiness. From the perspective of human rights theory, this is not just 
an issue of prioritising individual rights over group rights. Utilitarianism in the thinking 
of Mill as with Jeremy Bentham basically implies a criterion that the public good 
should be whatever produces greatest happiness in society, such that no extraneous 
value like equality, freedom or human rights can override it (Fields, 2010, p. 68). 
The question of whether freedom is intrinsically valuable, or only valuable if it serves 
other values, is one which Joseph Raz (1986) has discussed in a framework of 
political theory, dealing with political morality alongside a theory of institutions (p. 3). 
As proponent of a perfectionist liberalism or comprehensive liberalism – which bases 
political principles on ideals of the good life and not only the role as citizens, Raz 
asserts that freedom is valuable because it is “a concomitant of the ideal of 
autonomous persons creating their own lives through progressive choices from a 
multiplicity of valuable options” (p. 265). He argues against the limitations of 
consequentialist morality as represented by utilitarianism, citing John Rawls’ 
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objection in A Theory of Justice (1971) that utilitarianism disregards the 
separateness of persons in its willingness to take from one person and give to 
another depending on the greater net benefit from the allocation (pp. 27-29; cited in 
Raz, 1986, p. 271). Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) would go a 
step further by invoking the “Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not 
means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without 
their consent” (p. 31; cited in Raz, 1986, p. 273).     
Raz maintains that personal autonomy is about being part author of one’s life, and is 
not to be confused with moral autonomy in the Kantian idea of the will as a subject 
making the law for itself (p. 370). The value of personal autonomy according to Raz 
is a ‘fact of life’, not dependent on choice (p. 394); though bound up with availability 
of valuable options, it does not mean it is not a distinct ideal (p. 395). Valuing 
autonomy also commits one to a weak value pluralism according to Raz, who does 
not pursue a strong value pluralism which would commit one to the creation of value 
(p. 398). He sees autonomy ultimately as form of capacity in terms of mental and 
physical abilities and availability of adequate options, which may also be referred to 
as ‘positive freedom’ (p. 408). 
Parekh would situate Raz in the Western tradition as taking the Aristotelian view that 
the pursuit of human well-being is the telos of human life (Parekh, 2000, p. 90). He 
goes on to fault for Raz’s perspective that modern western liberal society is based on 
the idea of personal autonomy, such that his case for autonomy is first and foremost 
is premised on it being central to Western self-understanding (Raz, 1986, pp. 369-
370, pp. 391-394). This suggests to Parekh that it is an intrinsic value not per se or 
universally, but only for western people due to the way they are historically 
constituted, as if there is no other good reason to cherish other than for history 
(Parekh, 2000. pp. 92-93), with Raz seeing autonomy in terms of a capability rather 
than a rights-based morality. Parekh also objects to Raz’s second argument that 
autonomy is a functional requirement of modern society, which makes it no different 
from amoral skills such as literacy and numeracy (Ibid., p. 93). This poses a problem 
with Asian immigrants to Britain, whom as Raz observes do not value autonomy, yet 
are remarkable in their material success (Ibid.). In a later work, Ethics in the Public 
Domain (1994), Raz incorporates a new argument that since liberals value human 
well-being they should also value cultural membership, in structuring the members’ 
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perceptual and moral world and giving meaning to their activities, and in giving a 
sense of rootedness and identification (pp. 177-179, cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 95).Yet 
he maintains at the same time that the love of one’s culture should be ‘rational and 
valid’ and based on the ‘right reasons’ (1994, p. 184; cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 98). 
Parekh criticises this as universalising a liberal view of culture and implying that 
one’s relation to culture is contingent and conditional. Parekh argues that this is 
problematic: “To love a culture […] for the good in it is to love the latter not the 
culture itself” (p. 98).  
A major alternative to Mill’s and Raz’s comprehensive liberalism would be the view 
narrowed down to the realm of ‘political liberalism’, as developed by John Rawls in 
his more recent work Political Liberalism (1993) and Charles Larmore in The Morals 
of Modernity (1996), which Martha Nussbaum has professed to sharing, counting her 
own works Women and Human Development (2000) and Frontiers of Justice (2006). 
This involves essentially the idea of a liberal political order which may be described 
as an ideal of neutrality, not in terms of being neutral with respect to morality but 
“neutral with respect to controversial views of the good life” (Larmore, 1990, p. 341) 
as a minimal moral conception of liberalism. It may hence be further argued that “for 
real freedom to live according to one’s view also requires protecting the spaces in 
which people may leave one view and opt for another” (Nussbaum, 8th November 
2008, online).  
Rawls in A Theory of View considered plurality as both inescapable and desirable, 
but insisted that citizens were the ‘primary subject’ of justice whereby principles 
governing them should be arrived at rationally and settled one and for all (see 
Parekh. 2000, p. 81). His more recent work abandons the grounding of justice in a 
comprehensive doctrine to produce a more free-standing and political conception of 
justice as distinct from a metaphysical conception; but in the assumption that 
democratic public culture as a basis for justice is neutral, he appears to suggest that 
it is not self-validating as he then falls back on a philosophical argument that citizens 
are free and equal persons because of their moral powers in a sense of justice and 
the capacity to pursue conception of the good (see Ibid., pp. 82-83). From Parekh’s 
angle, Rawls’ limitation lies in taking much account of moral plurality but little of 
cultural plurality (Ibid, p. 89). 
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Liberal political theory, especially Rawks’ earlier emphasis on the universal demands 
of justice and his underlying view of man as free and rational being, has long been 
the target of criticism by thinkers classed as ‘communitarians’. Charles Taylor, in a 
1985 essay entitled ‘Atomism’, has notably attacked the atomistic view of man as 
being self-sufficient outside of society, which serves to privilege “the priority of the 
individual and his rights over society” (cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 246). It is however 
necessary here to trace communitarian thought back to the Aristotelian idea that 
justice is rooted “in a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both 
of the good for man and the good of that community” (MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 232-233; 
cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 246; cf. Etzioni, 1998, p. ix). In that regard, one may also 
defend Rawls for holding a vision of community which is anchored in cooperation 
and harmony, marked by a central principle of dependence whereby the individual 
has to obey the norms regulating his or her group, or he would be found “unworthy of 
his associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense of his own worth” (Rawls, 
1971, p. 445; cited in Alejandro, 1999, p. 298). But the key divergence would 
apparently be on the point of rationality. The objection against Rawls from Alasdair 
MacIntyre, coming from the position of virtue ethics which may also be traced back 
to Aristotle’s moral philosophy, is that the particularistic demands of patriotism are no 
less rational than the universalistic demands of justice (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 15-18; 
cited in Gutmann, p. 247). MacIntyre criticises that liberalism lacks foundations when 
its basis for moral judgments cannot be rooted in social life and instead becomes a 
matter of individual opinion (1981, p. 52; cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 247). Sandel 
would make a case for communitarian politics in raising concerns against the 
corporate economy and the bureaucratic state eroding forms of community (see 
Gutmann, 1999, p. 318). Against the latter critique, Gutmann argues that 
communitarians are not distinguished from liberals in either opposing or defending 
the market or welfare state, they may only differ in policies related to moral issues 
such as pornography (Ibid.). She suggests in summary that the worthy challenge to 
be posed by communitarian critics is “not to replace liberal justice, but to improve it” 
(Ibid., p. 260). 
The ‘communitarian’ label as such may not always be useful, as critics against Rawls’ 
devaluation of community, like MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor and Walzer, do not identify 
themselves with it, and the line between communitarianism and liberalism has also 
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been blurred. There are thinkers who may identify themselves as ‘liberal 
communitarians’, such as Selznick (1998, p. 3) who argues that liberalism may refer 
to commitment to political freedom and the rule of law but also to special concern for 
the poor and the oppressed, citing Dewey’s philosophy of combining a spirit of 
liberation and quest for social justice with responsible participation in ‘communities’.  
The difference to him is that liberalism suggests more emphasis on ideals of equality, 
liberty and rationality whereas communitarianism may refer to the ‘common good’ in 
terms of issues like allocation of resources, substance of education, problems of 
discrimination and poverty as well as the environment (Ibid., p. 11). While the 
arguments of four aforementioned thinkers may centre on the importance of 
particular social contexts and the social nature of the self, the second wave of 1990s 
communitarianism as represented by Amitai Etzioni among others would emphasise 
social responsibility and communal life (see Bell, 2012).  
With the foregoing discussion of moral foundation introducing the ideal of liberty and 
concern for the common good, one may now move on to the fine differences 
between communitarian and liberal justification on the value of multiculturalism, with 
regards to difficulty on issues like equal respect among diverse social contexts. The 
tension may be better appreciated with the help of the distinction made by Dworkin in 
his paper ‘Liberalism’, between two kinds of moral commitment, one relating to views 
on what constitute a good life, which is ‘substantive’, and the other relating to how 
members of society can deal fairly and equally with each other, which is ‘procedural’ 
(cited in Taylor, 1994, p. 56). This poses a challenge given the diversity of modern 
society, as discussed by Charles Taylor as a political philosopher who is 
representative of communitarian concerns in his justification for multiculturalism. His 
key thoughts shall be presented progressively here in the three following points: a 
critique on individualism in modernity; a grounding of morality and identity in social 
life, tied to a discussion on the modern ideal of authenticity; and the advocacy for a 
politics of recognition.  
Firstly, Taylor in The Ethics of Authenticity (1991) has described individualism as one 
of the “malaise of modernity” (p. 1), expressing the experience of loss or decline in 
culture even as civilisation ‘develops’.  Despite the fact that many people in the world 
today enjoy the right to choose their own patterns of life in many ways which their 
ancestors had no control over, and one may argue this achievement is yet 
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incomplete considering the economic arrangements and hierarchy that still exist, 
Taylor sees a price being paid. With modern freedom, people are breaking loose 
from a sense of cosmic order whereby people used to be locked into given roles 
from which it was unthinkable to deviate, but the predicament is that such orders 
were precisely what gave meaning to the world and to social life: “The things that 
surround us were not just potential raw materials or instruments for our projects, but 
they had the significance given them by their place in the chain of being. (p. 3)” 
As Taylor argues in a paraphrasing of Max Weber’s argument, the discrediting of 
such orders leads to a ‘disenchantment’ of the world, for it then implies “the primacy 
of instrumental reason” (p. 5). Since social arrangements are no longer grounded in 
a sacred order, society is ‘up for grabs’ and can be reconfigured towards the goal of 
individuals’ happiness and well-being (Ibid.). The danger of this is that much social 
planning is “dominated by forms of cost-benefit analysis that involve grotesque 
calculations, putting dollar assessments on human lives” (p. 6). He also highlights 
the problem of commodification, emphasis on technological solutions and 
deterioration of the environment under capitalist development, citing Hannah 
Arendt’s observation that “the reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily 
on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by 
which they are produced” (see Ibid., p. 7).    
From there, Taylor comes to the consequence for political life: the institutions and 
structures of an industrial-technological society severely restrict one’s choices by 
forcing societies and individuals to give weight to instrumental reason instead of 
moral deliberation (p. 8). The example he cites is how private automobile is favoured 
over public transport in the modern cities despite the thinning of the ozone layer (p. 
9). Taylor suggests that such a structure of society can be seen as “imposing a great 
loss of freedom” (Ibid.), using a different sense of the word as individualist freedom. 
He further suggests that there is yet another loss of freedom in the sense of what 
Tocqueville calls ‘soft’ despotism, as such a society produces individuals who are 
‘enclosed in their own hearts’, with few willing to participate actively in self-
government, as people prefer to stay at home and enjoy whatever satisfactions of 
private life that the government distributes (Ibid.). The atomism of the self-absorbed 
individual hence contributes to a vicious circle in the ‘iron cage’ of the bureaucratic 
state through an alienation from the public sphere, such that people are losing 
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political control over their destiny, or what Tocqueville would call ‘political liberty’ (p. 
10).  
The second aspect in Taylor’s thought involves a discussion of authenticity in 
morality as well as in identity. He traces the ethic of authenticity to the end of the 18th 
century where it was originally built on Descartes’ individualism of disengaged 
rationality and Locke’s political individualism, with a conflict coming from a later form 
in the Romantic period which was critical of disengaged rationality “and of an 
atomism that didn’t recognise the ties of community” (p. 25). The idea arising was 
that human beings are endowed with a moral sense or intuition for what is right or 
wrong, against the view that knowing right and wrong was a matter of dry calculation. 
(p. 26). 
This idea then of an ‘inner voice’, of being in touch with one’s own moral feelings, 
was also tied to the idea of an ‘individualised identity’, (1994, p. 28). Taylor refers 
here to Rousseau’s presentation of the issue of morality as following a voice of 
nature within us, a voice which may also be “drowned out by the passions that are 
induced by our dependence on others, the main one being amour propre, or pride” (p. 
29). He also cites Herder’s idea that every person has his or her own ‘measure’: 
“Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes Maass, gleichsam eine eigene Stimmung aller seiner 
sinnlichen Gefühle zu einander. (cited in p. 30)” With this perspective comes a 
powerful moral ideal, Taylor says, as “[i]t accords critical moral importance to a kind 
of contact with myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as danger of being 
lost, partly through the pressures towards outward conformity, but also because in 
taking an instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the capacity to listen to this 
inner voice (1991, p. 29).” 
The argument that Taylor takes from here is, however, that contrary to any 
assumption which may thus be made, the individual’s original way of being is not 
inwardly generated without social influence. The crucial feature of human life, he 
asserts, is its ‘dialogical’ character. By that, he refers specifically to George Herbert 
Mead’s idea of the ‘significant others’, whereby the self is constituted through the 
social experience of interaction with others (1994, p. 32).   
In the modern ideal of authenticity described by Taylor, Herder’s conception of 
originality is applied not only to the individual person among other persons, but also 
142 
 
to a Volk among others (p. 31). Given the perspective from social psychology that 
one’s identity depends on one’s dialogical relations with others (p. 34), it makes the 
politics of identity stressful, for oppression can result from refusal of equal 
recognition (p. 36). 
Taylor’s discussion in ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1994), as a third and most crucial 
aspect in his political philosophy, involves a struggle in the politics of equal 
recognition, between a principle of equal citizenship and dignity on one hand, and a 
politics of difference on the other. The difficulty stems from the development in the 
modern notion of identity, whereby it may be argued that everyone should be 
recognised for his or her unique identity, and it follows from there that an assimilation 
to a dominant identity would be “the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (p. 
38). Such a politics of difference in fact grows out of the politics of equal dignity, 
based on the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect. This refers to 
the term ‘dignity’ as used by Kant in Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, which 
suggested that what commanded respect in human beings are their status as 
rational agents, with the capacity or ‘universal human potential’ of directing their lives 
through principles (see Ibid., p. 41). Taylor argues that the potential of forming and 
defining one’s own cultural identity is, by the same token, a universal potential to be 
accepted (p. 42). But to those fighting for universal dignity and non-discrimination by 
insisting on being ‘difference-blind’, such a politics of difference may seem like a 
form of betrayal of the principle as it seeks to redefine non-discrimination as 
“requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment” (Ibid., 
pp. 39).  
Furthermore, in an intercultural context of recognition, there may be another demand, 
that equal respect be accorded only to “actually evolved cultures” (Ibid.). One may 
cite the instance of Eurocentrism in a statement like “When the Zulus produce a 
Tolstoy we will read him,” as attributed to the writer Saul Bellow, which suggests that 
the Zulus, despite having the same potential for culture formation like anyone else, 
has nevertheless produced a culture that is less valuable than others (Ibid.).  By 
indirectly forcing people into a homogeneous mould that may be seen as reflecting a 
hegemonic culture, “the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only 
inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, 
itself highly discriminatory” (p. 43). Taylor hence disputes Dworkin’s assumption that 
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a liberal society is simply one that adopts no particular substantive view about the 
ends of life (p. 56). He points out: “Political society is not neutral between those who 
value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut 
loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development.” 
In short, Taylor sees a problem with “a form of the politics of equal respect, as 
enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is inhospitable to difference, because (a) it 
insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, 
and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals” (p. 60). He puts forward a politics of 
‘recognition’ based on Hegel’s argument that human beings can only flourish to the 
extent that they are recognised (p. 50). This apparently departs from Rousseau’s 
attempt to convert human equality into identity (Gutmann, 1994, p. 6). But Taylor re-
interprets Rousseau’s new discourse of esteem as inaugurating an age of dignity to 
replace the traditional and inegalitarian way of thinking on honour. In contrast with 
amour propre as a source of evil in its concern for others’ opinion, caring about 
esteem in a perfectly balanced reciprocity is also compatible with Rousseau’s idea of 
freedom and social unity, Taylor (1994, p. 48) argues. Hegel in contradicting the old 
discourse on the evil of pride as a lack of virtue hence arguably follows Rousseau by 
seeking the struggle for recognition in a regime of equals.   
On this, Parekh (2000) would concur with Taylor’s observation that social recognition 
in a culturally diverse society is central to the individual’s identity and self-worth, and 
misrecognition can severely injure these; but he doubts that one may persuade a 
dominant group rationally to change its views, without countering the misrecognition 
“by both undertaking a rigorous critique of the dominant culture and radically 
restructuring the prevailing inequalities of economic and political power” (Ibid., p. 
343). Parekh therefore proposes an ‘interactive and dynamic’ model of 
multiculturalism whereby a society develops a common sense of belonging not 
based on shared ethnic or cultural characteristics, but as a community bound by 
common good and collective will that is ‘dialogically constituted’ (Ibid., p. 341). 
Bhargava (2010) would appreciate Taylor’s Hegelian approach in helping to grasp 
the notions of dignity and self-esteem as collective values which is lacking in the 
Kantian treatment, but emphasises the importance of dignity in labour. Applying 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to the case of the Bhangi, the lowest segment in the 
‘untouchable’ caste in India for their dirty work as ‘manual scavengers’, he argues 
144 
 
that beyond cultural autonomy, cultural communities also “must be open to critical 
evaluation” (p. 42). 
A liberal justification of multiculturalism, as represented by Will Kymlicka among 
others, argues similarly for a politics of recognition, except for a key difference that 
the cultural rights of individuals are argued as providing a source of self-respect and 
material for leading a meaningful life, such that one may describe the focus as being 
on instrumental rather than inherent value of communitarian identities (Kaul, 2011, 
pp. 510-511). Kymlicka has argued for in Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory 
of Minority Rights (1995, p. 81) for the basic principles of human beings’ interest in 
leading a good life, which entails firstly that they should lead their lives in accordance 
with their beliefs on what gives value in life, and secondly that they should be free to 
question and revise their beliefs (cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 99). In comparison with 
liberal thinkers like Mill and Raz, Kymlicka’s view on autonomy may be described as 
a modest one, as it is based simply on the ability or condition for leading a good life, 
not by argument that autonomy is desirable because it expresses one’s moral nature, 
individuality, progress or happiness (see Ibid.). Kymlicka’s achievement lies in 
effectively taking over the Rawlsian theory of justice and extending it to relations 
between cultures, enabling him to argue that enforced assimilation never works and 
only leads to disorientation (Ibid., p. 101).      
Kymlicka (2003) has outlined three general principles of the multicultural state:  
“that the state is not a possession of the dominant national group, but belongs 
equally to all citizens; that assimilationist and exclusionary nation-building 
policies should be replace with policies of recognition and accommodation; 
and that historic justice should be acknowledged” 
          (p. 154) 
However, he emphasises that there is no single model of the multicultural state, as 
there are great variations on state reforms that may be demanded, from country to 
country as well as from group to group within the same country, such as immigrants 
versus indigenous peoples (p. 153). Another interesting facet in his theory is on the 
conception of the ‘intercultural citizen’, whereby he notes that individual citizens may 
fully accept the political commitment of state without believing in possessing 
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intercultural skills themselves (p. 154). Some multicultural reforms may indeed result 
in a reduction in the need or incentive for intercultural skills or knowledge on the part 
of the individual, especially in federal multination states or self-governing territories, 
which allow minorities to create ‘parellel societies’, for instance among the Flemish- 
and French-speaking groups in Belgium or among the German-, French and Italian-
speaking groups in Switzerland (Ibid., pp. 154-155). In conclusion, Kymlicka 
suggests that the ideal of an intercultural citizen, with robust levels of intercultural 
skills in dealing with diversity, or intercultural knowledge on other traditions and 
identities, “does not fit neatly or simply into our ideal of a multicultural state that deals 
justly with ethnocultural diversity (p. 166). He identifies three possible areas of 
tension, namely that the intercultural citizen may prefer global rather than local 
interculturalism, that intercultural exchange may unfairly burden isolationist groups, 
and “that the model of the intercultural citizen requires a level of mutual 
understanding that is either tokenistic (if focused on superficial cultural differences) 
or utopian (if focused on deep cultural differences)”  (Ibid.). Ultimately, Kymlicka is 
inclined to fall back on Rawls’ assertion that ‘justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions’, that the emphasis on intercultural skills should not imply undermining of 
justice (Ibid.). In Parekh’s perspective, however, this is a limitation on the part of 
Kymlicka, whereby he is able to demonstrate why human beings need a stable 
culture but unable to provide reason as to why they need access to other cultures 
(2000, p. 108). 
But perhaps the most problematic component in Kymlicka’s multicultural theory is his 
differential approach towards the cultural claims of minorities. According to his logic, 
national minorities have the strongest cultural claim and moral weight while voluntary 
immigrants have the weakest, by reason that their country of origin is their cultural 
home and by leaving it, it implies that they have chosen to live by the culture of their 
adopted country – an argument which Parekh (2000, p. 103) questions for its sharp 
distinction between immigrants and citizens. Modood (2007) calls this a 
‘multinational bias’, as Kymlicka seems to suggest that individual autonomy depends 
on membership of a ‘societal culture’, and since migrants do not have any distinct 
one, they cannot claim multicultural rights (p. 34). Modood also sees a ‘secularist 
bias’ in Kymlicka’s theory, by treating groups formed by religion differently from 
ethnic groups (p.29). Kymlicka’s argument (1995, pp. 35-38) may be valid in principle 
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wherein he says that giving a group the right to restrict the behaviour of its members 
can be potentially unjust, and therefore multicultural citizenship should be primarily 
about giving groups the right to protect themselves from external forces, as one 
would grant (2007, p. 29). However, Modood sees a flawed logic in Kymlicka 
supporting multicultural rights based on language, but ruling out the possibility of a 
multi-religious state and too readily dismissing religious groups’ claims in relation to 
policy as ‘exemptions’ (pp. 26-27), when denial of individual autonomy is not limited 
to religious groups. Modood cites that the German state has institutionalised fiscal 
support for both Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches, while the Indian state 
regulates several organised religions and their legal principles, even though state 
officials and citizens need not subscribe to any of the faiths (p. 28).  
The 2008 Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue cites that the 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised pluralism built on “the genuine 
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, 
ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic 
ideas and concepts” (p. 13). It stresses however that intercultural dialogue is needed 
as a ‘major tool’ in managing cultural diversity in order “to safeguard freedom and 
well-being” (Ibid.) of all living on the continent.  If this is taken to suggest that the 
approach of ‘intercultural dialogue’ is a procedural approach of deliberative 
democracy that may accommodate cultural and value pluralism without 
compromising on principles of freedom and human rights, the test of its application in 
any region of the world would be how its ‘neutrality’ is defined and what moral 
commitments ultimately carry more weight.  
But meantime the term ‘multiculturalism’, instead of being equated with value 
pluralism as a positive ideal, has been attached with more stigma than ever in 
Europe. As Charles Taylor (2012) observes of the recent years in 2010s, the heads 
of government in three major European countries, namely Merkel, Cameron and 
Sarkozy, have echoed one another in announcing the end of ‘multiculturalism’ as a 
failure, a regrettable experiment (p. 414). He writes: “The underlying assumption 
seems to be that too much positive recognition of cultural differences will encourage 
a retreat into ghettos, and a refusal to accept the political ethic of liberal democracy 
itself. As though this rush to closure was the first choice of immigrants themselves, 
from which they have to be dissuaded through ‘tough love’ (Ibid.).” One problem 
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seems to be that politicians do not understand the dynamics of immigrant societies 
and fail to realise the natural tendency for immigrants to cluster with people of similar 
origin or background in the first instance (Ibid.). But Taylor also recognises the 
tendency of a host society to fear being changed by the newcomers: “The notion that 
‘they can be equal collaborators in remaking our common culture rings alarm bells in 
all who share this anxiety. It seems safer and more sensible to insist that they 
conform first to what we consider the basics, before we let them become co-deciders 
(Ibid., p. 420).”  
Bearing that in mind, one may deem it understandable if the search for a social or 
communication tool to promote a sense of community among people of different 
cultural backgrounds may also be constrained by the need to retain one’s core as an 
individual belonging to a particular cultural group. The discussion in the following 
section will also reflect such challenge as to how open-ended an intercultural 
dialogue can be at a personal level. 
 
3.2 Culture Assimilator as a Tool for Dialogue – an Intercultural 
Competence Framework according to Alexander Thomas  
 
3.2.1 Dimensions of Intercultural Competence for Intercultural 
Learning  
We now turn to look at ‘intercultural dialogue’ in another sense, not at the level of 
public policy, but as a process of intercultural communication at the level of day-to-
day life whereby ‘mutual understanding’ poses a challenge. We shall begin with an 
explanation of the philosophy behind intercultural dialogue under such a perspective, 
and then proceed to discuss the dimensions of intercultural competence that support 
intercultural dialogue in a framework proposed by Alexander Thomas (2003, 2008, 
2011) based on Culture Assimilator, an approach developed in Chicago in the 1960s. 
It will be argued here that the relevance of this framework hinges on the idea of 
‘intercultural learning’.  
Unlike in the discussion of the preceding section, intercultural dialogue as discussed 
within a framework of intercultural communication is concerned basically with face-
to-face interactions, where the challenge, at a personal or organisational level, lies in 
mutual understanding of intentions communicated through actions that may be 
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culture-specific. If the sense of intercultural dialogue on a political or societal level 
may be understood as a challenge of cultural differences in moral judgment, then its 
sense on a personal level may be understood as a challenge of cultural differences 
in terms of norms, which is the focus of the Culture Assimilator framework to be 
discussed in relation to critical incidents of cross-cultural interactions. The question is 
how the experience in the latter sense of intercultural dialogue may contribute to 
dialogue in the community at large. 
One may begin here by examining the theoretical basis for intercultural dialogue 
within a framework of intercultural communication. One early philosophy for 
intercultural dialogue would be that of Martin Buber as cited by Gudykunst (2003). 
Buber (1965) sees dialogue as necessary for the development of a community, 
which he considers not in terms of a group of like-minded people, but in terms of a 
group of individuals differing in minds but complementary in nature (cited in 
Gudykunst, 2003, p. 392). Unlike monologues which do not take into account the 
needs of others as unique human beings, but only serve to confirm one’s self-
reliance, and unlike technical dialogues which are aimed only at exchanging 
information, the goal of the dialogue as defined by Buber is to understand others and 
seek mutuality rather than one’s own feeling of control and ownership (cited in Ibid.). 
Buber (1965, p. 19) says that in dialogue “each of the participants really has in mind 
the other or others in their present or particular being and turns to them with the 
intention of establishing a living mutual relationship between himself [or herself] and 
them” (cited in Ibid.). Buber advocates walking a ‘narrow ridge’ which involves taking 
in both the view of one’s own and that of the other, not as in taking non-judgmental 
or relativistic attitudes towards others but to be ready to maintain or modify one’s 
opinions according to the arguments (Gudykunst, 2003, p. 393).  
There has incidentally been some attempt to compare Buber’s philosophy of 
dialogue, originally derived from a mystical tradition, with sociological perspectives in 
communication, such as those of Mead and Schütz, to explore the aspect of 
relations in communication or that of intersubjectivity in social action (Bidlo, 2006). 
One interesting fact is that Buber’s dialogue philosophy of the ‘I-Thou’ includes not 
only the relation between man and man but also between man and nature, and 
between man and spiritual existence; Buber has extended the encounters with 
spiritual existence to artistic creations too (Ibid., pp. 65-66). From a perspective of 
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cultural psychology as discussed in the previous chapter, dialogue through the arts 
may be understood as a kind of mediated communication. Where philosophy of 
dialogue goes, there has also been comparison between Levinas and Buber in their 
similar approach to dialogue. Levinas (1998) would emphasise the contrast between 
the ‘I-It’ approach based on the idea of experience and the ‘I-Thou’ approach based 
on relations, such that he sees dialogue as a transformative practice, not in terms of 
a notion of ‘experience’ or self-consciousness as lessons that converge into a unity 
of knowledge, but in terms of a kind of transcendence with a dialogic sense of 
oneself encountering another (cited in Keller, 2012, p. 116). 
Coming to the focus in this section, the philosophy of Ram Adhar Mall in intercultural 
dialogue has once been cited by Alexander Thomas to support his model for 
intercultural learning and intercultural understanding based on a framework of 
intercultural competence. Mall (1993) has expressed that the task of an intercultural 
philosophy should be to take relativism seriously and to reject any tendency that 
would treat any particular metaphysics, religion, culture, logic or ethic as absolute (p. 
10). A further argument of Mall would suggest that in intercultural dialogue, 
communication is more important than consensus, and this is taken as a basis for 
Thomas’ (2003b) model of intercultural competence in communication (p. 137).  
Dialogue in Thomas’ (2008) broader survey includes an aspect of content as well as 
an aspect of relation, and it can be influenced by formal communication elements 
such as social roles as well as by informal communication elements as in the 
dynamics between participants in terms of mood, sympathy, motivation, open-
mindedness and so on (p. 20). In Psychologie des interkulturellen Dialogs (2008), he 
cites various communication theories as useful references, including the theory of 
symbolic interactionism according to Mead (1968), the model of 
Perspektivenübernahme according to Rosemann and Kerres (1986), the axioms of 
communication according to Watzlawick and Beavin (1972), and also Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action (1996). He cites in particular Luhmann’s (1981) 
theory of self-referential system, whereby social systems are understood as being 
constituted of processes of communication, in order to suggest that the key to 
intercultural dialogue is not about the mutual creation of some unity as such but 
instead the continuation of communication provided by ‘understanding’ as a self-
referential decision (Thomas, 2008, p. 17)., However, his discussion on intercultural 
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dialogue ultimately centres on a model of intercultural competence which follows 
largely an approach of intercultural communication involving the Culture Assimilator 
as a tool for intercultural learning.  
Under this framework, which deals with situations of misunderstanding stemming 
from cultural differences in orientation system, Thomas (2003b) appears to adopt a 
relativist perspective in arguing that a person who behaves differently is in fact 
correct in his behaviour as corresponding to his own cultural orientation system (p. 
140). However, this line of argument has been criticised for it on one hand limits itself 
in the exploration of cultural psychology by assuming the structure of cultural 
orientation systems as universal, and on the other hand seemingly suggests that 
cultural transfer or change is undesirable if not impossible (Allolio-Näcke et al, 2003, 
p. 151). Mall (2003) himself has cautioned that knowledge or information on other 
cultures is necessary but not sufficient for mutual understanding and intercultural 
dialogue, as it may also turn out as a form of ethnocentric assumption that one can 
understand another culture better it does itself, and the framing of intercultural 
competence by Thomas, with reference to practical motives of making one’s life 
easier in business joint ventures, may tend to privilege a particular rationality such as 
that of neoliberal economy (pp. 196-198).  
In other words, this sets itself apart from motives of intercultural dialogue for 
transcendence in mutuality, as in the philosophy of Buber or Levinas, not to mention 
being more trivial or instrumental in scope compared to intercultural dialogue as 
discussed in Parekh’s sense of negotiating on differences in cultural values or 
practices. The challenge in intercultural competence, following Mall’s arguments, 
would be to go beyond cultivating a kind of competence that results in self-
transformation of merely a normative sense, that seeks consensus at the expense of 
a duty to remain true, that ultimately remains within the confines of egocentrism (Ibid., 
pp. 197-198). The kind of relativist attitude that Thomas appears to be promoting 
may risk degenerating into a matter of convenience, a relativism that Charles Taylor 
(1991) would call “an offshoot of a form of individualism” (p. 14), whereby everybody 
is thought to have a right to develop his or her own form of life for one’s own self-
fulfilment. In that case, there would be no further need for ‘intercultural dialogue’, 
especially if the purpose of intercultural competence is simply to find the easiest way 
for one to operate in a different environment to fulfil one’s own purpose.   
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This thesis will nevertheless continue to explore the potential in such a framework of 
intercultural competence with an argument of how certain components may be 
relevant in a humanistic context of intercultural dialogue through the medium of 
heritage. It would help to begin with an overview of the discourse on intercultural 
competence in the general field of intercultural communication and the academic 
discourse in Germany relating to its concept, then zooming into the conceptual 
framework of German social psychologist Alexander Thomas, in which intercultural 
learning is considered as a process for the achieving of intercultural understanding 
and ultimately intercultural competence (Thomas, 2003b, pp. 142-147). Eventually, a 
selection of more specific dimensions in intercultural competence will be discussed, 
namely open-mindedness, reflexivity, resilience and empathy, out of a range of 
general competence cited (Thomas, 2008, p. 27), with reference to their 
psychological bases and their implications for social relations in intercultural dialogue.  
The term ‘competence’ has been used in different ways in the literature of 
intercultural communication, one of the ways being to equate it with 
‘appropriateness’, which is also the main sense of competence as discussed in the 
Culture Assimilator model, which will be dealt with in the next section. In such a 
model, appropriateness may refer to legitimacy, acceptance or ‘assimilation’, the last 
typically used to represent “the extent to which a sojourner blends in with or 
becomes similar to the host culture”. (Spitzberg and Changnon, 2009, p. 6). 
Spitzberg observes various other senses equated with the term ‘competence’ in the 
literatures, summarised as follows: “understanding (eg., accuracy, clarity, co-
orientation, overlap of meanings), relationship development (eg., attraction, intimacy), 
satisfaction (eg., communication satisfaction, relational satisfaction, relational quality), 
effectiveness (eg., goal achievement, efficiency, institutional success, negotiation 
success), appropriateness (eg., legitimacy, acceptance, assimilation), and 
adaptation” (Ibid.). Competence may also be conceptually equated with a set of 
abilities or skills, or at times a subjective evaluative impression (Ibid.).  
Just as ambassadors and diplomats throughout history have recognised the 
importance of familiarity and competence with cultural practices of their destinations, 
the need to train individuals to serve in programmes such as the Peace Corps 
stimulated a new government and social scientific interest in the concept of 
intercultural competence after World War II, as the United sought greater 
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involvement in foreign lands and businesses (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Ezekiel (1968) for 
instance found that more competent Peace Corps volunteers tended to be 
characterised by a wider range of interests, valuing intellectual matters, higher 
aspirations, cheerfulness, verbal fluency, valuing of autonomy, ability to create and 
exploit dependency in people and so on (Ibid., p. 8). Terms such as ‘intercultural 
competence’, ‘intercultural effectiveness’ and ‘intercultural adaptation’ came into 
currency in the 1970s (Ibid., p. 9). Intercultural competence may be seen as “the 
appropriate and effective management of interaction between people who, to some 
degree or another, represent different or divergent affective, cognitive, and 
behavioural orientations to the world” (Ibid., p. 7), orientations most commonly 
reflected in normative categories such as nationality, race, ethnicity, tribe, religion or 
region (Ibid.).  
According to a review by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), models of intercultural 
communication competence may be divided into 5 different types: compositional 
models, which identify components of competence without specifying relations 
among the components; co-orientational models, which conceptualise interactional 
achievement of intercultural understanding or its variants, focusing on 
communicative mutuality and shared meanings; developmental models, which 
specify stages of progression through which competence is hypothesised to evolve; 
adaptational models, which typically envision multiple interactants and emphasise 
their interdependence, and see adaptation itself as a criterion of competence; and 
finally causal process models, which reflect specified interrelationships among 
components which can be formalised into testable propositions with a downstream 
set of outcomes marking criteria of competence (Spitzberg and Changnon, 2009, p. 
10)  
These five types are however not all mutually exclusive in their compartmentalisation 
of intercultural competence. For instance, among those classified under 
compositional models, whereas the intercultural competence components model of 
Hamilton, Richardson and Shuford (1998) consists of attitudes, knowledge and skills 
as 3 separate realms, the facework-based model according to Ting-Toomey and 
Kurogi (1998) sees conceived with mutual influences among the knowledge 
dimension (eg. power distance and communication styles), mindfulness dimension 
(eg. reflexivity and empathy), facework competence criteria (eg. perceived 
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appropriateness) and interaction skills (eg. mindful listening and trust-building) (Ibid., 
pp. 10-13). Deardorff’s pyramid model of intercultural competence (2006) views 
requisite attitudes (eg. respect of cultural diversity, openness to intercultural learning) 
as enhancing knowledge and comprehension as well as skills on a higher level, 
which in turn enhance desired internal outcome (adaptability, flexibility, empathy) 
and finally desired external outcome (behaving and communicating effectively and 
appropriately) (Ibid.). 
In Germany, where research in intercultural communication saw its development in 
the 1980s from international management to education, psychology, linguistics and 
other social sciences, the discourse on intercultural competence has been 
multifaceted and often characterised by critical reasoning, a notable example being 
the reactions to Alexander Thomas’ 2003 paper in the Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik journal 
on his model of intercultural competence (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 209). 
On one hand there were pragmatic questions on the validity of the model in itself, on 
the other hand there were criticisms fielded at the theoretical assumptions of the 
model, coming from some totally different discipline (Ibid., p. 210). Generally, there is 
a divide between an ‘efficiency approach’ that aims to make intercultural 
communication more efficient, and a ‘growth approach’ that emphasises on further 
development and growth of individuals and groups; related questions are whether 
intercultural competence is conceptualised on the level of individual actors or 
organisational actors, in a multinational organisation context or a multicultural society 
context, and whether there is reference to equality of power (Ibid.).  
Apart from a psychological approach to intercultural competence as discussed here, 
there are also other approaches in Germany under the discipline of education and 
social work as ‘intercultural education’ (Auernheimer, 1996; Nieke, 1995), under 
cultural sociology with regards to issues of stratification (Geenen, 2002), ‘othering’ 
(Reuter, 2002) or migration (Han, 2005; Hoffman-Nowotny, 2005), or under cultural 
anthropology in terms of understanding and translating the ‘cultural other’, as 
Moosmüller and Schönhuth observe (Ibid., pp. 215-217). In terms of applied 
research in intercultural psychology, there has been focus on international transfers 
(Kühlmann, 1995), intercultural assessments to select personnel for international 
assignments (Deller, 2000), criteria and instruments to evaluate intercultural trainings 
(Kinast, 1998; Podsiadlowski and Spieß, 1996) and so on (cited in Ibid., p. 214). 
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However, Thomas (2003b) has been most notable in summarising a learning model 
for intercultural competence (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, op. cit.).     
One may summarise intercultural competence in short as a profile of capabilities and 
proficiencies that allows a subject to behave appropriately in situations of contact 
with other cultures, in the aspects of perception, thinking, understanding and action 
in the encounters, so as to enable positive intercultural exchange (Antor, 2007, p. 
112). But one problem with an approach of equating intercultural competence with a 
set of abilities or skills though, is that the same behaviour or skill may be perceived 
as competent in one context but another, or by one perceiver but not another, hence 
no particular skill or ability is ever likely to be universally “competent” (Spitzberg and 
Changnon, 2009, p. 6). Another question is where that ‘competence’ in question is 
located, whether it is in the person, or it is in the situation or social relation (Ibid., p. 
44). Thomas (2003b, p. 143) himself has cited a perspective of Furham and Bochner 
(1986) that intercultural competence is “not simply a personal trait or learned skill, 
but a social phenomenon. Any social interaction is a mutually organised, skilled 
performance … [resulting] from the participants having a shared, although often only 
implicit understanding of the bases on which the interaction is taking place (p. 217)”. 
However, in Thomas’ framework based on critical interaction situations, his 
theorising of intercultural competence is ultimately based on an assumption of 
cultural differences investigated in cross-cultural psychology.  
With this, it means that intercultural competence is assumed to be located in the 
person, which allows Thomas to concentrate on the concept of intercultural learning, 
beginning with the idea of learning itself. Learning is generally conceived of as 
involving a change which has taken place relative to an earlier state; it should by 
definition be based on experience and/or practice, and should be lasting, by effecting 
a change in behaviour and change in cognitive structure (Schermer, 1991, pp. 10-22; 
cited in Thomas, 2005, p. 70). Furthermore, one may argue for the concept of a 
‘proactive’ learner whereby that one not only selects and assimilates a stimulus, but 
also explores material for one’s experience and influences it actively (Bandura, 1978, 
p. 344; cited in Thomas, 2005, p. 71).  
The emphasis here on the active learner may be contrasted with a concept of 
participation in learning process as socialisation, which would refer not only to 
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“mastering a set of knowledge or skills, but also a matter of learning how to work 
together with the other people in the group according to one’s status as a member 
and the level of expertise one has attained. (Scollon, Scollon & Jones, 2012, p. 164)”  
A theory of social learning according to Bandura posits that people learn from others 
through, observation, imitation and modelling. He divides the process of such model 
learning into two sections, namely acquisition and performance (see Edelmann, 
1996, p. 286), the former requiring attention in the observation, dependent on 
characteristics of the model in emotional engagement among other factors, whereas 
the latter involves mechanisms of reinforcement and motivation. Thomas (2003b) 
however argues that a gradual process of ‘learning by doing’ in a monocultural 
context is not realistic in an intercultural context, and hence postulates a cybernetic 
model whereby intercultural learning may be stimulated (pp. 146-147).    
Based on an idea of culture as a field of action according to Boesch, Alexander 
Thomas says: “Intercultural learning takes place when a person in contact with 
people of a different culture, attempts to understand its specific orientation system of 
perception, thinking, values and action, to integrate it in one’s own cultural 
orientation system and to apply it to the thinking and action in the field of action in 
the other culture. Intercultural learning involves, apart from the understanding of the 
orientation system of the other culture, a reflection of one’s own cultural orientation 
system. (Thomas, 1988; cited in Müller & Thomas, 1991, p. 8)” This three-tier model 
of intercultural learning, understanding and competence, as formulated by Alexander 
Thomas, is conceived based on his framework of intercultural psychology (2003b, p. 
146) It forms the principle behind the Culture Assimilator as a tool for training 
intercultural competence using critical situations as source of knowledge for learning. 
He argues that intercultural learning would thus go beyond the recognition of some 
exotic features of other cultural systems or the comparison between the different 
orientation systems, to include intercultural encounters in one’s planning and 
evaluation of communicative and cooperative processes, to realise the potential for 
reliability, flexibility and creativity in intercultural exchange – Handlungssicherheit, 
Handlungsflexibilität, Handlungskreativität (Ibid.).  
This concept of intercultural learning, conceptualised on a cybernetic model, is 
hence ultimately directed towards training flexibility in action (behavioural aspect of 
competence) for intercultural situations. However, the strength of this framework, as 
156 
 
will be argued in this thesis, is precisely in its focus on situations of potential conflicts 
or misunderstanding, which may be developed in its efficacy to zero in on problems 
framed in terms of culture differences. This approach sets itself apart from a 
developmental model which is centred on observing and analysing attitudes of 
people towards cultural differences, as proposed by Milton J. Bennett. Bennett’s 
(1986) elaborate model postulates ethnocentric stages to ethnorelative stages in 
progressive categories of denial, defence, minimisation, acceptance, adaptation and 
integration (Ibid., p. 182). Integration for instance is described as a state involving 
“the ability to evaluate phenomena relative to cultural context” (Ibid., p. 186), such 
that a person is able to “construe himself or herself in various cultural ways” (Ibid.). 
He has referred to a concept of intercultural learning used for a conference on 
educational exchange, defined as “[a]cquiring increased awareness of subjective 
cultural context (world view), including one’s own, and developing greater ability to 
interact sensitively and competently across cultural contexts as both an immediate 
and long-term effect of exchange” (Bennett, 2009, online, p. 2).  
Such emphasis on awareness (cognitive aspect of competence) and sensitivity 
(affective aspect) of differences in world views may be seen as akin to an approach 
of cultural anthropology in understanding and translating an unfamiliar culture. 
However, Bennett (2004) has argued from a different perspective that being 
knowledgeable about a culture may not necessarily be associated with a feeling of 
acceptance, people may need to have a ‘critical mass’ of information about another 
culture in order to appreciate its world view, and be ready to abandon an 
ethnocentric view that assumes one’s own cultural patterns as the universal reality 
(pp. 68-69). In other words, enhancing the cognitive aspect in intercultural 
competence may not necessarily lead to an effect in the affective aspect. Studies 
have also suggested variation between culture-general and culture-specific 
assimilators, whereby the former appears to have positive effects on attitude towards 
others or empathy, in terms of importance given in considering other people’s 
feelings before making a decision, recognition of there being more than one way of 
getting things done, the inclination to defend others’ viewpoints and so on; whereas 
the benefits of the latter are reflected mainly in the decrease of stereotypes,  
development of complex thinking and isomorphic attributions about the target culture, 
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greater enjoyment, better adjustment to everyday stresses and better job 
performance (Cushner and Landis, 1996, pp. 191-194). 
Generally, one may argue for the ultimate importance of intercultural contacts. 
Bennett (2009) has discussed the positive effects of international exchange for 
students or training of primary and secondary school teachers, and a multicultural 
campus to help model citizenship in multicultural societies at large (pp. 13-14, online). 
Auernheimer (2007) argues based on research in intercultural education that 
intercultural learning could be facilitated in school environments where pupils are not 
segregated according to cultural origins even in primary school (p. 25). They may be 
involved in interactive role plays that deal with images of the self and others and 
collective experiences (Ibid., p. 26). There is incidentally another model of 
intercultural learning according to Weber (2005) which sees it as ‘identity negotiation’, 
based on the framework of Ting-Toomey in intercultural training, and the theory of 
‘expansive theory’ developed by Engeström in the context of activity theory (cited in 
Teräs, 2007, p. 36). In yet another concept, intercultural learning may be understood 
as a form of liberal education and enrichment, through reflection on the varieties of 
‘ethos’ available as human heritage or legacy on the globe (Rao, 2010, p. 174). This 
would be in line with dialogue in the paradigm of Oakeshott. Chapter 6 in this thesis 
will take into account a perspective of intercultural learning in an intercultural 
communication framework according to Robert E. Young (1996), which considers it 
in terms learning through conversations with other cultures, such that one may find in 
other cultures what one feels has been ‘lost at home’ (p. 144)   
We shall now shift our focus to consider intercultural competence in direct relation to 
intercultural dialogue as a whole. Intercultural dialogue is considered by Thomas 
(2008) as a form of interaction between people of different cultural communities for 
the purpose of reaching understanding. It is largely seen as a specific form of 
intercultural communication, whereby the divide between interaction and 
communication is arguably not considered particularly useful scientifically (Thomas, 
1991, p. 55; Frindte, 2001, p. 95). In the perspective of Thomas, intercultural 
dialogue as with other forms of intercultural communication can be enhanced 
through aspects of intercultural competence such as open-mindedness or curiosity, 
ability to adopt a different perspective, reflexivity, flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, 
empathy, and physical and psychological resilience (Thomas, 2008, p. 27). While 
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these aspects were listed there as an overview with little elaboration on their precise 
relevance to intercultural dialogue, the discussion below will attempt to expand a little 
on the psychological relevance of a selection of them, through comparison with 
perspectives on intercultural dialogue by other scholars. 
Where intercultural dialogue is concerned, the relevance of open-mindedness in the 
perspective of Thomas apparently refers back to the philosophy of Ram Adhar Mall 
in terms of intercultural understanding as Verständigung by way of intercultural  
discourses (Thomas, 2003b, p. 145). Thomas interprets this to mean that mutual 
understanding is not about producing consensus, but rather the acts of desire to 
understand and desire to be understood, via the process of communication (Ibid.). 
Mall (2000) has said that in the spirit of intercultural philosophy, one should be ready 
to renounce any perspective of absoluteness, for this would lead to breaking up of 
communication, especially when differences in approach are involved (p. 347; cited 
in Ibid). Referring to Mall’s motto “Einheit angesichts der Vielfalt” (unity in a view of 
diversity) (Ibid., p. 346), he argues that the minimal ‘consensus’ needed here is 
simply that communication is meaningful (Thomas, 2003b, p. 145). Thomas expands 
this principle from a psychological viewpoint to general contexts of intercultural 
encounters, including intercultural cooperation, as “die Realität interkultureller 
Begegnung, Kommunikation und Kooperation” (Ibid.). Given the emphasis on 
flexibility of action in his framework of intercultural competence, and on overcoming 
of misunderstanding in cross-cultural situations as the aim of the Culture Assimilator 
method in intercultural training, one may say that Thomas’ interpretation of open-
mindedness is largely a cognitive component in intercultural competence geared 
towards effective understanding of intentions for the purpose of cooperative action. 
There may be another position on the quality of open-mindedness, however, that is 
based on a logic presuming an intrinsic value in the diversity of cultures instead of 
highlighting cultural differences. Heinz Antor, while sharing a similar concept of 
culture with Thomas in terms of patterns of thinking and action (Antor, 2007, p. 115), 
hence cites the philosophy of Charles Taylor, who suggests it makes sense “to 
demand as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cultures with a 
presumption of their value” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 68-69; cited in Antor, 2007, p. 116). 
Antor (2007) argues that a view of the anthropological basis for cultural diversity 
would help to mitigate the concept of otherness, for mutual understanding, or even 
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communication itself, is unthinkable with a radically ontological other imagined as 
sharing little in common (p. 116). He acknowledges however that such a rational 
form of the cognitive component in open-mindedness is no guarantee for positive 
effects, and hence adds that an affective component in open-mindedness has to be 
cultivated through benevolent intercultural encounters (Ibid.). 
Instead of emphasising how open-mindedness may lead to flexibility in intercultural 
exchange, Antor argues that intercultural competence in intercultural dialogue should 
mean not only being open and tolerant towards the other, but also, paradoxically as 
it may sound, being committed to one’s own position (cf. Buber, 1965; cited in 
Gudykunst, 2003, p. 393) and representing one’s own identity while opening up to 
the other (Antor, 2007, p. 118). Intercultural dialogue, he reasons, requires two sides 
or more, hence intercultural competence in this context should not be a wrongly 
motivated act of mimicry to adapt fully into the other culture, for that would be as 
absurd for a dialogue as a xenophobic rejection of the other (Ibid.).  
Another cognitive component of intercultural competence would involve reflexivity. 
Reflexivity in the sociological perspective of Giddens would refer not only to self-
consciousness but also to the monitored character of practices as part of social life 
(Giddens, 1993, p. 90). He has argued that it is a quality built into the system, 
whereby the “[c]ontinuity of practices presumes reflexivity, but reflexivity in turn is 
possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes them distinctively ‘the 
same’ across space and time (Ibid.).” In modernity, however, reflexivity extends into 
the core of the self, for unlike in traditional cultures where things stayed more or less 
the same at the collective level from generation to generation, the self in modernity 
has to be explored and constructed in connection with social change. One may 
therefore argue in a transcultural model of society that reflexivity is already an in-built 
process. Under an intercultural model, however, one assumes cultures as closed 
systems of orientation, and the quality of reflexivity or reflexionsfähigkeit in one’s 
rationality would refer instead to reflections on cultural differences as part of 
intercultural learning, under the model of Culture Assimilator as will be discussed in 
detail in the next subsection.    
The aspect of intercultural competence best associated with the affective dimension 
would be empathy. The word ‘empathy’ has been traced back to its Greek origin as 
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empatheia, meaning insight into another person’s reactions, but the concept referred 
to as Einfühlung, came from the theory of Theodor Lipps around 1900, which was 
used to explain how people experience inanimate objects or understand the mental 
states of other people (Rasoal et al, 2011 p. 2). This was also applied to 
philosophical and psychological analysis of aesthetic experiences. In the definition of 
developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman, it is an emotional response involving 
“psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent 
with another’s situation than with his own situation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 30). For 
social psychologist Mark H. Davis, it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon of feeling 
similar feelings as the other, having feelings of empathic concern, and understanding 
the other (Davis, 1994; cited in Rasoal et al, 2011, p. 4). 
Although empathy research would have important implications for intercultural 
interaction, it seems to have focused almost exclusively on empathic ability among 
individuals of the same ethnic or cultural background (see Rasoal et al, 2011, p. 2). 
In a rare exception, the term ‘ethnocultural empathy’ has also been coined by Wang 
et al (2003) with regards to the challenge of cultural differences. They postulate that 
ethnocultural empathy has four components, namely intellectual empathy, 
communicative empathy, ethnocultural empathy, and acceptance of cultural 
differences (see Rasoal et al, 2011, pp. 6-7). These involve the theoretical aspect of 
considering an individual within his cultural context, the need to control one’s 
prejudices, and practical experiences of contact (Ibid.).  
In relation to the issue of how art forms or intangible heritage such as dance may be 
used as a medium to develop empathy for intercultural dialogue, there is much room 
that may be explored in psychology of aesthetics. It would suffice for now to point out 
that artistic activities can generate psychological functions and hence mediate to 
shape individuals’ thinking, according to the Activity Theory as cited by Ratner (1996, 
p. 414). Incidentally, some concept of empathy has also been discussed in a 
phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity, though some of the most far-
reaching phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity actually go beyond this 
question of empathy (Zahavi, 2001, p. 153).  
Another related dimension of intercultural competence would be Belastbarkeit or 
resilience, which has been cited by Heinz Antor (2007) as important especially in the 
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case of dissent or the threat of conflicts, as there may be tendency to idealise 
intercultural exchange before one experiences the complex reality (p. 117). One 
therefore has to be cognitively informed and affectively equipped for such realism as 
part of one’s competence (Ibid.).   
But if the discussion thus far renders the impression that the challenge of 
intercultural dialogue is mainly geared towards a thematic concern with ‘cultural 
differences’, one should note that one of the ‘key competence areas’ for intercultural 
dialogue as cited in the 2008 White Paper takes a more universal outlook of 
empowerment for all – it speaks of education for democratic citizenship, involving, 
inter alia, “civic, history, political and human-rights education, education on the global 
context of societies and on cultural heritage […] particularly the capacity for reflection 
and the self-critical disposition necessary for life in culturally diverse societies” 
(Council of Europe, 2008, p. 29).  
In this regard, one may consider the relevance of competence for intercultural 
dialogue from a more universal and less static perspective of moral psychology like 
that discussed by Kohlberg (1999) regarding “culturally universal stages of moral 
judgment” (p. 50) based on a psychological theory of development derived from 
Piaget on the claim “that both logic and morality develop through stages and that 
each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its 
predecessor” (p. 52). ‘Equilibrated moral judgments’ as such involve principles of 
justice or fairness, which Kohlberg allies with the ethics of Kant and Rawls (p. 53). 
Hence according to Kohlberg, one progresses from a ‘preconventional level’ of the 
child oriented towards punishment-and-obedience followed by an instrumental-
relativist attitude, to another two stages of ‘conventional level’, and finally to the 
autonomous level with social contract legalistic orientation in Stage 5 and universal-
ethical-principle orientation in Stage 6, governed by a role-taking according to the 
Golden Rule (p. 63). However, a more recent perspective of social domain theory 
has departed from Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s description of moral development in 
terms of increasing differentiation between moral and non-moral concepts, by 
proposing that moral, conventional and psychological domains are separate 
developmental systems which are self-regulating (Smetana, 1999, online). This 
perspective would focus on experiential origins in the construction of knowledge in 
morality.   
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3.2.2 Culture Assimilator training for intercultural understanding  
This subsection will provide an overview of the psychological principles behind the 
model of the Culture Assimilator which has been developed as a tool in intercultural 
communication to help stimulate intercultural learning. Its strengths and limitations in 
training intercultural competence will be discussed, along with the question of how or 
in what sense it may be adapted for the purpose of this thesis in helping to enhance 
intercultural dialogue with the medium of cultural heritage.  
It will be argued that this framework is useful as a heuristic model for the discussion 
of cultural differences which may be perceived by members of different cultures in a 
form of ‘folk psychology’, but one needs to be careful with the assumption that 
cultural differences can be deduced from actors’ behaviour in cross-cultural 
situations as being representative of their cultural systems. It will be discussed as to 
what aspects of intercultural competence connected with the Cultural Assimilator are 
most relevant to the process of intercultural dialogue and what perspectives remain 
beyond the scope of this framework. 
The basic principle of the ‘Culture Assimilator’ is about training a person to make 
proper attributions on behaviour observed in a different cultural group out of multiple 
possibilities. This involves exercises in interpreting the cultural standards of an 
unfamiliar culture on the examples of different cross-cultural situations, which have 
been collected through interviews and presented in text form as training material. 
The Culture Assimilator, otherwise known as the Intercultural Sensitizer (ICS), has 
apparently been “exposed to the most intense scrutiny and analysis and has 
repeatedly demonstrated positive impact on people’s cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural processes” (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185), in short the three 
domains, which intercultural training generally aims to influence as part of its overall 
goals. ‘Positive impact’ here refers to various aims of intercultural training, which 
includes not only the attempts to help people communicate more effectively, but also 
to help people deal with stresses that accompany intercultural encounters, to enable 
people to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships with those of a different 
background, and to enable people to accomplish tasks that they set out to do in a 
new setting (Ibid.). It hence goes beyond what one may consider as the main 
163 
 
challenge of intercultural dialogue as a form of open exchange for mutual 
understanding, and is centred on personal development in an unfamiliar environment. 
The efficacy of the Cultural Assimilator would be better appreciated when placed in 
the context of different models in training intercultural behaviour as discussed in the 
field of intercultural communication. Following the conceptualisations of intercultural 
training in an overview by Brislin, Landis and Brandt (1983), intercultural behaviour is 
considered as “an action that can produce significant change in the judgments of the 
actor’s social or skill competence” (Landis and Bhagat, 1996, p. 2), whereby such 
changes might be positively or negatively reinforced through the process of 
interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds. One framework compares 
distal-proximal views of intercultural behaviour, whereby the most proximate set of 
variables influencing intercultural behaviour is made up of image of the self, abilities 
and aptitudes, personality traits and so on; social-psychological related variables 
then includes constructions of the in-group and the out-group, norms and roles; most 
distal would be cultural variation including dimensions such as individualism-
collectivism and power distance, as discussed by Hofstede or Triandis (Ibid., pp. 2-3). 
Another framework presented by Landis and Bhagat (1996) includes the potency 
and direction of influences in a complex of variables. This includes the three 
dispositional components, namely the affective, cognitive and behavioural, jointly 
predictive of a characteristic called arousal seeking (Ibid., p, 5). The latter is also 
influenced by what they call centrality of goals, which has its theoretical origin partly 
in Bem’s work (1967) suggesting that cognitive dissonance effect only occurs when 
behaviour is viewed as a central part of self-perception (Ibid., p. 4). Landis and 
Bhagat also modify a formula by Triandis (1977) on behavioural intention, such that it 
becomes a function of past experiences of the individual, the affective responses to 
both the behaviour and the target, as well as the extent to which the behaviour is 
consonant with the self-image or centrality of goal and the level of desired arousal 
seeking (Ibid., p. 6). 
Based on this framework by Landis and Bhagat and their classification of cross-
cultural training into different emphases on changes in people’s thinking (cognitions), 
changes in people’s affective reactions (feelings), and changes in people’s behaviour 
(Ibid., p. 10), the Culture Assimilator approach is seen to fit in best with cognitive 
goals, though such an assignment may also arguably be considered an over-
164 
 
simplification (Ibid., p. 8). As will be explained, the strategic goal of the Culture 
Assimilator is to improve intercultural understanding by making ‘isomorphic 
attributions’, but it has also been argued that this has positive impact in the affective 
and behavioural dimensions too. 
The Culture Assimilator as a cross-cultural training strategy is based on a critical 
incident approach which may be traced back to the 1950s technique first described 
by John Flanagan. The critical incident technique consists of a set of procedures for 
collecting direct observations of human behaviour in order “to facilitate their potential 
usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad psychological 
principles” (Flanagan, 1954, online, p. 1). An ‘incident’ refers to any observable 
human activity that is “sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and 
predictions to be made about the person performing the act” (Ibid.), whereas being 
‘critical’ means the incident must occur “in a situation where the purpose or intent of 
the act seems fairly clear to the observer and where its consequences are 
sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects” (Ibid.). The Culture 
Assimilator subsequently involves the use of critical incidents as short vignettes or 
accounts on interaction between individuals from different cultures with the intent of 
pursuing some common goal. Trainees reading these scripted accounts of situations 
are presented with a number of alternatives to explain the problem, and are asked to 
select the one that best explains the problem from the other’s point of view (Cushner 
and Landis, 1996, p. 185). The work of Andrea Müller and Alexander Thomas in 
Interkulturelles Orientierungstraining für die USA (1991) is an example of such 
training material developed in Germany, following studies by Thomas and others on 
Youth Exchange Programmes in the 1980s (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 
214). 
The development of Culture Assimilator as a training tool in intercultural 
communication may be traced back to the University of Illinois in 1962, where 
researchers led by Larry Stoulrow, working with Osgood, Fiedler and Triandis, 
proposed the creation of a computer programme to provide cross-cultural training to 
students, and the term ‘Culture Assimilator’ was hence proposed (Cushner and 
Landis, 1996, p. 185). The first assimilator developed was to address communication 
and interaction between Arab and American students. Arab students were asked to 
relate a variety of culture clashes they had encountered with their American peers 
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and to explain the problem to the best of their perspective, whereas American 
students were then asked to review the incidents and to explain them from their 
perspective. Episodes were hence constructed with four or five alternative 
explanations or attributions, one of them provided by the Arab respondents and the 
rest mostly presented by American respondents; such has been the general format 
for most Culture Assimilators (Ibid.). 
Osgood (1977) and Triandis (1972) suggest that the greatest problems in 
intercultural understanding and communication occur at the level of people’s 
subjective cultural differences, for unlike what they refer to as ‘objective elements of 
culture’ such as artefacts, food and clothing which are relatively easy to visualise and 
analyse, “intangible elements of a group of people [such as] values, attitudes, and 
norms of behaviour” are more difficult to visualise and analyse (Ibid.).The behaviour 
of other people can seem meaningless when one has no adequate knowledge of the 
cultural context, and hence one may misunderstand the reasons or motivations for 
people’s behaviour, or in another words make wrong attributions (Ibid.) A main goal 
under the Culture Assimilator is hence for people to make isomorphic attributions, or 
similar judgments about the causes of another’s behaviour (Ibid.). 
The term attribution in social psychology refers to the “process of assigning a cause 
to our own behaviour, and that of others” (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008. p. 80). There 
are several main theoretical perspectives in the general body of attribution theory, 
the earliest being that of Fritz Heider (1958), who held that people are intuitive 
psychologists or ‘naïve psychologists’ in constructing causal theories of human 
behaviour (Ibid.). Heider made an important distinction between ‘internal (or 
dispositional) attribution’ and ‘external (or situational) attribution’, as he believed that 
people distinguish between personal factors (eg. personality, ability) and 
environmental factors (eg. situations, social pressure) (Ibid., p. 81; Thomas, 1991, p. 
176).  
The attribution process is subject to bias, and one of the best known thereof is 
correspondence bias, also called the fundamental attribution error, as originally 
identified by Ross (1977), referring to a tendency for people to make dispositional 
attributions for others’ behaviour even when there are clear external or 
environmental causes (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 91; Thomas, 1991, p. 178). 
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Pettigrew (1979) has suggested that the fundamental attribution error may emerge in 
a slightly different form in intergroup contexts where groups are making attributions 
on ingroup and outgroup behaviour, and he calls this the ultimate attribution error. 
He argues that negative negative outgroup behaviour is dispositionally attributed, 
whereas positive outgroup behaviour is externally attributed or explained away in 
other ways to preserve an unfavourable outgroup image (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, 
p. 98). Such bias in attribution is also closely related to another form of bias, namely 
essentialism, as discussed by Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (1998) and by Medin 
and Ortony (1989), referring to a pervasive “tendency to consider behaviour to reflect 
underlying and immutable, often innate, properties of people or the groups they 
belong to” (Ibid., p. 92).  
Alexander Thomas has emphasised that Kulturstandards or cultural standards - a 
term apparently borrowed from cognitive anthropologist Ward Goodenough (1964) 
for the framework of Culture Assimilator (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 214) - 
are hypothetical constructs. They are useful as such in critical interaction situations, 
whereby interaction partners from a different background may not behave in ways as 
expected by someone who is socialised in different values and norms (Thomas, 
2011, p. 108). He recognises that globalisation has led to diversity in ways of life and 
what some refer to as hybrid culture, but points out the challenge of an 
Überschneidungssituation or cross-cultural situation for people who have not 
experienced similar challenges in monocultural conditions (Ibid., pp. 104-105). Under 
such circumstances, a tool like the Culture Assimilator can help one understand 
happenings and interactive behaviour by finding proper causal attribution, as to why 
things occur in a particular way in the social environment, and final attribution, as to 
what goals the interaction partners may be following (Müller and Thomas, 1991, p. 9).  
Müller and Thomas have also remarked with regards to their training programme as 
an example of Culture Assimilator that to enhance its effectiveness, the critical 
interaction situations presented in the form of ‘multiple choice’ may be further used 
as basis for role play or group discussion (Ibid., p. 12). Secondly, given that the 
Culture Assimilator method seeks to emphasise the difference between cultures, one 
would also need to moderate that by discussing commonalities or similarities 
between the cultures, in order to lessen the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ibid.). 
Thirdly, such training should not be limited to acquaintance with an unfamiliar cultural 
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orientation system, it should also help stimulate reflection on one’s own cultural 
orientation system, as part of awareness on cultural differences; activities of role play 
and simulation would hence be meaningful in complementing an otherwise purely 
cognitive approach of the Culture Assimilator (Ibid.). Fourthly, it is noted that the use 
of such training material may trigger off culture shock, such that the trainees may 
experience a sense of insecurity and anxiety as what they have assumed to be valid 
ways of behaviour, strategies, values and norms are suddenly put into question 
(Ibid.), and hence a trainer would have to be able to recognise and deal with such 
reactions, and group work may also be more conducive. 
Thomas cites Fiedler et al (1971) in the following criteria that critical interaction 
situations should fulfil as material for the Culture Assimilator: it should be a quotidian, 
authentic situation of encounter between two or more persons of different cultural 
backgrounds; it should be experienced as a situation of conflict or a situation that is 
incomprehensible; it should be able to be interpreted with the help of knowledge on 
the target culture, that is the conflict should be based on cultural differences; it 
should be easily described, not too complicated and should be restricted to a 
particular area or topic; there should be sufficient background knowledge for the 
situation to be grasped; the situation should be typical and plausible (Thomas, 2011, 
pp. 102-103). Thomas suggests that based on experience, around 30 interviews on 
critical interaction situations would be sufficient to cover the range of situations, any 
number higher than that would not yield noteworthy addition of information, the 
accounts would just seem repetitive (Ibid., p. 109).  
The “Culture Assimilator” approach of Alexander Thomas may be considered as a 
‘culture-specific assimilator’, in contrast to ‘culture-general assimilators’ as 
developed by Brislin and others, which are meant to prepare individuals for 
intercultural encounters with people from a variety of backgrounds. However, as 
mentioned, Thomas’ approach emphasises that it serves to develop reflection on 
one’s cultural orientations and awareness of cultural differences.  
There has been various attempts to expand this approach for wider applications in 
intercultural dialogue, judging from the work in Psychologie des interkulturellen 
Dialogs (2008) edited by Alexander Thomas. The definition of culture here appears 
not to be tied particularly to ethnicity as such, but more heuristic as a concept, with 
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the flexibility of being tied alternatively to a national culture, a religion or even a 
corporate culture. Stögbauer and Müller (2008) for example use the framework to 
discuss ‘interreligious competence’ for intercultural dialogue, whereby sensibility and 
respect for religious views may be developed (p, 74). It has also been suggested that 
Culture Assimilator as a tool for intercultural learning can be used to help create a 
space for dialogue in the schools, by combining with interactive activities such as 
cross-cultural family exchange and annual events or projects (Ponte, 2008, pp. 98-
103), such interaction being arguably important in order to avoid too much emphasis 
on cultural differences. 
The theoretical framework of Alexander Thomas on intercultural dialogue, centred on 
the conceptual too of the Culture Assimilator, is in short built on the following main 
premises. Firstly, culture can be seen as an orientation system which is transmitted 
from generation to generation, and which influences the values and the actions of 
the members of the relevant group or community. Secondly, cultural differences 
manifest in situations of intercultural encounters whereby actions of people 
according to their own cultural standards may be misunderstood or not attributed 
properly. This is due to the lack of similar contexts and hence the lack of mutual 
expectations, which in the words of Parsons et al (1953, p. 35ff; cited in 
Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 79) would be the problem of ‘complementarity of 
expectations’ which social interaction is dependent on. Thirdly, the Culture 
Assimilator as a tool may help train one to recognise and assimilate an orientation 
system different from one’s own, through exercises in making proper attributions. 
Finally, given that intercultural dialogue is the interaction between people of different 
cultural communities for the purpose of mutual understanding, the Culture 
Assimilator can help facilitate conditions for such exchange by training aspects of 
intercultural competence such as open-mindedness, reflexivity, flexibility and 
resilience.  
The critique by Mall (2003) among others on Thomas’ perspective of intercultural 
dialogue based on a framework of intercultural competence has been mentioned in 
the preceding subsection. But there are further problems to be resolved with such an 
approach to intercultural dialogue, when the approach of Culture Assimilator is used 
to frame the problem of cultural differences that are to be overcome through training 
of intercultural competence. One may begin by looking at difficulties or gaps at a 
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theoretical level as one attempts to reconcile this framework with Luhmann’s theory 
of self-referential system, which Thomas (2008) has cited as relevant for intercultural 
dialogue. 
The main incongruity comes from the fact that a self-referential system according to 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory is constituted not of persons but of processes of 
communication, as a closed system of meanings (Luhmann, 1995, p. 37), whereas 
culture in Thomas’ Cultural Assimilator model is an orientation system imagined as 
being internalised by each member in the cultural group, implying that each person 
becomes a unit as carrier of the culture. Thomas (2011) considers cultural standards 
as highly generalised and culturally specific ‘dispositions’ which are ‘internalised’ and 
hence influence the evaluation and the steering of actions by the individuals (p. 108). 
The perspective of Luhmann’s self-referential system suggests that individuals, 
which are not elements of any system as such, would by default play multiple roles in 
different systems; this hence accommodates the imagination and operation of both 
transcultural and multicultural systems at the same time without affecting the unity of 
any cultural system. The model of the Culture Assimilator however may lean towards 
a perspective of individuals as members of a uniform and bounded cultural group, by 
assuming that they behave according to the same unity of cultural standards in an 
orientation system.  
Thomas prefers to explain any variation in behaviour not in terms of situations or 
social roles, but by postulating ‘central’ cultural standards as regulating wide-ranging 
areas of one’s thinking, evaluation and actions, whereas ‘peripheral’ cultural 
standards only have regulating functions for particular situations or certain groups of 
persons (Ibid.). The main assumption under this model is that people have different 
cultural standards due to different socialisation, but it too easily labels people by their 
ethnicity or country or origin, with little attention as to how people vary regionally or 
how people may have been socialised in culturally diverse environments. Thomas 
himself appears to concede that his framework is designed for a pragmatic purpose 
mainly to help people of a monocultural background who need to encounter a 
cultural environment of another country (Ibid., pp. 104-105). This model may hence 
lend itself to easy stereotyping of people identified as a certain cultural group, which 
is especially problematic considering Thomas’ (2003a, 2011) simultaneous use of 
two definitions of culture – one may unwittingly tend to ‘understand’ members of the 
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other culture as mere products moulded in culture as an ‘orientation system’ in the 
Parsonian sense, while considering oneself as a free agent in culture as a ‘field of 
actions’ in the sense of Boesch.   
Another issue is that the way intercultural dialogue is theorised in his intercultural 
competence framework does not seem to factor in the dynamics of cultural meanings 
between individuals and groups. Thomas has acknowledged that in analysing the 
conditions for intercultural dialogue from a psychological point of view, the 
observation is not to be limited to dialogue between two persons, as it involves also 
dialogue between groups and within groups (Thomas, 2008, pp. 20). However, the 
Culture Assimilator has largely been conceived around face-to-face interactions 
between two persons in cross-cultural situations or kulturelle 
Überschneidungssituationen (Thomas, 2011, p. 103). Minimally echoing Luhmann’s 
concept of interpenetration between systems, Thomas has also spoken of dynamics 
within the ‘intercultural’ as an area of intersection between culture of one’s ‘own’ 
(Das Eigene) and of the ‘other’ (Das Fremde), in terms of what is observed in cross-
cultural situations (Ibid.). But Thomas’ emphasis in intercultural dialogue seems tied 
to a narrow interpretation of Mead’s theory of symbolic interactionism, in terms of the 
‘subjective’ manners in which persons and situations are defined by the 
communicators in interaction (Thomas, 2008, p. 16). In fact, his basic framework of 
intercultural competence appears to justify itself philosophically by citing Mead’s 
conception of the self, whereby the ‘I’ consists of the response of the individual to 
attitudes of the others, the individual’s action against the social situation (Mead, 1934, 
p. 175). Borrowing from Mead, Thomas (1991) propagates the ultimate aim of social 
psychology as the development of the strength of the ‘I’ and the promotion of a 
conscious and reflexive integration in society (p. 11). Instead of exploring how 
symbolic meanings may be modified through social interaction, like in the 
perspective of Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, the assumption in such a 
framework of intercultural competence is that the system of meanings does not 
change. The assumption in fact seems that there may be two distinct and separate 
cultural systems that may never change, and the question is simply how an 
individual can navigate from one to the other with the help of pragmatist knowledge 
on cultural differences to avoid discomfort in cognition or conflict in action.  
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On this aspect of cultural differences, one needs to caution that an attempt to 
deduce ‘cultural standards’ based on critical situations is an oversimplification, 
omitting the difference between evaluation and valuation which Anderson (1993, p. 5) 
would identify as distinct aspects, in terms of how people decide if something meets 
the given standard versus how much cares for the standard in practice. Hence 
‘cultural standards’ as observed from behaviour reflect a matter of norms rather than 
a matter of value rationality, the latter being the real concern in any public policy in 
the discussion of ‘cultural differences’ especially where it comes to the issue of 
different moral values. It is not sound to deduce core values of any culture based on 
observation of a random sample of behaviour among members of a community, 
instead of considering how cultural values are articulated or institutionalised. 
Furthermore, to borrow the sociological expressions of C. Wright Mills, these critical 
situations remain at the ad hoc level of day-to-day ‘trouble’ and not ‘issues’ where 
intercultural dialogue is concerned, since they are limited to the character of 
individuals and their immediate relations with others, and have not transcended into 
public matters (1959, p. 8). Why is it important to talk about ‘reflexivity’ stimulated by 
material of the Culture Assimilator, if it is not in the sense of Dewey’s (1932) reflexive 
morality, for instance? If the result of such reflexivity would be flexibility in action, that 
may suggest there are no fundamental conflicts and what one learns through the 
Culture Assimilator is simply instrumental reasoning which has nothing to do with 
intercultural dialogue as an open exchange of views.   
It may hence be more useful to think of the function of Culture Assimilator as giving 
confidence to people who need to work in a different cultural environment and prefer 
to maintain some sense of control by keeping to one’s centre in what Thomas calls 
an ‘orientation system’ for actions while assimilating a different system of actions. 
The ‘reflexivity’ which Thomas refers to as a competence does not imply having to 
relativise one’s value system like what Milton Bennett suggests in his developmental 
model, but simply means awareness of cultural differences to help one survive in a 
different environment  through ‘flexibility’ in action. It also has little to do with 
intercultural dialogue in terms of liberal learning in principle, except it may help build 
confidence for social interaction with people of a different community and may 
provide an experiential basis for more interest in intercultural learning. 
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The Culture Assimilator would therefore be more meaningfully used not as a 
conceptual tool to derive any cultural standards in a way which may suggest a 
hierarchy among cultures, but as a training programme or teaching aid to build 
confidence for intercultural encounters and at the same time direct learners away 
from forming easy stereotypes about the others’ cultural habits or moral character, 
while solving day-to-day troubles in dealing with a different set of cultural or social 
norms. 
There are in summary many limitations to Alexander Thomas’ adaptation of the 
Culture Assimilator framework in an ambition for intercultural dialogue, which will be 
listed as follows. First of all, the cross-cultural situation as a starting point does not 
describe a situation of intercultural dialogue with mutual intentions to learn from each 
other on the basis of mutual respect for each another as rational beings. Instead it 
takes a behaviourist perspective as it describes a situation where challenge is posed 
by the lack in mutual expectations of intentions, such that the behaviour of the other 
tends to appear irrational and is assumed to be a problem of cultural differences. 
The features of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in Alexander Thomas’ definition basically 
revolve around situations of face-to-face communication as such (2008, pp. 19-20). 
Secondly, going beyond such an assumption of cultural differences, there are 
aspects of intergroup features or social-structural context which may influence 
attitude and behaviour in intercultural situations, including asymmetry in power 
relation (Auernheimer, 2007, p. 18). This is not taken into account under the Cultural 
Assimilator approach, whereby Alexander has preferred to distinguish any variance 
in behavioural patterns in terms of central and peripheral cultural standards. Thirdly, 
by attributing differences in behaviour not to other psychological factors of the 
circumstances but to ‘cultural standards’, this may lend itself to a construction of 
cultural stereotypes. The circumstances may not only be socially influenced as 
mentioned in the second point, but also personal. As Searle (2001) has argued, 
action may be independent of desire, and it may also be caused by a weakness of 
will which makes it a form of irrationality (p. 24ff). An assumption of  ‘orientation 
system’ for action that lumps beliefs and desires together with internalised 
dispositions would make no difference between whether an action is rational or 
irrational, and may even lead to the impression that ‘cultural standards’ of the 
community in question might well be irrational. Fourthly, the Culture Assimilator has 
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been developed and applied mainly as a tool to prepare managers who need to work 
in a foreign environment overseas or to help students who need to encounter peers 
who have come from a different background, hence the assumption is one of distinct 
or different national or organisational cultures which have never mixed or established 
any pattern of interaction. It may be more relevant for those who come from a 
predominantly monocultural background than those who already grow up socialising 
with people of other cultural communities; its application in Singapore for instance 
would have to be justified for the Chinese community as a dominant ethnicity which 
can easily live according to its own cultural standards with little need to 
accommodate perspectives of other communities.  Fifthly, the Culture Assimilator 
highlights encounters that reveal cultural differences which imply the need for 
reflexivity in cognition and flexibility in the norms or habits of action on an individual 
level as contingency to minimise conflicts in situations. It does not focus so much on 
competence in open-minded dialogue on a community level for future-oriented 
mutual understanding in moral decisions or cultural practices. ‘Cultural standards’ in 
this framework are simply accepted contingently into one’s own orientation system 
for the sake of functions in social or business life, instead of becoming an issue for 
exchange of views and progress of society. It reduces ‘dialogue’ from the challenge 
of resolving differences in cultural values to one of communication in instrumental 
values. Sixthly, this is a learning tool for a one-sided classroom setting rather than a 
real-life situation, which means it may prepare a participant for possible scenarios 
through pragmatist knowledge, but it has not opened up to the possibility of 
exchange in alternative views from both sides in intercultural learning. Seventhly, it 
focuses on cognitive learning of behavioural action, not on cultural expressions and 
meanings, and also omits the affective aspect in intercultural learning, for instance 
through arts education, which may help promote empathy across cultural 
communities. This aspect will incidentally have to be explored with cultural heritage 
and expressions on the example of dance in this thesis.  
Lastly, a key aspect remaining is that the original Culture Assimilator in fact is 
arguably useful as an approach with much potential for investigating cross-cultural 
situations where misunderstanding often occur. Through interviews with members of 
the other culture, one may be able to discover a range of different explanations for 
similar behaviour, which may be attributed to circumstantial factors of the situation, 
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to the social role of the person, or simply personality which varies among individuals; 
one may even be able to discover very different behaviour by members of the other 
culture in the same situation, hence debunking any stereotype, if one does not 
assume situations of misunderstanding as the norm.  
The biggest problem with Alexander Thomas’ re-interpreting of the Culture 
Assimilator is that he has taken the feature which is the greatest asset in the 
approach, and turned into a liability. Instead of attempting to diffuse typical actions 
into different possible explanations, he has latched on to a Parsonian grand theory of 
culture as ‘orientation system’ and used it to characterise people of certain cultural 
groups identified by default according to their nationalities or ethnicities. This may 
lead to a danger of producing a new racist discourse that is transferred from physical 
traits to “cultural norms, values, traditions and lifestyles of outsiders” (Lentin and 
Titley, 2012, p. 50), which would run counter to the liberal spirit in intercultural 
dialogue.  
The most interesting contribution which Alexander Thomas (2011) has introduced to 
the study of critical incidents is his suggestion to validate findings with ‘external 
experts’ that may relate historical development in political, religious or social aspects 
(pp. 110-112). However, the problem is that this procedure involves a certain 
characterisation of culture in dispositions of thinking and actions already assumed as 
representative of the community, without questioning who should be speaking for the 
culture. 
To avoid unnecessary stereotyping, it would be more meaningful if cross-cultural 
situations can be studied instead using a strategy along the lines of anthropologists 
Geertz and Abu-Lughod in an ethnographical approach focusing on the particular 
and the polysemic. The coherence of culture needs to be deconstructed, one way 
being through a re-interpretation of history. Beyond that, it would be more useful to 
find practical application of cross-cultural situations not by deducing ‘cultural 
standards’ postulated as ‘internalised dispositions’ of the other, but by using these as 
references for dialogue to discuss ‘intercultural standards’ in particular situations. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate how some of these ideas of 
modification to the Culture Assimilator may be applied to situations involving 
intercultural communication in cultural heritage. 
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4. NEED FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE AS A 
CULTURALLY DIVERSE NATION 
 
The preceding chapter has considered intercultural dialogue as a form of policy 
approach, in relation to its goal in social cohesion and an ideal of value pluralism 
which may lean towards premises of liberalism. It has also analysed the process of 
intercultural dialogue as a form of intercultural communication where cognitive and 
affective aspects like open-mindedness, reflexivity and empathy may be desirable.  
The first half of this chapter will begin with a consideration of how the distinction of 
cultural communities in a multicultural system of society from a transcultural system, 
may be understood as a form of socially constructed knowledge. Both of these 
models may hence be accommodated under a constructivist perspective whereby 
cultural communities reproduce themselves as what Luhmann refers to as self-
referential systems. These two models may however imply different ways of 
imagining intercultural dialogue, with emphasis on ‘understanding’ and respecting 
another culture in a multicultural model where differences in cultural identities are 
salient, and emphasis on participation and creativity in a transcultural model where 
the community transcends cultural differences.   
Considering the challenge of increasing cultural diversity in a nation, the chapter will 
then consider how the notion of race as basis of identity has been socially 
constructed, especially as a form of social control in a colonial system. The specific 
example would be postcolonial Singapore, where the regime has inherited its current 
race-based classification as a legacy from the British colonial rulers, and propagated 
such consciousness in a politics of difference under an ideology of ‘multiracial 
meritocracy’. Furthermore, one will study public policies in Singapore more 
concretely against ‘measures’ of intercultural dialogue in terms of social cohesion 
among different cultural communities and open exchange of views in the public 
spheres. Discussion will also centre on how a description of Singapore based on a 
scale or spectrum between civic and ethnic nationalism may provide insight on the 
tension between interests, and how one may go beyond a description of Singapore 
as prioritising communitarian values over liberal values in its public policies, to 
analyse what lies within its ‘Asian modern’ ideology and how it is manifested in the 
socio-political structure. An additional aspect would be the latest challenges in 
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Singapore with a neoliberal migration policy as part of globalisation, which has led to 
debates on whether rising opposition voices constitute a form of xenophobia.     
 
4.1 The Social Construction of Cultural Communities 
4.1.1 Society in a Transcultural System as distinct from a Multicultural 
System  
This section will introduce the concept of ‘transculturality’, as an alternative 
imagination of modern culture with all its differentiation and complexity under 
globalisation (Welsch, 1999, 2012), and as an alternative model for promoting 
dialogue. It will also discuss observations in social psychology of the ‘plural’ or 
‘postmodern’ self which may support such a model for the understanding of how 
culture as a system functions across socially ascribed boundaries among 
communities. In order to accommodate multicultural as well as transcultural 
perspectives on what intercultural dialogue should entail, this chapter will begin with 
a discussion on how Luhmann’s constructivist perspective in his Theory of Self-
referential Systems can provide an overall conceptual framework here. 
As a most important social theorist of the 20th century though relatively unknown in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, Niklas Luhmann has been noted for his unique contribution 
in a systems theory that characterises modern society in terms of social 
differentiation and system formation, whereby one takes a post-ontological position 
that questions the distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities (2002, 
pp. 68-69). Taking positions that swing between realism and radical constructivist, he 
has suggested that a knowing system has no entry to the external world but one may 
as well claim the external world as it is, since “there is no way of deciding between 
them” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 67; cited in Christis, 2001, p. 329). What he offers 
effectively is a pluralistic solution to the mind-body dualism (Moeller, 2012; cited in 
Lee, D.B., 2012, p. 479). There are also major implications on an epistemological 
level with Luhmann shifting the traditional unit of sociological analysis from the 
individual actor to differentiated social systems, in a theory which has provided a way 
to understand various aspects of social life ranging from the financial crisis, the mass 
media, to the ‘plurality and incommensurability’ of meaning in contemporary society 
(Ibid.). 
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The significance of Luhmann to this thesis may be best appreciated by considering 
his model on the constitution of social systems as an innovative departure from 
Parsons’ theory, which has been criticised by Wrong (1961) as an ‘oversocialised 
conception of man’, contrary to a Freudian view that man is never a fully socialised 
creature. The context of this cultural determinism in Parsons is his classical solution 
for the problem of ‘double contingency’, related to the analysis in Toward a General 
Theory of Social Action (Parsons and Shils, 1951) on the neo-Kantian, 
transcendental question of minimal conditions for social stability (see Vanderstraeten, 
2002, p. 81). The problem is how the ego and the alter are able to anticipate each 
other’s expectations and actions, to which the assumed answer is that available 
options “have some measure of stability in two respects: first, as realistic possibilities 
for alter, and second, in their meaning to ego” (Parsons and Shils, 1951, p. 105; 
cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 81). The further presupposition is that the actions, 
gestures or symbols hold a function transcending particular situations of interaction, 
such that one may speak of “a common culture existing between them, through 
which their interaction is mediated” (Ibid.; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 82). 
Separately, Parsons writes that the “most important single condition of the 
integration of an interaction system is a shared basis of normative order” (1968, p. 
437; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 82), which he equates with ‘a common culture’. 
Parsons also emphasises elsewhere on the regulative role of culture and the 
importance of “socialisation to the grounds of consensus” (1966, p. 14; cited in 
Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 83). In short, Parsons employs a ‘negative’ conception of 
double contingency, as Vanderstraeten (2002, p. 83) notes, one identified with the 
non-social or non-adapted which has to be eliminated through values and norms. 
It is exactly such a negative constitution of interaction that Luhmann refers to when 
he questions in Soziale Systeme (1984): “Is it enough to conceive social order as a 
boycotting of boycotting, or must one not know from the beginning how it is generally 
possible and sufficiently probable? (English: Social Systems, 1995, p. 116; cited in 
Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 83)” Luhmann would look instead on positive aspects of 
double contingency, arguing that this cannot be eliminated if social interaction is 
conceived as the encounter between the ego and the alter as two autonomous 
systems. His critique is also directed against the work of George H. Mead as founder 
of symbolic interactionism, whereby the problem of contingency is addressed only 
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from one side of the interaction, confined to the ego’s actions, reflections and 
expectations, assuming that the same is true on the other side (Vanderstraeten, 
2002, p. 85). To Luhmann, the solution to the double contingency problem does not 
lie in human nature, social consensus or cultural value with prior validity, but within 
the chance of meaningful selection:  
What the experience of contingency achieves is the constitution and opening 
up of chance for conditioning functions within the system, thus, the 
transformation of chance into structural probabilities. Everything else is a 
question of selecting what proves its worth and what has further usefulness. 
    (1995, p. 120; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 87) 
In short, Parsons’ and Luhmann’s accounts of double contingency diverge as the 
former considers the ego and the alter as solving the problem not by communication, 
but by introspection (Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 88). Furthermore, Parsons considers 
the constitution of social system as bound to cultural forms manifested in normative 
order, maintained through the mechanisms of socialisation and internalisation, 
whereas social systems in Luhmann’s theory consist of communications, not of 
human beings (Ibid.), and human beings as psychic systems also have an autonomy 
in selectivity that allows them not to accept what is communicated or how it is 
communicated (Ibid., p. 89). Hence whereas Parsons’ account may lead to a 
deterministic, monolithic and bounded view of culture when adapted in a 
conceptualisation of ‘orientation system’ under the Culture Assimilator framework, 
the theoretical formulation of Luhmann is free from such limitations as it provides an 
account of social systems as “a reality sui generis” (Ibid., p. 89). 
In Luhmann’s theoretical perspective, a social system comes about through the 
capability of producing relations to itself and of differentiating these relations from 
relations with the environment (1993, p. 31). The notion of self-reference according 
to him describes a unity of processes and elements within a system for itself, 
independent of the observation by others (Ibid., p. 58). The system is nevertheless a 
construction, as the observed distinction between self-reference and reference on 
the other does not exist in the environment at large, but only in the system itself 
(Luhmann, 1996, p. 6 f; cited in Berghaus, 2011, p.45). In Luhmann’s perspective on 
how the world is constructed, meanings are made out of such differentiation in the 
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organisation of information, not through identification among information: “Am 
Anfang steht also nicht Identität, sondern Differenz. (1993, p. 112)” Luhmann 
eliminates an old approach of ontology by making reference instead to an observer 
describing the world (2002, p. 138 f; cited in Berghaus, 2011, p. 30).  
The versatility in Luhmann’s theory of self-referential system lies in short in moving 
away from Parsons' constitution of social system in action or interaction and his 
reliance on a cultural explanation for normative aspects of the actions, to situate the 
constitution of systems instead in the communication of meanings. He is hence able 
to combine both psychic and social systems in a perspective of “psychic systems 
constituted on the basis of a unified (self-referential) nexus of conscious states, and 
social systems constituted on the basis of a unified (self-referential) nexus of 
communications” (1995, p. 59). Psychic and social systems are thus considered as 
evolving together in a common achievement of ‘meaning’ (Ibid.). Referring to what in 
general systems theory is already spoken of as ‘mutualistic’ or ‘dialogical’ 
constitution, he argues that the mechanism involves coordination by means of 
communication which is not to be equated with social action (p. 138). 
Communication is also not to be understood with the usual metaphor of transmission 
which involves too much ontology (p. 139). Instead, he adapts what Karl Bühler 
refers to as three ‘performances’ of human language, namely presentation, 
expression and appeal, into three aspects of selectivity (p. 142). In a somewhat 
uncustomary way of referring to the addressee as ‘ego’ and the utterer as ‘alter’, 
Luhmann centres the unity of communication on the observation of alter by ego: 
“Ego is in a position to distinguish the utterance from what is uttered. If alter knows 
that he is being observed, he can take over this difference between information and 
utterance and appropriate it, develop it […] to steer the communication process” (p. 
143). In short, communication in Luhmann’s perspective is possible “only as a self-
referential process” (Ibid.). 
Luhmann’s concept of self-referential system, along with his mix of realist and 
constructivist epistemology, hence lends itself to adaptation for discussion of social 
groups as a social construction. Hejl (1987), in his reinterpretation of Luhmann, 
would suggest that a social group as system is constructed by ‘living systems’ which 
are free in choosing to participate in the constitution of any specific system (p. 326). 
The assumption is that each living system with its cognitive subsystem would have a 
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condition that is comparable to those of other group members and from its point of 
view is interacting in relation to such parallel conditions (p. 319). Without wallowing 
in problems of ontology, one may take this to suggest, following Luhmann’s abstract 
model, that human beings as psychic systems are autonomous and can be 
functioning in connection with different cultural systems at different moments. Culture, 
conceived as a self-referential system of meanings, works more autonomously unlike 
in the concept of an ‘orientation system’ which assumes that each person is 
internalised with certain cultural values through socialisation, as a specimen in the 
mould of his or her cultural group. With this new and more flexible model of culture, 
one may say that participation in a multicultural or a transcultural system is more a 
matter of one’s construction. Such a model is also supported by psychological 
theories that suggest the existence of the plural self. 
Before discussing what implications this holds for intercultural dialogue, it is 
necessary to delve into what ‘transculturality’ means. The concept has notably been 
propagated by Wolfgang Welsch based on a doubt as to whether ‘interculturality’ is 
the right concept for the intention of dialogues under conditions today (Welsch, 1994, 
p. 147). He argues that instead of what one has always imagined as national or 
regional cultures, there are diverse ways of life nowadays, with cultures after the end 
of traditional cultures that do not follow the boundaries of the old cultures but cut 
across them, hence the term ‘transculturality’ (Ibid., pp. 147-148).  
Welsch argues that the traditional concept of single cultures, like what developed in 
the late 18th century by Johann Gottfried Herder, has become untenable, for modern 
societies are very differentiated within themselves, and the imagination of cultures as 
closed spheres or autonomous islands are highly fictional. He also criticises 
interculturality for being unable to arrive at any solution, as the separatist character 
of cultures remains the problem; and he argues similarly with multiculturality that a 
mutual understanding or a transgression of separating barriers cannot be achieved. 
He is for 'transculturality', which he describes as “a consequence of the inner 
differentiation and complexity of modern cultures” (Welsch, 1999, online, emphasis 
in original), as cultures today are characterised by hybridisation. Transculturality, he 
says, “is gaining ground moreover not only on the macrocultural level, but also on 
the individual's micro-level” (Ibid.).  
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There seems to be support in social psychology for Welsch’s perspective on the 
level of the individuals. Peter Adler has discussed this phenomenon of the 
‘transcultural’ individual (otherwise somewhat confusingly also referred to as the 
‘multicultural’ or ‘intercultural’ individual) as a new type of person “whose orientation 
and view of the world profoundly transcends his or her indigenous culture […] 
developing from the complex of social, political, economic, and educational 
interactions of our time” ([1977] 2002, online). The terminology refers to an individual 
whose “essential identity is inclusive of different life patterns and who has 
psychologically and socially come to grips with a multiplicity of realities (Ibid.). The 
‘transcultural’ or ‘multicultural’ individual is one with “the experience of having been 
exposed to and having internalised two or more cultures” (Nguyen and Benet-
Martinez, 2010, p. 89), and one may say the individual has a ‘multicultural identity’ 
when this individual “expresses an attachment with and loyalty to these cultures 
(Ibid.).  
Further to this, Ulric Neisser (1993) has pointed out that the term self may have 
several meanings, excluding the simplistic notion of an inner self postulated in much 
folk psychology and in religious traditions in terms of a ‘real me’ responsible for all 
behaviour, and rejecting also any imagination of the self as a special part of the 
person or the brain (pp. 3-4). Instead, based on different psychological processes, 
he identifies the ecological self as the individual considered as “an active agent in 
the immediate environment” (p. 4), the interpersonal self that is established through 
face-to-face interaction with others (Ibid.), the conceptual self which depends on 
cultural forms including expectations and obligations and is derived through reflective 
self-consciousness (Ibid.), the temporally extended self which is established through 
the recounting of life narratives to others or oneself (p. 5), and the private self which 
may be the focus for some people whom Jung would term as introverts (Ibid.). 
On the word ‘identity’, a basic distinction has similarly been made in sociology 
between social identity and self-identity according to the process of identification and 
relevance, though there have been differing views. Generally, the former refers 
especially to the characteristics attributed to an individual by others, marking 
individuals as the same as others, such that there may be collective or shared 
identities predicated on common goals, values or experiences; whereas the latter 
refers to the process of self-development through which we formulate a unique 
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sense of ourselves and our relationship to the world around us (Giddens, 2001, pp. 
29-30).  
In a different perspective, the social identity may also be considered as inextricably 
tied to the self-concept instead of being attributed by others. Tajfel has thus defined 
social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). This 
is a concept at the core of the Social Identity Theory which relates specifically to 
intergroup relations.  
The notion of self-identity draws on theoretical perspectives of symbolic 
interactionism in relation to the ‘me’ and the ‘I’. This dates back to Mead, who has 
discussed how the individual becomes a self “in so far as he can take the attitude of 
another and act toward himself as others act” (Mead, [1934] 1967, p. 171) through a 
social process of interaction in a group whereby one becomes an object to one’s self. 
Consciousness of the self is not simply about organic sensations or affective 
experience, but feeling of the attitude of the other towards oneself, such that the self 
is essentially a cognitive phenomenon (Ibid., p. 173).  
A social constructionist perspective on identity has been applied in psychology as 
well as cultural studies to consider it as a matter of identity politics. Stuart Hall has 
analysed identity or the process of identification as a process of articulation or 
signifying practice subject to the play of difference (Hall, 1996, p. 3), advocating a 
concept of identity that is “not an essentialist, but a strategic and positional one” 
(Ibid.; cf. Gergen, 2001, p. 169f). This concept “does not signal that stable core of 
the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without 
change” (Ibid.), nor is it that “collective or true self hiding inside the many other, more 
superficial or artificially imposed 'selves' which a shared history and ancestry hold in 
common” (Ibid. pp. 3-4). Hall maintains that identities in late modern times are 
“increasingly fragmented and fractured, never singular but multiply constructed 
across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and 
positions.” (p. 4). Recognising the role of ‘difference’ in one’s psychic life, whereby 
“the ‘Other is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects” (Hall, 
1997b, p. 237), he argues that ‘difference’ as such is ambivalent and “can be positive 
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and negative” (Ibid., p 238), whereby it may be it used in a racialising discourse of 
othering, but ‘difference’ is also needed “because we can only construct meaning 
through a dialogue with the ‘Other’ ” (p. 235). On the last point, he (Ibid.) cites 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1935) on how meaning is established and sustained through 
dialogue.   
Such a view on social identity as a process of articulation and dependent on context 
is vindicated in the study of immigration by way of applied psychology, for instance in 
the work of Carola Suarez-Orozco (2003). Observing that social spaces are more 
discontinuous and fractured than ever before for youths in the era of globalisation, 
she argues that identity formation is not simply a process of passing through different 
stages to achieve a stable identity, but rather a process that is fluid and contextually 
driven (p. 3). She cites the example of a person raised in Beijing and discovering that 
he or she is ‘Asian’ for the first time only at age 30, for the same individual may 
never have considered his or her racial or ethnic identity within the context of Beijing, 
only the neighbourhood identity; in the Chinatown of the host society, one’s identity 
would be one of urban mainland China origin as opposed to Cantonese speakers 
from Hong Kong, whereas relative to the heartland of the host country, the identity 
becomes a more complex ‘pan-Asian’ construct (Ibid., pp. 3-4). 
The question of ‘transcultural’ or ‘multicultural’ identity is also intertwined with the 
question of acculturation, which includes not only social affiliation but also language 
use and value system, among other things. Whereas traditional views of 
acculturation have asserted that to acculturate means to assimilate, as in a uni-
dimensional, one-directional and irreversible process of rejecting one’s ethnic or 
original culture and adopting the new or dominant culture, a wealth of acculturation 
studies conducted since the mid-1980s have supported acculturation as a bi-
dimensional, two-directional, multi-domain complex process not limited to 
assimilation into the mainstream culture (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez, 2010, p. 91). 
There is support for the idea that individuals can simultaneously hold two or more 
cultural orientations, as provided by socio-cognitive experimental work showing that 
bicultural individuals shift between cultural orientations in response to cultural cues, 
a process known as ‘cultural frame-switching’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, perspectives on 
acculturation do not presuppose that individuals internalise their different cultures 
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uniformly, given that acculturation may take place in many different domains of lie 
including language use or preference, social affiliation, communication style, cultural 
identity and pride, and cultural knowledge, beliefs and values (Zane and Mak, 2003, 
cited in Ibid.). Nguyen and Benet-Martinez cite the example that a Japanese 
American may endorse Anglo-American culture behaviourally and linguistically, yet 
remain very ‘Japanese’ in values and attitudes, in terms of ethnic culture; a Mexican 
American on the other hand may behave in ways that are predominantly Mexican, as 
in Spanish-speaking and living in a largely Mexican neighbourhood, yet displaying 
great pride and attachment with American culture (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez, 
2010, p. 91). 
Hence with such a transcultural outlook, an attempt to adopt framework of culture as 
orientation system for behaviour in intercultural communication, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, would have to be modified by postulating that individuals may act 
or react according to norms and values of one cultural system or another, depending 
on the situation. One may maintain a multicultural framework for the consideration 
that there are cultural systems with different values and norms that are in 
intersection, but these systems are not embodied in each individual as a single 
identity. One may even choose to think of ‘cultural standards’ or even ‘culture’ itself 
not as anything with ontological status in itself, but rather as a heuristic or ‘tool for 
thinking’ (Scollon et al, 2012, p. 3). The question would not be whether any given 
moment is an instance of ‘intercultural communication’, but “what good does it do to 
see a given moment of communication as a moment of intercultural communication? 
(Ibid., p. 2)”  
Welsch’s perspective may in short find support through evidence in social 
psychology of transcultural formation of individuals. But instead of emphasising 
observation of globalisation trends, he has also gone the other way of insisting that 
transculturality is not completely new historically. He criticises Herder’s envisaging of 
cultures as closed spheres or autonomous islands, in which each corresponds to a 
folk's territorial area and or language, such that culture is supposed to mould the 
whole life of the people concerned. It remains his main argument that the 
subsequent multicultural and intercultural models are obsolete and deficient whereby 
multiculturalist perspective sees society as being composed of such spheres of 
culture while the interculturalist perspective imagines relations as being between 
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such spheres (Welsch, 2012, p. 32). This would constitute a fundamental argument, 
preceding an account of the temporal trends of globalisation.  
When argued In terms of a manifestation of globalisation, transculturality may be 
understood not only in terms of the issue of identity but also in terms of boundaries 
of ‘cultures’ in the sense of anthropology, or in the sense of media communication, 
may be analysed with the concepts of deterritorialisation and hybridity (Hepp, 2006, 
p. 64). Deterritorialisation is a term used by many theorists, among them Appadurai 
(1990) and Featherstone (1995). According to Tomlinson, it involves a sense of 
ambivalence in cultural condition, not only due to what Auge (1995) describes as 
‘non-places’ created by contemporary capitalist modernity, such as airport lounges 
and supermarkets, as opposed to ‘anthropological places’ that provide cultural and 
memory through repeated ‘organic’ social interactions like in provincial towns 
(Tomlinson, 1999, pp. 108-109). It also has much to do with new media technologies 
availing a range of perspectives on events beyond that of the ‘home culture’, 
enabling people to situate themselves at a distance from the national or local 
viewpoint (Ibid., p. 116). Another aspect of deterritorialisation is “the lifting out of 
locality that occurs in this intertextual realm of the imagination” (Ibid., p. 119) notably 
with examples of in Hollywood movies and popular television series whereby one 
relates to environments that one has never experienced at first hand, that exist 
instead in one’s cultural imagination.  
The importance of a historical perspective for deterritorialisation has been 
emphasised by Tomlinson. Whereas Appadurai has argued, somewhat echoing 
Welsch’s view, that “natives, people confined to and by the places to which they 
belong, groups unsullied by contact with a larger world, have probably never existed” 
(cited in Ibid., p. 129), Tomlinson prefers to argue on the basis of the acceleration of 
globalisation that deterritorialisation is a valid way of grasping “a mode of cultural 
experience which is particular to global modernity and distinct from the general 
properties of fluidity, mobility and interactivity that can be attributed to all historical 
cultures” (Ibid., p. 130, emphasis in original). Another pertinent aspect of culture 
under deterritorialisation, as Tomlinson points out, is that it may be uneven in its 
effects, such that under social differentiations of race, class, gender and age within 
developed societies, some would clearly “live a deterritorialised culture more 
intensely, actively and (on balance) enjoyably than others” (Ibid., p. 132).  
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Another concept related to transculturality is that of cultural hybridisation, which may 
partly be understood from a deterritorialisation perspective as “the mingling of 
cultures from different territorial locations brought about by the increasing traffic 
amongst cultures” (Ibid., p. 142). Canclini (2005) celebrates the notion of 
hybridisation, which “as a process of intersection and transaction, is what makes it 
possible for multicultural reality to avoid tendencies toward segregation and to 
become cross-cultural reality” (p. xxxi). However, Tomlinson (1999) would caution 
that the very structure of the hybridity argument may summon implicit myths of 
origins, for hybridity is after all derived from notions of breeding in plants and animals 
and Is carried over to the cultural sphere with negative notions of racial mixing and 
creolisation (p. 143). Jonathan Friedman (1995) would simply trace the ‘confused 
essentialisation’ of the discourses of hybridity or creolisation to the inappropriate 
‘substantialisation of culture’ in the first place (1995, p. 82). Nederveen Pieterse 
(1995) suggests that the idea of hybridisation is meaningful only as a critique of 
essentialism (cited in Tomlinson, 1999, p. 144). The notion of hybrid cultures may 
otherwise be considered useful more specifically for grasping the new cultural 
identifications that are emerging, such as in youth culture built around popular music 
forms like hip-hop (Gilroy, 1993, cited in Ibid., p. 147).  
The difference between a multicultural system and a transcultural system, when 
considered as self-referential systems, basically lies in different boundaries defined 
according to one’s rationality in relation to values and identity. They may be 
considered here as two different kinds of social system that reproduce themselves 
with their own internal logics. Understood in terms of a constructivist social theory, 
such systems as constructs serve to explain perceptions of social phenomena, and 
the criteria in testing such a theory lies not in whether it corresponds with ‘the reality’ 
but in its capacity in problem-solving, its consistency and its linkage with other 
disciplines (Hejl, 1987, p. 305). Understood at the level of social constructionism 
which accepts the system as a form of living reality, a social system is constituted 
and integrated through members who have each cultivated a state of cognitive 
subsystem at least comparable to that of other group members (Ibid., p. 319). Social 
systems as such does not consist of closed groups of individuals, for individuals are 
free to take part in a group or leave without leaving one’s character, and individuals 
considered as living systems on their own are always part of a number of different 
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social systems at the same time (Ibid., p. 326). Luhmann has notably stressed that a 
social system consists of a network of communication, not of human bodies and 
brains (1989, p. 12). Self-reference of elements in a system is ensured through 
reproduction of the actions, not reproduction of units like cells, molecules, ideas and 
so on (1993, pp. 61-62). Following Luhmann’s argument, action is constituted as 
information in a social system by means of communication and attribution of 
intentions, hence the fundamental process that produces a social system is one of 
communication (Ibid., p. 192).  
One may also propose here to understand intercultural dialogue, based on the 
paradigm of Luhmann, by considering it on a social level as an interaction system in 
which the engines of ‘interpenetration’ are activated, as opposed to the case of 
society as a different kind of social system, where communicative events form a self-
referential closure (1995, pp. 416-417). Luhmann would reformulate the 
transcendental consciousness of intersubjectivity discussed in a phenomenological 
approach under what he calls a psychic system (Ibid., p. 146).  
It will be argued here that intercultural dialogue may be seen as involving similar 
social processes of interaction or interpenetration in both transcultural and 
multicultural contexts but in terms of different system structures, whereby cultural 
differences and group identities are salient in a multicultural system but not in a 
transcultural system. As suggested above, these systems are constructed by the 
observer and the key to a system is the unity of communication, not the fixed 
membership of any group. One may therefore imagine a psychic system as co-
situated with a transcultural system when cultural identity is assumed to be irrelevant 
to the meanings that it relates to, whereas a multicultural system may come into 
picture when one considers two or more systems that are differentiated in cultural 
values or meanings, that may come into in interaction. The differentiation in systems 
here between the transcultural and the multicultural here should in the first instance 
be understood as a construction for explanatory power, as a descriptive statement, 
without judgment of ethical superiority in one over the other, or of redundancy in 
either model. It simply acknowledges that individuals as psychic systems have an 
autonomy and their functioning in different cultural systems of meanings is 
contingent and hence there is no need to essentialise individuals as having only 
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unique memberships in culturally defined groups, or cultural groups as being 
homogeneous.  
It would be argued here that ‘transcultural’, as a description of the social system in 
which one imagines himself or herself to function in, is as such a term relative to 
‘multicultural’. It should not be so understood that being ‘transcultural’ means one is 
absolutely ‘free’ from any form of belief or valuation, whereas being ‘multicultural’ 
means one only acts according to cultural values of one’s community. One is only 
‘transcultural’ in the sense that one decides that the boundaries of the cultural 
community ascribed to him or her is irrelevant to his or her meaning making. One 
who imagines himself or herself as ‘transcultural’ may equally be subscribing to 
some other form of ideology while claiming to renounce any cultural value embedded 
in a community, just as one who considers himself or herself part of a ‘multicultural’ 
system may in fact be subject to a similar or different kind of ideology that cuts 
across cultural differences. 
This dualistic perspective is hence neutral in the sense that it accommodates both a 
policy of multiculturalism as politics of recognition, and a policy of transculturalism 
promoting interaction that transcends any reification of cultural differences, without 
assuming that the two are mutually exclusive.  
For a perspective of multiculturalism, one may follow the argument of Modood (2007), 
citing Wittgenstein’s perspective of language-games with overlapping ‘family 
resemblances’, to emphasise that one can speak of “there being ethnic groups or a 
cultural plurality without having clear-cut ideas of what is an ethnic group or a culture” 
(p. 97). Against an argument of Berger and Luckmann (1967) that may suggest any 
culture and ethnicity per se is no more than a kind of reification, Modood asserts that 
“ethnic groups are not natural but simply a feature of society and so have no higher – 
but no lower – ontological status than, say, class or gender” (2007, p. 114), hence 
there is no need to understand the distinctness of a group either as a fiction or as an 
essence.” (Ibid.) He adds: “Those who insist that ethnicity, groups and 
multiculturalism cannot be saved without essentialism, and so must be left behind, 
are themselves essentialists (Ibid.).”  
The issue of multiculturalism has been raised in relation to the politics of recognition, 
in a theoretical discussion which scholars like Charles Taylor (1992) as well as Axel 
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Honneth (1992) have traced back to Hegel’s work on dialectical relation particularly 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), leading to much debate in the 1990s and 
2000s on whether individuals and cultural groups alike should be the object of a 
recognition policy (Seymour, 2010, pp. 1-3). On the concept of ‘recognition’ with its 
polysemic nature, Seymour cites Ricoeur (2004) who has identified three meaning: 
firstly, a reference to repeated action of identifying a single object or an individual; 
secondly, an application to oneself in what one does or in things that others do, 
providing some continuity in one’s life; thirdly, a reference to mutual 
acknowledgement that individuals or groups decide to give to one another (see 
Seymour, 2010, p. 4). It is the third meaning, Seymour points out, that is of interest in 
the context of multiculturalism, for the first is purely epistemological, the second may 
have ethical consequences additionally, but the third has a practical dimension and 
is a moral action with illocutionary force (Ibid.). There is an element of recognition in 
Habermas’ communicative ethics, to the extent that one speaks of exchange 
between persons in accordance with normative procedures, whereby protagonists 
accept dialogue with one another in an ideal communication situation (Ibid., p. 5). 
But it is in Honneth’s work that the theme of recognition is taken beyond this 
framework of dialogue, to consider conflicts, power relations and struggles operating 
out of institutionalised spheres; assuming a perspective of social psychology, he 
sees mutual recognition in terms of three psychological effects, namely self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Ibid.). The distinction between respect and 
esteem here is significant as it opens up a dimension that is overlooked in liberalism 
with an equal respect policy. The politics of recognition admitting the sense of 
esteem concerns measures to ensure a differentiated status for individuals and 
persons in the political sphere, hence it would consist of “a set of statutory rules 
aiming to ensure the social conditions of self-respect and self-esteem” (p. 6) 
whereas Rawls would not distinguished between primary social goods providing 
these different social conditions, Seymour notes. In short, the question of recognition 
may be one “in the sense of respect (equal treatment) or of esteem (difference)” (p. 
8), and it may also be understood “in a broad sense (tolerance-respect) or a narrow 
sense (politics of difference)” (Ibid.).  
Transculturalism needs not be seen or used as a suppression of esteem for the 
difference that one or the other cultural group decides to articulate. As it is defined 
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here, a transcultural outlook denotes a perspective of one’s function in a cultural 
system larger than what external observers may associate him or her with. This 
larger cultural system may be imagined as the multicultural nation, or may be 
imagined as global culture. In the former case, it would involve what Benedict 
Anderson would refer to as an imagined community of the nation; in the latter case, it 
would be an imagination which in Roland Robertson’s term would be a kind of global 
consciousness. In the model of symbolic interactionism, the self as human acts 
towards others on the basis of meanings one has for others, which arise out of social 
interactions with others; but in the model of a self-referential system, where the 
external observer is irrelevant, the self would construct the boundary of one’s system 
for such meanings and interactions.    
In an optimistic view, a transcultural outlook should lead to a kind of cosmopolitanism, 
“a concern with forms of belonging that go beyond the community into which one is 
born to a concern with the wider world of a global humanity” (Delanty, 2009, p. 20). It 
may thereby, ideally, contribute towards a consciousness for global governance that 
is much needed to deal with ‘collective issues’ such as management of global 
warming or human development targets like poverty reduction, health or educational 
provision (Held, 2006, pp. 157-158); or for that matter, contribute to the protection of 
cultural and natural heritage of the world. 
But in reality, a transcultural outlook denotes nothing but an emphasis on individual 
autonomy, over traditional networks of community, in the making of one’s meanings 
while functioning in the world. One is still given to whichever other social trends that 
may prevail; one may, for instance, integrate in the sense of Ritzer (1993) with a 
McDonaldised system in material and cultural consumerism. Welsch (2012) is hence 
right to note that transculturality which has intensified today does not in reality take 
place in a space free from power, that it is above all the capitalist economy with its 
global tapping of material and human resources which has changed the structures of 
traditional relations and the economic structures between the rich and the poor, 
leading to massive migration (p. 36). Consequently, individuals may not be free to 
choose elements that form their identity, but at the same time, social identities 
between the rich and the poor are becoming a transcultural phenomenon (Ibid.).  
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In fact, an indulgence in individual autonomy just means that one may be free in 
consuming cultures from around the world, eating Chinese takeaway, practising 
Yoga and Pilates, listening to Reggae music, having fun with Japanese Cosplay and 
watching Korean drama, flying to Bali or Bangkok for a holiday, and does not feel 
limited by one’s socialisation in a geographical location or by one’s language 
competence, given the availability of Youtube and Google Translate where one can 
learn enough of everything for one’s own purpose. But that does not necessarily 
imply that one therefore sees no differences among these various cultures and the 
communities associated with them. Hence a transculturalist as such does not believe 
in boundaries or taboos among cultures where he is concerned, but he needs not 
believe all cultures are equally valid or share a universal kind of rationality. Spivak 
would note: “Most people believe, even (or perhaps particularly) when they are being 
cultural relativists, that creation and innovation are their own cultural secret, whereas 
‘others’ are only determined by their cultures. (2012, p. 31)”  
What would ‘intercultural dialogue’ mean in a transcultural model then? Following 
Delanty’s (2009) argument, intercultural dialogue in cosmopolitan terms should be 
“Self- as well as Other-directed” (p. 261; cf. Levinas, 1969, cited in Zylinska, 2005) in 
deliberative reasoning of cultural and political standpoints, in that it involves social 
actors on all sides to reflect on their assumptions and standpoints, instead of a 
conventional sense of “[seeking] only the understanding of the perspective of the 
Other without further reflection on the implications of the dialogue for one’s own 
position” (Ibid.).  
But it may otherwise also be assumed as intercultural communication that becomes 
“simply communication for its own sake” (Ibid.) if it is neither deliberative nor 
reflective nor critical, if it does not involve societal learning (Ibid.), but seeks flexibility 
in action only to survive in an unfamiliar environment with minimum stress, in which 
case a simple device such as the Culture Assimilator would suffice. ‘Understanding’ 
another culture in such intercultural communication practice may be assumed as a 
kind of cultural relativism equated with a “notion that our understanding of other 
cultures should be internal” (Hanson, 1975, p. 62) - whereby ‘internal understanding’ 
is constituted by Ryle’s notion in The Concept of Mind (1949) of ‘knowing how’, 
which may be interpreted simply in terms of dispositions. ‘Intercultural understanding’ 
or ‘internal understanding’ would then amount to this: “when the natives can tell us 
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the rules they follow, their rationale for acting, we understand their behaviour in 
those terms. When the natives cannot articulate the rules they follow, we make 
formulations or statements of them by inference, statements which we evaluate by 
their ability to account for or predict behaviour which natives accept as appropriate. 
(Hanson, 1975, p. 65)” Taken in this sense, there is no difference between 
intercultural understanding based on a transcultural or a multicultural model, and 
likewise for ‘intercultural dialogue’ if it reduced to such a process of ‘understanding’, 
if cultural differences are assumed as the issue in any case. (Incidentally, 
‘intercultural understanding’ in English may also be taken to refer to a quest for 
common ground, as Verständigung in the sense of Habermas.) 
The distinction will be made in this thesis however with regards to intercultural 
dialogue as cultural exchange between people of different cultural communities 
through the medium of arts or heritage. It will be assumed that under a transcultural 
approach of intercultural dialogue, the performance or interpretation of an intangible 
heritage such as dance may tend to focus on creative work to transcend differences 
in cultural identity, whereas the same under a multicultural approach may tend to 
focus on affirming and respecting differences in cultural identity in presentation and 
an understanding of the dance heritage may tend to focus on cultural difference. 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and ‘intercultural learning’ as a 
component of dialogue may involve both approaches if it strives to appreciate 
aesthetic values of the heritage and to respect social values of its institutionalised 
practices at the same time. The discussion of intercultural dialogue on a transcultural 
model will be further developed in Chapter 6 with reference to the concept of 
Russian philosopher Mikhail Epstein. This will be followed by discussion of a 
multicultural approach that adapts the Cultural Assimilator framework on critical 
incidents, for an improved concept of intercultural learning.  
The concept of intercultural learning to be proposed here on the example of dance 
heritage as medium of dialogue will be based on a philosophy of liberal learning that 
aligns with Parekh’s argument for appreciation of cultural diversity, considering that 
no single culture exhausts the full range of human possibilities (2000, p. 167), while 
highlighting the need for respect in terms of a recognition of difference, an aspect 
which tends to be overlooked in an intercultural competence framework involving the 
Cultural Assimilator investigation of critical incidents. The argument is that such 
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investigation of cross-cultural situations should not be used to essentialise cultural 
differences. ‘Cultural differences’ that are constructed to place cultural communities 
on different ranks of hierarchy need to be deconstructed with the help of some 
historical perspective that situate differences in context. The choice to be different in 
alignment may be articulated by a cultural community, but otherwise the community 
should not be stereotyped on basis of external observation.  
It is hence significant that Homi Bhabha has made a distinction between ‘culture as 
epistemology’ which focuses on understanding of function and intention, and ‘culture 
as enunciation’ which focuses on signification and institutionalisation (1994, pp. 177). 
Whereas the epistemological “is locked into the hermeneutic circle, in the description 
of cultural elements as they tend towards a totality” (Ibid.), the enunciative is more of 
a dialogic process “to track displacements and realignments that are the effects of 
cultural antagonisms and articulations” (p. 178), “subverting the rationale of the 
hegemonic moment” (Ibid.). In his postcolonial perspective on “the historical and 
epistemological condition of Western modernity”, he has cited how Foucault’s 
spatialising of historical time has helped to reveal a game of ‘double and splits’, 
where one can see “how modernity and postmodernity are themselves constituted 
from the marginal perspective of cultural difference” (p. 196), and how a 
‘dehistoricised figure of Man’ is produced at the cost of the ‘others’ becoming 
peoples without a history (p. 197).  
In cultural psychology, Shweder et al (2003) have used a study based on interviews 
in the city of Bhubansewar, Orissa, India to identify three coexisting thematic clusters 
of ethical discourse, namely autonomy, community and divinity, whereby each area 
of experience in domains such as education or healthcare may be represented by 
multiple discourses (pp. 140-142). This makes an interesting alternative to a Culture 
Assimilator approach which privileges the selection of critical incidents by one party 
as observer with personal instrumentalist interest, and makes generalisations of 
cultural standards on such basis. Being more objective in this procedure of selection, 
not to mention its observation of moral standards through institutionalised discourse 
instead of individuals’ behaviour, this method would also arguably have more 
legitimacy as basis for ‘reflexivity’ through comparison. Most significantly, the three 
themes involve major moral goods and obligations which hold universal relevance 
and pertinence for the world as “they all relate to the kinds of responsibilities persons 
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have to take care of themselves and others, and to treat the environment, the 
ecological matrix of personal life, with respect” (p. 150). These three themes, along 
with the issue of tradition versus modernity, will also come into focus in Chapter 6 in 
the discussion of dance heritage as medium of intercultural dialogue. 
The real challenge of intercultural dialogue involving the idea of communicative 
ethics, following Habermas’ principle of public participation which he has been 
espousing since his essay The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962; 
trans. 1988), should rightly lie in restoring a sense of agency and efficacy to 
individuals despite the trend of modern societies being dominated by the principles 
of money and power, as Benhabib (1992, p. 80) would point out. In such dialogue as 
a conversation of moral justification as envisaged by Habermas in his deontological 
ethics, individuals need not view themselves as ‘unencumbered’ selves for the sake 
of adopting ‘the view from nowhere’ (Thomas Nagel) that Kantian liberalism would 
demand, for Habermas himself has also formulated, in the language of G.H. Mead, 
an insight on the intersubjective constitution of the self as ‘I’ through interaction with 
others in a community of speech and action (Benhabib, 1992, p 71). Based on such 
an argument which is shared by communitarians, there is no need to imagine a 
transcultural model as basis for intercultural dialogue.   
Yet the issue of cultural identity above all else appears to remain the battleground in 
the European ideological discourse of ‘intercultural discourse’, in political “debates 
about cultural diversity in the context of immigration [whereby] class tends to be 
drowned out thanks to a widespread eagerness to discuss cultural differences” 
(Eriksen, 2006, online). Contrasting the concept of cultural difference with that of 
cultural diversity, Eriksen notes a trend in the European discourse whereby diversity 
is largely associated with phenomena such as rituals, food, folktales, arts and crafts, 
whereas difference in cultural values expressed as ‘multiculturalism’ is immediately 
seen as a cause of social problems from immigrants (Ibid.). With such highlighting of 
difference in the public life, a neo-liberalist ideology, associated with individualist 
values in the freedom to choose and with the ethos of consumerism, also plays a 
part in stigmatising minority communities (Ibid.). One may hence argue for the need 
of better precision in the agenda of ‘intercultural dialogue’ discussed in the EU, as a 
guiding concept and as a political instrument, if “the EU’s view on diversity seems to 
be more about food and language than conflicting morals and divergent 
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interpretations of freedom of speech (Näss, 2010, online). If one considers the 
perspective of Laclau (2007, p. 35), the challenge of intercultural dialogue 
democracy sould be to displace any particular claim as the true body of universalism, 
in order to accommodate different groups with their particularisms of values in a 
competition to find universal representation. 
While “[l]iberal-democratic capitalism has imposed itself as the only rational solution 
to the problem of organising modern societies” (Mouffe, 1999a, p. 3), the model of 
consensual politics or deliberative democracy seems to presuppose an eradication 
of political antagonism, which the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt would 
describe as friend-enemy relation (Ibid.), in his thesis that the criterion of the political 
lies in such distinction. As Mouffe argues, denying anatagonism in theory does not 
make them go away; Schmitt’s essay ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’, published 
in an English translation by Dyzenhaus in 1999, may thus contribute to a debate on 
how to save the state from discredit by acknowledging the limits of pluralism (Ibid.) 
Observing that the individual in many states “feels that he is in a plurality of ethical 
bonds and is bound by religious communities, economic associations, cultural 
groups, and parties” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 198), Schmitt asserts that political unity is 
“the highest unity” (p. 203) as it prevents opposing groups from dissociating into 
extreme enmities such as a civil war. Against the liberal emphasis on the 
universalistic ‘humanity’, Schmitt provides the insight that democracy always entails 
relations of inclusion-exclusion: if the people are to rule, it is necessary to decide 
who belong to the ‘people’ as ‘demos’ (Mouffe, 1999b, pp. 42-43).  
In asserting the need for homogeneity in a democracy, Schmitt has made “[an 
important point that] the democratic concept of equality is a political one which 
therefore entails the possibility of a distinction.” (Ibid,, p. 40; emphasis in original). 
Contrary to some interpretations, Schmitt never postulated that a sense of belonging 
to a people could only be envisaged in racial terms; instead he insisted on a 
multiplicity of ways in which homogeneity could be manifested, for example in saying 
that the substance of equality “can be found in certain physical and moral qualities, 
for example, in civic virtue, in arte, the classical democracy of vertus [vertu]” (p. 41). 
However, his problem lies in presenting a false dilemma between pluralism and unity 
of the people, as Jean-Francois Kervegan (1992) has pointed out: “for Schmitt, either 
the State imposes its order and its rationality to a civil society characterised by 
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pluralism, competition and disorder, or, as is the case in liberal democracy, social 
pluralism will empty the political entity of its meaning and bring it back to its other, 
the state of nature” (cited in Mouffe, 1999b, pp. 49-50).  
Mouffe hence rejects Schmitt’s dichotomy and proposes to replace ‘homogeneity’ in 
democracy with what he prefers to call ‘commonality’, one that would be “strong 
enough to institute a ‘demos’ but nevertheless compatible with certain forms of 
pluralism: religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political 
parties” (Ibid., p. 50). Dyzenhaus on the other hand would cite a sense of social 
homogeneity as advocated by Hermann Heller in ‘Politische Demokratie und Soziale 
Homogenität’ (1992, p. 34), bound by the ‘We’ as community despite conflicts of 
interest, without which a political unity may cease to exist, as people can no longer 
recognise one another as part of the unity, and no longer identify with symbols and 
representatives of the state (cited in Dyzenhaus, 1999, p. 87). Modern democracy, 
as Heller argues, should therefore be based on two ideas in the rule of law, namely 
that the law binds the rulers to the rule, and that the rulers must find immanent 
justification for their rule (cited in Ibid., p. 89). 
With these challenges in mind, the remaining sections in will examine the social and 
political structure in the case of Singapore, a culturally diverse nation with a high 
proportion of foreign population under its neoliberal economic and migration policies. 
The ‘people’ in Singapore is very much defined in the official discourse by the notion 
of ‘races’, conflated with the notion of ‘cultures’. This has led to a racially defined 
approach of ‘communitarianism’ with differentiated policies in various spheres of 
social life, and to some extent divisions among the people in social interaction.  
 
4.1.2 The Social Construction of ‘Race’ – example of Singapore as 
postcolonial nation 
 
As part of a larger framework on cultural policy, this section will consider the social 
construction of ‘race’ as a notion which has been entangled with ideas of cultural 
differences, such that ‘culture’ is not imagined in terms of meanings or values that 
may be freely adopted and acquired by individuals through learning, but as 
something embodied in individuals akin to biological traits. Apart from reinforcing 
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racial stereotyping on a societal level, its legitimation of race-based communitarian 
policies may also have negative impacts on social cohesion in a nation.  
This will be illustrated in the rest of the chapter here with the case of Singapore 
under its ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’. However, instead of limiting to a 
perspective of downward conflation such that divides between cultural communities 
are assumed to be structured along a particular ideology of nationalism through what 
Althusser calls ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, one will also include the perspective 
of how the local communities in Singapore transcend the official classifications in 
making their own meanings through social interactions. This may be seen for 
example in the rise of nationalist sentiments against the government’s race-based 
rhetoric for its neoliberal migration policy, a tension which may have contributed to 
the ruling party’s slide in votes during General Elections in 2011, when much 
discontent was voiced in the social media online, an aspect where parallels have 
been drawn with the Arab Spring (Hodal, 6 May 2011, online).   
This section will however begin its discussion on the relation between ‘race’ and 
‘nation’ by examining the idea of nationalism in Singapore’s context with the help of 
Hobsbawm’s general historical analysis of the nation as a modern institution and 
Chatterjee’s analysis on nationalism that is more specifically applicable to 
postcolonial situations in Asia.  
Singapore has developed from a British trading colony established in 1819 into one 
of the world’s most globalised economies today, with a high non-resident population 
of 25.7% as of 2010 while the citizen population stands at 63.6% (Yeoh and Lin, 
April 2012, online). Based on a perspective of World Systems Theory, Singapore’s 
development as a periphery or semi-periphery state, like South Korea or Taiwan, 
may be seen in terms of its function in distributing products from cheap labour to the 
core states, though it has also been able to combine such an economic model with 
some improvements in welfare and infrastructure, which helps provide popular 
legitimacy (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995, p. 396). More specifically, based on 
Sassen’s (2009) analysis of specialisation among global cities, Singapore’s 
significance in the world economy is underscored by its number one ranking in 
indicators of ‘ease of doing business’, ‘contract enforcement’ and ‘investor protection’ 
(p. 213). Hobsbawm (1992) has compared Singapore and Hong Kong to Lübeck and 
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Ghent in the 14th century, as independent mini-states with economic significance out 
of proportion to their size and resources (p. 25). The raison d'être of Singapore’s 
nation-building may hence be best explained by way of its colonial history. But 
before that, it is necessary to start with an understanding of how the modern concept 
of the ‘nation’ began in 19th-century Europe.       
The political meaning of ‘nation’ started with an equation of ‘the people’ with the state, 
after the manner of the American and the French Revolutions (Ibid., p. 18). But in 
reality, not all states would coincide with nations that are homogeneous in ethnic, 
linguistic or other terms, or vice versa. Ernest Renan hence famously asked: “why is 
Holland a nation, while Hanover and the Grand Duchy of Parma are not? (1939; 
cited in Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 24)” On conditions in the establishment of the national 
state, John Stuart Mill would make the observation that it had to be feasible and that 
it had to be desired by the nationality itself (cited in Ibid.). This would be translated 
into the ‘principle of nationality’ and the ‘threshold principle’, the former dominating 
the peace treaties after World War I in the Wilsonian formulation, immediately 
resulting in a Europe of 26 states (Ibid., p. 32). But based on a study of regionalist 
movements in western Europe, Hobsbawm suggests that it could have numbered 42 
if only the ‘threshold principle’ was abandoned. National heterogeneity was accepted, 
as it was assumed then as Mill did that smaller nations stood to gain by merging with 
bigger ones. It was arguably not out of place in mid-19th-century thinking when 
Frederick Engels predicted the disappearance of the Czechs as a people (pp. 34-35). 
According to Hobsbawm there were in practice only three criteria which allowed a 
people to be classed decisively as a nation: firstly, a “historic association with a 
current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past” (p. 37), such as the English 
and the Russian people; secondly, “the existence of a long-established cultural elite, 
possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular” (Ibid.), such as 
the Italian and German peoples despite the lack of a single state; thirdly, “a proven 
capacity for conquest” (p. 38).  
Hobsbawm argues, perhaps somewhat hastily, that nationalism has become less 
important in the late 20th century, “no longer, as it were, a global political programme” 
(p. 191). With regards to the apparent explosion of separatism in 1988-92, 
specifically in Yugoslavia, he would dismiss it simply as “unfinished business of 
1918-21” (p. 165). However, he seems astute in noting that it was “[not] the desire 
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for German unity [that motivated] the political opposition in the DDR” (p. 168) but 
unexpected events outside Germany. Similarly, with the USSR, he argues it was not 
internal national tensions that led to the collapse, but a matter of economic difficulties, 
citing that the case for nationalist movements would be stronger in western Europe 
(Ibid.).  
Gellner (1983) begins his arguments on nation and nationalism with Max Weber’s 
celebration definition of the state, “as that agency within society which possesses the 
monopoly of legitimate violence” (p. 3), going on to say that a definition of 
nationalism may be parasitic on that of the state, as nationalism seems to emerge 
“only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for 
granted” (p. 4). He also argues that nationalism is not an awakening of a pre-existing 
cultures, but “the consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply 
internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state” (p. 
48). It is a crystallisation not of natural units, but of new units using cultural, historical 
and other inheritance as “raw materials” (p. 49). Describing the state as an 
elaboration of division of labour (p. 4), he explains that state and culture have to be 
linked due to the rise of industrial society which creates a norm in ‘exo-socialisation’ 
as “the production of men outside the local intimate unit” (p. 38). That is why “the age 
of transition to industrialism was bound […] also to be an age of nationalism” (p. 40) 
and there is also a link between nationalism and processes of colonialisation and de-
colonialisation (p. 42).  
In a postcolonial perspective, Chatterjee (1986) finds himself having to address the 
perspective that there is, in contrast to the pure and original form of nationalism 
emanating from ‘western’ culture, an ‘eastern’ type of nationalism which is “both 
imitative and hostile to the model it imitates” (p. 2). One possible response to this, in 
a Marxist perspective picking up from theoretical questions left off by Lenin’s idea of 
‘self-determination’, would be Horace B. Davis’ proposition, that “Nationalism … is 
not in itself irrational, but it may be irrationally applied. (1978, p. 25; cited in 
Chatterjee, 1986, pp. 18-19)” But for some perspective in history, Chatterjee would 
refer to a more sophisticated treatment of the subject in Anderson’s (1983) 
consideration that third-world nationalisms in the 20th century came to acquire a 
‘modular’ character, drawing from the examples of earlier models in ‘creole 
nationalism’ of the Americas, ‘linguistic nationalism’ of Europe and ‘official 
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nationalism’ like in Russia. As Chatterjee (1986) notes, Anderson’s argument of 
nations as ‘imagined communities’, superseding previous ‘cultural systems’ of 
religious community and dynasties, is more nuanced than Gellner’s argument that 
nations are an invention of nationalism rather than a matter of self-consciousness 
awakened (p. 19). However, he argues there is ultimately no substantive difference 
between approaches of the two, as one relates 20th-century nationalism to a change 
to requirements of ‘industrial society’ while the other refers to the dynamics of ‘print 
capitalism’, but both invariably see third-world nationalisms as shaped by historical 
models, instead of acknowledging the possibilities that may be afforded by the 
intellectual process of creation (p. 21).  
The main focus of Chatterjee’s postcolonial critique would however be a ‘liberal-
rationalist dilemma’ in talking about nationalist thought, as seen in the work of Hans 
Kohn, whereby nationalism has its birth assumed in universal history, in a 
development that is part of the same historical process which brought about the rise 
of industrialism and democracy (p. 2). While this suggests that nationalism 
represents in essence a universal pursuit of liberty and progress, there has been 
undeniable evidence that “it could also give rise to mindless chauvinism and 
xenophobia and serve as the justification for organised violence and tyranny” (Ibid.), 
Chatterjee points out, citing the case of Fascism. But the issue to him becomes even 
murkier with an attempt to resolve this dilemma by means of Kohn’s distinction 
between ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ nationalisms. The liberal-rationalist’s 
paradigmatic form whereby nationalism goes hand in hand with reason, liberty and 
progress has also led to the assumption that any special type of nationalism “[which] 
emerges under somewhat different historical circumstances [is therefore] complex, 
impure, often deviant” (p. 3). The typical solution to this is to construct sociological 
conditions as cause for any type of deviation, with the assumption that the world is 
swept by a ‘tidal wave of modernisation’, in which the essence lies in the awareness 
of man’s ‘capacity to contribute to, and to profit from, industrial society’, but the 
problem then lies in the ‘structure’ of traditional society being eroded (p. 4). Hence 
the liberal dilemma is circumvented by sociology, in which modernisation is 
considered a positive fact of contemporary history tied to psychological aspects of 
dignity and self-respect, and all that the liberal conscience of the West needs to 
adopt is an attitude of sympathy as “backward nations will find their own chosen 
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paths to independence, freedom and progress” (Ibid.), in a teleology of political 
development. But curiously, with such empiricist sociology, even the relation 
between nationalism and illiberal regimes may be justified by a theory of stages of 
development, such that for new nations struggling to modernise, “it might be a 
perfectly rational strategy for them… to postpone the democratic consummation of 
their efforts until the economic structures of their society are sufficiently industrialised 
and their social institutions modernised” (p. 5), Chatterjee notes, citing David E. 
Apter’s The Politics of Modernisation (1965) and Samuel P. Huntington’s Political 
Order in Changing Societies (1969). Such arguments easily play into the hands of a 
relativised position expressed by Kedourie, with the suggestion in Nationalism (1960) 
that nationalism is a doctrine invented in early 19th-century Europe and hence an 
import fundamentally alien to the non-European world (cited in Chatterjee, 1986, p. 
8). 
Chatterjee sees both sides of these arguments as sharing the Enlightenment view of 
rationality and progress. But as the conservatives see problems in the colonial world 
of ‘traditional loyalties clothed in the garb of modern political organisations’ and the 
liberals assert that those ‘irrational and regressive features are only a hangover from 
the past’, one question is missing: “why is it that non-European colonial countries 
have no historical alternative but to try to approximate the given attributes od 
modernity [when that means] their continued subjection under a world order which 
only sets their tasks for them and over which they have no control? (p. 10)” This 
question, Chatterjee argues, is one that is simply not possible to pose in the 
bourgeois-rationalist thought without landing oneself in a precarious discourse of 
power (p. 11).  
The problem as Chatterjee sees it, is that nowhere in this discussion of nationalism 
has anyone challenged “the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and capital” 
(p. 168). Instead, the conflict between metropolitan capital and the people as nation 
is resolved “by absorbing the political life of the nation into the body of the state” 
(Ibid.), and with the state acting as “the rational allocator and arbitrator for the nation” 
(Ibid.), capital continues to be protected in its continual exploration of possibilities in 
investment and production. Such is the reality “that has been suppressed in the 
historical creation of post-colonial nation-states” (p. 170). The next question, if one 
may add here, would nevertheless be how a state may manage to preserve its 
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functions in a capitalist system while absorbing the political life from a plurality of 
values and identities. Would the strategy be to suppress some of these values, or to 
create new identities? The answer might be a mix of both.    
The challenge of the multi-ethnic society in Singapore, or Malaysia for that matter, is 
something that few countries of the non-Western world have illustrated (Hefner, 2001, 
p. 4) in terms of its diversity. Developed from a British colonial legacy since the 19th 
century, it consists of 74% Chinese, 13% Malays, 9% Indian and 3% ‘others’ in 
resident population according to the census of 2010 (Singapore Department of 
Statistics, 2010, p. v). These racially defined groups, assumed for the purpose of 
public policies as distinct and separated from one another and homogenous in 
themselves, may in fact be further differentiated according to language or religion. 
The official discourse and administration has long maintained a simplified impression 
of a ‘homogenised’ existence of bounded groups, despite the existence of some 
hybridity in cultural practices among the groups (Chua, 1998, p. 190), which it 
represents by the simple formula of ‘CMIO’ as four ‘races’ of the nation (Siddique, 
1989; cited in Ibid.).   
The past legacy of Singapore may be characterised as the challenge of a ‘plural 
society’, to adopt the term dating back to the 1940s, which incidentally made 
particular reference to colonial territories such as British Malaya and Dutch East 
Indies. British administrator and political writer J.S. Furnivall defined a plural society 
as one that comprises “two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, 
yet without mingling, in one political unit” (Furnivall, 1944, p. 446; cited in Hefner, 
2001, p. 4). He had assumed that the Chinese, Malays and Indians in British Malaya 
for instance were socially segregated and lacked a “common social will” (Hefner, 
2001, p. 4) such that different ethnic and religious groups had little in common apart 
from market interests (Ibid., p. 5).  
But further to that, the current challenge for Singapore in multiculturalism also stems 
from recent trends of immigration which has parallel with the unprecedented 
increase in immigration to Western countries in the 1990s and 2000s, a period which 
has seen the largest immigration to the United States since the Great Immigration of 
the 1890s, and in Europe, immigration of a massive scale without modern precedent 
(Ibid., p. 2). The period of 2000s has incidentally seen the emergence of ‘bi-
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culturalism’ in Singapore’s political rhetoric and national narrative, promoting an idea 
that Singapore’s citizenry is comprised of descendants of immigrants and Singapore 
should have a core elite with the ability to work well “in the Singapore context as well 
as in the land from which their forebears had come, namely China, India, the Malay 
Archipelago and the Middle East” (Heng, p. 28). To put it simply, this is an extension 
of a race-based communitarian ideology, but one motivated by the development of a 
neoliberal economy.   
Before proceeding to further analyse Singapore’s race-based ideology as an illiberal 
form of multiculturalism, it would help to be equipped with a general view on how the 
notion of ‘race’ has emerged in the history of colonialism. The history of the 
construction and reproduction of the idea of ‘race’ has been analysed exhaustively 
by authors like Barzun (1938), Montagu (1964) and it is hence well understood that 
this idea of ‘race’ first appeared in the English language in the early 17th century and 
became used in European and North American scientific writing in the late 18th 
century to identify and explain certain phenotypical differences between human 
beings (Miles, 1993, p. 28). The related concept of ‘racism’ came from the title of a 
1933/4 book in the German language (published in English in 1938 as Racism) by 
Magnus Hirschfeld, who refuted 19th-century arguments on existence of a hierarchy 
of biologically distinct ‘races’ (Ibid., p. 29).  
Following scientific and political critique of fascist ideologies, dispute on whether the 
term ‘race’ should be used within science to refer to populations characterised by 
particular genetic profiles has continued, with some arguing for the need to discuss 
‘race’ as an analytical concept in order to formulate a theory on ‘race relations’, or 
how different ‘races’ interact with one another (Ibid.). It is hence that a theory of 
racism also becomes entangled in a theory of ‘race relations’ (Ibid.). O.C. Cox for 
instance constructed a Marxist theory of ‘race relations’ in Caste, Class and Race 
(1970), whereby ‘race relations’ are regarded as a variant of class relations, 
considering that whereas this has not arisen in the process of proletarianisation 
within Europe, ‘racial antagonism’ has taken place in the Caribbean and the USA as 
what was essentially class conflict (see Miles, 1993, p. 32). Sivanandan (1982) on 
the other hand has referred to the idea of ‘race’ in his analysis of South Africa in 
terms of a capitalist formation whereby racist classification has been legitimised in an 
ideology that grades such differences in a hierarchy of power (see Miles, 1993, p. 
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38). Noting that the race struggle is also the class struggle, he argues that racism 
cannot be abolished by rejecting the idea of ‘race’ and hence defends the common-
sense definition of ‘race’ as a reference to a group of persons who share the same 
descent or origin (Ibid.). Stuart Hall (1980) recognises that it is not biological 
characteristics in themselves, real or imagined, which have determinate effects, or 
even the perpetual distinction of such being made, but rather the question “what are 
the specific conditions which make this form of distinction socially pertinent, 
historically active” (cited in Miles, 1993, p. 44).  
But the work of Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) may 
still be criticised for reifying the idea of ‘race’, Miles (1993, p. 44) argues. He cites 
Guillaumin (1980) to point out that the idea of ‘race’ is essentially ideological, for 
while one cannot deny considerable somatic variation between individual human 
beings, the use of phenotypical features to classify human beings into groups, and 
the description of ‘racial’ relations as ‘natural’, rather than socially determined, is 
created in certain historical and material conditions to represent the world as such for 
political interests (Miles, 1993, pp. 44-45). Guillaumin asserts: “Merely to adopt the 
expression implies the belief that races are ‘real’ or concretely apprehensible, or at 
the best that the idea of race is uncritically accepted; moreover, it implies that races 
play a role in the social process not merely as an ideological form, but as an 
immediate factor acting as both determining cause and concrete means. (1980, p. 39; 
cited in Ibid., p. 45)” 
Following a Marxist perspective that all social relations are socially constructed and 
reproduced in specific historical circumstances which are alterable by human agency, 
Miles argues that the task would then be to deconstruct ‘race’ and detach it from the 
concept of racism (1993, p. 49). He writes: “By deconstructing the idea of ‘race’, the 
effects of the process or racialisation and of the expression of racism within the 
development of the capitalist world economic system are more clearly exposed 
because the role of human signification and exclusionary practices is prioritised. 
(Ibid.)” He cites the example that it was only after Africans were enslaved that they 
became represented in negative terms as an Other and certain phenotypical 
characteristics of theirs were signified as expressive of them being an inferior type of 
human being (Ibid., p. 50). In short, he argues that “through a process of racialization, 
racism became an ideological relation of production: that is to say, the ideology of 
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racism constructed the Other as a specific and inferior category of being particularly 
suited to providing labour power within unfree relations of production” (Ibid.). 
We now turn our attention back to Singapore, a territory under Malay rule since the 
13th century, before the advent of the British. Sir Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant 
Governor of the British colony at Bencoolen, Sumatra, was searching for an island 
as a new port in the region to rival the Dutch, when he arrived in Singapore in 1819. 
As the incumbent Sultan of Johor then was in alliance with the Dutch and the Bugis, 
Raffles smuggled in the sultan’s elder brother Tengku Hussein to be recognised as 
the rightful Sultan of Johor, in exchange for which the British East India Company 
was granted the right to establish Singapore as a trading post. Singapore was 
promoted as a free port with no taxes and a strategic waypoint between India and 
China, and population steadily increased within four years, to over 10,000 with 
Straits Chinese, Arabs and Indian coming for trade; the free market philosophy 
envisaged by Raffles would remain the foundation of Singapore’s economy ever 
since (Hunter, 24th March 2013).  
More migrant workers from China and India settled down in the subsequent decades 
as labourers, traders and soldiers. Under urging of the merchant community, 
Singapore was declared a British Crown Colony in 1867 to bypass British Indian rule.  
Singapore saw substantial rise in trade with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. 
By then there was already a wealthy Anglicised elite growing out of the Straits 
Chinese, Indian and Malay traders assimilating Victorian values. Singapore also 
became a centre of rubber shipment and tin trade. The British began a special 
relationship with the English-educated Straits Chinese known as baba, with the help 
of whom they squashed secret societies (Ibid.).  
During anti-colonial movements in the 1950s, Chinese-educated activists and 
students started allying with a multicultural ‘Malayan culture’ despite their cultural 
affiliation often being identified with communist China. The Malay language was 
included in Nanyang University, the Chinese-medium university established in 1956 
out of a community initiative, whereby the manifesto of the university’s establishment 
dated 7th April 1953 stated the dialogue between eastern and western culture along 
with the development of Malayan culture as its two main features (see Wang, 1997, 
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pp. 176-177). Students in Chinese middle schools also had much cross-cultural 
exchange that included watching and learning Indian classical dance (Wong, 2011).  
Meantime, the People’s Action Party (PAP) quickly grew in popularity under the 
charisma of its co-founder Lim Chin Siong, a Chinese-speaking left-wing politician 
and trade union leader. However, it was another co-founder, Lee Kuan Yew, born to 
a prominent Straits Chinese family and graduated as a lawyer from Cambridge 
University, who rose to become the Prime Minister of Singapore in 1959 when it 
gained self-government. Lee was allegedly in collusion with British authorities and 
Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock in imprisoning Lim Chin Siong as union leader prior to 
that (Tan and Jomo, 2001). A left-wing party Barisan Sosialis was subsequently 
formed by Lim in 1961 following his release, but ahead of elections to be held in 
September 1963, he and more than a hundred others were detained without trial in 
February that year, under the new Internal Security Act 1960, an instrument derived 
from the Emergency Regulations Ordinance earlier used by the British against 
communist uprising. The charge of communist subversives against them was 
consistently denied (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 18), as with the case of Chia Thye 
Poh, who was elected as MP in 1963 but similarly detained and eventually became 
one of the world’s longest-serving prisoner of conscience in the last century, living 
without freedom for 32 years. Tan Lark Sye, founder of Nanyang University, was 
notably deprived of his citizenship in September 1963, while the leftist Singapore 
Association of Trade Unions collapsed the same year following detention of its 
leaders.  
After a brief political manoeuvre of joining Malaysia in 1963 as part of a new 
federation along with Sabah and Sarawak, Singapore was expelled and hence 
declared its own independence in 1965. While the move by Lee and his faction of 
PAP in pushing for merger was clearly in calculation that the rightist Malaysian 
federal government would have little hesitation in putting their leftist rivals in 
detention indefinitely (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 18), the expulsion from Malaysia is 
an episode shrouded in more mystery. Racial tension between Chinese and Malays 
culminating in the 1964 riots is the main factor cited in official textbooks, but PAP 
was also accused of being double-tongued and two-faced by rivals in the Malaysian 
government (See, 28th July 2005, online). Singapore led under PAP thus “declared 
itself a constitutionally multiracial state – possibly the first such state in the world” 
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(Chua, 2003, p. 60). The imperative of establishing Singapore as a multiracial 
society was outlined at the First Session of the First Parliament on December 22, 
1965 by then Minister for Law and National Development, Mr E.W. Barker. He stated: 
One of the cornerstones of the policy of the government is a multi-racial 
Singapore. We are a nation comprising people of various races who constitute 
her citizens, and our citizens are equal regardless of differences of race, 
language, culture and religion… To ensure this bias in favour of multi-
racialism and the equality of our citizens, whether they belong to majority or 
minority groups, a Constitutional Commission is being appointed to help 
formulate these constitutional safeguards.  
(Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966, cited in Ng, 2010, pp. 92-93)  
Multiracialism was eventually implicitly constitutionalised through the Official 
Languages and National Languages Act [Article 153A], with Malay, Mandarin, Tamil 
and English instituted as the four official languages (Ibid.). The term ‘race’ was 
hence conflated in Singapore with divisions along the line of language, in a way that 
reflects Benedict Anderson’s analysis of nationalism in relation to print 
capitalism. ’Race’ has however also been conflated with religion through similar 
mechanisms in administration, for example all Malays are by constitutional definition 
Muslims whereas Hinduism is identified with ‘Indians’ (Chua, 1998, p. 190). Such 
simplification of ethnic categories under the one-party rule of the PAP is basically an 
extension and intensification of British colonial administrative practice in erasing 
social and cultural differences among the immigrant population and regrouping them 
into a smaller number of categories with bigger numbers of individuals (Purushotam, 
1998; cited in Chua, 2005, p. 4).  
Apart from such assurance in equal recognition of the citizens as separate racial 
communities, the Singapore government also re-configured the local communities 
through urban development and relocation to high-rise buildings, under schemes of 
its Housing and Development Board which quickly rose into prominence after a 
mysterious fire that devastated the Bukit Ho Swee area (Loh, 2009, online). With the 
elimination of rural kampung as well as slums in urban quarters, unwanted social 
networking that might harm political stability was also dismantled. Meantime, 
considering itself surrounded by potential hostile countries, Singapore was receiving 
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help from the Israeli forces as early as 1965 in establishing the Singapore Armed 
Forces (Barzilai, 2004). The SAF was to adopt a cautious approach whereby citizens 
of Malay descent would not be enlisted, and despite later relaxation, it was disclosed 
in 1987 that placing of Malays in key position is avoided (Yong, 26th June 2009).  
Singapore’s first Culture and Foreign Minister Rajaratnam would reflect without irony 
in 1969 on the PAP’s shift in the course of its ascent to power: “We started off as an 
anti-colonial party. We have passed that stage: only Raffles remains. (cited in Hong 
and Huang, 2008, p. 16; cf. Lim, Jan 2013, online)” Rajaratnam has earlier said, 
when quizzed on what a common Singaporean or ‘Malayan’ culture means, that it 
was one that would have “new beliefs and social behaviour… common to all [ethnic] 
communities” (see Lim, Ibid.). But by the time that Singapore celebrated 25 years of 
self-government in 1984, when the first ever set of school textbooks on Singapore 
history was issued, Rajaratnam went well beyond rehabilitating Raffles as an 
‘imperialist’ who ‘did not loot the country’, but produced “a vision of Singapore as a 
great trading centre, open to all who are enterprising and willing to take their 
chances on the basis of merit and hard work” (cited in Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 16). 
One may say that Singapore’s legitimation of a neo-colonial model as ‘multiracial 
meritocracy’ was thus completed through a sense of continuity in history. 
Goh (2008) has argued that postcolonial nationalism should not be viewed as 
derived directly from ethnic identities, “but from the engagements of the intellectual, 
political and economic elites of formerly colonised peoples with the racial 
representations and racial state of colonialism” (p. 239). Citing Bhabha’s (2009) 
argument that the nation is a rhetorical manifestation of such complex engagements 
which maintain the symbolic bounds of the colonial state while threatening to 
undermine it, Goh argues “it is not that the imagination of Malaya could not contain a 
Chinese-dominated Singapore, but that the complex engagements of the nationalist 
elites with the colonial racial state and its pluralism clashed” (2008, p. 240). In short, 
the tensions and conflicts “resulted not from natural antagonisms between culturally 
different peoples but began in political disagreements in these engagements” (Ibid.). 
Following Maiello’s (1996) perspective that ethnic conflicts arise when the 
postcolonial state fails to resolve international tension between the ‘multiple national 
consciousness’ and the ‘singular nationalism of the nation-state’, Goh suggests that 
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this was the problem during merger and separation of Singapore and Malaysia 
between 1963 and 1965 (2008, p. 241).  
But returning the focus to the postcolonial discourse on race, one may relate this in 
Singapore as in Malaysia back to the issue of labour power as well as to the political 
project under the British colonial administration to govern diversity in a region with 
extended history of migration (Amrith, 2010, p. 301). Back in the 19th century, he 
points out, colonial discourse on race was used to characterise and differentiate 
between migrant groups, with the Asiatic population classed under ‘Chinese’, 
‘Mahometan’ and ‘Hindoo’ in an official report in Malaya in 1856, even as the same 
report would acknowledge that “no correct opinion can be formed of its composition 
from these distinctive appellations” (Ibid., p. 302). The Dutch administration in the 
East Indies would mark the Chinese as homogenous and different from the rest, 
requiring them to carry passes and imposing restrictions on their movements and 
places of residence (Ibid.). The European colonial administrations formed opinions 
on the racial diversity as a way to naturalise the economic division of labour, hence 
the Chinese were held to be industrious but fractious whereas the Tamils were held 
to be docile and good for hard labour (Ibid.). But the first explicit discussions of 
heredity were in connection with the creolized or hybrid communities. John Crawfurd 
(1783-1868), a Scottish administrator and amateur ethnographer, would describe the 
‘Jawi Peranakan’, a community that came about from intermarriage between south 
Indian Muslim men and Malay women, as a “motley race… of no very amiable 
description, partaking of the vices of both parent stocks” (Ibid., pp. 302-303). 
Peranakan Chinese families were similarly described as an inferior race, except for 
the Anglophone Straits Chinese elites, who were often Christian and were viewed by 
colonial officials as highly educated and loyal and effective collaborators (Ibid., p. 
303).’ The late 19th century also saw new anxieties about racial mixing as increasing 
numbers of European women arrived in colonial Southeast Asia and unions between 
European men and local women were becoming widespread (Ibid.).  
When the census was first introduced in Malaya in 1871, the desire to erect firm 
boundaries around race was apparently one rationale, given the idea then that 
peoples were different not only in appearance and culture but also in inherent 
capacities (Ibid.). By 1891, the census already listed the various ‘races’ and ‘tribes’ 
under the main headings that continue to shape official conceptions of race in 
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Singapore as well as Malaysia to this day: Chinese, Malays, Indians and others 
(Ibid.). Interestingly, the most significant creole communities no longer appeared in 
the census by the turn of the 20th century, as the Straits Chinese were merely listed 
as ‘Chinese’; from 1911, the Jawi Peranakan were simply listed as ‘Malay’ (Ibid.).   
The Chinese in Singapore are incidentally a heterogeneous population even in terms 
of ‘dialect’ origin alone, with more than 20 ‘dialect’ groups known (Lee, 2000, in 
Statistics Singapore Newsletter, p. 2). Based on population census in 2000, the 
Hokkiens make up 41% of the Chinese population, Teochews 21%, Cantonese 15%, 
Hakkas 8%, Hainanese 7%, not counting other groups such as Foochows, Henghua, 
Hockchia and Shanghainese which make up less than 2% each. The identity of the 
Peranakan Chinese, however, has become hidden amidst such statistics, for though 
their unique cuisine and costumes are known to Singaporeans and their artefacts 
have been represented in the museum, their own language, the Baba Malay which is 
a fusion of Chinese and Malay, has become extinct or unused today (Swee, 2008, p. 
1, online). Frost has shown that in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the permanently 
settled Straits Chinese represented a transcultural diaspora, “transcultural in the 
sense that the hybridity or creolisation evident in their domestic lives were carefully 
separated from their performance of a very Chinese ethnic identity in public” (Frost, 
2003, p. 2). Straits Chinese were noted for speaking in the English, Malay and 
Chinese languages, and they not only played a role as commercial go-betweens  
between the Chinese community and the European settler elite, they were involved 
variously as cultural agents in the transmission of modernity, Confucian revival and 
even overseas Chinese nationalism (Ibid.). However, their plural identities soon 
become faded, partly because modern education in Singapore after 1900 became 
broken down into polarised camps, with former Anglo-vernacular schools becoming 
solely English and dialect schools becoming superseded by Mandarin institutions, 
such that a whole new generation of local-born Chinese were increasingly forced to 
choose between one of two educational options (Ibid., p. 34). Government policies in 
Singapore since independence were to assimilate them into mainstream Chinese 
culture, such that they are not only classified as ethnically Chinese but also receive 
formal instruction in Mandarin Chinese as a second language instead of Malay 
(Swee, 2008, p. 2, online)   
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It is similarly through the standardised use of Mandarin Chinese, in education as well 
as in the broadcast media and official transaction, that the Chinese population in 
Singapore is eventually homogenised as one race after independence. Though the 
Hokkiens, Teochews, Cantonese, Hakkas, Foochows, Henghuas and Hockchias are 
all from the same southern Chinese regions of Fujian and Guangdong province, their 
languages are not mutually comprehensible despite having similar syntactic 
structures and sharing the same Chinese scripts. Their linguistic differences cannot 
be reduced to one of accent, and their reduction as ‘dialects’ is in fact ideological 
(Chua, 2005, p. 5). Nevertheless, the Singapore government saw it fit to launch a 
Speak Mandarin Campaign in 1979 among the Chinese, and the hitherto broadcast 
of Hong Kong movies and television serials in original Cantonese was also banned 
since then from public television. On 23 November 1979, the Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew appeared in a discussion with three journalists, whereby he set two 
targets: “five years for all young Chinese Singaporeans to drop dialects and use 
Mandarin and 10 years for Mandarin to be established as the language of the coffee-
shops, hawker centres and shops” (Platt, 1985, p. 23) 
Hence Chinese languages which are non-Mandarin became confined to home use, 
but some parents also began to speak Mandarin at home in the interest of helping 
their children’s academic achievement, with a side effect that communication was 
destroyed between grandchildren who speak no Chinese other than Mandarin and 
the illiterate grandparents who speak no Mandarin (Ibid.). Whereas 30.7% of the 
Chinese resident population above age 5 in 2000 spoke Chinese dialects most 
frequently at home, the percentage has dropped to 19.2% in 2010, whereby 32.6% 
prefer English and 47.7% (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 26). 
However, some dialects remain socially significant in certain segments of Singapore. 
The success of Worker’s Party, a main opposition party in Singapore, in the 
Hougang constituency, has partly been attributed to the fact that its leader Low Thia 
Khiang campaigns in Teochew, and the ruling People’s Action Party has been forced 
to follow suit, ban or no ban on dialects (Seah, 22nd Jan 2006, in The Sunday Star, 
online). Apart from this, Hokkien has been a lingua franca in Singapore since 
colonial days, especially when at least one of the participants in verbal 
communication has little or no formal education (Platt, 1985, p. 17), and this may still 
hold true even if this aspect is not reflected in census surveys.  
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According to definition in the census, Malays in Singapore refer to persons of Malay 
or Indonesian origin, such as Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis and so on (Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 185). However, though some of these categories 
continue to be enumerated in the census, cultural differences are suppressed under 
the single category of ‘Malay’ as a community that is represented for electoral 
purposes by Malay members of parliament (Chua, 2005, p. 5). Historically speaking, 
the ‘Malay world’ as it is understood today comprises peninsular Malaysia, the east 
coast of Sumatra, the west and southwest coast of Borneo and the Riau archipelago, 
where the Malays traditionally settled on the coast and river enclaves, deriving their 
livelihood from trade and other resources (Lian, 2001, p. 862). K.W. Taylor (1992) 
has highlighted that the beginning of Malay history as traditionally remembered in 
recent centuries is marked by the founding of Melaka as an entrepot and the 
adoption of Islam by its rulers, so much so that the Malay annals (Sejarah Melayu) 
do not consider the pre-Islamic Malay past to be of interest (Ibid., p. 863). The term 
Melayu was once used exclusively to refer to those of royal or noble descent, but 
Munshi Abdullah, a language teacher of mixed descent in the first half of the 19th 
century, and an early critic of the Malay aristocracy, used the name to refer to the 
common people (Ibid., p. 865). He also used the Malay term bangsa (race, or 
nationality) to refer to collective identity, and this came, as Milner (1995) describes it, 
at a time when British Malaya saw a mass influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants 
coming to work in the tin mines and on the rubber plantations (Ibid.). The Utusan 
Melayu newspaper established in 1915 then used the term bangsa to refer to the 
Malays, as a concept that distanced itself from the sultanate and even the Islamic 
community, at the same time without the biological-genetic overtones of Darwinism 
(Ibid.).  
Prior to this rise of nationalism, there was already a linguistic dimension to what 
Hefner describes as the ‘permeable ethnicity’ of the Malayo-Indonesian peoples 
which displayed resemblances in dress, dance, music and social etiquette when the 
16th-century Europeans discovered the trade networks in the archipelago that 
included most notably the great entrepot of Melaka (Hefner, 2001, p. 13). He argues 
that the spread of the Malay language in virtually all major trading ports of Southeast 
Asia suggests a kind of pluralism whereby ethnic division was not strictly bounded or 
harshly oppositional, such that there was a “transethnic sense of Malayo-Indonesian 
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civilisation’ (Ibid., p. 14). Many among the Chinese immigrants, the most numerous 
of minorities in the archipelago, used to be culturally close to natives and some were 
already Muslims, but from the late 19th century onwards, the sheer scale of Chinese 
migration, their economic success and their role as designated intermediaries for 
European enterprises all reduced the incentives for them to accommodate to local 
customs (Reid ed., 1996, cited in Ibid., p. 17). By the early 1920s, the Chinese 
already outnumbered Malays in the peninsula (Hefner, 2001, p. 18). Hence identities 
became more oppositional with the rise of nationalism in Malaya, and even Javanese 
and Sumatrans who migrated to the peninsula well into the 20th century became 
identified as ‘Malays’ in the new ethnic structure, as long as they were Muslims and 
were willing to adopt Malay airs (Roff, 1967, p. 111, cited in Ibid., p. 19).  
Eventually, religion developed into an important marker of the Malay identity in 
Malaysia and Singapore. The difference with Indonesia here lies partly in the colonial 
policies. Missionisation was given the green light in Indonesia under Dutch rule as 
they viewed Javanese rulers as only superficially Islamic and hence decided to have 
Christian enclaves carved out in an otherwise continuous Islamic expanse. The 
British on the other hand viewed the Malay chiefs as ‘Muhammadan Monarchs’ and 
hence took a cautious approach to maintain “intact, so far as was compatible with 
other aims, the internal structure of Malay authority and social organisation” (Roff, 
1967, p. 11, cited in Ibid., p. 21). There was hence a linkage of royal and religious 
authority leveraged by colonial control, with profound effect on subsequent 
Malaysian pluralism. In British Malaya, the sultans’ authority over Islamic education 
and organisations limited opportunities for religious experimentation, as seen in the 
1904 Muhammadan Laws Enactment forbidding public teaching on Islam without the 
sultan’s approval in writing, and an amendment in 1925-26 providing severe 
penalties for anyone publishing literature concerning the religion without similar 
permission (Roff, 1967, p. 80, cited in Ibid.). This not only led to less dynamism for 
religious reform compared to Indonesia, but also had an impact on identity politics. 
As the Malay elite came to see themselves being in competition with immigrant 
Chinese and Indians, they also gave their profession of faith a narrow expression 
tied to ethnicity, as noted by Nagata (1984), such that to be Malay was explicitly 
marked as being Muslim and implicitly marked in opposition to Chinese and non-
Muslim Indians (Hefner, 2001, p. 22). During contestation of the concept of the 
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Melayu nationality between the forming of the Malayan Union in 1946 and the 
independence of the Federation of Malaya in 1957, there was in fact a proposal from 
the Malay Left for an ethnic identity based on historical and cultural origins, whereby 
members of other groups, such as Chinese and Indians, could be admitted if they 
were prepared to renounce any tie outside the peninsula (Lian, 2001, p. 867). 
However, the traditional elite spearheading the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) rejected this and favoured an exclusive bangsa Melayu nationality, and this 
was adopted for the formation of Malaysia’s modern nation-state (Ibid.). In Singapore, 
a similar approach of inclusion and exclusion has thus been adopted and a Malay is 
defined as “someone who is Malay, Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Arab or any other 
person who is generally accepted as a member of the Malay community by the 
community” (Rahim, 1998, p. 18, cited in Chua, 2005, p. 5), with Malay as the 
language to be taught in schools and the Islamic religion taken as an additional 
‘defining element’ for all ‘ethnic’ Malay population (Chua, 2005, p. 5).  
Constitutionally, all Malays are Muslims, such that ‘Malays’, especially descendants 
of Indonesian extraction, who are Christians just become an anomaly (Ibid.). On the 
other hand, conversion to Islam by a Chinese through intermarriage has been 
referred to as masuk Melayu, and a Chinese woman would tend to refer to herself as 
a Muslim and “no more a Chinese” (Ackermann, 1997, p. 56).  
The Indian minority in Singapore is defined in the census as referring to persons of 
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi origin, such as Tamils, Malayalees, Punjabis, 
Bengalis, Singhalese and so on (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 185). 
Indians began arriving into Malaya in 1786 when the British took control of Penang, 
and they were among the first migrants to arrive in Singapore after British colonial 
officials Sir Stamford Raffles and William Farquhar  landed in Singapore in 1819 
(Periasamy, 2007, in BiblioAsia, Vol. 3, Issue 3, October 2007, pp. 5-6). Indian 
labourers were employed in the sugar, pepper and gambier cultivations in the 19th 
century, and many settled down also as shopkeepers, cow keepers, milk sellers, or 
as public works employees, along with South Indian traders, financiers, money 
changers and so on (Ibid.). A trend soon developed such that whereas one would 
see mostly English-educated South Indians and Ceylonese Tamils employed in the 
railways, as clerks in government offices, in businesses and so on, the North Indians 
and specifically the Punjabi Sikhs would be employed as policemen, watchmen and 
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caretakers (Siddique, 1990, cited in Ibid., p. 10). After the Second World War, three 
linguistic groups became especially discernible, namely the Tamils followed by the 
Malayalees and the Punjabis (Mani, 2006, cited in Ibid., p. 10). Due to its 
predominance, Tamil was named one of the four official languages when Singapore 
proclaimed self-government in 1959 and Tamil schools became fully aided by the 
government (Tamil in SITE!, 2012, online). It was after a prolonged period of this 
south Indian language being imposed as the official Indian language that other South 
Asian languages such as Bengali and Hindi have been accepted as mother tongues 
for ‘Indian’ students (Chua, 2005, p. 6), due to demand. The proportion of Tamil 
speakers among the Indian population has apparently been on the decline, whereby 
Tamils constituted 58.3% of the total Indian population in Singapore in 2000 
(Periasamy, 2007, in BiblioAsia, Vol. 3, Issue 3, October 2007, p. 10), whereas the 
use of Tamil as the most frequently spoken language at home among Indians 
declined from 42.9% in 2000 to 36.7% in 2010, whereas speakers of other 
languages (not counting English or Malay) increased from 9.9% to 13.8% in the 
same period (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 26), suggesting a growing 
trend of immigration by non-Tamil Indians into Singapore. Nevertheless, ignoring 
some class divide between Tamils and non-Tamils in the Indian community, the 
preservation of Tamil as an official language has long helped to unify much of the 
Indian community, by cutting across caste and religious lines (Chua and Kwok, 2001, 
p. 104). The Indian population is incidentally also diverse in terms of religion, with 
Hindus comprising 59% in 2010, Muslims at 22% and Christians at 13% (Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 29). 
The use of different bases for assembling of the three ‘racial’ populations, the Islamic 
religion as overriding marker for the Malays and the prominence of Tamil language in 
representation of the Indians, shows that the construction of these categories is far 
from ‘natural’, as Chua (2005) argues. He notes: “The governmental simplification 
and homogenisation obviously operated instrumentally on a set of convenient 
elements – language, religion and geography - rather than with a consistent singular 
principle of ‘race’.” (Chua, 2005, p. 6) Such inconsistent mode of organising the 
population into three races, accepting no hybrids, was entirely for the ease of 
governance (Ibid.).  
216 
 
The word ‘race’ is hence constantly used in political and popular discourse and 
assigned the same meaning as ‘ethnic group’ by the Singapore Department of 
Statistics (Ho, 2009, in The Social Studies, Nov/Dec 2009, p. 287). ‘Race’ as such is 
inherited by patriarchal descent, as all Singaporeans are automatically assigned a 
particular race at birth as determined by the race of the father (Ibid.). Although the 
Immigration and Checkpoints Authority introduced a flexible option beginning from 
January 2011 for parents of different races to reflect their child as a ‘double-barrelled 
race’, for example as “Chinese-Indian” or “Indian-Chinese”, the initial assignment to 
mother tongue education in schools has to refer to the first component of the stated 
‘double-barrelled race’ (ICA, 29th December 2010, online). It does little in altering the 
fact that “the racialised culture is assumed to be embedded in the language of the 
race which is assured continued existence through compulsory school instruction as 
the ‘mother tongue’ language of the student” (Chua, 1998, p. 190).   
Benjamin (1976) has postulated that if the concept of multiracialism reflects a 
functioning social and cultural organisation in Singapore, then one might expect 
certain consequences, namely that a ‘same’ ethnic group would be much more 
ethnically conscious than in society with a ‘non-racial’ category, and that there would 
be a tendency to make the social reality fit an ethnic or racial theory of causation 
(Benjamin, 1976, p. 119). He then goes on to cite observations that “Singaporeans 
are inclined to show particular concern for ethnic identity is especially apparent to 
visitors from countries where the ‘same’ ethnic group is represented” (Ibid., p. 120), 
whereby a Singaporean would normally wish to know it is a ‘Chinese’ from Hong 
Kong or Taiwan, ‘Indian’ from India, Pakistan or Ceylon, and ‘Malay’ from Indonesia, 
rather than other possible criteria such as class, age or degree of educational 
attainment (Ibid.). Furthermore, ‘culture’ in public discussion in Singapore has 
usually referred not to any new Singaporean synthesis or innovation but simply an 
agglomerate of the separate Chinese, Malay, Indian and European traditions, each 
as “a traditional, ethnically delimited culture, a Golden Age to which each ‘race’ can 
look back separately for inspiration”  (Ibid.). Incidentally, Benjamin uses the word 
‘culture’ to refer loosely to “a socially derived complex of ideas quite different from 
actual behaviour” (Ibid., p. 117), citing it as similar to the Durkheimian notion of 
‘conscience collective’. He subsequently also discusses how each constituent ‘race’ 
is ascribed “a stereotyping list of defining behavioural characteristics” (Ibid., p. 124), 
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for instance government ministers who are Malay by ethnicity would urge Malay 
audiences to be more positively oriented towards urban life, “despite the lack of 
evidence that Singapore Malays exhibit a ‘rural’ world view” (Ibid.), whereas in 
Chinese circles, there would be a tendency to propagate a Confucian view of 
morality and even a ‘return’ to extended-family pattern of residence though this had 
been rare among ancestors of the Singapore Chinese community (Ibid.).  
There is arguably also a strong conflation of race with religion in Singapore 
perpetuated by government statements, despite the difference by degrees, with 99.6 
of Malays being Muslims, 55.4% of Indians being Hindus and 64.4 per cent of 
Chinese being Buddhists or Taoists according to statistics of the year 2000 census 
(Ng, 2010, p. 93).   
In terms of changing trends, the percentage of Muslims and of Hindus among the 
resident population has been stable between 2000 and 2010, while the percentage 
of Buddhists/Taoists has dipped from 51% to 44.2%, whereas the percentage of 
Christians has increased from 14.6% to 18.3% (Singapore Department of Statistics, 
2010, p. 29). The attraction of Christianity has been thus represented: “One 
important factor for the increasing popularity of Christianity seems to be a general 
dissatisfaction among young Chinese Singaporeans with their parents’ religious 
practices which they perceive as ‘illogical, unrealistic and superstitious’. Christianity 
in contrast is considered to be ethnically neutral, unlike Islam and Hinduism. It 
represents western influence and is associated with modernisation and the English 
language. Christianity there is supposed to be ‘rational, orderly and systematic’…”  
(Ackermann, 1997, p. 55). A growing trend of mega churches identified as 
evangelical or charismatic has in particular been a subject of sociological study in 
recent years. 
Chua (1998) has argued that there is much hybridity in cultural practices of everyday 
life in Singapore, though there has been an attempt to erase such hybridity through 
construction of the different ethnic cultures within racialised boundaries. One aspect 
is the mixture of languages that developed historically through inter-ethnic economic 
cooperation, for instance a mix of Malay and English as a medium between Indian 
traders who spoke no Chinese and Chinese brokers who spoke no Indian languages 
(Chua, 1998, in Chen, 1998, p. 187). There has more recently been a patois of 
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English known as ‘Singlish’ which has emerged among the local population, 
including the tertiary educated who speak grammatically proper if not grammatically 
perfect English (Chua, 2005, p. 14). A blending of English with Chinese syntax and 
vocabulary, particularly Hokkien which has been a lingua franca in Singapore for a 
long time, “Singlish has been defended by middle class, proficient-English-speakers 
as an identity marker of being ‘Singaporean’ (Ibid.)”. Another aspect is that of food, 
for example the street-food known as mee goreng, whereby “mee is Chinese made 
noodle [and] goreng is the Malay word for frying”, and it is served generally by Indian 
Muslim hawkers (Chua, 1998, in Chen, 1998, p. 187). Finally, there is absorption of 
elements across religious practices, for example Malay indigenous animistic 
practices relating to local spirits, which have been adopted by Chinese as datuk 
gong (Ibid.). Such hybridity has been signified locally with the term ‘rojak culture’, 
whereby rojak is a dish that mixes together disparate cultural ingredients (Ibid.).  
One may argue also that the local communities of Singapore were not mutually 
exclusive along ethnic lines of ‘race’ to begin with, but tended to be more fragmented 
with the process of Singapore’s drastic urbanisation into Housing and Development 
Board (HDB) estates, among other measures. This social construction of ‘race’ has 
permeated the social organisation in Singapore since its nation-building days, and is 
a key to understanding the political ideology of communitarianism under the current 
regime, whereby different ethnic groups tend to be segregated in spheres of social 
life such as housing, education, media and so on through differential policies. 
However, one may also grant the local communities more agency, to consider that 
life in the state-planned HDB needs not be conceived as non-authentic but instead 
as a world where meanings are made through “local experience [mediating] national 
identity”, like what Lai (1995, p. 5) argues in a study on inter-ethnic relations in 
Singapore, citing A.P. Cohen (1982, p. 13) argument on the co-existence of local 
collectivity and wider social contexts. Lai observes in the housing community of 
Marine Parade how identities may be transformed through quotidian activities of 
shopping, eating, chatting and playing, how cultural boundaries may be redefined 
and how there may be tension between spontaneous grassroots interaction and top-
down bureaucracy in the management of pluralism (see Pearson, 1997, p. 453).  
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Lai (1995) also notes there that despite an official discourse under the government’s 
attempt of sinicisation whereby ‘Chinese = Mandarin = Confucian culture’, there 
remains a demarcation between the English- and Chinese-educated Chinese 
populations in language, education and culture, related to differing political 
orientation whereby the Chinese-educated elite has historically seen the English-
language as language of the colonial oppressor (pp. 143-147). In the recent online 
dissent against the PAP government’s neoliberal population policy, one may observe 
a new shift in identification, with challenges against the official racialised justification 
that new citizens from China are cultural interchangeable with Singaporean Chinese. 
One local Chinese blogger who notably expressed such a view was a train officer 
with the pseudonym of Gintai, whose blog first went viral when the Singapore Mass 
Rapid Transit (SMRT) system experienced its first major train disruptions in 
December 2011, prompting angry Singaporeans to complain of overcrowding in the 
city-state. He also commented on MP Seng Hang Thong’s discriminating remarks 
suggesting that SMRT’s emergency preparedness was hampered by English skills of 
Malay and Indian staff. A few months later, Gintai turned to the topic of his 
camaraderie with a Malay colleague: “I feel much closer and at ease with Train 
Officers like Anak Abu even though those PRs are Chinese. We are Singaporeans. 
We grew up together sharing the same ideals in schools and living environment and 
even been through NS together. (Gintai, 23rd April 2012, online)” The serving of 
national service (NS) has incidentally been a sore point among male Singaporeans 
who lament their disadvantage in the job market while carrying the burden of such 
obligations as citizens. (The blog was discontinued some months later, after the 
blogger’s invitation to a meeting with Law Minister K. Shanmugam.) 
In August 2011, the simple local dish of curry came into spotlight as it turned into a 
symbol of Singapore identity. It followed from a newspaper report about a newly 
arrived mainland Chinese family who took offence to their Indian neighbours’ habit of 
cooking curry, forcing a mediation centre to rule that the Indian family should only 
cook curry while the Chinese family was out. Incensed by the incident, 40,000 
Singaporean netizens vowed to mark the weekend of 21st August as Curry Day by 
cooking the dish (Moore, 16th August 2013). This attempt to signify the Singapore 
identity seems to vindicate Stuart Hall’s perspective that “identities are constructed 
through, not outside, difference” (1996, p. 4)  
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Within the Indian community or, more accurately speaking, communities, one may 
also observe how the local Tamil-speaking community may be identifying 
themselves more as local Singaporeans and citizens than as ‘Indians’ when it comes 
to issues of employment and quality of living. In a Tamil television forum of Idhayam 
Pesugirathu (Series 2, Episode 7, 28th February 2013), participants have 
distinguished themselves from foreign talents and foreign labour coming from South 
Asia under Singapore’s current manpower and migration policies, as they lament the 
problem of overcrowding in the city among other issues. In short, there is much 
contestation in Singapore over the issue of whether ethnicity identities as defined by 
the state are relevant to Singaporeans, who are increasingly identifying themselves 
as locals instead of the reified races. Indeed, “ethnic identity is a highly relative 
concept that the political morality of nationalism seeks to transform into an absolute 
one” (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 43).  
The next half of the chapter will discuss the lack of approaches for ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ in Singapore in terms of a sense of social cohesion and public spheres for 
liberal open exchange, under such a differentiated communitarian approach. 
Peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups, referred to as ‘racial harmony’ 
in Singapore’s National Education programme, is achieved with the help of 
draconian legal measures, in a delicate form of ‘tolerance’ in the public sphere 
maintained by way of censorship and punishment. The CMIO model of racialised 
multiculturalism hence functions as a Hobbesian model focusing on conflict 
prevention (Taib, 11th October 2012, online), which also serves to legitimise 
continued authoritarian rule rather than to promote communal relations among the 
local people.  
 
4.2 Need for Intercultural Dialogue in Singapore to overcome Cultural 
Differences  
4.2.1 Lack of Social Cohesion in Singapore – Civic or Ethnic 
Nationalism? 
 
This section will consider the issue of social cohesion in the example of Singapore, 
not only in terms of the challenge by virtue of de facto diversity in its ethnic plurality, 
but in terms of the adoption of a differentiated approach under the framing of a 
multiracialism as defined by the state in its ‘CMIO’ formula. It also examines whether 
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the nation can truly be considered civic rather than ethnic, whether some groups 
may be disadvantaged in lieu of assimilation through education, and whether the 
housing policy in Singapore serves to promote integration.   
With the compartmentalisation of racial categories in Singapore under the neat 
CMIO formula, it creates a paradox. The sense of nationhood, with a 
correspondingly differentiated policy, has been tied to an idea of Singapore as a 
meritocratic society that claims equality while constructing and perpetuating racial 
differences (Purushotam, 2000, pp. 13). A characterisation of Singapore as a 
‘multiracial meritocracy’ (Lee, 9th April 2009, online), as part of the political rhetoric in 
Singapore by its statesmen, has underlined its claims of being a superior model in 
contrast to what it criticises as the favouring of the indigenous peoples in Malaysia 
and Indonesia – unlike in Singapore, the Chinese on the other side are a minority 
instead of a dominant ethnicity.   
Such state-defined multiracialism, where ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are used 
interchangeably, has “permeated all levels of society and is now common among 
officials, policy makers, academics and the public alike” (Lai, 2004, p. 9), such that 
most Singaporeans have also become “quick and proficient in racial categorisation 
and interpretation in both their public and private lives” (ibid), with “direct 
consequences not only on the structuring of identities and opportunities for in-group 
members but also on relationships and modes of interaction where ethnic individuals 
and groups meet” (Ibid.). Maintaining social cohesion involves not only a challenge 
due to fluid social contexts in terms of social identities; it is also a question of how 
one may see divisions, not necessarily in terms of racial or ethnic tensions, but also 
in terms of income or wealth inequality and disparities in political participation or 
other forms of participation (Ibid., p. 3). In other words, the success of social 
cohesion also hinges on the level of ‘meritocracy’ that is claimed under Singapore’s 
ideology. 
One may assess the public policies in Singapore with regards to their function under 
its state ideology, by analysing the ideology from the angle of civic versus ethnic 
nationalism, and in terms of communitarian versus liberal values. From there, one 
may examine the effects of its consequent policies on various spheres of public life 
for the different ethnic groups.  
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The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is one of the most commonly 
used concepts in the study of ethnic relations and nationalism. It dates back to the 
1907 work Cosmopolitanism and the National State, where German historian 
Friedrich Meinecke asserted a fundamental difference between political and cultural 
nations, a dichotomous framework then developed and popularised by Czech émigré 
Hans Kohn in his 1944 book The Idea of Nationalism (see Shulman, 2002, p. 555). 
Kohn argued that nationalism in the West, particularly England, France, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, was primarily political, being 
inspired by Enlightenment ideas of liberty and equality and having struggled against 
dynastic rule, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, nationalism arose in 
polities that poorly coincided with cultural or ethnic boundaries (Ibid.). Hence in the 
Western model, citizenship is equated with membership in the nation, whereas, in 
the Eastern model, nations have been consolidated around the common heritage of 
a people and the idea of the volk or people instead (Ibid.).  
Kohn’s contrast of the two models cast the Eastern form of nationalism in a negative 
light, for he described it as not only less rational but also lacking in self-assurance 
and compensating an inferiority complex with over-emphasis, as it “extolled the 
primitive and ancient depth and peculiarities of its traditions in contrast to Western 
nationalism and to universal standards (Kohn, 1994, p. 164; cited in McCrone, 2008, 
p. 318). As such, these civic/ethnic and West/East dichotomies have been criticised 
for having a normative, ethnocentric bias. McCrone raises that such a distinction 
“does lend itself to ethnocentric caricature – why can’t they be more like us?” 
(McCrone, 1998, p. 9; cited in Shulman, 2002, p. 558; emphasis in original). 
Conceptually, some scholars have also attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic 
distinction, with Yack challenging the notion that a civic identity would be freely and 
rationally chosen whereas an ethnic identity is inherited and emotionally biased, for 
civic identities may also be inherited, he argues  (Yack, 1999, p. 109; cited in 
Shulman, 2002, p. 558). Nielsen and Kymlicka both argue that ethnic nationalism 
should not be equated with cultural nationalism for they differ in openness to outsider, 
as seen in examples of Quebec and Flanders where nationalisms have been 
labelled as ethnic but should actually be seen as cultural (Kymlica, 1999, p. 133; 
Nielsen, 1999, p. 126; both cited in Shulman, 2002, p. 558). Finally, from an 
empirical perspective, scholars working with the civic/ethnic dichotomy have also 
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been quick to say that most states and nations contain both components. Smith for 
instance says that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying 
degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; 
at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasised” 
(Smith, 1991, p. 13; cited in Shulman, Ibid.).  
In any case, a framework using conceptual categories along the lines of ‘civic’ and 
‘ethnic’ has been adapted and elaborated by David Brown to view nationalisms 
among Southeast Asian countries as forming a continuum from ‘ethnocultural’, 
through ‘multicultural’ to ‘civic’ (Brown, 2005; cited in Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 3). 
Adopting this spectrum of categorisation, Burma may be placed on the furthest 
extreme of the ‘ethnocultural’ end, with Thailand not far behind, whereas Indonesia is 
placed on the ‘civic’ end, with Singapore behind it, while Malaysia may be placed in 
the middle (Ibid.). Barr and Skrbis argue that the placing in such categorisation may 
be misleading, for even as Indonesia was quasi-secular in national ideology and race 
and ethnicity were not recognised as legitimate forms of identification, there was also 
clear ethnic dimension in transmigration policy whereby Javanese and Madurese 
were shipped to outlying provinces, resulting in dominance over the locals (Barr and 
Skrbis, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, despite the official rhetoric that Singapore follows a 
civic model of nationhood, Barr and Skrbis argue that “since around 1980 the 
Singapore nation-building project began moving away from a civic-oriented model 
[…] towards a more ethnic-cum-racial form, with the conceptions of ‘Chinese 
ethnicity’ and a peculiarly Singaporean notion of ‘Chinese values’ assuming 
increasingly important roles” (Ibid., p. 5). Rather than a picture of meritocracy as 
painted in official rhetoric of the Singapore leaders, what Barr and Skrbis see in the 
Singapore society is an occupation of Chinese ethnicity and values coming to 
occupy a similar place that Malay ethnicity occupies openly in Malaysia: “it is the 
basis of full identification with the nation, but allows the other communities to live and 
prosper in a relatively comfortable communion with the centre (Ibid.)”. 
The first signs in Singapore of a shift in the direction towards ethnic nationalism, 
according to Barr and Skrbis, were the launch of the ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’ in 
1979 and the decision within the same year to enhance elite Chinese-medium 
schools under the Special Assistance Plan (SAP), whereby children were given 
multiple advantages such as special consideration for pre-university scholarships 
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(Ibid., pp. 92-93). Neither Indian nor Malay students, in contrast, were given special 
help or schools of their own to address their needs (Ibid., p. 93). Following that, 
Confucianism was propagated in Singapore, beginning with the invitation of Chinese-
American professors of Chinese students to Singapore in 1982 to announce that 
Confucianism is suitable for all Singaporeans, regardless of race or religion. As 
reported in the national Straits Times newspaper on 5th September 1982: 
“Confucianism can be practiced by all, regardless of their colour or creed. It may 
have natural appeal to the Chinese, but it is meant to be universal as it just teaches 
a person how to be a human, how to live” (cited in Ibid., p. 95). Along with that, there 
was a discourse arguing that Chinese culture was good for the development of 
Singapore, a discourse led by Singapore’s prime minister for over three decades 
since 1959, Lee Kuan Yew. He said on 25th August 1992:  
 
“In looking back over the last 30 years, I believe we were fortunate that 77% 
of our people had strong Chinese traditional values which put emphasis on 
the strength of the family, the bring up of children to be modest, hardworking, 
thrifty, filial, loyal and law abiding. Their behaviour had an influence on non-
Chinese Singaporeans.” (cited in Ibid., p. 87) 
 
‘Chinese values’ as such were of course a construction, in fact something that was 
previously given mostly negative associations in the public discourse in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when they were linked with Chinese communism and Chinese 
chauvinism (Ibid., p. 45). But Chinese values as defined in a narrow, sectarian 
version by the Singapore government were soon “promoted to the whole population 
through the thin disguise of the ‘Asian values’ rhetoric and enshrined in the national 
ideology through the White Paper on Shared Values in 1988” (Ibid., p. 95). This 
privileging of Chinese values, along with a rising dominance of Mandarin as a major 
vehicle of communication, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups, is characterised by 
Barr and Skrbis as a form of ‘Sinicisation’ and ‘incomplete assimilation’ – “a 
balancing act between the imperative that minority members need to strive to act 
‘like Chinese’ in order to succeed and the insistence that at the end of this process 
they will continue to be relegated to a minority status” (Ibid., p. 98).   
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David Brown (1994) has analysed similar changes in Singapore in the management 
of ethnicity but under a different framework with wider historical scope, whereby he 
distinguished between three periods: the first from self-government in 1959 to 
independence in 1965, was an ‘ethnic mosaic’ period whereby ethnicity was 
downplayed to promote a unifying capacity of multiracialism; the second period, from 
1966 to 1980, was distinguished by principles of race-blind meritocracy; the final 
period beginning in the 1980s may be seen as an attempt of ‘inclusionary 
corporatism’, characterised by ethnicity being increasingly managed through 
mechanisms of a corporatist state (see Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 53). Corporatism 
refers to “attempts by an avowedly autonomous state elite to organise the diverse 
interest associations in society so that their interests can be accommodated within 
the interdependent and organics national community” (Brown, 1994, p. 67). Brown 
suggests that the development of corporatist tendencies in a plural society leads to 
the state becoming involved in attempts to engineer ethnic consciousness, and that 
the state may seek to organise ethnic communities as ‘singular, compulsory, non-
competitive and hierarchically ordered’ categories, with effective supervision of 
ethnic demands by licensing and controlling the issues recognised as legitimate 
(Ibid., p. 76).  
Brown notes that even in the initial period of ‘ethnic mosaic’, it did not imply that each 
ethnic group would receive equal attention, for there was in practice “a stress, both in 
national ideology and in resource allocation, on the constitutionally guaranteed 
‘special position’ of the Malays” (Ibid., p. 79). Hence the Malay language was not 
only a lingua franca but also promoted as the national language, and the Malays 
received free education, unlike other racial communities (Ibid.). The government was 
“impelled to downplay its concern to protect Chinese interests while displaying its 
concern for the Malays” (Ibid.), due to its desire to attain independence. 
Circumstances changed after independence, such that national ideology began to be 
portrayed more in terms of ethnic neutrality, whereby the discourse of 
‘multiculturalism’ was used “to celebrate the virtue of inter-ethnic tolerance in an 
achievement-oriented society committed to economic development” (Ibid., p. 80). 
With unchallenged authority, the Singapore government in the 1970s concentrated 
on the central task of industrialisation and inculcated its citizens with ideals of self-
reliance, pragmatism and pursuit of excellence, such that the national identity 
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became epitomised in ideas of ‘national development’ and ‘meritocracy’ (Ibid.). In the 
1980s and early 1990s, Brown argues, Singaporean politics moved in a corporatist 
direction. The People’s Action Party regime had already subsumed all trade unions 
under the pro-government National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) in the 1960s and 
proceeded to appoint its party members to key NTUC posts. Its government also 
offered ‘non-constituency MP’ places to defeated opposition candidates since 1984 
and provided channels such as the Government Feedback Unit since 1985 for 
controlled participation. Alongside such political moves, Brown sees the 
government’s remoulding of ethnic cultural values, to form a national identity with 
core ‘Asian values’, as part of a more inclusionary corporatist strategy, furthered by 
an institutionalisation of ethnic interests through state-licensed organisations 
“through which ethnic interests could be articulated and through which state policies 
could be promoted” (Ibid., p. 96).  
Considering the function of corporatist strategies in controlling and depoliticising 
ethnic interests, as described by Brown, and the argument of Barr and Skrbis that 
there is ‘incomplete assimilation’ whereby the culture of the dominant ethnicity is 
privileged as being superior and more conducive for economic excellence, one may 
see that a civic/ethnic dichotomy is inadequate in characterising Singapore’s 
ideology as a nation. Singapore has also been characterised as an authoritarian 
political system, whereby “authorities are appealing to Confucian traditions 
somewhat dishonestly to justify an intrusive and unnecessarily paternalistic political 
system” (Fukuyama, 1995, online), with an argument made by former Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew and his followers that “Western-style democracy is incompatible with 
Confucianism, and that the latter constitutes a much more coherent ideological basis 
for a well-ordered Asian society than Western notions of individual liberty” (cited in 
Ibid.). Legitimised by Confucianism as ‘Asian values’, Singapore’s authoritarian rule 
is used to promote political stability which in turn is used to advance economic 
development, as Lingle (1996) has argued. Authoritarian rule at the same time may 
be used to suppress ethnic and class conflicts, legitimated especially by anti-
communist ideology, as Deyo (1987) and Rodan (1994) have pointed out (see Goh, 
2002, online, p. 2). The question of Singapore in a classification between civic or 
ethnic nationalism, regardless of whether one sees the rule as more authoritarian or 
more corporatist, may thus be refined to one of whether one sees capitalism or 
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Chinese values as reigning supreme in their conflation.  Confucianism has 
incidentally been compared to the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ as a driving force behind 
economic success (Lim and Chua, 2003), quite without irony. 
Another paradigm for analysing the organising of ethnic cultures under Singapore’s 
political system would be the distinction between communitarianism and liberalism. 
This may provide us with further perspectives on how different ethnic communities in 
Singapore are disconnected from one another and how much autonomy or privilege 
each community may enjoy under the system. But first of all, it has to be recognised 
that whereas communitarianism, with its insistence of community-embeddedness of 
individuals, emerged in the West as an alternative or modification to liberalism, as 
notably debated in the 1980s (Chua, 2004, p. 3), communitarianism in Asia is “a 
counter-discourse to liberalism, not a reformist one” (Ibid., p. 8). What political 
leaders in Singapore, and elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia, employ as national 
ideology is a ‘vernacular communitarianism’, whereby a sense of community 
providing emotional and material resources is taken for granted as everyday life, 
such that “politics is always about the management of the social rather than the 
adjudication of conflicts between individuals” (Ibid., p. 9). This is not to say that 
individuals in such a social system are so thoroughly socialised that they do not feel 
repressed, hence there is a need for Asian politicians to demonise liberalism as 
‘Western’, while imposing their ‘collective’ values’ onto the citizens (Ibid.).  
In Singapore, claims to a ‘communitarian’ ideology are made as the Singapore 
embraces capitalism and legitimises itself on its economic achievement (Ibid., 14). 
Whereas the challenge of a liberal government in seeking stability is to contend with 
issues of social welfare for individuals, the task of a communitarian government is to 
support conservative values of tradition (Ibid., p. 16). This is done in Singapore 
through a multi-racial division in governance which is combined with other political 
manoeuvrings to remove challenge from any social group to the power of the regime, 
such that development of democratic politics in Singapore is severely hampered 
(Ibid., p. 19).  
The racially defined communities in Singapore are incidentally evenly distributed in 
the island state due to deliberate redistribution of the population by quota in the 
process or urbanisation. Concentration of ethnic quarters in pre-independence days 
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has been broken down, such that ‘community’ in Singapore no longer exists in the 
sense of such locality. “This enforced physical integration of the different racial 
groups as immediate neighbours [was] rationalised negatively in terms of preventing 
racial conflicts and in more positive terms as encouraging racial integration” (Chua, 
2004, p. 90), even though there is no reason to believe that this served any more 
than to weaken cohesion within ethnic communities. 
Drastic urban development took place in Singapore from 1960s to 1980s. In 1959, 
when Singapore gained self-government, less than 9% of the population was 
sheltered in public housing; but since the creation of the Housing and Development 
Board (HDB) in 1960, by 1974 nearly 43% of the population lived in HDB flats, and 
by 1989 the proportion was 87%, with 20 'New Towns' encircling the original urban 
core. (De Koninck, Singapore/re, cited in Koolhaas, 1995, p. 1033) This may be seen 
as part of de-traditionalisation policies which replace communal traditions with a new 
collective life. While there have since been efforts to conserve external facades and 
structures of old colonial buildings for instance, Singaporeans have lamented that 
these seem to cater to the tastes of tourists but ignore intangible aspects of heritage 
such as "traditional trades and lifestyles" (Teo and Huang, 1995, pp. 610-611). 
In his diagnosis of Singapore's urban 'renewal', Rem Koolhaas has thus summarised 
it: "the new republic's blueprint, its dystopian program: displace, destroy, replace". 
(Koolhaas, 1995, p. 1035) The HDB system was not only a speedy solution for 
efficient housing, but also an emergency response to a specific political crisis, for it 
was said that in the slums and kampungs (Malay for rural village) of the early 1960s, 
"criminal elements bred and thrived; Communism found new adherents", as HDB 
stated in its 1969 memorial publication First Decade in Public Housing (cited in 
Clancey, 2004, ip. 48).  
Further to that, in 1989 the Ethnic Integration Policy was introduced to set ratios for 
ethnic groups in public housing estates to ensure a balanced mix of ethnicity and 
prevent enclaves from forming. This also effectively helps the People's Action Party, 
political incumbents of a one-party rule since 1960s, to disperse voters, the 
opposition being known to fare better in constituencies with high populations of 
Malays (Think Centre, 2010, p. 6). Unfortunately, the policy often makes it difficult for 
children of minority races to live near their parents (Ibid., p. 7). The quotas for 
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precincts and blocks have been 84% and 87% for the Chinese, 22% and 25% for the 
Malays, and for the Indians/'Others' it was 10% and 13% until March 2010; this 
would make it difficult for Indian families to move into the Little India area, as one 
cannot buy flats from Chinese families (Tham, 16 March 2010), for instance. A new 
quota announced for permanent residents, set at 5% and 8% respectively, further 
complicated the matter (Ibid.).  
Little India or Tekka is incidentally a rare area in Singapore where there is an 
unbroken sense of authentic living culture, as the shophouses of the conserved 
buildings remain bustling with life till today. Apart from the colourful vegetable stalls 
and a wide range of Indian restaurants, there are various traditional trades such as 
flower shops, textile shops, jewellery shops, sweets shops, shops selling religious 
artefacts and products, even fortune-tellers with parrots. There is incidentally a Little 
India Shopkeepers and Heritage Association which was established in 2000 under 
the urging of the Singapore Tourism Board partly for the objective of "the betterment 
of Little India as multi-cultural and multi-ethnic tourist destination in Singapore" 
(Lisha, 2010, online). It plays a significant role in the organisation of annual 
celebrations of various traditional festivities in Little India, including Deepavali 
(festival of light), Pongal (harvest festival) and Thaipusam. An Indian Heritage Centre 
has been scheduled for construction in Little India by end-2013, as a project of the 
National Heritage Board.  
This compares favourably to the area known as Chinatown in English, a misnomer 
given that the Chinese are a majority almost everywhere in Singapore, and this in 
fact refers to the place called Kreta Ayer (in Malay) or Niu Che Shui (in Mandarin), 
formerly an enclave of the Cantonese community specifically. Despite conservation 
of the physical buildings, it has lost its specific flavour since the 1980s when 
residents and shops were displaced, and has become a manifestation of Singapore’s 
Sinicisation with a grand Chinese identity. The exhibition in the Chinatown Heritage 
Centre (visited in February 2013), is not only conspicuous for its dark lighting in a 
reproduction of dingy living conditions of the original tenants but also for the over-
emphasis in its exhibition on lack of hygiene and development in Chinatown instead 
of sharing fond memories in a sense of communal bonding.   
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The Malay settlement of Geylang Serai has another twist of fate, whereby in addition 
to urban redevelopment, a replica Malay Village was created, without finding 
success as a tourist trap. Most recently, there are plans for a new ‘civic centre’ there, 
tentatively called Wisma Geylang Serai. It is significant that such ethnic 
neighbourhoods, including also the Arab Street area, used as venues for annual 
festive bazaars and some cultural shows, serve as symbolic centres of ethnic 
cultures in Singapore, whereas the new towns are kept ethnically neutral as 
neighbourhoods.  
The ethnic quota in public housing has often affected the social and cultural lives of 
the residents, especially the minority groups of Malays and Indians. For Malays 
especially, there are aspects in daily life being Muslims such as dietary items which 
are grouped into halal and haram (permissible and not permissible by religion 
respectively), hence in any event of emergency, it would be difficult for a Malay 
family to find a Malay neighbour to take care of children (Chua, 2004, p. 91). With 
local state-initiated activities being more cost-effective for the Chinese majority due 
to critical mass, it is also not surprising that the mosques with control over their own 
spaces have become the centre of Muslim activities in each public housing new town 
(Ibid.). 
One key institution set up in the process of Singapore’s modernisation and 
urbanisation is that of the ‘community centres’ situated at new towns or housing 
estates around the island nation. They are a network of centres which originated as 
food distribution centres in the colonial days but later provided sports activities and 
cultural activities that contributed to a collective sense of multiracial Malayan culture 
prior to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965. Holden (2004) has analysed 
its function since the 1960s as “part of a postcolonial narrative of production, of the 
disciplining of individual citizen subjects in a national modernity” (pp. 79-80), an 
institution that manages leisure time of citizens as “self-improvement and bodily 
training … as part of an ascetic devotion to work which Max Weber identified with 
Protestantism and which, in the 1980s and 1990s, came to be identified with 
Confucius and Asian values in Singapore” (p. 80). The community centres were first 
taken over from the colonial rulers and placed under the newly formed People’s 
association after Singapore gained self-government in 1959. Through these centres, 
the PAP also appropriated the successful mass mobilisation of their leftist, Chinese-
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educated allies in promoting a new nationalist culture that is cleansed from decadent 
Western culture such as cabarets and nightclubs (Ibid. 82-83). When the left wing of 
the PAP broke off as Barisan Sosialis in 1961, six members of staff were sacked and 
a strike by majority of PA staff put down; the community centres have since then 
become narrowly political, promoting the influence of the ruling party (Ibid., p. 84). 
Until today, the PA remains a party organ that may restrict the use of its venues even 
while belonging to an opposition party’s ward.  
Education is another public sphere that is ruled by the logic of multiracialism in 
Singapore. Whereas English as the primary language of instruction for all in school 
and also the working language in public administration has provided as a basis of 
meritocracy in Singapore, the teaching of mother tongue has been organised 
according to rigid classification based on paternal descent, as mentioned in the 
previous section. Such enforcement of language education as racial marker is 
potentially a hurdle in social mobility: for example, a child who is born of mixed 
parentage such as Indian and Chinese, with English spoken in the family, would tend 
to suffer poor performance in Mandarin or in Tamil, and “may as a consequence be 
deprived of tertiary education as entry to local university is contingent upon his/her 
achieving a minimum standard in the second language” (Chua, 2004, p. 89). Some 
flexibility was only introduced in more recent years. But this reflects a multicultural 
and communitarian policy that uses education of a second language or ‘mother 
tongue’ as “vehicle for transmitting culture and values of its race” (Ibid.) but 
hampering employment opportunities for some in the process. Apart from racial 
differentiation at the individual level, there is also question of unequal treatment for 
students in different school systems. Whereas Christian mission schools and 
‘bilingual’ schools which have Chinese as another first language often enjoy special 
assistance, the lack of subsidy for Madrasahs under Edusave scheme has been a 
concern for the Malay-Muslim community (Abdullah, 2011; Manap, 2012, online). 
Social welfare has also been divided in Singapore to some extent along ethnic lines. 
Ideologically speaking, the PAP government has insisted that it is against social 
welfarism for two primary reasons, firstly that it believes welfarism saps the work 
ethic, secondly that it argues that substituting itself for the family in providing social 
and financial support as such would weaken the family and the fundamental bond in 
society (Chua, 2004, pp. 91-92). Yet, the government does give subsidies in areas of 
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education, health, housing and other infrastructure provisions, often under 
description as ‘human capital’ investments, including ‘a very generous package’ 
since 2003 of assistance up to S$100,000 for purchase of public housing (Ibid., p. 
92). Such ‘generosity’ of course also has to be evaluated against trends of rising 
housing prices through the decades along with conditions of eligibility and 
availability. Most recently, PM Lee Hsien Loong has rejected a proposal by local 
economist Prof Lim Chong Yah for ‘wage shock therapy’ to be implemented to 
address income inequality and compensate for stagnating wages in the past decade 
attributed to the influx of low-wage foreign workers. He argues in a May Day rally 
speech that one “must get at least 30 per cent productivity growth in ten years” in 
exchange for 30 per cent real wage growth (Lee H.L., 2012, online). 
Racialisation in welfare provision actually began in Singapore in the early 1980s with 
an attempt to address the disadvantaged social, economic and educational position 
of the Malay community relative to the Chinese and the Indians (Chua, 2004, p. 92). 
An organisation dedicated to helping Malay children from lower-income families who 
are falling behind in their education, the MENDAKI (Majlis Pendidikan Anak-Anak 
Islam) was established with governmental financial support and collaboration of 
other Malay-Muslim community organisations. But due to ‘the logic of equality of 
racial groups’ (Ibid.), the Chinese population followed suit by setting up the CDAC 
(Chinese Development Assistance Council), and this was followed by SINDA 
(Singapore Indian Development Agency). The government administrates it by 
deducting a small sum of money from the monthly salary of each working 
Singaporean through the Central Provident Fund. As typical under Singapore’s 
multiracial policy, “individuals are marked by official racial categories and not 
permitted to contribute across racial boundaries” (Ibid.). Furthermore, potential 
beneficiaries of mixed parentage tend to fall between the cracks, especially South 
Asian Muslims. Ironically, with these racially divided self-help groups, the Chinese 
community by sheer numbers and economic strength tends to collect more funds 
than the Malays and the Indians, hence the minorities, especially the Malay 
community, again tend to compare unfavourably (Ibid., p. 93). This may have a long-
term effect of perpetuating economic divisions, though the government has also 
encouraged the three racial organisations to share resources and to allow children of 
different races access educational help at centres closest to homes regardless of 
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which organisation is operating the centre (Ibid.). Whether the ethnic majority stands 
to benefit most from this would be another question.  
It has been noted, based on research in North London, that racism, especially 
among the inner-city working class, does not operate in the form of cultural 
stereotypes alone, but has manifested as part of a process whereby residents and 
workers attempt to make sense of their concerns in urban decline (Rattansi, 1992, p. 
31). Racist discourses and practices as such are seen to flourish in “situations of 
acute competition for scarce resources such as employment and housing and they 
are exacerbated by the insecurities of rising inflation” (Ibid.). A similar argument may 
possibly be made of Singapore, which has seen rapid population growth by 2010 of 
permanent residents rising to 10.7% of total population and that of non-residents 
rising to 25.7% of total population (Lai, 2012, p. 4). However, in contrast with ‘anti-
immigrant’ contexts of the West, expressions of xenophobia have largely been 
limited to netizens’ comments on websites and more specifically during General 
Election of 2011, and there is a need to disentangle from these the more general 
locals’ sentiments against policies of rapid and massive immigration which lead to 
“claims of discriminatory hiring practices against locals, soaring property prices 
including public housing, allocation of places and bond-free scholarships to foreign 
students in the highly competitive higher education sector and growing pressures on 
social facilities and public transport” (Ibid., p. 37).  
The issue of xenophobia and racialisation in Singapore is complicated by the official 
classification of Chinese and Indian immigrants under the same ethnic identities as 
local ethnic Chinese and Indians, “a misfit that is based on false assumptions of 
ethnic cultural similarity and identity” (Ibid.), with an “expectation of relatively 
problem-free integration arising from supposed similarities [that] falls flat in the face 
of the poignant differences and divides [particularly] between local Chinese and PRC 
Chinese” (Ibid.). Ultimately, one may argue that the conditions for local-immigrant 
relations and integration would much depend on economic growth and distribution 
issues as well as city planning for liveability (Ibid., p. 39). There is also one principle 
that should arguably be upheld for the sake of social cohesion, namely that 
Singaporeans should be convinced that “citizenship and belonging is what is 
meaningful, rightful and at the heart of it all” (Ibid.) in order to present more extreme 
sentiments of ethnic nationalism from taking roots against current trends of 
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immigration promoted by the government. In February 2013, Singapore saw an 
unprecedented protest of thousands against a government white paper that 
envisages a population growth to 6.9 million by 2030, a significant event for its 
expression of nationalist sentiments (Au, 17 Feb 2013, online).  
 
 
4.2.2 Lack of Liberalism in Singapore in the Public Spheres on Issues 
of Racism and Stereotyping  
 
This section will deal with the question of whether problems of racism and 
stereotyping among different cultural communities are suppressed or further 
perpetuated by illiberal public policies, which eschews open exchange of view in the 
public sphere for draconic legal measures instead to maintain ‘racial harmony’. It will 
conclude in reference to Kymlicka’s framework of liberal multiculturalism, that as long 
as the particular context of Singapore’s current political atmosphere prevails, 
‘intercultural dialogue’ in Singapore can only refer to a form of national education or 
cultural industry and not to a sense of deliberative democracy.  
The public media in Singapore is available in all four official languages. But the 
government exercises social and political control with the press and other media. 
The Newspaper and Printing Act (1974) imposed limits on ownership of media, with 
a restrictive definition of its role as ‘supportive of government interests’, stipulating 
that all newspapers are to be Singaporean public companies including management 
shares allocated to government-owned holding companies and trusted individuals 
which have 200 times voting power over ordinary shares in matters of editorial policy 
and appointment or dismissal or directors and editorial staff (Chua, 2004, p. 81). 
Past directors of the domestic intelligence service, the Internal Security Department, 
have been continually appointed to the management board (Ibid.). In the 1980s, a 
monopolistic company, the Singapore Press Holdings, was even set up to 
incorporate all national newspapers in all the official languages (Ibid.). Formerly, 
Nanyang Siang Pau, a privately owned newspaper used to be alleged of playing up 
pro-communist sentiments and issues of Chinese languages, and in May 1971, the 
general manager and three other leading staff members including editor-in-chief Liy 
Sing Ko were arrested under the Internal Security Act (SDP, 2012, online). In 1986, 
a bill to amend the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) was also introduced 
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to restrict the sale and distribution in Singapore of any foreign publication if it was 
found to be “engaging in the domestic politics of Singapore” (Ibid.).  
The Singapore government is also monitoring the new media on internet out of 
political considerations. In 2012, a few months ahead of the General Elections, The 
Online Citizen, one of the country’s most popular socio-political websites, was 
ordered by the government to be gazetted as a political organisation under the 
Political Donations Act, to prevent anonymous donations or funding from foreign 
sources (CNA, 17th February 2012). On 28th May 2013, the Media Development 
Authority announced that any online news site reporting on with more than 50,000 
viewers from Singapore a month would have to put up a S$50,000 bond and comply 
within 24 hours to its directions to remove any content deemed in breach of content 
standards according to a Licensing Regime, which was gazetted two days later as 
subsidiary legislation to the Broadcasting Act without parliamentary discussion 
(#FreeMyInternet, 1st June 2013). This prompted an online petition to defend 
freedom of speech and a protest on Hong Lim Park on 8th June 2013 attended by 
more than 2,000 Singaporeans, where bloggers criticised the regulation as being 
politically motivated in curtailing criticisms against the government, taking into 
account that a ‘clarification’ by Minister Tan Chuan-Jin suggested blogs may also 
have to be looked at if they ‘evolve’ into news sites (Channel News Asia, 8th June 
2013; The Online Citizen, 5th June 2013). Human Rights Watch describes the new 
rule as casting “a chill over the city-state’s robust and free-wheeling online 
communities” (New York Times, 9th June 2013) as it “will clearly limit Singaporeans’ 
access to independent media” (Ibid.). 
Apart from freedom of speech, freedom of association in Singapore has been 
severely restricted through the Societies Act which requires all voluntary 
associations to register with the Registrar Society, which is empowered to deny 
registration with minimum reasons, for instance the presumption that activities may 
have negative consequences on public order (Chua, 2004, p. 82). Freedom of 
assembly is also limited, for the Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU) housed 
in the Police Department can deny any permit by simply citing that ‘Police assesses 
that the event has the potential to lead to law and order problems’ (Ibid., p. 83). 
Giving of speeches in public is defined as ‘public entertainment’ and hence license is 
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required, arguably contrary to the principle of freedom of expression which is 
supposedly guaranteed by the state constitution (Ibid.).  
The most anti-democratic of all legislation is however the Internal Security Act, which 
empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to detain anyone for years without public trial, 
as long as the Minister has subjective reason to believe that the detained has acted 
against national interest and is a threat to national security. Apart from arrest 
operations in 1960s and 1970s whereby alleged communists have been detained for 
as much as two or three decades, a group of social activists including young 
Catholics were detained in 1987 for an alleged ‘Marxist’ conspiracy. In 2001, 13 
Muslim ‘extremists’ linked to Al-Qaeda were detained. Despite the relatively sparse 
use of the ISA in Singapore in more recent decades, it is “cold comfort to a 
population that is increasingly better educated and diversified in their opinions and 
sentiments. Finally, so long as the ISA remains as a piece of the legal arsenal for 
repression, it will always mark the absence of democracy in Singapore.” (Ibid., p. 84) 
Singapore is known for “very severe gerrymandering” in the electoral process (Ibid., 
p. 79), prompting unheeded calls for an independent electoral commission. There is 
also much racialisation in political elections in Singapore, notably through 
institutionalisation of the GRCs (Greater Representative Constituencies), each 
formed by up to 6 constituencies. The rationale for the GRC was ostensibly to 
ensure that the minority races, namely Malays and Indians, are represented in all 
future parliaments, for each contesting team for a GRC must include a Malay and an 
Indian minority member, and a team has to garner the largest number of aggregate 
votes in order to win the GRC. But what it does in effect is to disadvantage the 
opposition political parties, as the grouping of constituencies makes it not only harder 
for them to attain a winning margin, candidates also have difficulty to raise funds as 
deposit for qualification in the first place (Ibid., p. 80).  
Chua would thus summarise politics in Singapore: “In the desire to maintain ‘social 
harmony’, an abstract socially desirable good, the government has chosen to 
engage in ‘preemptory’ action as a mode of government, a strategy that is implicit in 
all the above-discussed anti-democratic legislation. (Ibid., p. 97)” Political thinker 
David Miller (2000) would characterise the PAP government as an extreme form of 
‘right communitarianism’ that may also more simply be called authoritarianism (see 
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Ibid., p. 94). But the ‘success’ of communitarianism in Singapore apparently lies in 
achieving a kind of stability through authoritarian rule and corporatist strategies. 
Chua has argued that only a segment of the tertiary educated, middle-class 
individuals in Singapore may crave for liberal freedom, whereas for the rest, “the 
apparent benefits of emphasising ‘collective’ well-being provide a sense of security, 
in spite of some lack of freedoms. The worst nightmare of a liberal in Singapore is to 
discover just how pro-family, pro-racial, pro-religious identification and nationalistic 
are the overwhelming number of Singaporeans. (Ibid., p. 98)” 
As long noted by Benjamin (1976), “Singapore’s Multiracialism puts Chinese people 
under pressure to become more Chinese, Indians more Indian, and Malays more 
Malay, in their behaviour”. Brown argues that such multiracialism also promoted 
political stability in two ways: “It removed ethnicity from the political arena and 
defined its location in the non-political social realm, and it also provided individuals 
with the ‘cultural ballast’ which is, according to the government model, necessary in 
order to prevent the alienation (cultural and also potentially political) of the ‘rootless’ 
individual. (Brown, 1994, p. 83)” Althusser’s (1971) notion of Ideological State 
Apparatuses may well be applied here to a consciousness of nationalism (p. 219), 
whereby modern power in nationalism institutionalises knowledge on reality (Ibid.) 
and uses research institutions and intellectuals as tools of social order                                                                
(Ibid.). 
The privileging of the social over the individual in Singapore is explicitly articulated in 
the five ‘Shared Values’ of its national ideology: nation before community and society 
above self; consensus instead of contention as the basis of conflict resolution; family 
as the basic building block of society; regard and community support for the 
individual (Chua, 2004, p. 14). This formulation suggests that ultimately, nothing will 
ever be allowed to precede ‘national’ goals as set by Singapore’s one-party 
government. What constitute the aspirations and values of each racially and 
culturally defined community may also find little voice in the public sphere apart from 
the official channels, due to draconian control under the rule of PAP which remains 
unchallenged, with the help of non-democratic instruments along with devices of 
corporatism.  
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‘Chineseness’ for one is hence essentialised for instance in a way that is in line with 
authoritarian rule and capitalist economy in the guise of Confucianism promoted by 
the PAP government. Hence when the Nanyang University, a Chinese university 
established in the 1950s through donations from people of all walks of life, was 
closed by the PAP government in 1980, it was a move that cannot be explained 
through the standardisation of English as common language per se, but is apparently 
due to fears of political radicalism oriented towards communist China among the 
Chinese-educated intellectuals (Chua and Kwok, 2001, p. 108). Around the time of 
1997 election, the PAP leaders levied charges of Chinese chauvinism at opposition 
leader Tang Liang Hong of Workers’ Party, who positioned himself as representing 
the Chinese community. He was eventually declared bankrupt after defamation suits 
filed by PAP leaders for questioning their integrity, and fled Singapore after receiving 
death threats (Amnesty International, 15th August 1997, online). Intellectuals within 
the Chinese community, while careful in their public interventions, have been critical 
of the state’s subsequent idea of developing a Chinese ‘cultural elite’ and changes to 
the Chinese-language curriculum announced in early 1999, reflecting “tremendous 
scepticism toward the state’s efforts at cultural engineering” (Chua and Kwok, 2001, 
p. 110). They “feel that culture should not be trivialised and politicised by the state 
such that, in raising cultural concerns, the Chinese-educated [is] so quickly tarnished 
by the label of chauvinism” (Ibid.). 
Another example of how alternative voices of the communities become muted is the 
development of the AMP (Association of Muslim Professionals), which was formed 
after an inaugural conference of Malay-Muslim professionals in 1990, motivated by a 
disenchantment of organisers with the way the Malay-Muslim community was 
controlled and represented by PAP Malay MPs (Ibid., p. 100). They argued that 
these Malay MPs were dominated by party interests and unable to represent the 
Malay-Muslim interests, and hence a new professional organisation was needed as 
an alternative channel. But this challenge to the status quo seemed quickly 
dissipated when the government offered to fund AMP at the same level as 
MENDAKI. It agreed and ended up developing the same community services and 
became very similar (Ibid., p. 101). Since then, AMP has again wanted to reposition 
itself to engage in national, inter-ethnic and issue-oriented agenda, but PM Lee 
Hsien Loong has reminded at its 3rd national convention in June 2012 that it should 
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stay focused on education, family and financial skills and take caution in “venturing 
into civil society issues which are not primarily to do with the Malay-Muslim 
community” (CNA, 30th June 2012, online). 
Similarly, the interests of the Indian community is supposed to have found 
representation through organisations like SINDA and the Hindu Endowments Board 
(HEB), but the latter is in fact also an institution dating back to colonial days for the 
government to exercise control of religious and cultural practices, such as restriction 
of music instruments in religious processions, stipulated in HEB guidelines and 
enforced by the police. In 2011, after a report in the national Straits Times 
announced that devotees at the annual Thaipusam festival are to observe rules not 
to beat drums, play music or chant loudly during the 4 kilometre procession, local 
human rights lawyer M. Ravi filed an originating summons against the Attorney-
General’s Chamber and HEB, saying that the guidelines violate the rights of religious 
minorities under the Constitution; to nobody’s surprise, it was thrown out of court.   
Where cultural heritage is concerned, nothing is allowed to take precedence over 
national goals of economic development, and some would hence choose to label the 
approach of the PAP regime as ‘pragmatism’ (Kwek, 2004, p. 112). On the question 
of whether Singapore can afford urban conservation, Chief Planner of the Urban 
Renewal Authority in Singapore, Liu Thai Ker, has said that conservation “should not 
be an economic burden to the government. Instead, its economic success will go a 
long way towards furthering the cause of conservation. (Ibid., p. 114)” It is not 
surprising that Singapore does not follow the example in many advanced countries in 
subsidising heritage conservation or according concessions such as direct grants, 
tax rebates and compensation (Ibid.). Heritage is discussed in Singapore more as an 
industry and even given the needs of national education, economic growth takes 
primacy, without taking heed of social or cultural impact (Ibid., p. 121).  
The most recent example is the controversy of government’s plans to construct an 8-
lane highway through the cultural landscape of Bukit Brown, a setting of tropical 
rainforest which has become the biggest Chinese cemetery in the world outside 
China over the century, the resting place of many pioneers in Singapore’s history. 
The government stood firm in going ahead with development plans despite token 
consultation with activist groups in 2012, with Minister for National Development Tan 
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Chuan-Jin reducing the heritage place as a matter of memories and arguing that the 
next generation can simply “create their own memories’ (Tan, 6th March 2012). The 
English national newspaper Straits Times labelled the concerned heritage lovers and 
nature lovers, who were calling for a moratorium in the highway project, as 
‘naysayers’, and published forum letters dismissing conservationists as peripheral 
interest groups while insisting ‘national goals’ have to take precedence (SG Hard 
Truth, 22nd March 2013), in a typical manner of manufacturing consent through the 
state-monitored media in Singapore. But what seems overlooked, in such ‘national 
goals’ of racing to build infrastructure for an envisaged 6.9 million population in 2013, 
is the issue of spatial justice as well as the need for social cohesion achieved 
through a “shared sense of home” (Geh, 2013, p. 14). The strong public reaction 
against the loss of Bukit Brown as heritage is arguably an indicator of “this growing 
need for visible and palpable proofs of our shared past. A rapidly changing 
landscape may be a developer’s dream and entertain tourists but stressful nightmare 
for those who choose to make Singapore home. (Ibid., p. 17)” 
Even if social stability may render an impression of social cohesion with few cases of 
inter-ethnic violence, there remains an undercurrent of racial tension among various 
groups, whereby the Indian and Hindu population seems to experience high racial 
discrimination despite economic integration. In The Ties That Bind and Blind (Chin 
and Vasu, 2007) a Nanyang Technological University report based on surveys 
conducted between 2006 and 2007 on attitudes of racial or religious groups towards 
others, it is found that Chinese are least accepting towards being in a place full of 
Indians, with 75% approval compared to 79% for Malays and 86% for 'Others', and 
also least receptive towards the prospect of Singapore's majority population being 
Indian, at 56% compared to 58% for Malays and 66% for 'Others'. In terms of the 
attitude of Christians towards non-Christians, the report notes a 76% approval of 
being in a place full of Hindus compared to 99% for Buddhists or Taoists and 82% 
for Muslims, and only 58% are receptive towards Hindus becoming a majority 
population, compared to 97% for Buddhists or Taoists and 61% for Muslims.   
Racial discrimination against the Indians on the part of the dominant Chinese 
population in Singapore is tied to physical attributes as well as cultural prejudice. 
One form of discrimination encountered by Indians in Singapore is when they 
attempt to rent an apartment from a Chinese household. They are often turned away 
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on some pretext, with some Chinese landlords complaining that the cooking of curry 
is too smelly, or that Indians place ‘weird-looking idols for prayer’ which would not be 
good for their fengshui (Aiyer, 2006, p. 123). It has also been observed that Chinese 
passengers in buses and trains may move away and find another seat to avoid 
Indian passenger sitting next to them, and Chinese taxi drivers may be hesitant in 
accepting Indian passengers who are flagging (Ibid., p. 122). The common 
stereotypical perception of Indians is that they are ‘smelly and dirty’ (Ibid.). 
Additionally, there are stereotypes of Indians being “cliquish, conservative, cunning 
and verbose” (Ackermann, 1997, p. 72). The Malays on the other hand have been 
stereotyped variously as being “oversensitive, extreme in religion, warm, friendly, 
gentle” (Ibid.), conservative, ‘traditional’ and essentially a rural, village-dwelling 
people, relatively laid back compared to the Chinese (Ibid.). The Chinese emerge 
looking the best in such stereotyping, being regarded generally as “modern and 
hardworking” (Ibid., p. 71). 
Such stereotyping and prejudices in daily life aside, there is also ‘scientific racism’ in 
Singapore which has been disturbingly expressed by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s 
prime minister for three decades, who has remained in the Cabinet even two 
decades after stepping down, under the job title of ‘Senior Minister’ and then 
‘Minister Mentor’. He has reportedly related in a question and answer session, after 
delivering a public speech on 27th December 1967, a story that goes like this:  
Three women were brought to the Singapore General Hospital, each in the 
same condition and needing a blood transfusion. The first, a Southeast Asian 
was given the transfusion but died a few hours later. The second, a South 
Asian was also given a transfusion but died a few days later. The third, an 
East Asian, was given a transfusion and survived. That is the X factor in 
development.  
(Barr, online, p. 1) 
 
This has been interpreted as a racial hierarchy of Asians based on strengths and 
weaknesses which are genetic and inherent, in which the Chinese and other East 
Asians are at the top, Malays and other Southeast Asians are at the bottom, and 
Indians and other South Asians are in between” (Ibid., p. 4) Lee has apparently also 
drawn arguments of racial hierarchy from an environmental determinism based on 
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Arnold Toynbee’s ‘Challenge and Response’ thesis, which he quoted in Cabinet 
meetings as early as 1959 (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Toynbee has argued in A Study of History 
that the Sinic or Chinese civilisation was nurtured in the north of China where climate 
was severe and hence became a ‘hard’ society, whereas societies nurtured in easy 
environments are inherently weak (Ibid., p. 8). In 1965, in an interview on Australian 
television, Lee cited differences in physical environment to discuss the difference 
between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia:  
 
One is the product of a civilisation which has gone through all its ups and 
downs, of floods and famine and pestilence, breeding a people with very 
intense culture, with a belief in high performance in sustained effort, in thrift 
and industry. And the other people more fortunately endowed by nature, with 
warm sunshine and bananas and coconuts, and therefore not with the same 
need to strive so hard. Now, these two societies really move at two different 
speeds.”  
(Ibid., pp. 8-9) 
 
In reality, the income of Malays in Singapore was noticeably lagging behind the 
Chinese in 1970s, but there could be different explanations. Tania Li found that by 
1983/4, “The widespread and deeply held belief among Malays in Singapore is that 
their problems and disadvantages have been imposed on them on a racial basis by 
the Chinese majority. Discrimination by Chinese against Malays is based on the 
Chinese opinion that Malays are culturally inferior and incapable of hard work. (see 
Brown, 1994, p. 87)”. Prejudice against the Malay may also be traced back to the 
attitude of colonial capitalism in the 19th and 20th century when conditions of labour in 
colonial enterprises were far from favourable, such that the Malays were better off in 
their villages and traditional occupations including rice plantation as opposed to 
rubber, tin and opium which garnered more revenue for the government, and hence 
“the Malays were not considered very productive in the colonial capitalist sense” 
(Alatas, 1977, p. 95). Citing Mannheim on the distorting influence of ideology, Alatas 
therefore argues that the study of the Malays has been “overwhelmingly dominated 
by ideological forces of the uncritical and superficial kind” (Ibid., p. 9) 
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Possible racial discrimination has also been observed within civil service and 
education in Singapore: “Instructively, data highlighting Chinese over-representation 
in the bureaucracy, GLCs, statutory boards, the SAF, and the over-representation of 
Chinese recipients for the most prestigious scholarships such as the President’s and 
SAF Scholarship, is not publicly discussed and is generally sidestepped by the 
Singapore media. In the purportedly meritocratic society, there has only been one 
non-Chinese President’s scholar between 1987 and 2005. Up to 2005, 98 per cent of 
recipients of the Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) have 
been Chinese. Moreover, there has never been a Malay SAFOS recipient. Similarly, 
up to 2005, 97 per cent of Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship (SAFMS) 
winners were Chinese. It was only in 2004 that a Malay received the SAFMS. 
(Rahim, 2009, p. 66)” 
Union leaders have also voiced concern in 2003 that Malay women were facing job 
discrimination based on the clothes they wear, only to be met with then Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s dismissive response that the problem was more about lack 
of education and that any discrimination would just be ‘a reality of living in a 
multicultural society’ (Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 104). 
As a cultural practice, the issue of the tudung or Muslim headscarf has in fact 
become a sore point in Singapore. In 2002, four first-grade Malay Muslim girls in a 
primary school wore the headscarf every day against the school rules. After the 
school authorities tried in vain to stop them from doing so, the government asserted 
that they would no longer be permitted to attend the school if they did not comply 
within specified time limit. Eventually, one girl voluntarily left the school while the 
other three were compelled by the government to leave. There was some contention 
as there seemed to be inconsistencies: the government was meantime allowing Sikh 
schoolboys to wear the turban at school; all Muslim women teachers had been 
allowed to wear tudung in national schools; many schools have also not followed the 
government line, with some wearing it with acquiescence of school authorities (Law, 
2003, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 2003, pp. 54-55). 
This having occurred at a time of anti-terrorism, Muslim MPs in Singapore were even 
compelled to explain to the PAP government the difference between Muslim piety 
and Islamic fundamentalist extremism (Ibid., p. 64). The episode puts into question 
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the government’s claim that its multiracial policies allow each ethnic group to live 
according to its own culture, with equal opportunity for all (Ibid., p. 67).  
It appears that discrimination based on race, culture or religion has not been dealt 
with satisfactorily by the authorities in Singapore. In The Ties That Bind and Blind 
report, it is suggested in the conclusion that 'tolerating the different' would be the 
“realistic and viable option to sustaining cohesion in a culturally diverse society", 
rather than expecting society to commit to "substantial common values in the place 
of tolerance (Chin and Vasu, 2007, p. 35).” The idea of tolerance may well be the 
most prevalent interpretation of 'racial harmony' advocated by the government 
ministries and agencies, rather than mutual understanding. Interestingly, in a survey 
to find out religious attitudes among some 2,800 Singaporean secondary school 
students, results showed that while three-quarter of them stressed the importance of 
tolerating people of other religions, the general definition of ‘tolerance’ is simply “not 
talking about it” (Chew, 2008; cited in Lee, T., 2009, TOC, online).  
If nothing else, Singapore has no short of legal instruments to rely on in guarding 
against discord among its multi-ethnic population. It has a Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act, in effect since 1992, which allows the government to restrain any 
person of authority in any religious group or institution for "causing feelings of enmity, 
hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups", or for carrying out 
activities to promote a political cause under the guise of propagating any religious 
belief, and so on. This is on top of a Sedition Act, last revised in 1985, which covers 
tendencies such as exciting disaffection against the government as well as 
promoting "feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the 
population of Singapore"; it was first used in 2005 when three men were charged 
under this act for making seditious and inflammatory racist comments on the internet. 
In February 2010, three Chinese youths aged between 17 and 18 were held by the 
police for allegedly posting racist remarks on Facebook against Indians; while 
eventually released, they could have faced fines of up to S$5,000 and three years' 
jail under the Sedition Act.  
These two acts are in addition to the Internal Security Act, inherited from the British 
colonial administrators, and used between the 60s and 80s mainly to target leftists. 
The same act became used in the 2000s to arrest more than 30 alleged members of 
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an Islamic militant group were arrested for suspicion of terrorism. In February 2010, 
a pastor of an evangelist church was called up by the Internal Security Department 
and given a warning after video clips posted on Youtube in which he was seen 
interviewing a former Buddhist monk and nun about their conversion, whereby he 
appeared to make disparaging comments on tenets of Buddhist teachings such as 
nirvana, meditation and reincarnation.   
Apart from challenging the justification for such legal measures on account of 
national security, one may also argue that there can be other ways of maintaining 
ethnic and religious harmony, of promoting intercultural dialogues, beyond tolerance 
in the form of avoiding discussion of differences. Mr Githu Muigai, UN's Special 
Rapporteur on racism and discrimination, said after a visit to Singapore in April 2010: 
“time is ripe for the authorities to review any legislative restrictions that may exist”, 
“to allow Singaporeans to share their views on matters of ethnicity” and “work 
together to find solutions” (Muigai, 28th  April 2010, online). 
For a while, the Singapore government appeared to be relaxing on sanctioning of 
racist comments online. When three bloggers in Singapore were found posting 
content that could be deemed as inciting racial and religious conflict in November 
2011, targeting especially at the Malay-Muslim community, the authorities chose not 
to prosecute. Instead, Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs Dr Yaacob Ibrahim 
commended on the community for responding in a way that was ‘calm and rational’, 
and asserted the need for a code of conduct for people to moderate their views 
online (Saas, 27th November 2011, in CNA, online). But dealing with racist remarks 
in Singapore appears to be an ongoing challenge in Singapore. In December 2011, 
MP Seng Han Thong had to make an apology after making racialised comments that 
attributed failure in communication with commuters during underground breakdown 
to ethnicity of train staff: “I noticed that the PR mentioned that some of the staff, 
because they are Malays, they are Indians, they can't converse in English good, well 
enough” (Syuhaida and Chan, 22nd December 2011, in CNA, online).  
In March 2012, a 19-year-old polytechnic student posted on Facebook a racist 
comment that Indians should be relegated to separated cabins in the train, upon 
which MP Indranee Rajah called for Singaporeans to “celebrate not only our 
commonalities, but our differences as well” (Fong, 28th March 2012, in Yahoo 
Singapore News, online). But any hope that the government would choose dialogue 
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and education over censorship in dealing with the social media was dashed as the 
new MDA licensing regulation on websites in effect from 1st June 2013 marked 
another regression.  
This subsection will complete its analysis on the conservative and authoritarian rule 
in Singapore by measuring its multicultural approach against some of the standards 
of Western liberal multiculturalism discussed by Kymlicka (2002): 
1.  “One difference between liberal and illiberal forms of nation-building is in the 
degree of coercion used to promote a common national identity. (p. 54)” 
Singapore does not claim to have a single national identity, but under its 
multiracial policy, it has used coercion to ban the use of Chinese dialects in 
the media in order to create a uniform Chinese identity as the dominant 
ethnicity. It has also notably banned the wearing of headscarves among 
Muslim schoolgirls in public schools in 2002; but there is no issue with the 
ninth Speaker of the Singapore Parliament, Halimah Jacob, elected in 
January 2013, wearing the tudung.  
 
2. That “liberal states have a more restricted conception of the relevant ‘public 
space’ within which the dominant national identity should be expressed, and a 
more expansive conception of the ‘private’ sphere where differences are 
tolerated” (pp. 54-55). Singapore apparently takes a pragmatic approach, for 
despite the public ban of Chinese dialects in the media, the ruling party PAP’s 
candidate Desmond Choo spoke Teochew at a by-election rally in May 2012 
for the Hougang constituency, where the incumbent opposition MP Low Thia 
Khiang of the Workers’ Party (WP) is known to be popular among the 
Teochew voters there before he contested in a different constituency. (Choo 
lost in any case.)   
 
3.  “Third, liberal states are unlikely to prohibit forms of speech or political 
mobilisation that challenge the privileging of a national identity (p. 55)” Soon 
after civil society activist Nizam Ismail, who represented a minority identity as 
a director of the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), participated in a 
Hong Lim Park protest against the government’s Population White Paper and 
spoke at a forum held by the opposition, he was removed from his 
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appointment in April 2013. State-owned national newspaper Straits Times 
subsequently printed a two-page report entitled ‘When Activists Cross a Line’ 
(4th May 2013) indicating an issue of ‘political agenda’ (Loh, 5th May 2013). 
The New Paper, a tabloid belonging to the same Singapore Press Holdings, 
did an interview with him and then published an article citing that he was 
‘pushing for racial politics’ (TNP, 2nd May 2013). From the same newspaper 
group, the Malay newspaper Berita Harian (28th April 2013) published a report 
alleging that Nizam not only had financial problems but also had ‘intimate 
relationships with several women’. In short, Singapore may not always 
prohibit any speech challenging its national agenda outright, but the media 
may appear to be assisting in a form of smear tactics against minority 
representation associated with an opposition view.   
 
4. “Fourth, liberal states typically have a more open definition of the national 
community. Membership in the nation is not restricted to those of a particular 
race, ethnicity, or religion (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 55).” Furthermore, as a result of 
this ‘inclusiveness’, “the terms of admission are relatively thin” (Ibid.). The 
Constitution of Singapore appears to be relatively flexible on the issue of 
citizenship by registration. Apart from issues relating to duration of residence, 
one just needs to be “of good character” (Part X, Section 123 – 1a) and to 
have “an elementary knowledge of one of the following languages, namely, 
Malay, English, Mandarin and Tamil” (Section 123 – 1e). In practice, on the 
other hand, Singapore has kept reiterating the need to maintain its ethnic ratio, 
whereby the Chinese population remains dominant. Despite causing a furore 
with a 2011 book Hard Truths To Keep Singapore Going where he described 
the Muslim population as posing a problem in integration for being ‘distinct 
and separate’, Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly 
cautioned against declining fertility rate among Chinese, which stands at 1.08 
in 2011, compared to 1.09 for Indians and 1.64 for Malays. He highlights that 
“the size of each successive generation of Chinese Singaporeans will halve in 
the next 18 to 20 years” (Lee, 7th May 2012), a point which is easily 
interpreted as hinting the need for a strong Chinese ratio in National Service.  
248 
 
On 19th April 2013, little more than a month before the new MDA online regulations 
were announced, an online cartoonist named Leslie Chew, known for his Demon-
cratic Singapore series published on Facebook, was arrested for alleged sedition, his 
handphone, computer and hard disk confiscated by the police. While he was 
investigated for a cartoon that appeared to be critical of government policies towards 
the Malays, the fact that he was investigated under the Sedition Act instead of 
Section 298A of the Penal Code (“promoting enmity between different groups on 
grounds of religion or race”) is significant, as media analyst Cherian George (whose 
loss of tenure as lecturer at Nanyang Technological University meantime led to an 
online protest by students and faculty members) observed (Choo, 26th April 2013).  
As Bao and Kymlicka (2005) have noted, political discourse in Asian countries tends 
to reject ‘Western’ models of liberal-democratic multiculturalism for being grounded 
in ideas of individualism and competition, while claiming Asian societies are 
grounded in ‘communitarianism’, in ideas of harmony, deference and paternalism (p. 
6) Such talk has been discredited for the way it has been manipulated by leaders like 
Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew “to justify their 
authoritarian rule and suppression of political dissent” (Ibid.) There is a need to 
distinguish between such state-defined ‘communitarianism’ with what Chua Beng 
Huat terms as ‘vernacular communitarianism’, the latter referring to obligations 
towards one’s own local ethnic, religious or linguistic community, whereby there may 
indeed be less emphasis on individual choice and the freedom to exit – yet it is a 
difference not to be exaggerated (Ibid., pp. 6-7). It is also important to trace the shifts 
in Singapore’s political discourse on national identity back to its early days of 
independence. While Lee Kuan Yew in 1971 was espousing the adoption of English 
language as “a key to advanced technology to the West” (cited in Velayutham, 2007, 
p. 56), a trend of ‘excessive job-hopping’ among workers by the end of the decade 
had prompted the political elite to warn against a ‘creeping individualism’ invading 
the society’s moral foundations, eventually leading them to ‘Asianise’ Singapore 
through introduction of religious studies and Confucian ethics in school between 
1979 and 1990 (Ibid., p. 57).  In a response to globalisation in the 1990s, a new 
discourse on the magic of ‘New Asia’ sprang up, allowing Singapore to appropriate 
modernity - in terms of economic progress, technology, education and high 
standards of living - as an Asian achievement, while constructing dichotomies 
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between the West and the East in attributes like consumerism/modesty, 
anarchy/order, individualism/community, contention/consent (p. 74). Such discourse 
of ‘Asian values’ serve as a creative way to bundle together the political objectives of 
power, economy and national identity: “A successful Singaporean economy relied on 
the twin imperatives of embracing a globalised modernity while developing a 
population with significant commitment to Singapore as a nation and consent to the 
powers which drive it. (p. 76)”   
Given such a political atmosphere that eschews ‘contention’ for ‘consent’, one can 
only assume that there is no room for ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the context of 
Singapore to be imagined as a form of open exchange of views, as a form of 
deliberative democracy, to resolve issues of social inequality or intercultural 
misunderstanding. ‘Intercultural dialogue’ in Singapore in that case can only refer to 
a form of activities staging a veneer of ‘racial harmony’ in the hope that people will 
come to believe in it. To that end the Singapore government has officially recognised 
the role of heritage appreciation in strengthening a “sense of national identity and 
belonging”, as stated in its 2000 Renaissance City Report (Ministry of Information 
and the Arts, 2000, p. 4). Festivals like the Singapore HeritageFest are now seen 
also as an “endeavour to bring people together” (Lui, 11th August 2010), in the words 
of Acting Information, Communications and Arts Minister Lui Tuck Yew, who 
remarked said of Singapore‘s multicultural society that “in today’s modern 
environment, we have lost some of the intimacy of these interactions and the mutual 
understanding that comes with it” (Ibid.).  
Similar sentiments seem to be expressed by former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, 
best known as author of the book entitled Can Asians Think? (2001), criticising 
Western nations on their ideals of human rights and individual freedom. Comparing 
Singapore with America which builds its national identity on values of freedom and 
democracy pride of its achievements, Mahbubani, who is currently dean of the Lee 
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, describes Singapore an “accidental nation” (10th 
June 2013) for which it is “difficult … to create a sense of a national identity” (Ibid.).    
Reminiscing on Singapore’s ethnic harmony in close-knit neighbourhoods of the 
1960s, he asks if Singapore today can rely on an ethnic harmony presumed to come 
from natural evolution, or whether such harmony has in fact been an artificial 
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development requiring “harsh and unforgiving laws which allow no expression of 
ethnic prejudice” (Ibid.).  
In all such discourse, ethnicity and culture are put forward as fundamental fault lines 
in society, whereby the Hobbesian option of conflict prevention through authoritarian 
rule instead of open dialogue seems inevitable with modernisation. Under such 
assumptions, the only question that should remain in ‘intercultural dialogue’ would 
pertain to how exactly heritage may help to promote feelings of mutual respect and 
understanding between different communities in the ‘cultural’ sphere, putting aside 
any social disparity that might equally be an issue. In Chapter 6, the concept of 
intercultural dialogue in transcultural as well as multicultural models as discussed in 
this chapter will be applied to the case of Singapore, using the intangible heritage of 
Indian classical dance as the example of a medium. Meantime in the following 
chapter, one shall first explore the concept of heritage generally and then more 
specifically that of dance as cultural heritage. 
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5. HERITAGE AND DANCE 
 
This chapter will provide first of all an overview of the meanings of ‘heritage’ as an 
epistemological concept and as a practice. The former relates to heritage as material 
objects and as cultural values, whereas the latter involves institutionalised practice 
which has developed from social life at community level and an instrument at 
national level to an issue of global governance at international level. Considering the 
current global consciousness on heritage, as seen in international frameworks for 
tangible as well as intangible heritage, the use of heritage for intercultural dialogue, 
as expressed in the relevant conventions, is one aspect that awaits further 
exploration. Intercultural dialogue as such will be analysed as a process applicable 
under assumptions for a transcultural model of society as with a multicultural model, 
whereby the challenge in each case may be seen in an attempt to overcome 
differences in cultural identities as well as in the interpretation of local and universal 
values of heritage.   
The second half of the chapter will analyse the implications of dance being 
interpreted and practised as a form of heritage. It will begin with an introduction on 
dance as theorised in various perspectives of anthropology through development of 
the discipline over the last century, from psychological and functionalist explanations 
to a structuralist perspective that sees dance as a symbolic or ritualistic action which 
may evoke social cohesion or more complex forms of social relations, as well as a 
communication theory of dance which considers how it transmits or conveys cultural 
meanings, providing one model to analyse intercultural dialogue involving dance as a 
medium. Finally, dance will be considered in terms of its institutionalised role as a 
form of heritage at community and national levels, not to mention how dance as 
heritage may be dealt with presently on an international level through global 
governance with instruments such as the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention. This 
will provide a basis for further exploration in the subsequent chapter with regards to 
the use of dance heritage for intercultural dialogue.  
 
 
 
 
252 
 
5.1 The Concept and Practice of Heritage 
5.1.1 What is Heritage?  
This section will discuss the concept of ‘heritage’ and trace how it has expanded 
through time in senses of the word as well as in categories of objects with associated 
heritage values, up to its globally adopted usage as a legal concept in international 
frameworks today, covering ‘cultural heritage’, ‘natural heritage’ and ‘intangible 
heritage’. The understanding of heritage in the prevailing discourse will be 
discussed, with a clarification on the difference between history as account of the 
past and heritage as embodiment of the past. One will also delve into questions 
relating to ontological premises of ‘cultural heritage’ between objects and a cultural 
system of values and meanings, and it will be argued that it is a form of 
objectification through not only material forms but also performances. ‘Heritage’ as a 
whole has to be understood as not only through epistemological approaches such as 
historiography, ethnography or archaeology in relation to material evidence but also 
in terms of a social construction of knowledge itself, whereby man creates the tools 
of cultural expressions but is in turn reproduced through such cultural expressions, in 
a dialectic relation.  
The word ‘heritage’ as it is commonly used today encompasses two key ideas which 
are much intertwined, namely “heritage as ideals and heritage as things” (Davison, 
2008, p. 32). Davison argues that this is evident in the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ 
as widely used as part of international frameworks such as that of UNESCO today, a 
concept which stems from “an anthropological understanding of ‘culture’ as 
embracing both values and the objects in which they were embodied” (Ibid.). These 
two ideas may hence tend to be conflated, such that not only is the value of a 
heritage object or place assumed to be objective and one with its materiality, the 
concept of heritage may even privilege the materiality so much that it “is used to 
legitimise, or make material, the intangibilities of culture and human experience” 
(Kuutma, 2009, p. 7). Cultural heritage may generally be understood as privileging 
“the situated, material, aesthetic and experiential aspects of culture” (Ibid., p. 6), in a 
conception which drew initially from Western or European architectural and 
archaeological conservation practices, before being extended now to cultural 
expressions like storytelling, craftsmanship and rituals under the term ‘intangible’ 
(Ibid.).  
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But there is one key aspect to the concept of heritage not to be neglected, namely 
the sense of history or of the past. It has been commented that heritage is “virtually 
anything by which some kind of link, however tenuous or false, may be forged with 
the past” (Johnson and Thomas, 1995, p. 170; cited in Harvey, 2007, p. 26). 
Lowenthal has contrasted heritage practice with history as an ‘account of the past’ 
(1996, p. 121). He wrote:  
Critics castigate heritage as a travesty of history. But heritage is not history, 
even when it mimics history. It uses historical traces and tells historical tales, 
but these tales and traces are stitched into fables that are open neither to 
critical analysis nor to comparative scrutiny… Heritage and history rely on 
antithetical modes of persuasion. History seeks to convince by truth and 
succumbs to falsehood.  Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents 
and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error… Neither history nor 
heritage is free to depart altogether from the well-attested past. But historians 
ignore at professional peril the whole palimpsest of past percepts that heritage 
casually bypasses. (Ibid.) 
While this antithesis between heritage and history has been criticised for making an 
assumption of historians being dedicated to ideals of objective truth and for ignoring 
the systematised evaluation of heritage in the professional practice (Davison, 2008, 
pp. 35-36; cf. Harvey, 2007, p. 30), it serves to underscore heritage practice, in its 
engagement with an imagination of the past, as being more complicated than a mere 
presentation of historical ‘truths’ through material evidence.  
While this may lead to questions of epistemology in approaching the phenomenon of 
‘heritage’ as objects or places located in the natural or social world, or otherwise in 
terms of social practices tied to interpretations of the past or the world at large, it 
would be useful first of all to trace the development of the concept of ‘heritage’ 
through time, especially with its relationship to ‘culture’. The original sense of the 
word ‘heritage’ referred first and foremost to the physical property or heirlooms 
handed down from parents to children, and by extension of analogy it would also 
refer to an intellectual or spiritual legacy (Davison, 2008, p. 31). It is basically a word 
expressing a relationship with the past, derived “from the vocabulary of traditional 
societies in which values were derived from ancestral relationships” (Ibid.). Such 
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inheritance, or legacies of mostly private realms, can be seen in the case of Europe 
significantly as the reserves of nobilities, but may also be observed in terms of 
religious lineages of the church; this eventually became extended to a more public 
domain, more specifically as national and secular heritage, under the political 
projects of the modern nation-state in 19th-century Europe (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 57).  
Heritage as we know it has hence become a ‘political’ idea which “asserts a public or 
national interest in things traditionally regarded as private” (Davison, 2008, p. 36), 
such that the public may reserve the right, for instance, to ensure the preservation of 
a building or place, even overriding the right of an owner with legal title to alter or 
demolish it (Ibid.). While there is difficulty in finding agreement on how the roots of 
‘heritage’ as a distinct practice should be traced, it may be argued that development 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries marked “a distinct qualitative shift in attitudes 
to the past” (Carman and Sorensen, 2009, p. 13), in contrast with valorisation of the 
past in earlier societies such as the Roman and Chinese Empires, as there was a 
shift whereby heritage increasingly became institutionalised as “a public concern and 
[…] an expression of the interests and responsibilities of civic societies” (Ibid.). One 
may however note the predominance of certain interests, values or approaches 
guiding heritage practices till today. As Harvey (2007) has argued, heritage as a 
process “is not given, it is made and so is unavoidably, an ethical enterprise” (p. 37). 
One new function in the use of heritage objects as part of a national project during 
the 19th century may be seen in the use of public institutions of high culture such as 
museums – with forerunners in the private Wunderkammer or cabinet of curiosities 
of the monarchs in privileging the sense of sight as source of knowledge – used for a 
new public cause of lifting the taste and hence moral and behaviour among the 
common people. Tony Bennett notes that high cultural practices in general originally 
“formed part of an apparatus of power whose conception and functioning were 
juridico-discursive”, a form of power which, as defined by Foucault, “deployed a 
range of legal and symbolic resources in order to exact obedience from the 
population” (Bennett, 1995, p. 22). Just as the art of festival along with ballet and 
theatre all formed parts of an elaborate performance by the late 17th century 
concerned first and foremost with the display of royal power” as Norbert Elias has 
demonstrated, by the early 19th century these practices became inscribed in ‘new 
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modalities’ for the exercise of what Foucault described as disciplinary or 
governmental power (Ibid., pp. 21-22). However, Bennett emphasises that this new 
governmental power is characterised by a multiplicity of objectives rather than a 
single principle like sovereignty, such that 19th-century reformers “typically sought to 
enlist high cultural practices for a diversity of ends: as an antidote to drunkenness; 
an alternative to riot, or an instrument for civilising the morals and manners of the 
population” (Ibid., p. 22). A second point he notes, following Foucault’s argument, is 
that governmental power works through detailed calculations and strategies rather 
than laws and edicts, and hence high culture “was increasingly thought of as a 
resource to be used in programmes which aimed at bringing about changes in 
acceptable norms as self-acting imperatives” (p. 23) The nature of museums as a 
kind of heritage practice followed such rationales of availing high culture to the 
people. “The museum had to be refashioned so that it might function as a space of 
emulation in which civilised forms of behaviour might be learnt” (p. 24), with natural 
and cultural artefacts arranged and displayed in a way to increase knowledge and 
enlightenment of the people, and it also had to be developed “as a space of 
observation and regulation in order that the visitor’s body might be taken hold of and 
be moulded in accordance with the requirements of new norms of public conduct” 
(Ibid.). Artefacts or heritage objects were thus institutionalised for acts of public 
viewing.  
Where built monuments are concerned, the concept of cultural heritage in the global 
framework today, as represented by the Venice Charter with its emphasis on 
materiality, may be traced back to the development of 19th-century nationalism and 
liberal education movement in Europe, as Smith (2006, pp. 17-18) argues. She notes 
how the use of monuments in commemorating and triggering particular public 
memories and values led to a dominant practice of restoration for historic buildings, 
only to be criticised by John Ruskin in his treatise The Seven Lamps of Architecture 
(1849), which in turn inspired a new conservation ethos of ‘conserve as found’ in 
heritage practice (Smith, 2006, p. 19). In the Venice Charter of 1964, the preamble 
appears to propagate a similar ethos in its humanist intention for conservation or 
restoration of monuments, considered “no less as works of art than as historical 
evidence” (ICOMOS, 1965, Article 3), with implicit purpose of a civilising education 
for future generations. At the same time, the wording of the preamble suggests an 
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imagination of an unquestionable relationship between the materiality of monuments 
and their intrinsic value: “Imbued with a message from the past, the historic 
monuments of generations of people remain to the present day as living witnesses of 
their age-old traditions. (Ibid., preamble)” It may be interpreted as reflecting and 
perpetuating the idea of inherent nature of value and significance in a monument, as 
it creates “a sense that memory is somehow locked within or embedded in the fabric 
of the monument or site” (Ibid., pp. 90-91).     
We may now turn to consider how cultural heritage is studied or assessed through 
epistemological approaches under the prevailing international framework, leaving out 
natural heritage which would involve natural sciences instead of social sciences. 
Through international agencies such as UNESCO, the concept of heritage has been 
extended significantly “from a familial or national setting to an international one” 
(Davison, 2008, p. 32), based not so much on a humanist as on an anthropological 
understanding of culture which “strengthened the moral claims of the would-be 
custodians of cultural property while side-stepping difficult distinctions between its 
‘high’ and ‘low’, popular and elite forms” (Ibid.). Cultural heritage has been thus 
defined in UNESCO’s Draft Medium Term Plan 1990-1995: 
 
The cultural heritage may be defined as the entire corpus of material signs 
- either artistic or symbolic - handed on by the past to each culture and, 
therefore, to the whole of humankind. As a constituent part of the 
affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities, as a legacy belonging to 
all humankind, the cultural heritage gives each particular place its 
recognizable features and is the storehouse of human experience. The 
preservation and the presentation of the cultural heritage are therefore a 
corner-stone of any cultural policy. 
(UNESCO, 1989, p. 57; cited in Jokilehto, 2005, pp. 4-5) 
 
The policy paper goes on to list the scope that may be covered under cultural 
heritage, including items of cultural property, monuments, buildings, architectural 
complexes, archaeological sites, rural heritage and the countryside, as well as urban, 
technical or industrial design, furniture, and also ‘non-physical’ or intangible cultural 
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heritage “which includes the signs and symbols passed on by oral transmission, 
artistic and literary forms of expression, languages, ways of life, myths, beliefs and 
rituals, value systems and traditional knowledge and know-how” (Ibid., p. 5; 
emphasis my own). 
In reference to this definition of cultural heritage in terms of a sum total of cultural 
expressions, Jokilehto of ICCROM has found it apt to refer back to the most ‘classic’ 
definition of culture in anthropology, that by Edward Burnett Tylor in Primitive Culture 
(1871), as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society” (see Ibid., p. 4). The mention of Tylor is significant, as he has been noted for 
his reaction against Arnold’s humanistic concept of culture, with an evolutionary 
perspective which led him into placing great emphasis on objects of material culture 
as manifestations of culture (Stocking, 1963, p. 9).  
While Jokilehto’s description of cultural heritage as ‘material signs’ seems an explicit 
reference to the studies of material culture, these have gone through much evolution 
since Tylor’s era. The primary concern with material culture under anthropological 
research until the 1920s followed the assumption that the ceremonies and belief 
systems of ‘primitive’ cultures could not be saved, whereas artefact studies provided 
basis for theories of social evolution, diffusion and acculturation (Tilley et al, 2006, p. 
2). Due to the replacement of evolutionism with functionalism in theoretical outlook, 
however, primary concern in anthropology shifted from artefacts to social life (Ibid.). 
Material culture entered the mainstream again following another theoretical shift in 
1960s to structuralist and symbolic anthropology (Ibid.). There have also been 
corresponding Marxist positions in material culture studies especially in the 1970s 
and 1980s, which continued to current concerns with globalisation, cultural hybridity, 
and cultural flows (Tilley, 2006a, p. 7). These may be summarised then in broad 
strokes under the two perspectives of culture as system of meanings and culture as 
social life, which in this thesis would be reconciled according to Archer’s (1996)  
dualistic approach, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
One key aspect to cultural heritage that is present from both a structuralist or 
semiotic perspective and a Marxist perspective is that of ‘value’. One may even go 
as far as arguing that it is value and meaning that “is the real subject of heritage 
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preservation and management processes” (Smith, 2006, p. 56). That is arguably too 
reductive, however, whereas this thesis prefers to argue that the significance of 
heritage lies in its symbolising of values and meanings in a cultural system through 
its material form or performance. As Tilley (2006b) argues, “[i]deas, values and 
social relations do not exist prior to culture forms which then become merely passive 
reflections of them, but are themselves actively created through the processes in 
which these forms themselves come into being” (p. 61). This dialectical relationship 
will be elucidated later on with the concept of ‘objectification’.  
The question of value in heritage has in any case been elevated to the level of a 
worldwide metaculture, through the spread of a globalised heritage practice. With the 
1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention combining both built and natural 
remnants of the past as ‘World Cultural and Natural Heritage’ (Davison, 2008, p. 32),  
and effectively “universalising Western concepts of heritage and the values inherent 
within” (Smith, 2006, p. 28), a new sense of global awareness was created for 
common interest and responsibility in preserving cultural and natural heritage “to 
whatever people it may belong” (UNESCO, 1972, p. 2) “as part of the world heritage 
of mankind as a whole” (Ibid.). This may be seen as part of a peace project in 
UNESCO’s larger mandate, under a philosophy of ‘unity in diversity’, whereby 
traditional boundaries no longer demarcate ownership (Di Giovine, 2009, p. 142), 
and instead a place may be valorised as having ‘universal value’ by the authority of 
an international body (Ibid., p. 209). In short, it is a process of global consciousness 
whereby heritage transcends particular ownership as a public concern. 
Not only has the relation with heritage objects and places grown from interests at 
private or local levels to national and global levels due to increasing interconnections 
in a globalised world through increasing travel and communication as well as 
exchange in goods and ideas, the scope of what qualify as heritage has also been 
expanding in the global consciousness due to the growth of knowledge in increasing 
differentiation of cultural and social meanings associated with heritage. Value, which 
may be understood simply as “a social association of qualities to things” (Jokilehto, 
2006, p. 2), is ascribed to ever more categories of heritage, with an expanding 
awareness of historical and scientific knowledge and a new-found importance given 
to monuments and sites representing ‘modern heritage’, ‘agricultural, industrial and 
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technological properties’ and ‘military properties’ among others, as evident in new 
typological frameworks promoted (ICOMOS, Feb 2004, p. 15). With the world 
witnessing an exponential inflation of heritage, it is well foreseeable that debates on 
priorities among different forms of heritage would be inescapable.   
The very way in which heritage places and their values are categorised already 
reflects some judgment on what is more relevant to society as a whole. For instance, 
the cultural significance of sites, landscapes or buildings is defined in the Burra 
Charter (1999) as “aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, 
present or future generations” (Australia ICOMOS, 2000, p. 2); in the World Heritage 
Convention (1972), monuments and groups of buildings are considered as ‘cultural 
heritage’ for their “outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or 
science” (UNESCO, 1972, p. 2), sites for the same value “from the historical, 
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view” (Ibid.), and ‘natural heritage’ 
“from the aesthetic or scientific point of view” (Ibid.). Whether one includes or omits 
social or spiritual values, and whether one highlights ‘natural heritage’ as set apart 
from cultural heritage, already reflects certain assumptions on what is most relevant 
for conservation, what constitute the key aspects of ‘culture’ and how it should be 
studied. There appears a tendency to subsume cultural value under the social, once 
again reflecting the anthropological perspective of culture as social life, whereas 
spiritual value suggests a reaction to the predominance of modern rationality. Among 
all, aesthetic value would be closest to a concept of culture in a humanist view. 
Despite how knowledge on heritage may take on an air of objectivity through 
procedures of study under disciplines such as history and anthropology, in practice it 
is ultimately “a social construction, imagined, defined and articulated within cultural 
and economic practice” (Graham, 2002, p. 1003), as “that part of the past which we 
select in the present for contemporary purposes” (Ibid., p. 1006); the word ‘cultural’ 
to be understood here as a shorthand for the inextricable political and social factors. 
As Tunbridge and Ashworth (2007) have pointed out their coinage of ‘dissonant 
heritage’, heritage may be used not only as cultural resource for its intrinsic value, 
but also as political resource to legitimise state ideologies or as economic resource 
as an industry on its own or to earn locational preferences for other economic 
activities (p. 206). 
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Bendix (2009) has similarly remarked: “Cultural heritage does not exist, it is made. 
From the warp and weft of habitual practices and everyday experience – the 
changeable fabric of action and meaning that anthropologists call ‘culture’ – actors 
choose privileged excerpts and imbue them with status and value. (p. 255)” In fact, 
the elevation of the social significance of cultural heritage to a global stage often 
creates a paradox. A heritage would be “considered to have high social value and to 
be endowed with the capacity to foster positive identification within groups or entire 
polities” (Bendix, 2009, p. 258). Whereas in reality, it also involves economic value, 
not to mention political interest, yet the significance of cultural heritage is presented 
as “emanating from one particular cultural context” (Ibid.).  
In short, one may argue from a socio-cultural perspective that it is a gross 
oversimplification to imagine cultural heritage in a purely semiotic perspective as an 
unproblematic phenomenon representing some essence of culture. Cultural heritage 
may arguably be better understood as undergoing constant dynamic processes of 
change through three potential “loci of agency” (Ibid., p. 260), namely society, politics 
and economy. Bendix would argue that one challenging task for cultural 
anthropologists today is to be take a more reflexive approach particularly on the 
subject of ‘intangible heritage’, as formalised in the 2003 convention, to help 
document “the processes that foster as well as hinder heritagisation” (Ibid., p. 254), 
and overcome arguments from their own disciplinary history that would otherwise be 
simply “taken up as tools to legitimise the need for one or another practice to be 
reclassified as intangible heritage” (Ibid.). Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (2006) would argue 
that intangible heritage as such is “a mode of cultural production that gives the 
endangered or outmoded a second life as an exhibition of itself” (p. 313), whereby 
any listing of ‘world heritage’ tangible or intangible serves to “convert selected 
aspects of localised descent heritage into a translocal consent heritage” (Ibid., p. 
314), such that these elements are no longer transmitted through traditional means 
that are oral or by gestures, but are instead subject to interventions and put into a 
new context in relationship with other ICH elements (Ibid.), a new context which 
hence may be described as ‘metacultural’ (Ibid., p. 319). 
One may also consider the critique by Denis Byrne (2008) on the practice of cultural 
heritage as a form of reification based on the notion that “culture is a thing, an object 
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that can be acted upon from the outside, an entity that is available to conservation” 
(p. 159, italics in original). He comes from a perspective of seeing culture as no more 
than a pattern of thoughts and actions (Ibid.) and heritage as “a field of social action” 
(Ibid, p. 167). The notion of reification here may be traced back to Georg Lukacs who 
attacked the view of “culture as a thing rather than a set of ideas, actions, and beliefs 
residing in people’s minds” (Ibid., p. 159) 
The concept of objectification, which may be traced back to Hegel and Marx, has 
been defined as the “concrete embodiment of an idea [which] becomes realised in 
the form of a material thing” (Tilley, 2006b, p. 60). It has been cited to provide an 
understanding of the relationship between subjects and objects as the central 
concern of material culture studies (Ibid., p. 61). It explains how the “material object 
may be a powerful metaphorical medium through which people may reflect on their 
world” (Ibid., p. 62). But as art, material forms and performances are more than just a 
kind of representation. An example to illustrate this would be Yolngu aboriginal 
paintings in north-east Australia, which are not to be considered as mere 
representations of the ancestral past, but to be seen as having intrinsic value while 
serving to connect ‘the particular with the general’, ‘the individual with the collective’ 
and ‘the outside to the inside’ (Morphy, 1991; cited in Tilley, 2006b, p. 67). In other 
words, one may understand the symbolic meanings of such art within its cultural 
system and “far from being a passive reflection of ideas or social relations” (Tilley, 
2006b, p. 67).  
In the second instance, one may further consider the function of such artistic 
expressions as part of a socio-cultural system, as heritage that is instituted and in 
turn facilitates socialisation within a cultural community – not just how man creates 
cultural expressions but how cultural expressions make man. This may be 
understood in terms of how Berger and Luckmann (1967) have characterised the 
dialectical relationship “between man, the producer, and the social world, his 
product” (1967, p. 61). They state in summary: “Society is a human product. Society 
is an objective reality. Man is a social product. (Ibid., italics in original)” This outline 
helps to explain how heritage as a human product gains objectivity through the 
process of institutionalisation and how man in turn becomes a social product through 
the process of socialisation.  
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The three ‘moments’ or processes identified in the dialectical process are namely 
externalisation, objectivation and internalisation (Ibid.), whereby objectivation, a word 
derived from the Hegelian and Marxian coinage Versachlichung (Ibid., p. 197), refers 
to a “process by  which the externalised products of human activity attain the 
character of objectivity” (Ibid., p. 61). This results from habitualisation and 
institutionalisation, which in the perspective of Berger and Luckmann, are significant 
as the human organism otherwise lacks the necessary biological means to provide 
stability in human behaviour that it finds in its socio-cultural formation (Ibid., p. 50-
51). Citing Gehlen’s concept of Triebüberschuss and Entlastung, they say: 
“Habitualisation provides the direction and the specialisation of activity that is lacking 
in man’s biological equipment, thus relieving the accumulation of tensions that 
resulted from undirected drives. (Ibid., p. 53)” They see institutionalisation as 
occurring “whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types 
of actors” (Ibid, p. 54), a concept of institution that is admittedly broader than 
prevailing thoughts in contemporary sociology relating to social control (Ibid., p. 197). 
They argue that institutions by their very fact of existence tend to control human 
conduct by establishing predefined patterns (Ibid., p. 55) and that there is a 
functional gain as interaction between people becomes predictable (Ibid., p. 57).  
Another quality of institution according to Berger and Luckmann is historicity, through 
which social formations also acquire a quality of objectivity (Ibid., p. 58) and hence 
can be transmitted to a new generation (Ibid., p. 59). However, they do not claim that 
integration within a socio-cultural system naturally follows, for they argue that 
functional integration cannot be assumed a priori as different sets of 
institutionalisation processes may take place concurrently for the same individuals 
without hanging together functionally as a consistent system (Ibid., p. 63). – an 
interesting aspect which one might already appreciate with the discussion of 
transculturality or individual as the postmodern self in the previous chapter.  
But in addition to institutionalisation through habitualisation, they also highlight the 
process of ‘legitimation’ in society, which may be described as a “ ‘second-order’ 
objectivation of meaning” (Ibid., p. 92), as this produces new meanings that serve to 
integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes (Ibid.). 
Legitimation is a process of explaining and justifying. It ‘explains’ the institutional 
263 
 
order “by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings” (Ibid., p. 93), and 
also justifies the institutional order “by giving a normative dignity to its practical 
imperatives” (Ibid.). Legitimation is a process whereby ‘knowledge’ is produced 
which precedes ‘values’ of institutions (Ibid., p. 94).  
How such values of institutions may be internalised by individuals as members of 
society, comes in the next moment as a matter of socialisation. Internalisation, 
according to Berger and Luckmann, is “the basis, first, for an understanding of one’s 
fellowmen and, second, for the apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social 
reality (Ibid., p. 130). In primary socialisation, the ‘significant others’ of an individual 
are imposed upon him, as each individual is born into an objective social structure 
within which he encounters the significant others of his socialisation (Ibid., p. 131). At 
this stage, “there is no problem of identification” (Ibid., p. 134). But in the next stage, 
there is secondary socialisation, as “the internalisation of institutional or institution-
based ‘sub-worlds’ ” (Ibid., p. 138), or “the acquisition of role-specific knowledge” 
(Ibid.), this being required due to the division of labour in society.  
The above discussion on institutionalisation would serve as an explanation of culture 
in terms of social life. The role of symbols in the transmission of culture, as 
mentioned earlier, would however be more lucidly and extensively discussed not so 
much in terms of institutionalisation as through the perspective of a phenomenology-
influenced sociological study. This includes rituals, which may be summarised as the 
communicative action forms of symbols (Luckmann, 2007, p. 124). As Hobsbawn 
(1983) has also argued, in his discussion on how ‘invented traditions’ serve to 
establish social cohesion, legitimise authority or inculcate beliefs and behaviour (p. 
9), there is a difference between tradition as such and “convention or routine, which 
has no significant ritual or symbolic function” (Ibid., p. 3)   
A concept of ritual would arguably be a key to understanding much of what is 
currently termed intangible heritage, which may be understood in the sense of 
“enactment […] through the acts of people” in the words of Arizpe (cited in Aikawa-
Faure, 2009, p. 24). The foremost category by that token would be performing arts - 
including dance, which provides the example to be studied in this thesis.  
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The dialectic relation between cultural expressions as products of man, and man’s 
social life as shaped by the heritage of his cultural expressions, would easily lead to 
a debate in relation to ‘intangible heritage’, on the question of whether one should 
focus on such expressions as creative products, or as processes as part of social 
life. Such debate can be seen prior to the adoption of the 2003 Intangible Heritage 
Convention, when UNESCO organised the international roundtable entitled 
‘Intangible Cultural Heritage – working definitions’ at Turin in March 2001. Two 
anthropologists took different positions as they assessed results of a worldwide 
survey, undertaken by UNESCO, of definitions used by members states, IGOs, 
NGOs and other institutions, for the term ‘intangible cultural heritage’ or equivalent, 
including ‘folklore’, ‘traditional culture’, ‘oral heritage’, ‘traditional knowledge’ and 
‘indigenous heritage’, as provided by 36 entities (Ibid., p. 23).  
Manuela da Cunha, anthropology professor from University of Chicago, proposed a 
wide-ranging scope in the definition of intangible heritage to shift the focus from 
products to the process of production, covering folklore and crafts, biodiversity as 
well as Indigenous knowledge, whereby the protection of cultural heritage would 
necessarily entail the protection of the social and environmental context (Ibid., pp. 
23-24). She recommended that a primary objective of the new instrument should be 
to maintain ‘living processes’ rather than exclusively ‘historical processes’ and 
concluded that UNESCO should take a more ‘holistic view of protection’ in relation to 
economic issues, privileging cultural producers (Ibid.). She also raised the issue of 
identity in relation to intangible heritage, noting a duality between definitions of 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ assertions of cultural identity, as well as a shift of notion in 
many countries from denial of legitimacy of local identity as inimical to national 
identity, to an acknowledgement of plural ethnicities and identities (Ibid., p. 23).  
On the other hand, Lourdes Arizpe, professor and researcher at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico and former Assistant Director General for Culture 
at UNESCO, favoured a more limited scope of domains to be considered as 
intangible heritage, suggesting that UNESCO should identify within its new 
international instrument what have not yet been dealt with other organisations. To 
her, UNESCO as an IGO needs to find a balance between member states’ political 
consensus and scientific rigour. She considered ICH as a process of creation 
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comprising skills and past practices among other factors, emphasising that 
“enactment is an essential and defining aspect of ICH in a sense that this heritage 
exists and is sustained through the acts of people” (Ibid., p. 24). She gave a list of 
justifications for establishing the new instrument, including to “conserve human 
creations that may disappear forever, taking into consideration the importance of 
valuing human creations and enhancing the diversity of human creation” (Ibid.); “to 
“strengthen identity in compliance with UNESCO’s mandate to promote peace” 
(Ibid.); to “provide historical continuity” (Ibid.) for the psychological need of people to 
feel belonging to some tradition; and to “foster enjoyment” (Ibid.).  
Arizpe grouped principal elements of ICH under themes of life, social, biodiversity, 
land, symbolic, spiritual, literary, performing arts and festive; by eliminating elements 
already dealt with by other IGOs, she then identified domains that UNESCO should 
focus on, namely: “i) the area between nature and culture; ii) areas concerning 
Indigenous people’s culture; iii) social cooperation and social cohesion; iv) oral 
tradition; and v) local arts and crafts” (Ibid., p. 25).   
The presentation of the two views led to animated debate among experts, who were 
divided between anthropological concerns of local practitioner communities and 
political concerns of states’ roles, between those considering ICH as product and 
those considering it as process, with the issue of cultural rights of Indigenous 
peoples and economic aspects of ICH protection causing controversial discussions 
(Ibid.). In the consensus that emerged, one conclusion was that the term ‘community’ 
should be the keyword for the new instrument (Ibid., p. 26).  
In January 2002, an expert meeting which convened in Rio de Janeiro then 
reaffirmed earlier UNESCO views that it should focus on the cultural dimension of 
ICH and not duplicate activities of other organisations, particularly in economic rights 
for which agencies like WIPO and WTO already have specific expertise (Ibid., p. 34). 
They also stressed that a flexible concept of ‘safeguarding’ should be adopted, 
respecting the diversity of ICH as well as the internal dynamics of each cultural 
expression, and they considered linking the preservation of ICH with cultural diversity 
as a source of creative inspiration and sustainable development, developing the 
convention within the framework of the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration of 
Cultural Diversity (Ibid., p. 35). Such consideration of the dynamic processes in the 
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creation and development of material and immaterial cultural expressions, would 
incidentally be important to an understanding of cultural diversity that considers 
cultures as open rather than closed systems (see Albert, 2010, p. 19; Albert, 2011, p. 
6). 
The principles championed throughout these meetings and subsequent 
intergovernmental expert meetings, as recalled by Aikawa-Faure (2009), former 
Director of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Unit of UNESCO, were that ICH should 
refer to a process and not to a product, that it is not static but constantly developing, 
that its safeguarding should take a practitioner- or community-centred approach in 
order to ensure viability, and that respect for human rights, cultural identity, diversity, 
creativity and mutual appreciation were integral to the safeguarding process – 
principles that “are fully embodied in different parts of the Convention” as one sees in 
the Preamble, Article 1 (Purposes), Article 2 (Definitions) and Article 15 (Participation 
of communities, groups and individuals) (Ibid., p. 36).  
The idea that intangible heritage is both a re-enacted and a creative process, 
providing a sense of historical continuity and cultural identity, and encompassing 
both the processes as well as products, as discussed in the Turin meeting, is thus 
formalised in the definition under Article 2 (Definitions) of the Convention:  
The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts 
and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in 
some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This 
intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is 
constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them 
with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity. 
(UNESCO, 2003, p. 2, online) 
 
There is a difficulty here posed by the idea of ‘continuity’, however, for as 
Hobsbawn (1983) has argued, the break in continuity is something that cannot be 
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overlooked even in traditional realms of genuine antiquity (p. 7). He noted that 
“new traditions can thus use old materials” (Ibid.), and “plenty of political 
institutions, ideological movements and groups – not least in nationalism – were 
so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented” (Ibid.). Skounti 
(2009) similar argues with regard to intangible heritage that a ‘recycling’ of cultural 
facts, under a conviction on the part of individuals and institutions that they are 
contributing to protecting forms of cultural expressions, gives an “authentic illusion” 
(p. 77) that is akin to the invention of traditions. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, a more pertinent question is not so much that of authenticity in heritage 
per se, but as to how a plural society interprets in heritage, as one will discuss in 
the following section.  
 
5.1.2 Heritage as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue? – between a 
transcultural model and a multicultural model 
This section will consider how heritage may be used as a medium for intercultural 
dialogue in a plural society, through the use of cultural and natural heritage as 
resources of knowledge for learning. Following discussion in the preceding 
subsection, any heritage may be understood within the context of a cultural system 
as ideals or values embodied in material forms, performances or sites; or within 
context of a socio-cultural system for its historical value that explains circumstances 
leading to its production in existing form as found; or for its own intrinsic aesthetic 
value that may or may not have to be appreciated within context of a particular 
cultural system. This is not to mention how natural heritage may be considered for its 
scientific value, presumably in a universal sense that does not require 
contextualisation within a cultural system. 
An additional consideration would be how heritage ‘tangible’ or ‘intangible’ alike may 
not only serve the interpretations of the past, but also be used as common medium 
of activity within a community or beyond. In this regard, ‘culture’ in the framework of 
the globalised world today may, further to Bennett’s and Meyer’s perspectives on 
human development and collective action, be considered in terms of a liberal 
learning of the self and the world of human expressions (Oakeshott, 1989, pp. 43-45), 
that would “always relate to an historic inheritance of human achievement” (Ibid, p. 
50). Culture in this sense would be enhanced through the ethics of heritage 
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protection in providing common resources for knowledge in science and history and 
for personal development in aesthetics.  
Intercultural dialogue through heritage may then be understood as an open 
exchange as in interaction, through cross-cultural activities among individuals 
regardless of social group identities of their cultural communities. An argument for a 
transcultural model would not only be based on a belief in the reality of “inner 
differentiation and complexity of modern cultures” as Welsch (1999) suggests, but 
also one that refers to “the right to live beyond one’s culture” in the view of the 
philosopher Mamardashvili as cited by Epstein (1999a, p. 82). In short, beyond a 
matter of identity and representation in heritage practice, there is also a matter of 
freedom of participation.  
The need for overcoming of cultural identity alone may be justified partially by the 
aim of intercultural dialogue in terms of social cohesion. Yet another important 
aspect in the process of intercultural dialogue would in theory involve open exchange 
of views for reasoning, whereby one attempts to understand and respect the 
rationality of the other in society. This section hence assumes a transcultural 
approach in dialogue through heritage as one that focuses on the task of social 
cohesion through common activity while privileging the individual’s liberal choice; 
whereas a multicultural approach in dialogue through heritage may be considered as 
one that focuses on understanding and respecting a different cultural system, 
privileging values of its community as well as appreciating the symbolic meanings of 
its expressions as part of cultural memory. The two approaches are not assumed 
here to be mutually exclusive or any of them a superior model independent of socio-
political context.  
The challenge of heritage policy in plural societies has been discussed by Ashworth 
et al (2007) in terms of the social role and political interest in heritage: “It is self-
evident that society is composed of individuals, that individuals are different, and 
thus that society must be plural. Heritage, however, is about common values, 
common purpose and common interests. Societies may be pluralising […] but official 
heritage often remains stubbornly in the singular. (p. 71)” Several policy models of 
plural societies can be observed, the first to be mentioned being the assimilatory or 
integrationist model, whereby heritage would function to “act as an instrument of 
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assimilation of ‘outsiders’ into the core while constantly reaffirming and strengthening 
it among ‘insiders’ [and it also] exercises an educational and socialisation role as 
excluder and includer (Ibid., p. 75)”. Other policy types according to Ashworth et al 
include the melting pot model, the ‘core +’ model with add-ons to a leitkultur, the 
pillar model with self-contained groups of minimal uniformity imposed, and the 
mosaic or salad bowl model which invites all social groups to be part of its heritages 
(Ibid., pp. 77-85). This framework relating to the instrumental role of heritage in the 
plural society takes some of its cue from Hall (2005), on aspects such as the 
awareness of symbolic power involved in the act of representation, the relation of 
culture and identity, the politics of recognition and issue of equality, not to mention 
the challenge of cultural relativism (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 49).  
According to analysis of Ashworth et al (2007) on different models of heritage 
management in plural societies, Singapore would serve as an example of the ‘core+ 
model’, whereby the “a plural society adopts a leading culture which is not the culture 
of the majority or, indeed, even that of any of the diverse cultural groups involved” (p. 
155). Such an ‘imported’ core in this model does not involve so much as something 
in the sense of a Leitkultur which has survived into the postcolonial era, for instance 
in the form of a lingua franca or a sport, but instead simply a “convenient binding 
mechanism” (ibid.). In the case of Singapore, where urban development threatened 
to destroy local historical identity reflected in the shop-houses and kampongs soon 
after independence in 1965, colonial nostalgia as represented by such oriental icons 
as the Raffles Hotel was distanced from British history and reappropriated as a 
Singaporean institutional open to all within economic limits regardless of ethnicity 
(Henderson, 2001; cited in Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 157). Meantime, with introduction 
of the Land Act in 1974 empowering the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) to 
acquire land from private landowners, as many as 23 mosques, 76 suraus (Muslim 
buildings for prayers), 700 Chinese temples, 27 Hindu temples and 19 churches 
were acquired between then and 1987, their land used for redevelopment purposes 
(Kong, 1993, p. 31; cited in Kuah-Pearce, 2009, p. 169).   
Such a third party imported core model (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 155) as Singapore 
hence contrasts with a melting pot model, or for that matter a pillar model whereby 
“each group is free to create, manage and consume its own heritage without 
interference from, or indeed participation by, others” (Ibid., p. 165). A case in point is 
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the nomination of Singapore Botanic Gardens (SBG) as world heritage site, 
submitted in on 7th December 2012, in which the justification refers under Criterion (ii) 
to “economically important plants across the world and South-East Asia [with] a 
fundamental influence on the social and economic development and prosperity on 
the region” (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2013, online; emphasis added); and 
under Criterion (iv) to it being “a unique exemplar of a British colonial tropical botanic 
garden” (Ibid.; emphasis added). While welcoming the submission of tentative listing 
including the SBG as world heritage site, the Singapore Heritage Society noted in a 
statement (2nd April 2013, online) that Singapore’s ratification on 19th June 2012 as 
190th state party to the 1972 World Heritage Convention was made known to the 
Society only through UNESCO news release, and expressed hope for greater 
transparency in the government’s plans and actions. It highlighted Article 12 in the 
UNESCO operation guidelines, which says that state parties to the Convention are 
encouraged to ensure participation of a wide variety of stakeholders including local 
communities and NGOs in the ‘identification, nomination and protection’ of world 
heritage properties (Ibid.). The society also highlighted Article 64 of the same 
guidelines, whereby state parties are encouraged to prepare Tentative Lists with 
wide participation of stakeholders including local communities and NGOs (Ibid.).  
This was not incidental, for the nomination coincides with ongoing plans of the 
government for highway construction and future property development cutting 
through the historic Bukit Brown Cemetery, which consists of more than 100,000 
graves amidst 230 hectares of lush greenery. This is in spite of fervent calls by 
activist groups including Nature Society in 2011 and 2012 to preserve it as a heritage 
park, citing nature protection reasons as well as national identity (see Huang, 12th 
March 2012, online; Huang, 25th March 2012). A loose network of volunteers, 
connected through the social media and dubbing themselves the ‘Brownies’, have 
worked independently of the National Heritage Board, going to the site every week to 
conduct tours for school groups and members of the public including international 
visitors, not to mention organising exhibitions and a series of talks, with the hope that 
heritage status may be given to Bukit Brown. Independent historian Raymond Goh, 
alongside his brother Charles Goh who is founder of Asia Paranormal Investigators, 
have virtually eclipsed the work of National Heritage Board as they have managed to 
discover and identify the graves of 41 pioneers of Singapore with roads named after 
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them (Goh, 6th June 2013). Volunteers like him see not only spiritual value and 
historical value in the site for the local communities, but also aesthetic value in 
intricate relief sculpture and tile art among other elements of the graves with the 
unique setting blending Chinese fengshui beliefs into the landscape of a tropical 
rainforest. Raymond has written in a helpless plea, upon news of the SBG 
nomination: “But yet, do you know we can have another cultural and natural heritage 
of outstanding universal value, one that is still yet unappreciated by the public at 
large, and that the government is planning to drive a highway through it to alleviate 
traffic congestion?” (Goh, 13th May 2013, online). Bukit Brown Cemetery, which is 
the largest Chinese cemetery outside China, with some graves dating back to 1830s 
(The Economist, 17th March 2012, online), also poses a challenge to the assumption 
in multi-ethnic Singapore that heritage may be allocated neatly and separately 
according to race. It is not only because some graves feature imposing figures of 
bearded Sikh guards, recalling an uncomfortable page in history of them serving 
Chinese merchants during British colonial days, but also because this Chinese 
cemetery represents more specifically the Hokkien and Peranakan communities, 
whereas major cemeteries of other Chinese communities such as the Cantonese 
and the Teochews have long been exhumed for urban redevelopment. Such is the 
limitation in cultural heritage being viewed along the lines of community identity and 
clan ownership, which are often fragmented. Hence the pluralistic values of Bukit 
Brown as not only cultural but also natural heritage, as public good of the Singapore 
society in mitigation against Urban Heat Island effects for instance (Huang, 25th 
March 2012; Huang, 1st April 2012), are obscured in the process of a discourse 
along the lines of cultural and national identity. 
The neglect of Bukit Brown as heritage has also been set in contrast with the 
heritagisation of the Sun Yat Sen Villa – where the ‘Father of Modern China’ used to 
stay as a revolutionary against the Qing dynasty in early 1900s - which was gazetted 
as national monument in 1994 and after restoration through efforts of the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce at the behest of Minister George Yeo, officially 
opened as the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall on 12th November 2001, the 
135th anniversary of Sun’s birth (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 181). Hailed as ‘a 
cultural shrine for all ethnic Chinese Singaporeans’ in the 1990s during the height of 
the Asian Values discourse and business orientation towards China as an important 
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market for Singapore investors, much fanfare was made of China’s one million 
renminbi donation (S$183,000 then) towards its renovation, little fanfare of  
S$100,000 from Taiwan (p. 189). As Bukit Brown came under threat, it was often 
pointed out that 20 members of the Tong Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) 
who supported Sun were actually buried there (Goh, 13th May 2013). Based on such 
argument of comparable historical values and bearing in mind China’s political 
interest in the Villa, the disregard of Bukit Brown may be interpreted not only as the 
government placing higher priority in urban development over heritage protection, 
but also as it placing greater importance on diplomacy with China than on local 
heritage and local identity. Considering that new Mandarin-speaking immigrants from 
China make up the greater proportion of Singapore’s current population increase, the 
exhuming of this cemetery belonging to the Hokkien-speaking local Chinese may 
even be interpreted as part of an attempt by the government to replace local identity 
that is primarily of the southern Chinese stock with a grand Chinese identity of 
predominantly the northern Chinese stock – which would come across to local 
Singaporeans as neo-colonialism manifested in an ‘imported core’ of heritage. 
Returning from here to the general discussion, both a transcultural and a 
multicultural model for intercultural dialogue involving heritage as medium clearly 
have to be assessed through questions of symbolic power that cultural studies 
typically tackles, such as whether the transcultural expressions may obliterate any 
community’s longing for recognition of its identity, and whether a particular 
representation of multicultural identities obscures further issues of diversity in social 
values. One ‘difficulty’ is that “as a communicative practice, heritage and its 
messages are multi-vocal, relayed simultaneously from many sources, both 
public/official and private/unofficial, and at many scales” (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 
207). Where political significance goes, heritage is “a key force for cohesion but also 
fragmentation” (Ibid., p. 212) and pluralising of the past through heritage 
interpretation would be ‘an unavoidable condition of postmodern societies (Ibid.).  
A review of existing literature in heritage studies suggests that where relevance to 
intercultural dialogue is concerned, most emphasis has been on the overcoming of 
cultural differences in terms of identity. To cite an example of intangible heritage, 
Rodney Harrison has considered the invention of the Notting Hill Carnival, by 
drawing on older traditions of festivals and carnival from Britain and the Caribbean, 
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as a form of social ‘work’ in promoting racial harmony between British African 
Caribbean people and white indigenes. He says that the way two traditions were 
brought together by emphasising “some of the positive aspects of cultural diversity in 
Britain in terms of music, dance and cuisine was an ingenious way of attempting to 
bring together a community that was divided” (Harrison, 2010, pp. 244-245). As what 
he calls ‘social action’, heritage here appears to embody the idea of transculturality 
or hybridity. This model is interesting in the context of this thesis, for it may be 
contrasted with the example of performing arts used at national occasions in 
Singapore, where heritage tends to emphasise an idea of ‘multiracialism’, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
There may yet be a different strategy based on transculturality for the representation 
of heritage, as analysed by Sharon Macdonald in the museological representation of 
the Transcultural Galleries at Cartwright Hall in Bradford, a city in Britain which has a 
substantial South Asian population and has seen racial tensions since the 1970s. 
Instead of arranging artefacts in terms of separate cultures, curator Nima Poovaya 
Smith appointed in 1986 has used a notion of ‘connection’ as the logic of display, 
conceptualised along lines of movement, process or creative agency (Macdonald, pp. 
126-127). 
Where a multiculturalist perspective is emphasised, however, the challenge in 
heritage has been discussed beyond symbolic representation for the politics of 
recognition, venturing into the issue of rights. The late 20th and early 21st centuries 
have arguably seen “radical change in the conceptualisation of nation states as 
homogeneous units” (Logan et al, 2010, p. 12), and one big question is the extent to 
which societies should accommodate and recognise all cultural differences and 
languages, or whether such recognition may be confined to indigenous groups (Ibid., 
pp. 12-13). Human rights may well be evoked when claims in favour of cultural 
diversity and heritage, particularly the intangible, are at stake, as in claiming a 
cultural practice as a human right under the sub-category of cultural rights, but there 
may often be debates with claims from others that the practice contravenes laws or 
human rights instruments (Ibid., p. 14). In short, heritage may also pose the 
challenge of cultural relativism. 
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Such challenge of relativism relates to a predicament that the anthropologist Thomas 
Hyllad Eriksen has seen in the World Commission on Culture and Development 
report Our Creative Diversity, which sees culture as “the fountain of our progress and 
creativity”, in a double-edged argument that culture is not only an instrument of 
development not also the social basis of the ends themselves, such that “[r]espect 
for all cultures whose values are tolerant of others and that subscribe to a global 
ethics should be the basic principle” (WCCD, 1995, p. 15). On ‘creativity’, as a factor 
which is “[f]ar from being germane to the arts alones [but instead] vital to industry 
and business, to education and to social and community development” (Ibid., p. 78), 
the report has on one hand cited Weber’s pioneering association of culture and 
religion with entrepreneurship (Ibid., p. 88), but on the other hand, in its Weberian 
concern with cultural values in the context of modernity, ultimately placed cultural 
values, associated with traditions and ethnic heritage (Ibid., pp. 193, 274) on equal 
footing with development and modernisation (Ibid., p. 15).  
To summarise it in the perspective of Eriksen (2001, online), there remains an 
unresolved tension between the explicit assertion of culture being ‘dynamic’ and the 
imagination of cultures largely as islands. The position of WCCD may be appreciated 
in consideration of how anthropologists have been urging development agencies to 
be more sensitive towards local conditions and to take into account the cultural 
dimension; but Eriksen raises concern that “the insistence on cultural difference and 
plurality as constitutive of the social world does not fit very well with the equally 
strong insistence on the need for a global ethics” (Ibid.) Furthermore, in WCCD’s 
middle ground between “a relativistic view of development and a universalist view of 
ethics” (Ibid.), it has distanced itself from issues of identity politics and mono-ethnic 
models within the nation-states, instead of confronting questions such as how a state 
may strike a balance between equal rights for all citizens and the right for groups to 
be different, as discussed by Kymlicka (1989) and Taylor et al (1992) on the issue of 
multiculturalism (cited in Ibid).  
Eriksen would in fact advocate eschewing all blanket concepts of culture relating to 
diversity among different communities, and instead adopt a discussion of ‘culture’ 
generally only in terms of Bildung rather than traditions (Ibid.), which would imply not 
shying away from some form of value hierarchy in the pursuit of global ethics. He 
cites Levi-Strauss’ (1979) foresight in saying that “we will awake from the dream that 
275 
 
equality and brotherhood will one day rule among men without compromising their 
diversity” (461; cited in Ibid.), to argue that it would be more realistic for WCCD to 
recognise this dilemma while subscribing to Levi-Strauss’ perspective of a world 
partitioned into different cultures (Ibid.). He himself argues that the world is more 
continuous and hence such concept of separate cultures is not as useful as speaking 
simply of ‘local arts’ or constructed ‘local realities’; even cultural rights should be 
focused on the individual (Ibid.), he argues from a liberal standpoint. 
The current UNESCO global framework on intangible heritage may not be rights-
based, but it makes an interesting attempt in promoting a form of world polity 
founded on promoting cultural diversity. Where safeguarding of the heritage and 
rights of indigenous peoples is concerned, there have been other instruments which 
are stronger in tone or provision than the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention, 
namely the 1989 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention (No. 169) 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, and the 2006 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (see Marrie, 2009, p. 
174). Nonetheless, the central role given to cultural communities was meant to be 
one of the most significant aspects of the 2003 Convention, as noted by International 
Cultural Heritage Law specialist Janet Blake (2009, p. 45). This idea within the 
framework of ICH “provides opportunities to democratise the process by which we 
give value to heritage” (Ibid., p. 46), although it also raises the further question of 
whether official recognition should then depend on whether the ICH expressions or 
practices are highly valued outside the immediate cultural community (Ibid.). She 
also notes that there can be a difference in the first place “between the meaning of a 
term such as ‘community’ to an anthropologist, for example, and its legal definition(s)” 
(Ibid., p. 51) - which brings one to the question of who has the authority to decide. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice, asked to elucidate on the term, noted 
that the “existence of communities is a question of fact; it is not a question of law” 
(Ibid., p. 52), which one should understand as implying that ‘ordinary meaning’ 
should be applied (Ibid.). The accepted understanding of ‘minorities’ in relation to 
Article of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1996) relies on both objective criteria such as ethnicity and language as well as the 
subjective one of self-identification or ‘solidarity’; the ILO Convention on Tribal and 
Indigenous Peoples also places high importance on ‘self-identification’ as criterion 
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(Ibid.). Blake raises a question: can a group which “has no consciousness of itself as 
a group or a community” (Ibid.) be said to ‘exist’ legally despite “objective criteria that 
sets it apart from other elements in a state’s population” (Ibid.)? This question 
touches on the issue of who should have authority in knowledge of defining a group, 
whether it should be a government or some international experts for instance.  
After an expert meeting held in Tokyo in 2006 to draft guidelines on implementation 
of provisions relating to community involvement in inventorying safeguarding ICH, 
‘communities’ are defined as “networks of people whose sense of identity or 
connectedness emerges from a shared historical relationship that is rooted in the 
practice and transmission of, or engagement with, their ICH” (Ibid., p. 60; italics 
added). This departs from an earlier definition for ‘community’ at a previous expert 
meeting in 2002: “People who share a self-ascribed sense of connectedness. This 
may be manifested, for example, in a feeling of identity or common behaviour, as 
well as in activities and territory. Individuals can belong to more than one community. 
(Ibid., p. 61; italics added)”   
Janet Blake points out that ultimately, any safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage 
must rely on the collaborative efforts and active involvement of cultural communities: 
“Unlike a site, a monument or artefact that has a material existence beyond the 
individual or society that created it… it is only through its enactment by cultural 
practitioners that ICH has any current existence and by their active transmission that 
it can have any future existence. (Ibid., p. 65)” Incidentally, other than the 2003 ICH 
convention, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions has also made reference to the issue of 
participation – in this case, the civil society is mentioned (Article 11, see UNESCO, 
2005, online). In relation to these two conventions, R. Albro has asked in a 2007 
paper: “how do UNESCO’s conventions help to configure the extent and limits of 
heritage participation and for whom? (Ibid., p. 62)” The relationship between the 
community and the ICH resource is not simple, as Blake notes, for there is potential 
conflict that exists not only between but also within cultural communities, which are 
“not static and unchanging but rather are fluid entities” (Ibid.).    
Community participation is highlighted in the fourth of five criteria for inscription on 
the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, which 
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requires under the Operational Directives: “The element has been nominated 
following the widest possible participation of the community, group or, if applicable, 
individuals concerned and with their free, prior and informed consent. (UNESCO, 
2011, p. 3)” Community participation has remained a difficult issue in the 
implementation of the 2003 Convention. As seen in negotiations of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, “the principle of community participation is extremely 
difficult to implement because of its wide-ranging political implications”; none of the 
first three sessions of the Committee saw the presence of representatives from 
communities, practitioners or grassroots NGOs as observers (Aikawa-Faure, 2009, p. 
39). 
In practice, identification of communities associated with an ICH and verification of 
community consent has still posed a problem in the nomination process, as 
acknowledged at the Sixth Session (Bali, Indonesia, November 2011) of 
Intergovernmental Committee. The Subsidiary Body, set up by the Intergovernmental 
Committee since the Fifth Session (Nairobi, Kenya, November 2010) to assess 
conformity of each nomination, has met with “difficulty to be certain that the 
community referred to in the description was the same as that involved in the 
safeguarding measures or that had provided its consent to the nomination” 
(UNESCO, June 2011, p. 9). Under criterion R. 4, states are requested to describe 
clearly how the community, group or individuals concerned have participated actively 
in preparing and elaborating the nomination at all stages, but there are often doubts:  
“What were the consultative processes leading to the nomination? How and when 
were they organized? How were the perspectives and aspirations of bearers and 
practitioners integrated into the nomination itself? What other forms did the 
participation of the community take? (Ibid., p. 12)”. With regards to the ‘free, prior 
and informed consent’ to be demonstrated, the Body often found it difficult to identify 
who the signatories were (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, accepting the fact that global frameworks as such may tend to render 
intangible heritage as new products for a new audience across borders as Skounti 
argues, one may simply maintain that a major potential and challenge will lie in the 
use of ICH elements as a medium for intercultural dialogue. The Operational 
Directives for the 2003 Convention has already cited Relevance Criterion 2 such that 
“Inscription of the element will contribute to ensuring visibility and awareness of the 
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significance of the intangible cultural heritage and to encouraging dialogue, thus 
reflecting cultural diversity worldwide and testifying to human creativity. (UNESCO, 
June 2010, p.3)”.  
If one accepts that heritage affords an opportunity for intercultural dialogue by 
learning about human expressions in other communities not only through shared 
activity, but also through cognitive and affective appreciation of the rationality in 
another cultural system as suggested in Chapter 3, one may argue that the symbolic 
meanings within the cultural system provide a key to a better understanding. This 
would mean that heritage as cultural symbols are not only understood in terms of 
their social functions in a socio-cultural system but in terms of their meanings in the 
cultural system as a totality of cultural expressions resulting from history up to the 
present time. Heritage forms an integral part of these cultural meanings, embodied in 
places, objects or performances as a form of ‘memory’. It has been indeed observed 
that there is no defining action or moment of heritage beyond “a range of activities 
that include remembering, commemoration, communicating and passing on 
knowledge and memories, asserting and expressing identity and social and cultural 
values and meanings. (Smith, 2006, p. 83)” With regards to heritage places and 
events as a collective aide-memoire, it has also been argued that these form “an 
active component of a cultural toolkit for remembering and forgetting” (Smith and 
Waterton, 2009, p. 293), citing the perspective of James Wertsch (2002) that 
remembering is not a passive process but is actively engaged to negotiate collective 
and individual aspirations (cited in Ibid.).  
In this respect, rituals, festivals and elements of music, dance and poetic forms, 
which might be classified as ‘intangible heritage’ under the prevailing global 
framework, may all considered a form of cultural memory, according to Jan Assmann 
(1992, p. 56-57). Assmann has cited the perspective of Maurice Halbwachs that 
memory is constituted through the process of socialisation and the collective is also 
a subject with memory under a social frame or cadres sociaux (Ibid., 35-36); 
Halbwachs’ perspective of the past may even be drawn in parallel with that of Berger 
and Luckmann 40 years later, in terms of a social construction (Ibid., p. 48), 
Assmann argues. Whereas Halbwachs ties cultural memory to a sense of stability in 
space and time and to group identity but differentiates it from ‘tradition’, Assman 
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prefers to differentiate between ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ memory (Ibid., p. 45), 
whereby communicative memory refers to memories relating to the recent past 
which may be recorded as oral history (Ibid., pp. 50-51), whereas cultural memory, 
including myths, is oriented towards fixed points in the past (p. 52) and carries 
meanings beyond routine life (p. 54). The last point parallels what has been said by 
Luckmann as well as Gehlen about the significance of ritual lying beyond routine life.  
With regards to the concept of collective memory, Wertsch (2009) has cited 
psychologist Bartlett’s emphasis back in 1930s, in reaction to Halbwachs, that it 
should be seen as “memory in the group, [but] not memory of the group” (Bartlett, 
1995, p. 294; cited in Wertsch, 2009, p. 119; emphasis in original citation). Wertsch 
would suggest to view memory as being distributed within a group through an 
instrumental process that “involves active agents, on the one hand, and ‘cultural 
tools’ such as calendars, written records, computers, and narratives, on the other” 
(Ibid.). His notion of cultural tools as mediating in active remembering is derived from 
the soviet psychologist Vygotsky, credited for originating the Activity Theory in 
psychology. Vygotsky (1978) has remarked that the essence of human memory 
consists in the fact that human beings actively remember with the help of signs, 
citing the example that one may also say the very essence of civilisation lies in 
purposely building of monuments in order not to forget (p. 51).  
A dichotomy has been made by Halbwachs between memory and history, a 
distinction which has been carried forward by historian Peter Novick in his argument 
that “[understanding] something historically is to be aware of its complexity, to have 
sufficient detachment to see it from multiple perspectives, to accept the 
ambiguities… [whereas c]ollective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, 
committed perspective… reduces events to mythic archetypes” (pp. 3-4; cited in 
Wertsch, 2009, p. 125). Similar observations on cultural memory have been made by 
Jan Assmann. At the risk of oversimplification, one may distinguish collective 
memory from analytic history as considering the former as ‘subjective’, reflecting a 
particular group’s social framework, and the latter as ‘objective’, though scholars 
such as Hayden White (1987) have also raised questions on whether any 
representation of the past can be genuinely objective (see Ibid., pp. 125-127). But 
one may argue that if intangible heritage is considered as cultural memory in the 
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form of myths, festivals and rituals, it follows that it involves subjectivity in terms of 
the representation or embodiment of particular cultural values, notwithstanding any 
‘objective’ historical circumstances that may have given rise to the arbitrary symbolic 
forms. 
Awareness of the past, as furbished by memory along with history, relics and rituals, 
involves one’s experience as well as belief, for “[t]he past simply as past is wholly 
unknowable” (Collingwood, 1928; cited in Lowenthal, 1985, p. 187). Hence 
Lowenthal writes: “We are in fact aware of the past as a realm both coexistent with 
and distinct from the present. … Deliberation often distinguishes the here and now – 
tasks being done, ideas being formed, steps being taken – from bygone things, 
thoughts, and events. But conflation and segregation are in continual tension; the 
past has to be felt both part of and separate from the present. (Ibid., p. 186)” He cites 
philosopher R.G. Collingwood on the sense of time: “We do call the past, as such, 
into being by recollecting and by thinking historically […] but we do this by 
disentangling it out of the present in which it actually exists. (cited in Ibid.)” Whereas 
awareness of the past may be based on memory, the range of meanings associated 
with memory may obscure its relations with the past. On this, Lowenthal cites 
psychologist Ulric Neisser as criticising the long-time preoccupation in a natural 
science paradigm of psychology with replicable, value-free, quantitative laboratory 
analysis: “if X is an interesting or socially significant aspect of memory, then 
psychologists have hardly ever studied X. (cited in Ibid., p. 193)” Neisser’s own work 
Remembering in Natural Contexts would therefore draw insights from novelists, 
historians and psychoanalysts.  
The concept of memory is important to culture and heritage alike. Luhmann has 
gone so far as to speak of culture as the ‘memory of social systems’ (1999, p. 47). 
For the sake of clarity in psychological terms, one may summarise culture – 
reclaiming Weber’s perspective from Parsons – as the knowledge of meanings and 
values which provide relevance to action; heritage, on the other hand, may be 
understood as the objectification of meanings and values in artefacts, places or 
performances and an externalisation of memory in a sense of continuity with the 
past. As far as such a theoretical perspective is concerned, the distinction between 
‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ in the current global discourse is superfluous, if not to say 
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‘colonial’, as Herzfeld argues, in how “beholden the whole system is to a Cartesian 
understanding of the world” (see Byrne, 2011, p. 147).  
‘Tangible’ heritage on its own would be ‘mute’, as Lowenthal argues, for despite any 
aura of antiquity, it still requires interpretation to voice its meaning (1985, p. 243). He 
would deem unreal the distinction made by Michael Oakeshott between 
‘disinterested’ historian and the ‘practical’ people “who use the past to understand, 
sustain, or reform the present” (Ibid., p. 237). Where national identity is concerned, 
even the difference between history and fiction would arguably be one of purpose or 
device rather than content, in their common search for ‘truth’ which is more than the 
truth about the past; what the novelist achieves where the historian does not is in re-
creating a past that is more vital (pp. 226-229). Herzfeld (1997) would remind us that 
the language of national or ethnic identity, in its discourse of inclusion and exclusion, 
is also “a language of morality” (p. 43). 
In the context of a multi-ethnic nation, an appreciation of cultural heritage of a 
different cultural community would hence involve not only experiencing the aesthetic 
values associated with it but also interpreting the moral values associated thereof. 
This thesis would also emphasise that an awareness of ‘cultural differences’ in terms 
of respect for institutionalised normativity should be guarded against stereotyping of 
members of a cultural community through a Parsonian understanding of culture as 
behaviour. In the subsequent chapter, we shall turn to explore how intercultural 
dialogue may be promoted through the medium of dance as heritage in the case 
study of Singapore. Meantime, the second half of this chapter will attempt a pseudo-
etic definition of ‘dance’ and discuss in what sense dance may constitute as heritage 
in the first place. 
 
 
5.2 Dance as Communication and Dance as Heritage 
5.2.1 What is Dance? – Perspectives in Anthropology 
 
In this section, we shall explore as to how dance as heritage in different communities 
transmits different cultural values and hence has potential as a medium for 
intercultural dialogue. This subsection will begin by first attempting to define dance 
as a phenomenon in itself, based on perspectives in anthropology, before looking in 
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the following subsections on how it may function as a form of communication and 
how it is socially constructed as a form of heritage with particular values ascribed. 
The approach in defining dance here will be one based on social anthropology, 
involving a combination of etic and emic perspectives. The etic perspective has been 
informed partly by a philosophy of art, as elaborated with the help of the art theory of 
Susanne K. Langer in Feeling and Form (1953), recognised for its importance till 
today in honouring dance as part of the canon of art forms (Huschka, 2002, p. 57). It 
is known for adapting the concept of ‘symbolic form’ from the logic of cultural 
sciences as exemplified by Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophie der symbolischen Formen to 
discuss dance as a form of communication through gesture, rather than as a 
symptom of emotions (Langer, 2011, p. 280) as early scholarship in anthropology 
tended to do. The “virtual realm of Power” that dance thus creates through gesture 
(Ibid.), as discussed by Langer, is interesting in the context of this thesis as it 
provides another dimension of dance as communication which may transcend 
cultural differences. Such aspects of dance will be dealt with later.    
On the hand, an emic perspective on dance would emphasise that what constitutes 
as dance differs from culture to culture, not only in form and but also in function and 
meaning. In fact, dance anthropologist Adrienne L. Kaeppler has asserted that 
whereas cultural forms that result from the creative use of human bodies in time and 
space are often glossed as ‘dance’, in many societies “there is no indigenous 
concept that can be adequately be translated as ‘dance’ ” (Kaeppler, 1985, p. 92). 
Kaeppler has been credited for setting out emic elements of dance using examples 
in Tongan culture, offering a clear ethnoscientific approach in analysis that might be 
used to further studies of dances anywhere from an anthropological perspective 
(Williams, 2004, p. 191) This perspective is especially important for the purpose of 
the thesis as ‘dance’ is linked to different meanings and indeed different cultural 
values for different cultural communities, which presents a great challenge  as well 
as opportunity in the use of dance as medium for intercultural dialogue. What one 
needs to do would be to apply an imposed etic in the definition of dance in order to 
guide the process of understanding a particular dance as cultural form, for instance 
Indian classical dance, from the perspective of a different cultural community.  
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We shall begin here by attempting to give a simple ‘universal’ definition of dance, in 
the first instance without going into perspectives of dance as an art specifically. 
Through this process, we shall see how one needs to filter away perspectives of 
dance as a psychological or biological phenomenon from a functionalist explanation 
of social anthropology relating to aspects of culture and identity, with the latter 
perspective to be elaborated later on.  
A most basic concept for dance, as cited by Anya Peterson Royce in The 
Anthropology of Dance first published in 1977, would be “rhythmic or patterned 
movement” (Royce, 2002, p. 5). However, as she points out immediately, this is too 
general and insufficient to distinguish dance from other rhythmic activities such as 
those in work routines or sports, hence an alternative would be to formulate dance 
as “rhythmic movement done for some purpose transcending utility” (Ibid.). Yet if one 
considers that there may be dance which is essentially an aesthetic activity versus 
dance which serves some other function as well, then one has to rephrase the 
definition in order to circumvent such a distinction, for such distinction serves little 
purpose, when one thinks of dance as an aspect of ‘human behaviour’, Royce 
argues, noting that such distinction has led to a dichotomy in dance literature 
between those who write about ‘art’ dance and those who write about ‘folk’ dance 
(Ibid.). A more inclusive definition would certainly be more helpful in discussing 
phenomena of dance, particularly for the purpose of this thesis, which is using dance 
as a medium for exchange between cultures which may have very different ideas of 
dance. Royce eventually streamlines her definition for dance as “patterned 
movement performed as an end in itself” (Royce, 2002, p. 8) 
Incidentally, one further confusion Royce has noted while considering ‘rhythmic 
movement’ as the distinguishing feature of dance, is the question of whether there is 
dance of human versus dance of nonhuman (Royce, 2002, p. 5). Curt Sachs, author 
of World History of the Dance (Eine Weltgeschichte des Tanzes) first published in 
1933, has compared the human activity of dancing with ‘dancing’ of birds and other 
animals (Sachs, 1937, pp. 9-10, cited in Royce, 2002, p. 4). The resolution to this 
confusion, as Sachs himself then proposes, is to make a distinction between innate 
and acquired behaviour, although he brings in confusion again with the question of 
whether the dancing of chimpanzees may be acquired (Royce, 2002, p. 4).  
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This brings in an important issue, for dance has often been conceived of as little 
more than innate behaviour in general books on dance. Psychologist Havelock Ellis 
has not only argued in the 1923 book The Dance of Life with a cosmological 
statement that ‘life is a dance’ (Grau, 1998, in Carter ed., 1998, p. 198; Williams, 
2004, p. 33), he has even suggested elsewhere that dance has its origins in sex 
(Williams, 2004, p. 6). In Dancing: the Pleasure, Power and Art of Movement, a 
voluminous popular book published in 1992 to accompany a multi-million US dollars 
television series on dance forms around the world, Gerald Jonas begins with a 
passage depicting the movements of a child’s limbs at birth, declaring that the 
“impulse to move is the raw material that cultures shape into evocative sequences of 
physical activity that we call dance” (p. 12, cited in Grau, 1998, in Carter ed., 1998, p. 
198). Such tendency to consider dance as foremost a biological phenomenon born 
directly from nature may be motivated by a universalist view. As dance 
anthropologist Drid Williams points out, such universalist view may be summed up 
with a disguised syllogism thus: all dancing is movement, all human beings move, 
therefore all human beings dance; but such an argument about dance being a 
universal medium of expression among humanity makes no anthropological sense 
as it would have no significance in answering the question as to why people dance 
(Williams, 2004, p. 34). Particular explanations as to the origin of dance, be it 
biological or psychological or otherwise, may apply to some forms of dancing but not 
to others (Ibid., pp. 6-7). The notion of dance as a form of ‘behaviour’, when 
conceived as a universal phenomenon that is value-free, ‘objective’ and prior to 
human intentions, would be a conception that can be equally be attached to animals 
or machines, and separate from any social context (Ibid., p. 203).   
In explaining the interest of anthropology in concerning itself with the phenomenon of 
dance, Royce concluded her book with a quote by Curt Sachs in World History of the 
Dance to explain how dance is tied to culture:  
If the dance, inherited from brutish ancestors, lives in all mankind as a 
necessary motor-rhythmic expression of excess energy and of the joy of living, 
then it is only of slight importance for anthropologists and social historians. If it 
is established, however, that an inherited predisposition develops in many 
ways in the different groups of man and in its force and direction is related to 
other phenomena of civilisation, the history of dance will then be of great 
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importance for the study of mankind. (Sachs, 1937, p. 12, cited in Royce, 
2002, pp. 218-219)  
Royce has qualified in her attempt to find a definition for dance, that the reason for 
having definitions is ultimately to allow people to talk about something and others to 
understand it, and there are two levels of understanding here: one that has 
significance among natives, and one consisting of analytic devices that may not 
correspond to what is meaningful to those engaged in a particular dance form 
(Royce, 2002, p.8), in other words the emic and the etic perspectives. Writing in 
1977 on the developments in the anthropology, Royce has pointed out the 
importance in going beyond the analyses of dance form to consider how form 
shapes and is shaped by cultural standards and values (Ibid., p. 216).  
Her definition of dance as patterned movement performed ‘as an end in itself’ is 
inclusive enough to refer not only to dance performed primarily as aesthetic 
expression or for enjoyment but also dance performed as ritual activities (Ibid., p. 10). 
It suggests at the same time the presence of human intention in general, a point 
which is crucial in Williams’ perspective on danced movements. Williams asserts that 
it is generally true to say that danced movements “are intentional movements and 
therefore best understood as actions” (Williams, 2004, p. 20). She cites the 
description of dance as ‘expressive act’ according to Susanne Langer, as well as the 
position taken by philosopher David Best (1974, p. 193) that “an intentional action is 
not the same as a physical movement since the latter can be described in various 
ways according to one’s point of view and one’s beliefs about the person performing 
it” (Ibid.). Unlike a physical movement, an action according to Best cannot be 
specified without taking into account what the agent has intended (Ibid.).   
Williams hence rejects any characterisation of dance as a biological phenomenon or 
psychological symptom. Such perspectives may be dated back to scholarly attention 
of the Middle Age on danse macabre or the dance of death, and on the dancing 
mania of convulsive movement caused by disease known as St Vitus’s Dance (Ibid., 
p. 41), yet they have persisted well into the 20th century. A 1952 article by M.D.W. 
Jeffrey entitled “African Tarantula or Dancing Manila” for instance has suggested that 
dancing, along with sports activities such as tennis and rugby, results from an over-
accumulation of sex hormones, an argument that he supports through evidence of 
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research psychologists working with rats (Ibid., 40). He goes on to observe that 
young women are ‘the most often affected’ in such outbreaks of dancing mania, in 
Nigeria as with the Tarantella in Italy (Ibid.). This is criticised by Williams for making 
a baseless generalisation, from an European dance form believed to originate from 
the need to sweat out poison from the bite of a venomous spider, to a form of 
dancing in Nigeria that looks convulsive but is in fact associated with a religious 
movement (Ibid., pp. 40-41).  
Even social anthropologist Paul Spencer, who like Royce has taken a cue from Curt 
Sachs in emphasising that dance is more than mere expression of excess energy 
(Spencer, 1985, p. 5), who states that dance as an entity is not separable from the 
anthropological concept of culture and furthermore not separable from the 
anthropological concept of institution, has still considered the cathartic theory of 
“tension release achieved through dance” as a plausible partial explanation for the 
dance phenomenon (Ibid.). He tries to mediate the problem by citing that Susanne 
Langer herself has made a distinction between dancing as an art form and ‘pleasure 
dance’ in which emotion is experienced more directly, and hence he says this is 
largely a problem of definition (Ibid., p. 7). Of course, this poses no problem to the 
working definition we have adopted thus far, which sees dance as intentional action 
and is all-encompassing enough, as long as we do not see dance movements as 
involuntary symptoms of emotional release. Paul Spencer in fact cites various 
theories to explain different dances, referring to catharsis, expression, social function 
and so on, considering that they supplement each other, but what Williams cautions 
with regards to Spencer’s approach, is that different theories and explanation belong 
to different worlds of ontological and epistemological explanation and hence can be 
entirely incompatible if not contradictory (Williams, 2004, p. 23). Actually, one may 
also argue that the cathartic concept of dance as a safety valve for releasing 
emotional steam, as first proposed by sociologist Herbert Spencer in 1862, and cited 
by Paul Spencer as a concept foreshadowing Freud’s concept of the libido (Spencer, 
1985, p. 4), might be more useful when considered not in relation to psychological 
function but to social function. For instance, the pre-colonial dancing among the 
Kerebe in Tanzania, described as an inter-village competition during the dry season 
that provided an emotional outlet for men in contrast to their toil at other times under 
an oppressive regime (Ibid., p. 5), would make more sense being explained as a 
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social activity that is institutionalised, since as Spencer notes, it persisted and 
developed as a major preoccupation for some time after the demise of the regime 
(Ibid., p. 6)  
The social function of dance is a topic to be dealt with later on in this chapter. But 
now we shall finish off the discussion on dance as a psychological or biological 
phenomenon by turning to the perspective of Judith Lynne Hanna who sees dance 
as culturally patterned and has developed a theory on dance as nonverbal 
communication. She defines dance as being “composed, from the dancer’s 
perspective, of purposeful, intentionally rhythmical, and culturally patterned 
sequences of nonverbal body movements other than ordinary motor activities, the 
motion having inherent and aesthetic value” (Hanna, 1987, p. 57). In short, it 
includes the principal points discussed so far about dance being patterned 
movement, dance being intentional action as an end in itself, and dance being tied to 
cultural values, except that in addition she also considers dance as a nonverbal 
expression and emphasises its aesthetic value, two points that will also have to be 
addressed in time. 
What is of interest for a start is how Hanna deals with the question of whether dance 
is a biological phenomenon and what separates human from animals in dance. She 
actually takes an interest in the question of the extent to which human beings have a 
biologically based predisposition for dance, and she notes the phenomenon that 
animals such as chimpanzees, horses, dogs, bears, parrots or elephants have been 
trained through conditioning to perform some ‘dancing’ movements within their 
biological possibilities (Ibid., p. 58). Her view with regards to this, first of all, is that 
certain capacities would be realised only in humans, even if chimpanzees may 
display rhythmic movements and develop gestures, which suggest primates “carry 
the seed of those visual, motor, auditory, kinaesthetic, affective, and cognitive 
patterns that are more fully developed in humans” (Ibid.). But secondly, and very 
critically, she points out the distinction between fixed action patterns and selected 
action patterns, with a crucial factor being human’s symbolic capacity (Ibid.). She 
cites neurophysiological knowledge to explain this, saying that the capacity of 
neurological connections in human allows one to associate an object with a symbol 
that denotes it while being at a distance in time, space and affect (Ibid., p. 59). She 
goes on further to elaborate on dance as having ‘deep structures’ just like linguistic 
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behaviour (Ibid., p. 70) and being able to convey meanings and emotions through 
elements like icon, stylisation, metonym or metaphor just as in language (Ibid., p. 44). 
In short, the basic idea as shared with Suzanne Langer is that dance is a symbolic 
action and hence much more than a psychological symptom. While the details of 
Hanna’s paradigm of dance as nonverbal communication may not be relevant for 
purposes of the thesis, a general perspective of dance as a form of communication 
would still be helpful in our later discussion on functions of dance in larger contexts.   
The aspect of aesthetic value in dance is something that will be dealt with in detail in 
later on, this being an important aspect as it is also very much tied to differences in 
cultural values in relation to dance, not to mention posing a challenge when dance is 
considered for communication across cultures. The significance of dance as ritual 
activity, on the other hand, will be included in the discussion of social functions of 
dance.  
One interesting remark to be made here in closing would be to note that dance as an 
activity has tended to be seen negatively or as being of secondary importance in 
civilised society, especially when considered as a psychological symptom, as 
release of emotional impulses or excess energy like what was discussed earlier. A 
similar perception may be taken towards dance as ritual activity in the eyes of more 
secular cultures. Helen Thomas has noted in Dance, Modernity and Culture: 
Explorations in the Sociology of Dance that there is an association of dance with 
‘primitive’ cultures, as reflected in speculative evolutionary approaches, with non-
European societies seen as representing an earlier phase of human development, in 
“a world inspired by fear and dread” and steeped in magic (Thomas, H., 1995, p. 8), 
as if dancing would become less important as cultures become more ‘civilised’ and 
‘rational’ (Ibid., p. 9). It does not help that dance has often been considered one of 
the oldest if not indeed the oldest of all arts, for instance according to 18th-century 
enlightenment philosopher Condillac who thought that dance constituted the first 
symbolic activity from which language and music stemmed (Sparshott, 1998, cited in 
Thomas, H., 1995, p. 8). Another problem is the dogma of Cartesian dualism which 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) has referred to as the ‘Ghost in the Machine’ subjectivism, also 
tied to a distaste of the body in religious beliefs like a fundamentalist conception of 
Christianity whereby the soul is of paramount importance whereas bodily functions 
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are an unfortunate necessity and dance is sinful as it stimulates temptations of the 
flesh (Best, 1999, p. 104) 
A similar view is also reflected in the marginalisation of dance in sociology which 
focuses on the problem of modernity (Thomas, H., 1995, p. 9). This is so much so 
that the concern with dance in sociology as shown in studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
has focused mainly on working-class subcultures and youth, and when couched in 
functionalist perspectives, their behaviour of dance would be seen as an escape 
from the routine of work via some kind of fantasy (Ibid.), in short tending towards 
deviance from social norms. Helen Thomas sums it up by saying that “in relation to 
dance, subculture is to dominant culture as primitive is to modern culture: a 
dangerous, exotic, non-rational, marginal ‘other’.” (Ibid., p. 10) Bearing that in mind, 
we shall see what social anthropologists have to say about dance from a 
functionalist perspective. 
We have hence discussed the question of how dance should be defined or what 
constitute dance, and argued that dance should be studied in its significance to 
cultural contexts instead of seeing it as symptom of psychological or biological 
processes. Next, we shall look at the significance of dance in relation to social 
functions, and more specifically on the cultural values that it may transmit for a 
cultural community.  
A functionalist perspective on dance has incidentally been an important approach in 
social anthropology. However, instead of considering that there is some predominant 
function of dance that is applicable across all societies as some scholars may have 
speculated, here it will be argued that with dance being a differentiated phenomenon, 
the ‘function’ and values associated with dance will ultimately have to be understood 
within an emic perspective. Indeed, it may be further argued that, if dance may be 
used as a medium in “promoting respect for cultural diversity”, just as any intangible 
cultural heritage is meant to do according to the 2003 UNESCO convention 
(UNESCO, 2003, Article 2 Section 1), a respect for diversity in dance as cultural 
forms should also encompass respect for the cultural values that are attached to 
them.  
As mentioned earlier, there has long been a universalist view on dance that sees it 
as a phenomenon of nature, common to all human beings and independent of 
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differences among cultures. The propagation of such a view may well be motivated 
by love and enthusiasm for dance, or a good intention in emphasising what is shared 
among all mankind, but such claims serve no purpose in advancing knowledge from 
an anthropological perspective. Unfortunately, a review of dance literature also 
shows us that for a long time, studies on the cultural diversity of dance have been 
rare, and these too tended to focus on diversity in forms and were short on analysis 
of functions and values. 
For decades after its publication in the 1930s, Curt Sach’s World History of the 
Dance has served as a resource for researchers interested in the analysis of dance 
styles across different cultures, although the information that Sachs gathered was 
not only second- or third-hand but inadequate, being based on accounts of travellers, 
reports of missionaries and old ethnographic works (Youngerman, 1974, in Grau and 
Wierre-Gore ed., 2006, p. 77, 79). Sachs, who has notably called for a study of 
dance according to cultural context, has come up with an assortment of cultural 
opposites for his analysis of different dance styles (Ibid., p. 80). Some of the 
dichotomies he listed include: the absence versus existence of animal dances, 
convulsive dance versus relaxed and body-conscious dance, predominance of solo 
dance versus predominance of group dance, agricultural versus hunting or totemic, 
cult of the moon versus cult of the sun, dance in circles versus dance in lines and so 
on (Ibid., p. 81). His statements on styles have been criticised as essentially 
impressionistic (Royce, 2002, p. 138). 
The next large-scale comparison of dance features worldwide was to be the 
choreometrics project directed by Alan Lomax in the 1960s, a project involving the 
production of over 200 films of dance and everyday activities in major cultural 
regions in the world, followed by an application of a coding system for cross-cultural 
comparison of different movement traditions (Ibid., p. 137). The project benefited 
from the use of Effort-Shape, one of three leading dance notation systems invented 
in the 20th century. Lomax, who had the help of Irmgard Bartenieff and Forrestine 
Paulay as collaborators for devising of the coding system, analysed movement 
profiles using four major parameters: body attitude, type of transition, number of 
active body parts, and complexity (Ibid., p. 136). Altogether 43 movement traditions 
or ‘profiles’ were represented in the 200 films made, and these were grouped into 
seven ‘stylistic regions’ based on common patterns, namely Amerindia, Australia, 
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New Guinea, the Maritime Pacific, Africa, the ‘Old High Culture’ which refers to East 
Asia and parts of Central Asia, and Europe. (Lomax, 1968, 233)    
It may be pointed out that both of these cross-cultural studies on the diversity of 
dance were much influenced either by the 19th-century theory of unilinear 
evolutionism, or the slightly more sophisticated version of it, the theory of cultural 
milieus which suggests that cultural traits are developed ensemble in different 
geographic areas and spread mainly through migration. Sachs hence suggests that 
each prehistoric European culture would find a correspondence among the cultures 
of primitive people which can still be seen in contemporary times, as primitive people 
today are going through stages of evolution that the occidental culture has already 
passed through (Youngerman, 1974, in Grau and Wierre-Gore ed., 2006, p. 82-83). 
Lomax even goes so far as to suggest that pre-agricultural societies such as hunters 
and gatherers, pastoralists and horticulturalists have more simple movement profiles 
than agricultural societies, that complexity of dance style is correlated with level of 
socioeconomic development (Royce, 2002, p., 136, 139).   
Lomax also betrays an assumption that cultures are essentially bounded entities with 
particular traits, as he models dance culture upon languages, similar to Hanna’s 
assumption of a ‘deep structure’ in dance expression, and hence he considers 
people as belonging to movement traditions of body communication just as they 
belong to speech communities (Ronström, 2011, in McCormick and White, 2011, p. 
289). Lomax states the premise of his project thus: “Choreometrics test the 
proposition that dance is the most repetitious, redundant, and formally organised 
system of body communication present in a culture. (Lomax, 1968, p. 224)” He adds: 
“The dance is composed of those gestures, postures, movements, and movement 
qualities most characteristic and most essential to the activity of everyday and thus 
crucial to cultural continuity. (Ibid.)” He apparently sees the continuity of a culture as 
being embodied in form through instinctive biological or psychological behaviour, 
rather than regulated and negotiated through cultural values.  
The interest in such grand overviews on the diversity of dance seems to have waned 
towards the end of the 20th century, as anthropologists shift interest towards unique 
qualities of dance as a phenomenon in its own right, as seen with a symbolic, 
structural or semiotic approach, or considering all the complexities of its specific 
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context, rather than as a phenomenon derived from something else (Royce, 2002, 
pp. 31-32). There is even a contemporary approach to dance and movement that 
makes embodied knowledge an explicit focus, with scholars like Sally Ness and 
Barbara Browning (Ibid., pp. xx-xxi). In all, Royce identifies five different approaches 
of anthropologists in dance over the last century, in the following chronological order: 
the evolutionary approach; the culture trait approach; the culture and personality and 
culture configuration approach; the problem-oriented approach in complex and plural 
societies; and the approach focusing on dance as a unique phenomenon (Ibid., p. 
19). A quick look at these different approaches would show us an interesting 
development of random ideas on functions or cultural values associated with dance.  
Evolutionists, who posited some kind of stages of progress that all societies would 
go through, considered dance as an essential component of primitive culture, mostly 
associated with ritual and magic (Ibid.). Sir James Frazer, author of The Golden 
Bough (1890) has for instance told of how in Transylvania dancers would leap high 
in the air just in order to make the crops grow tall (Ibid., p. 20). As evolutionism gave 
way to cultural relativism in early 20th century, such tones became moderated by a 
view of culture as a unique combination of traits and circumstances, such as 
Franziska Boas who, in The Function of Dance in Human Society (1944), notes that 
among Kwakiutl Indians, there are expert performers for dance, although everyone is 
obliged to take part, so that “the separation between performer and audience that we 
find in our modern society does not occur” (Ibid., p. 22). The Culture and Personality 
school, as represented by anthropologists like Ruth Bennett, came about with the 
influence of Freud and psychoanalysis in the 1920s, and now one sees the idea of 
historical progress being abandoned and culture being characterised according to 
psychological set (Ibid., pp. 24-25). Borrowing the contrast between the ‘Apollonian’ 
and the ‘Dionysian’ from Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, Bennett in Patterns of 
Culture described the Southwest Pueblos as Apollonian (1934, p. 79), as they do not 
seek self-torture or ecstasy, their dance being “a monotonous compulsion” with 
“tireless pounding of their feet” seeking to conjure rain with the perfection of 40 men 
moving as one, without anything wild about it (Ibid., pp. 92-93). She describes on the 
other hand the Native American tribes of the Northwest Coast, specifically the 
Kwakiutl, as being Dionysian, as they strove for ecstasy in their religious ceremonies; 
the chief dancer would lose control of himself, froth at the month, tremble violently, 
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even holding glowing coals in the hands (Ibid., pp. 175-176). While such 
essentialising of cultural personalities would be considered problematic today, 
perhaps the contrast may arguably still be valid if one considers it as differences in 
cultural values. 
For the problem-oriented approach in complex and plural societies, Royce cites her 
observation of the Zapotec dances of Juchitan to illustrate that the performance of 
dance can also be a process of contestation in social behaviour whereby certain 
cultural values like family allegiance and unity may be upheld by those who demand 
more respect and authority by age (Royce, 2002, p. 31). Dance is also seen as a 
vehicle for communicating ideas of the identity of a tribe as well as parodying identity 
of other tribes, as observed in a 1956 study by J.C. Mitchell of the Kalela dance in 
the African Cooperbelt (Ibid.).  
It may be mentioned here that comparative studies in dance anthropology soon 
became more focused from studying general differences between different dance 
cultures to studying specific aspects such as comparison of the same genre in 
different regions, for example some comparative studies in the 1960s between 
‘weapon dances’ or trance dances in different cultures (Ibid., p. 134), which also 
suggests a new awareness on different functions of dance. What arguably marked 
the beginning of the new thinking in anthropological work on dance was a new 
express intention as characterised by Gertrude Kurath in the seminal article 
Panorama of Dance Ethnology: “not as a description or reproduction of a particular 
kind of dance, but as an approach toward, and method of, eliciting the place of 
dance in human life” (1960, p. 250; cited in Royce, 2002, p.16). Interestingly, she 
was also calling for an end to the dichotomy between ethnic dance and art dance. 
Indeed the confines of dance anthropology would eventually be exploded, with 
dance scholars since then opening up new theoretical and methodological 
approaches, especially after the 1980s, not only through semiotic notions of 
representation as mentioned earlier, but also by putting gender and ethnic issues on 
the agenda with feminist and sociological perspectives (Thomas, 1995, pp. 5-6).   
Kurath’s seminal article came at a time of major shifts in explanatory paradigms in 
social and cultural anthropology and raised questions with regards to the function of 
dance in culture (Williams, 2004, pp. 112-113). She noted: “Scholars have justified 
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their studies on dance, not only by their use to readers in search of information or of 
material for performances but also by the functional significance of dance in society. 
(Kurath, 1960, p. 235; cited in Williams, 2004, p. 113)” She argued that the relevance 
of dance ethnology may be justified, awaiting further inquiry into the function of 
dance in culture, “which in turn depends on more findings on the relative significance 
of dance in particular cultures” (Ibid.).  
One should now zoom into the development of the functionalist perspective in the 
anthropology of dance from early 20th century onwards. Functionalism on a whole 
dates back to 19th-century sociologist Durkheim with the analogy of society as an 
organism, and has provided the paradigm for sociological theory, most notably in the 
work of Talcott Parsons who worked on developing a grand theory or general theory 
of action in a functioning society, with a model consisting of the social system, the 
personality system and the cultural system. For anthropologists, it was significant as 
an alternative to earlier paradigms that were evolutionary or diffusionist, as observed 
by Malinowski in Introduction to Ashley-Montague (1937). He considered the 
functionalist approach as a vindication of empirical research, with the demand that 
observation be guided by “laws and principles of culture as a dynamic reality”, aiming 
at the “establishment of a common measure of all cultures, simple and developed, 
Western and Oriental, arctic and tropical” (cited in Williams, 2004, p. 104).   
Drid Williams sees functional explanations as an improvement over earlier 
explanations, which would have reduced dancing to single metabolic, chemical or 
psychological attributes of human beings as organisms (Williams, 2004, p. 107). 
Such explanations also tend to stay away from moral and aesthetic judgments about 
non-Western dance forms, and functionalism in research also tends to suggest 
requirement of fieldwork and familiarity with the spoken language of the peoples 
concerned (Ibid.). However, she sees limitations in such perspectives too.  
An early example of a functional explanation for dance would be what Radcliffe-
Brown proposed in The Andaman Islanders (1913). In keeping with a functionalist 
perspective that an activity would have its function insofar as it contributes to the 
maintenance of the social structure, he suggests that the chief function of the dance 
lies in the submission of the personality of the individual to community action; the 
harmonious aggregation of individual feelings and action produced concord and unity, 
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or “tribal solidarity”, which is intensely felt by every individual member who 
participates (Radcliffe-Brown, 1964 [1913]; as cited in Williams, 2004, p. 109) His 
functionalist perspective might also be blended here with an influence of Herbert 
Spencer’s theory on subliminal communication, as he considers the rhythm as 
generating a force that regulates the dancer to conform, such that he becomes 
absorbed in the unified community (Spencer, 1985, p. 13). Spencer considers this 
functionalist perspective as also a homeostatic model whereby not only is the society 
deemed as a living organism, the thoughts and sentiments of the individuals are 
seen as derived from himself and from society at the same time (Ibid., p. 14). 
Williams on the other hand adds that whatever Radcliffe-Brown has said about 
dancing the Andaman Islanders may well be true, but there is a problem with later 
writers generalising and applying the same “concord and unity” theory to dance in 
other cultures; the Kalela dance of the Bisa for instance is a case of dance producing 
disharmony rather than harmony in a complex society (Williams, 2004, p. 109).  
Another example of a functional explanation is Margaret Mead’s claim in Coming of 
Age in Samoa (1928) that dance serves a purpose in education and socialisation of 
Samoan children, partly as “it effectively offsets the rigorous subordination in which 
children are habitually kept”, and partly as it helps in “reduction of the threshold of 
shyness” (Mead, 1967[1928], pp. 117-118, cited in Royce, 2002, p. 25) The dance 
also provides an outlet for the individual to demonstrate skill and superiority and be 
rewarded (Royce, 2002, p. 78). In short, this is an explanation which sees dance as 
an organ of social control, but it is more complicated than say the notion of the 
minuet being used as an educational device in 18th-century Britain in epitomising 
etiquette (Spencer, 1985, p. 8). Instead of dance as a mould of standard products, 
Mead regards it as a device of selective education to separate adept children from 
the inept, preparing them for success or failure in later life; it becomes even more 
confusing as she adds to this a consideration of dance being cathartic, with children 
wallowing in an orgy of aggressive individualistic display (Ibid., p. 9). Williams 
summarises Mead’s perspective on dance generally as seeing it as a vehicle to 
accomplish psychological adjustments for Samoan and other teenagers (Williams, 
2004, p. 107) 
Gertrude Kurath (1949) has summarised occasions or functions of dance under 14 
purposes, such as courtship, weddings, hunting, battle, cure, clown and so on. 
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Anthony Shay (1971) created a more general typology with 6 categories such as 
validation of social organisation, vehicle of secular and religious rituals, 
psychological outlet, dance as aesthetic activity and so on. Bearing in mind the 
varying prominence of different functions in dance forms across cultures, we shall 
consider in the next subsection the meaning of dance as heritage with regards to its 
representation of cultural identities or values and its use in orientating behaviour. 
 
5.2.2 Power of Dance in communicating Cultural Values and embodying 
Social Relations 
 
Intangible cultural heritage or tradition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, may be 
understood generally as a social process whereby cultural values and meanings of a 
community are transmitted and negotiated through socialisation and 
institutionalisation. If ‘tangible’ heritage involves such construction of meanings as 
embodied in or ascribed to monuments, sites or artefacts, ‘intangible’ heritage in 
contrast involves the transmission and affirmation of meanings through re-enactment 
of performances and practices. This subsection will examine how dance functions as 
a type of intangible heritage that transmits cultural values, being a kind of ritualised 
action and a symbolic form or expression consisting of human movements. We shall 
consider how dance as such holds a kind of ‘power’ over people and how dance may 
furthermore serve to embody and communicate cultural meanings and have an 
effect in shaping or orientating people’s behaviour within and across communities.  
As suggested in the previous section, ‘dance’ is a general term for rhythmic or 
patterned movements which give aesthetic pleasure, but a dance form in any culture 
has to be understood in relation to its specific associated meanings or functions, for 
‘dance’ is not a universal category with the same meaning for all cultures. As dance 
anthropologist Adrienne L. Kaeppler has argued, ‘dance’ is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon that includes not only what the spectator may see or hear but also 
hidden and underlying processes under the specific social contexts (Kappler, 2000, 
in Dance Research Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2000, p. 117). “Cultural forms that result 
from the creative use of human bodies in time and space are often glossed as 
‘dance’ (Ibid.),” but movement analyses from anthropological points of view would 
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actually “encompass all structured movement systems, including those associated 
with religious and secular ritual, ceremony, entertainment, martial arts, sign 
languages, sports, and games (Ibid.).” Kaeppler considers these structured 
movement systems as systems of knowledge which are socially and culturally 
constructed, with content that “can be visual manifestations of social relations, the 
subjects of elaborate aesthetic systems, and may assist in understanding cultural 
values and the deep structure of the society (Ibid.).” 
Under the theoretical framework of this thesis, which analyses intangible heritage as 
part of cultural systems, the main interest is on how values and meanings may be 
communicated through a medium such as dance. Dance anthropologist Judith Lynne 
Hanna, who formulates a theory of dance as a form of non-verbal communication, 
sees dance as part of the cultural communication system in which human beings 
deal with problems of social organisation and regulation, discriminate between 
gender, age, social background or group membership and transmit information of 
culture to subsequent generations (Hanna, 1987, p. 64). She has gone so far as to 
develop an elaborate semiotic model to analyse how messages or meanings in 
dance are encoded and decoded between choreographers or dancers and the 
audience. She takes into account socio-cultural contexts as well as dynamics 
between dance expression and sensory perception, based on cognitive structures, 
emotions, communication skills and other factors (Ibid., p. 78). While this thesis does 
not aim to apply such an elaborate semiotic model to its final analysis, it does help to 
concur with Hanna as she argues that there can be polysemy or multiple meanings 
in a non-verbal form of communication like dance, which also often connotes certain 
social relationships among other things in its communicative function (Ibid., p. 89). 
Before looking at what specific social meanings a dance form may represent for a 
culture, let us turn to the question of how dance is an effective medium in 
communicating any value or meaning. Susanne Langer, coming from the philosophy 
of art, has been most influential in this regard in her discussion of the ‘virtual power’ 
created by dance. She sees dance as a ‘symbolic form’, in the senses that it 
manages to stir one’s aesthetic emotions as a symbolic expression, through 
conceptual but non-discursive means. She thus compares dance to a virtual realm of 
power, “not actual, physically exerted power, but appearances of influence and 
agency” (Langer, 1953, p. 175; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 40). Hanna similarly asserts 
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that dance is a symbolic behaviour, which communicates by creating an illusion 
through body locomotion and gesture (Hanna, 1987, p. 39), and she would 
emphasise that this capacity of humans in symbolisation, to “communicate abstract 
concepts, removed from an immediate stimulus, distanced in time and space and in 
deliberately chosen rhythms” (Ibid., p. 60), is what sets the performance of dance by 
human beings apart from ‘dancing’ by animals.   
Social anthropologist Paul Spencer has also cited Langer, in her perspective of 
dance as a virtual “realm of mystic forces” (Langer, 1953, p. 190, cited in Spencer, 
1985, p. 35), whereby a dancer’s world is “a world transfigured, wakened to a special 
kind of life” (Ibid.). But he subsumes this perspective under a theme of dance as 
“ritual drama” (Ibid., p. 27), based on Victor Turner’s concept of the communitas. 
This points to the paradox present in any society where people are divided by social 
inequalities and rivalries, yet at the same time there is a generic human bond that 
unites them, with all humans as mere mortals of a uniform condition. The relevance 
of dance is such that it is not just a highly social and levelling activity that draws 
people together in solidarity, it is also marginal and anomalous, contrasting with 
normal everyday life, taking the dancers out of their structured routine and into a 
realm of timeless charm. Turner’s model, to be discussed in detail later, has an 
affinity with a dream world in which the structure and repressions of everyday 
existence are upturned in a meaningful symbolic pattern, a shift from daily power 
relations to communitas with suspension of normal life. But Spencer would also 
suggest that dance may otherwise be part of a process of self-generation for a 
community, comparing the semi-religious fascination of dancing with Max Weber’s of 
charisma enhancing the moral authority of a leader. Or dance may also be used for 
mounting competition between rival groups, as a form of boundary display. 
Hanna (1987) has combined the two concepts of ritual and power to explore the 
communicative potency of dance. She suggests that dance provides a sense of 
power over the self and others, as a form of expression through which “life forces are 
made manifest and communicated” (Hanna, 1987, p. 128), and hence may be used 
for “validation and re-creation or leadership, competition for power, social control, 
coping with subordination or its threat, constraints on the exercise of power, and 
redress and transformation” (Ibid.). Referring to power as basically “the ability to 
influence others” (Ibid., p. 129), including people’s “predispositions, feelings, 
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attitudes, beliefs and actions” (Ibid.), she discusses the psychological basis for which 
dance may be significant as a symbol of power relationships and politics.  
Firstly, she argues, citing Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) phenomenology of perception, that 
it is through the body that humans express life experiences prior to using other 
material objects in the physical environment (Ibid., p. 130). She therefore says: “The 
simplest form of power is the individual’s own body. Ontogenetically each person 
experiences the discovery and mastery of the body in time, space, and effort 
patterns. (Ibid.)” The human body carries memory rooted in sensory experiences 
along with cultural attitudes, and it is hence not surprising that the body goes from 
being an instrument of physical power to being a symbol of power (Ibid.). Secondly, 
dance has efficacy in representing political thought as it is a multisensory 
phenomenon that combines aspects of vision, motion and emotional impact in its 
communicative expression (Ibid., p. 131). Thirdly, it is through symbols and rituals 
that group perceptions and attitudes are reinforced and internalised as part of a 
mechanism in socialisation and integration (Ibid., pp. 131-132).  
Hanna goes on to cite examples whereby dance is used as an agent of social control, 
to inculcate or maintain political and religious values. The Chinese Communist Army 
has for example used the Yangge (‘Red Sprout Song’) folk dance not only to rally for 
support in rural areas but also to convert the population in the larger coastal cities 
(Ibid., p. 138). Gloria Strauss (1977) has argued that the Chinese government also 
used the demanding and energetic dance form of the European ballet as a symbol of 
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the social equalisation whereby women are active and 
can be superior to men (cited in Ibid.). Similarly, ballet is also used as a metaphor for 
a transformed and egalitarian Cuba, whereby the previously aristocratic art is 
practised by thousands of students, such that the upright posture of the ballet 
dancer’s body is re-interpreted “to reflect the sort of pride exuded by a once-
colonised people now ‘standing tall’ and exerting an impact on international affairs” 
(Copeland, 1978, p. 13; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 139). The Spanish are known to 
have used dance dramas, especially those depicting the struggle of the church 
against its opponents, in order to demonstrate the Christian faith to the Native 
Americans and to convert them (Hanna, 1987, p. 139). In Kenya, war dances are 
held in every district to promulgate a new constitution under a Kikuyu tradition; at the 
1963 ceremony marking Kenya’s independence from Great Britain, President 
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Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, extended the tradition by calling for dances in every district, and 
ethnic groups from all parts of the country also came to the capital of Nairobi to 
dance (Ibid., p. 140).  
Gabriele Klein (2010) similarly observes that dance has been used in the European 
society not only as a form of cultivation of high culture, but also as an external 
representation of state power. She traces social dance or Gesellschaftstanz to the 
12th century in medieval Europe, when a new bourgeoisie class was rising in the 
cities, and the nobilities began to seek a new language of dance that distinguished 
itself from the wild Reigentanz or circle dance of the farmers (Klein, 2010, in Bischof 
and Rosny ed., 2010, p. 127). When Elizabeth I of England held festive ceremonies 
at her court, it was a reflection of a development in the Renaissance period, when 
the nobilities considered dance as part of the learning of good manners (Ibid., p. 
128). Klein cites Norbert Elias (1997) in his theory of civilising processes, that the 
nobilities are forced under threat of their economic and political power to acquire 
codified cultural knowledge through royal academies and assimilate such knowledge 
into part of its sociocultural habitus. She argues that dance plays an important role in 
the internalisation of such norms (Ibid., p. 129). Hence the Courante, which was 
basically a kind of step and hop at the time of Elizabeth I, developed under Louis XIV 
into a geometrically measured dance form that was representative of the court; the 
Menuett also developed at the time of Louis XIV, as another stylised dance form that 
was even more complicated in its variations (Ibid., p. 130). The Menuett became so 
representative in its courtly manners, even after the rise of the Contre-Danse in the 
18th century, that Wilhelm II in the late 19th century would attempt in vain to prescribe 
a renaissance of the Menuett while forbidding from official occasions the waltz which 
had been popularised during the bourgeoisie revolution as a symbol of equality (Ibid., 
p. 131).  
While the abovementioned examples demonstrate how dance has been used to 
civilise members of a cultural community or a nation by symbolising the power of a 
class or group through physical power of the body, we still need to explain the 
process in which dance transmits cultural values as heritage. This brings us to the 
aspect of dance as ritual. Ritual refers to “an extraordinary event involving stylised, 
repetitive behaviour” (Hanna, 1987, p. 129) which in the words of social 
anthropologist Raymond Firth can be understood as a “symbolic mode of 
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communication of ‘saying something’ in a formal way, not to be said in ordinary 
language or informal behaviour” (Firth, 1973, p. 176; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 129). 
Firth’s approach to ritual is, incidentally, one based on the meaning of rituals in 
relation to social tensions rather than to social solidarity.  
The earlier theories of social solidarity with regards to ritual are best represented by 
sociologist Durkheim, who reasoned that rites and ceremonies play an important role 
in society like religion, in terms of periodic opportunities for a social group to 
assemble itself around sacred images that represent the community. Rituals in his 
view are meant to arouse a passionate intensity or feelings of ‘effervescence’, 
whereby individuals experience something larger than themselves (Durkheim, 1965 
[1915], p. 258, cited in Bell, 1997, p. 24). Anthropologist Max Gluckman has however 
argued that Durkheim’s model of ritual as a projected expression of social cohesion 
and unity of the group needs to be modified as it does not do justice to the presence 
of conflict that is built into any society (see Bell, 1997, p. 38). Every social system, 
according to Gluckman, “is a field of tension, full of ambivalence, of co-operation and 
contrasting struggle” (Gluckman, 1963, p. 127; cited in Bell, 1997, Ibid.). Gluckman 
cited the example of Zulu women in agricultural rites, whereby women would boldly 
parade around in men’s clothes and do things which are normally forbidden to them. 
He suggested that these are ritualised rebellions with cathartic effect to release 
social tensions, hence ritual may help affirm unity, but not as a simple expression of 
social cohesion as suggested by Durkheim or Radcliffe-Brown (see Bell, 1997, Ibid.). 
This perspective is similarly seen in Firth’s conclusion that ritual provides for “the 
routinisation and canalisation” of personal and social tensions (cited in Ibid., p. 278). 
But further to this point, Gluckman’s work is significant as it moves away from 
Durkheim’s notion that ritual is primarily concerned with religion or the ‘sacred’. 
Instead, he defines in Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations (1962) that ritual is a 
category of social action covering religious activities in one extreme and social 
etiquette in the other, in the symbolic enactment of social relations (see Ibid., p. 39). 
Gluckman’s work on the ritualisation of social conflict, combined with the work of 
Arnold van Gennep (1909) on how rites of passage serve to order chaotic social 
changes that could otherwise destabilise society, was later developed by Victor 
Turner into an influential analytical model. Turner combined a functionalist interest in 
mechanisms for maintaining social equilibrium with a structural perspective on social 
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organisation of symbolic action, to argue that many forms of ritual serve as ‘social 
dramas’ whereby stresses and tensions built into a social structure could be 
expressed and resolved (Ibid.). Taking the example of his fieldwork among the 
Ndembu of northwestern Zambia, Turner analysed ritual, social order and communal 
strife by taking a cue from van Gennep’s idea of liminality within the three phases of 
rites of passage: separation, margin and reincorporation. He cites van Gennep who 
has shown that all rites of passage or ‘transition’ are marked by these phases: the 
first phase comprises “symbolic behaviour signifying the detachment of the individual 
or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural 
conditions (a “state”), or from both” (Turner, 1969, p. 94); the intervening liminal 
period is where the ritual subject or ‘passenger’ is ambiguous in attributes, neither 
here nor there, as “he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the 
attributes of the past or coming state” (Ibid.); the third phase is where the passage is 
consummated. 
Turner uses the Latin term communitas to refer to the modality of social relationship 
which can be recognised as emerging in the liminal period. In contrast to society as a 
structure, differentiated and often hierarchical in the system of political, legal and 
economic positions, this is “of society as an unstructured or rudimentarily structured 
and relatively undifferentiated comitatus, community or even communion of equal 
individuals who submit together to the general authority of the ritual elders ” (Ibid., p.. 
96). He suggests that social life for individuals and groups is a type of dialectical 
process “that involves successive experience of high and low, communitas and 
structure, homogeneity and differentiation, equality and inequality” (Ibid., p. 97). 
Communitas, as the ‘open society’, works in contrast to structure as the ‘closed 
society’, “in that it is potentially or ideally extensible to the limits of humanity” (Ibid., p. 
112). Communitas may manifest itself as so-called millenarian religious movements 
marked by equality, anonymity and absence of property, but as the impetus 
becomes exhausted, the movement in practice tends to become itself an institution 
with its own norms (Ibid., pp. 111-112). 
Turner hence finds it necessary to distinguish between different modalities or 
historical consequences of communitas: (1) existential or spontaneous communitas, 
similar to what hippies of the time (the 1960s) would call a ‘happening’; (2) normative 
communitas, where through time, under the need to mobilise resources or the need 
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for social control, the existential communitas is organised into a social subsystem; 
and (3) ideological communitas, which refers to a variety of utopian models of 
societies based on existential communitas (Ibid., p. 132). Therefore the use of the 
term ‘anti-structure’ by Turner to describe liminality and communitas, mainly in 
reference to tribal and agrarian society, should not mislead one into understanding it 
as simply a structure reversal or ‘mirror-imaging’ of ‘profane’ socio-economic 
structure, it is rather “the liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, 
creativity, etc., from the normative constraints incumbent upon a sequence of social 
statuses” (Turner, 1982, p. 44), to enact a multiplicity of social roles and be 
conscious of membership some categories of social groups. When persons, groups 
or ideas move from one level or one style of organisation to another, he say, “there 
has to be an interfacial region, or, to change the metaphor, an interval, however brief, 
of margin or limen, when the past is momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, 
and the future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality” (Ibid.; emphasis in 
original). The term limen is incidentally Latin for ‘threshold’, but adapted by van 
Gennep to apply to the idea of transition in rites of passage. Significantly, Turner 
also says: “ ‘Meaning’ in culture tends to be generated at the interfaces between 
established cultural subsystems, though meanings are then institutionalised and 
consolidated at the centres of such systems. (Ibid., p. 41; emphasis in original)”  
Despite the aspect of play in such ritual, this is part of what Durkheim would consider 
as ‘de la vie serieuse’, Turner argues, for they are intrinsically connected with the 
‘work’ of the collectivity in performing symbolic actions so as to promote fertility, 
crops, to cure illness, ensure success in hunting and agriculture and so on (Ibid., p. 
32). He cites the example of the Ndembu Twin Ritual, in which women and men 
abuse one another verbally in a highly sexual and humourous manner, a behaviour 
that serves the ultimate aim of the ritual, which is to produce healthy offspring but not 
too many at once (Ibid.). Turner considers that in relation to liminality in ritual or myth, 
it may be heuristically useful to cite Durkheim’s characterisation of ‘mechanical 
solidarity’, which Durkheim regarded as the achievement of group goals among 
small and non-literate societies with a simple division of labour and little tolerance of 
individuality (Ibid., pp. 41-42). Turner sees the expressive genres of ritual and myth 
as both ‘work’ and ‘play’ at the same time, arguing that the distinction between work 
and leisure may in fact be considered as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution 
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(Ibid., p. 32). He cites Jean Piaget, known for his study on the developmental 
psychology of play, for regarding it as “a kind of free assimilation, without 
accommodation to spatial conditions or to the significance of objects” (Piaget, 1962, 
p. 86; cited in Turner, 1982, p. 34). Hence ritual is both earnest and playful in the 
liminal phases of tribal and agrarian cultures, Turner argues, citing the observation of 
Milton Singer that a Krishna dance in contemporary India would be referred to as lila, 
sport, whereby participants ‘play’ in various ways as ‘Gopis’ or cowherdesses  with  
Krishna, one of the Hindu God Vishnu’s incarnation. It is an erotic love-play with 
mystical implications, as God’s ‘sport’ with the human soul (Singer, 1972, p. 160; 
cited in Turner, 1982, p. 35).  
Citing Turner’s concept of ritual as social drama, Hanna considers that dance-plays 
mediate social relations and political situations through four phases: (1) a breach of 
the norms of a social group; (2) an intensifying crisis; (3) a legal or ritual process for 
redress; and (4) public expression of a schism or a reconciliation (Turner, 1977, p. 
38; Hanna, 1987, p. 172). She relates with this paradigm the example of the 1929 
‘Women’s War’ of the Ubakala, in which ritualised behaviour of dance-play 
communication turned into real feminine protest by Ubakala women that forced the 
British to alter their colonial administration of Eastern Nigeria. Referring to the 
Ubakala dance-play as a metaphor for power that turned into riots, Hanna writes: “A 
dance-play performed to maintain cultural values or to mediate a paradox may 
indeed stimulate a crisis. (Hanna, 1987, p. 178)” Indeed, she argues that the 
symbolic representation of confrontation in dance may lead to actual assaults or 
enhance the dynamics of social relations, religion and politics, especially with warrior 
dances. “Dances, and especially warrior dance, may be a symbol of power 
representing, expressing, and communicating self-control and dominance,” she 
writes (Ibid., p. 180).  
As Fischer-Lichte (2012) notes, the transformative power of ritual as suggested in 
Turner’s theory would eventually be further developed by other scholars like Stanley 
J. Tambiah and characterised in terms of ‘performativity’ (p. 47). The idea of 
performativity makes reference to the conception of ‘speech act’ as formulated by 
John L. Austin based on linguistic philosophy (Ibid.). Fischer-Lichte emphasises that 
transformation made possible through performativity should not be conceived in a 
closed model as Tambiah does, but in an open model (Ibid., p. 48).  
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With respect to social relations, dance as ritual is not only used to heighten solidarity 
and boundary of a social group against others. It may also be used overcome 
cultural boundaries, as argued by Jochen Dreher and Silvana K. Figueroa-Dreher 
(2009), using the example of Tango. They cite Arnold Gehlen (1977) in the argument 
that rituals have an effect as behaviour which becomes collective routines of a social 
group as its form is known and socially sanctioned (Dreher and Figueroa-Dreher, 
2009, in Klein ed., 2009, p. 44). They also cite Turner to describe rituals as a specific 
form of social action that builds a sense of belonging by celebrating the central 
symbols (Ibid., p. 45). With the example of Tango, they claim that the moment of 
‘embrace’ (el abrazo), in which one experience an intimate physical connection by 
dancing navel to navel, even as strangers, is a form of ritual in the venues of 
Milongas which makes possible the inclusion of any person who is culturally an 
outsider (Ibid., p. 47). 
The next chapter will explore how such ritualistic or other aspects of dance may be 
exploited for intercultural dialogue to provide a sense of social cohesion. The 
following subsection will however consider how dance is used as a form of cultural 
heritage at a community level and beyond.  
 
5.2.3 Dance as Heritage  
The preceding subsection has provided some insights on the efficacy of dance in 
transmitting cultural values and evoking some form of social relations in society, 
thereby reflecting a community’s cultural system and socio-cultural system. This 
subsection will consider how dance may be considered as a form of cultural heritage 
according to the three basic senses of heritage as outlined in Section 5.1.1, namely 
heritage as ideals, as things, and as a sense of history or the past. One may hence 
see it as a representing certain achievement in human expressions by way of its 
ideals and physical forms, or by embodying certain memories of the past. At a 
community level or a national level, it also becomes a kind of symbol that serves as 
a marker of identity, while at the same time associated with the relevant ideals in 
cultural values.    
Dance as cultural heritage, being ‘intangible’ in terms of its maintenance through 
performativity instead of materiality, should not be assumed as a simple property of 
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continuity within a cultural communities, as if it is a form of internalised dispositions, 
but instead as a collection of symbolic expressions in a cultural system produced in 
the course of history along with associated ideals. It is, furthermore, to be 
understood through its use by a community as part of institutionalised cultural 
memory under the socio-cultural system. The challenge in maintaining ‘continuity’ of 
a dance heritage, following this dualistic perspective, would lie in the contestation 
between accommodating a plurality of expressions and interpretations on one hand, 
and preserving some particular social or cultural value and identity, as legitimised by 
certain interpretations of history and communicated through representations of the 
past, on the other.  
The first basic question that is underlying this discussion would be: what constitutes 
dance, or other forms of intangible or tangible heritage for that matter, as cultural 
heritage at its most fundamental, its ideal or its form? Following the argument of 
Tilley cited in Section 5.1.1 on material culture, cultural values should not be 
considered as existing prior to dance as a cultural form. As already put forward in 
Susanne Langer’s theoretical perspective, dance may be conceived as a ‘symbolic 
form’. From a perspective of communication, Section 5.2.2 has also explained the 
important aspect of dance being a form of ritualised action with transformative power. 
But even if dance be assumed as a signifier of cultural meanings and by that token 
imagined as secondary to the cultural values which would then be considered the 
‘real’ subject, an application of cross-cultural psychology by way of the theory of 
value orientation according to Talcott Parsons, which assumes values as internalised 
and manifested through one’s action or behaviour, would be too narrow to be helpful 
here. Dance, as argued in the last two sections, should be understood as intentional 
action that is symbolic and communicative, rather than behaviour or psychological 
effect that is affective and unconscious.  
Considered as cultural heritage, dance should furthermore be observed in terms of 
performances and creative works, in the ‘documentary’ sense of culture as “the body 
of intellectual and imaginative work” (Williams, 1961, p. 57), not only in the sense of 
culture as the ‘ideal’ or as the ‘social’ (Ibid.). In a transcultural model, dance heritage, 
by virtue of an indeterminate nature in its performativity, would, on assumption that 
cultural identities and norms are irrelevant over creativity in performances, be best 
explored from a documentary sense of heritage; whereas discussion of dance 
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heritage in a multicultural model would arguably be most fruitful when it considers 
cultural differences in ‘ideal’.  
The next most important question for dance heritage would in fact relate to a 
humanist rather than psychological perspective of culture, pointing to the aspect of 
aesthetic value which is also highlighted in dance theory, going beyond a 
functionalist explanation of dance in social anthropology. One may hence ask, in 
anticipation of challenges in intercultural dialogue through dance heritage as the 
medium: how may the aesthetic values of a dance heritage from a different cultural 
community be evaluated, should it just be accepted as subjective or be understood 
based on the rationality of associated cultural values? A further challenge would be 
how one may deal with polysemy in cultural meanings associated with a dance 
heritage. One answer to these questions would be to consider dance primarily as art, 
with meanings dependent on contexts shaped by institutionalisation, and hence 
susceptible to change in the course of history, as argued by Graham McFee in 
Understanding Dance (1992).    
McFee (1992) contends that it is inadequate to claim that aesthetic judgments in the 
domain of art are merely ‘subjective’. The term ‘subjective’, when taken in the three 
senses of being “private, idiosyncratic and biased” (p. 22), may represent a 
perjorative use of the term, suggesting that it is something bad or wrong (Ibid.). But 
he argues that if the word ‘subjective’ is used to suggest aesthetic judgments can be 
biased or idiosyncratic, it is not a problem since it presupposes the possibility of a 
judgment that is otherwise (Ibid., p. 23). What may be problematic is when the claim 
that subjective judgments are private involves the idea that ‘anything goes’, that 
opposite views of two persons would be equally valid (Ibid.). In contrast, McFee 
defines objective judgments as those that are “public, arguable, amenable to 
reasoning” (Ibid., p. 33). But what complicates the matter is a fourth sense of the 
word ‘subjective’, when it implies personal involvement such that the judgment draws 
on one’s perceptual powers, but the judgment can also be ‘objective’ in the sense of 
developing public judgment (Ibid.). McFee hence maintains that aesthetic education 
should not be considered as a simple contrast to ‘objective’ studies such as science 
and mathematics (Ibid., p. 35).  
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McFee then makes a further distinction between what may be called ‘aesthetic’ 
judgment in general including for objects of nature, and artistic judgment. The 
difference for a spectator is between seeing an object under concepts appropriate to 
the merely aesthetic, and bringing to bear on the object concepts which are 
appropriate to the appreciation of art, such as form, style and meaning (Ibid., p. 42). 
He cites as example a similar argument made by David Best with the example of 
dance performance by classical Indian dancer Ram Gopal, that though he was 
enthralled by the quality of the dance movements, it was clear that his “appreciation 
was of the aesthetic, not the artistic” (Best, 1978, p. 115; cited in McFee, 1992, p. 
43). McFee (1992) further argues that art is not only an intentional activity but also 
has a conventional character, such that the judgment of works of art has a ‘learned’ 
character (p. 44). As it is, dance as human action already has to be understood in its 
context as something that is rule-governed or rule-related (Ibid., p. 52), in contrast 
with any sequence of movements by apes or machines (Ibid., p. 56). McFee in short 
maintains an institutional concept of art, which would consequently also mean that 
art has a historical character, whereby “the meaning of a work of art at one particular 
time may be different from that which it has at some other time, solely in virtue of 
theoretical changes (Ibid., p. 84). Following this perspective, dance heritage may be 
taken to refer simply to all the artistic expressions of any individual, group or 
community in the form of dance that may be relevant knowledge as part of a cultural 
system.  
A third layer of understanding with regards to dance heritage however would go 
beyond the question of aesthetic value in dance, to consider dance beyond being an 
art form on its own, in its ‘larger’ social context. One may ask the question: what 
social or other values may be attached to dance as heritage of a community or 
nation within the structure of a socio-cultural system, and how may that relate to the 
question of social or cultural identity?  
Such questions would be extrinsic to the discussion of dance as art from the 
perspective of McFee, who has criticised the approach of viewing dance as having 
different functions which reflect on the various societies. He borrows the remark by 
Peter Fuller (1980) that art criticism in the 1970s had left an ‘art-shaped’ hole by 
speaking of many things which relate to art but not about art itself, to argue that “[t]he 
same seems to be true of much sociological writing about art in general and about 
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dance in particular” (McFee, 1992, p. 295) by sidelining the aesthetic and artistic 
dimensions of dance.  
However, these questions are relevant when considering how, as discussed in the 
preceding subsection, dance has been used as a way to civilise members of a 
society and provide them with a sense of place in the social structure. They are also 
relevant if one considers how significantly dance heritage may be used to represent 
identity of a community or a nation. It is therefore worth turning attention to the 
phenomenon of national dance forms, especially how their representation through 
national dance companies has been used in the 20th century by modern nation-
states to embody their nations (Shay, 2002, p. 26).  
Shay cites sociologist Craig Calhoun in observing how ‘naturalness’ of the nation-
state as an entity has come to be seen as stable and immutable (Calhoun, 1995, p. 
283; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 26). Calhoun writes: “This construction of ‘cultures,’, 
‘societies,’ and ‘nations’ as basic units of modern collective identity and of 
comparative social science research has significant implications. In the first place, it 
implies that each one is somehow discrete and subsists as an entity unto itself rather 
than only as a part of a world system or some other broader social organisation or 
discourse that defines it as a constituent unit or part. This boundedness is suggested, 
in large part, by the sharp boundedness of modern states; the ideology of 
nationalism promotes the notion that each has its own singular culture (and vice 
versa). (Calhoun, 1995, pp. 53-54; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 27)” Shay also cites 
anthropologist Herzfeld in observing that nationalism is “directly predicated on 
resemblance, whether biogenetic or cultural. The pivotal idea is that all citizens are, 
in some unarguable sense, all alike (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 27; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 
29)”. Hence it is not surprising that essentialism, as epitomised by presentations of 
national dance companies becomes a strategy representation of the State, Shay 
argues (2002, p. 30). He quotes Herzfeld in the observation of how essentialism 
operates on two different levels of both the State and the People, for it is “always the 
one thing it claims not to be: it is a strategy, born […] of social and historical 
contingency. The agents of powerful state entities and the humblest of local social 
actors engage in the strategy of essentialism to an equal degree (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 
31; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 30).”  
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Shay cites the example of how the Ballet Folklorico de Mexico under its founding 
director and choreographer Amalia Hernandez has successfully provided a 
representation of Mexico on the world stage. He notes that in her company’s 
performances both at home and abroad, Hernandez “chose to send a tourist’s 
picture-postcard to her foreign audiences and warm familiar images that evoked 
home and belonging in her home audiences (Shay, 2002, p. 87). This impression 
made a very deep impact on the Mexican-American audiences in the early 1960s 
and created a sense of pride and awareness among the Chicano community, 
resulting in “vociferous demand for the creation of scores of Ballet Folklorico look-
alike dance companies” (Ibid.).   
The performances and repertoire of the Ballet Folklorico were significant for the 
strategic role they play in representing the politics of identity in Mexico. They “set off 
heated discussions in the national discourse of Indianness versus Spanishness, 
which has dominated Mexican political and social life for the past four centuries. This 
discourse of mestizaje (racial mixing) intersects along lines of race, class, gender, 
and political and economic empowerment (Ibid., p. 88)”. In print, Amalia Hernandez 
consciously claimed to celebrate both her Spanish and Indian heritages, identifying 
herself as a Mestiza (Ibid., p. 89) But in fact, Shay argues, she had, in a way parallel 
to most other colleagues directing national companies, created a representation of 
Mexico that was acceptable and appealing to the upper-middle-class elite of Mexico 
City, rather than populations outside of the capital where there were no political and 
economic benefits (Ibid.). This is not to mention that the adoption of a Mestizo 
identity would also imply for the native the giving up of one’s cultural heritage such 
as language, lifestyle and clothing (Ibid., p. 90). 
In some cases, not only does the issue of class play a role in determining what form 
of dance expression is to be depicted on stage. There may also be modernist 
interpretations, often indicative of colonialist morality, on how a culture should be like, 
for the example of the nationalist Reda Troupe of Egypt (Ibid., p. 135). Shay would 
describe the resulting dance form in Hobsbawm’s terms as an ‘invented tradition’ 
(Ibid.).  
One part of the story is how belly dancers were frowned upon under attitudes of 
Victorian British morality which continued despite nationalism, with the respectability 
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of the new upper classes as well as the Islamists (Ibid.). Hence as Armbrust (1996, p. 
38) observed of post-1952 Egypt, “Heritage is not simply there, but something to be 
properly organised. Vulgarity should be struck from the record and the folk be 
admitted to Egypt’s heritage on condition of ‘authenticity’. (cited in Shay, 2002, pp. 
135-136).” Shay (2002) argues that one cannot attribute the attitude entirely to 
religion, even though Muslim fundamentalists have targeted belly dancers with 
physical threats and effectively changed the professional dance scene in Cairo (p. 
139); there is after all no specific proscription of dance in the Koran per se while 
hints in the hadith are ambiguous, and Muslims in Indonesia, Iran and Turkey have 
varied widely in attitudes towards dance (Ibid.). With regards to Egyptian dance or 
raqs sharqi (Oriental or Eastern dance), otherwise known as belly dance, there is 
nothing particular shameful about the dance movements on their own, despite 
common misunderstanding, and it is performed by both men and women under 
different genres (Ibid., p. 141). It is however considered dishonourable for a woman 
to perform it in front of males of not proper kinship by reason of Islamic law, whereas 
dancing at weddings is common, except they “should wear respectable clothes and 
move within proper limits” (Van Nieuwkerk , 1995; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 141). 
With the Reda Troupe created in 1959, which even came directly under the Ministry 
of Culture in 1961, the choreographer Mahmoud Reda “felt compelled create a new 
hybrid genre of dance to fit in with the modernist version of folklore” (Shay, 2002, p. 
145) in order to attract audiences and support from the elite classes (Ibid.). One 
major modification he made was to exclude males from performance of belly dance 
movements, “thus following the colonial gaze, now shared by the elite decision 
makers in the Egyptian government, of what constitutes proper and improper 
movements for the male” (Ibid., p. 148). Instead, he would create a male style of 
movements for the Fellahin men of Delta based on everyday work movements (Ibid.). 
Secondly, he also sanitised belly dancing of movements he found sexually 
suggestive (Ibid.) Thirdly, he employed the use of groups and removed solo-
improvised dancing although belly dancing had always been associated with soloists 
(Ibid., p. 149).  
Mahmoud Reda would say in an interview in 2000 that he did not follow any example 
in his staging: “What I did was my own invention. Artists throughout Egypt follow me. 
They think it is authentic. (Ibid., p. 145).” The final element that sets his work from 
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traditional Egyptian dance practices is his choreography, for instance in a work 
entitled Al-ginniyat al-bahr (The Mermaid), which follows the type of narration 
common to fairy tales of 19th-century European ballet (Ibid., p. 151). But Reda set 
such a trend that even the National Folklore Troupe founded separately in 1961, 
which travels widely, can be described as “very much a company in the Mahmoud 
Reda mold” (Ibid., p. 152). Interestingly, there is also a raqs sharqi community of 
more than one million women in the United States, an overseas community not of 
Egyptian origin but connected via websites, conventions and workshops, with “no 
wish to replicate actual folkloric practices from the field, but rather seek the 
spectacularised choreographic theatre genres of Egyptian choreographers such as 
Mahmoud Reda” (Ibid., p. 161). Shay likens this phenomenon to Anderson’s 
‘imagined community’ (Ibid.).  
The representation of a national identity through ‘dance heritage’ not only implicates 
the privileging of certain upper or middle class values and identity in the case of 
single ethnic nation-states; it is also problematic when state-sponsored national folk 
dance ensembles are used to represent multi-ethnic nation states (Shay, 2008a, p. 
166). Shay argues furthermore that there are typically four types of representation in 
such repertoire: firstly, positive representations, for example the way the Aztecs are 
portrayed as a noble people in Amalia Hernandez’s choreography, without reference 
made to their horrific sacrificial rites; secondly, ‘quaint’, ‘exotic’ or ‘primitive’ 
representation of a minority ethnic group, such as the Yaqui Deer Dance depicting 
the Yaquis as primitive, in contrast to the festive Mestizo dances representing Jalisco 
or Vera Cruz; thirdly, negative choreographic images to reinforce majority prejudices 
towards unpopular ethnic groups, such as the portrayal of Gypsies by Kolo, the 
Serbian State Folk Dance Ensemble; and finally, no representation, like the omission 
of the 10 per cent Turkish population in the Bulgarian State Ensemble of Folk Songs 
and Dances (Ibid., pp. 166-167). 
These different modes of choreographic representation would often be mixed for the 
effect of contrast as a form of ‘othering’, for example in the Moiseyev Company 
performances, in which “the Russians are noble, proud, and elegant, while the 
Lithuanians or Latvians are quaint peasants” (Ibid., p. 167). Similarly, one may 
analyse how the Serbian identity versus the ethnic minorities is represented in the 
repertoire of Kolo in the 1980s.  Shay stresses that this is not due to any evil notion 
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of hatred harboured towards any specific group, but rather that “individual 
choreographers, in undertaking the state imperative to represent the various 
ethnicities within their repertoires, turned to unmediated, pre-existing stereotypes 
that already floated freely in Serbian society to create the choreographic images” 
(Ibid., p. 170). Hence in a 1987 video of Kolo, one sees in the opening sequences 
that dancers’ faces are shown in a ‘heroic’ mode and juxtaposed with Serbian 
Orthodox icons of saints, whereas in a representation of the Albanians, one sees 
austere costumes and dancers with a noble demeanour suggesting that they are 
‘noble savages’ (Ibid., p. 171).  Another dance depicts the Muslims of the Sandjak as 
exotic, in an orientalist way similar to Hollywood and Broadway musicals, with a 
feminised culture calling to mind the notion of harem women sitting around all day 
(Ibid.). The Gypsies on the other hand “are shown as childlike, indolent, over-sexed” 
(Ibid.), with clichés like a Gypsy wagon, a camp fire and patchwork clothes, 
concluding with a man running his hand up a woman’s leg under the skirt, indicating 
a night of passion ahead (Ibid., p. 172).   
Shay argues that these choreographic images have the effect of establishing the 
minority ethnic groups as lower ‘Others’ in Serbian society. He ventures to ask: “To 
what degree can such negative, disparaging depictions of the ‘Other’ permit and 
encourage the excesses of ethnic cleansing that characterised Serbian civil life 
during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia? (Ibid.)” 
In his analysis of state folk dance ensembles, Shay is mainly concerned with the 
politics in representation of national identity, which involves the ‘strategy’ of 
essentialism as Herzfeld calls it, often involving the idea of authenticity: “The artistic 
directors and choreographers of most dance companies that perform traditional 
dances expend a great deal of time conducting research, or conversely, at least 
attempting to justify and show their works to be ‘authentic’. (Shay, 2002, p. 36)” But 
one may emphasise a further dimension tied to the representation of identity, which 
may be positive or negative as Shay mentions, and that is the aspect of moral value 
that is often bundled with identity through essentialisation. Herzfeld (1997) has said: 
“The terms for cultural identity assume a certainty hitherto denied them by the 
experiential exigencies of social life. Nationalistic reification of these terms reverses 
the contextual sensitivity appropriate and necessary to their use as terms of personal, 
moral evaluation; they become instead the technical vocabulary of a fixed political 
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order. (p. 43)” He added: “Ultimately, the language of national is indeed a language 
of morality. It is an encoded discourse about inclusion and exclusion. (Ibid.)” This 
can be underscored by the example of the former Yugoslavia as analysed by Shay.  
Shay (2002) maintains that there is a complexity of specific contexts in the formation 
of state folk dance ensembles, tied to discourses of not just nationalism alone but 
everything from ethnicity, religion, gender, class, race to colonialism, which one may 
analyse in performances with regards to the “unspoken aspects of these discourses” 
(p. 225). The theatricalised versions of social and ritual dances, which create a 
sense of authenticity by drawing on village practices in aspects of music, costumes 
and movements of folk and traditional dances ‘in the field’, are more effective as 
political statements than modern dance developed as high elite art, because they 
can claim to represent the masses and they also reach out to larger numbers of 
audience members as entertainment (pp. 226-227). By this argument, one also sees 
how dance forms that claim authenticity in traditional elements may be more readily 
accepted as ‘cultural heritage’ than choreographic works which are more associated 
with creativity of individuals.    
Not that there would be no multiple interpretations for any dance that may be classed 
as heritage, given that dance is polysemic by nature as discussed earlier. There are 
often conflicting historical interpretations of what is identified as a single 
phenomenon of dance, an interesting example being the case of flamenco dance in 
Spain. The multiplicity of identities involved in flamenco may be discerned in how the 
dance heritage is described in all all-inclusive manner under the Nomination File in 
2010 for its inscription into the representative list of UNESCO intangible heritage: 
“Flamenco baile is a dance of passion, of courtship, and a wide range of situations 
expressing individual sadness and joy. It has its own aesthetic, and is based on a 
complex technique. The form differs depending on whether the performer is a man 
(heavier use of the feet) or a woman (gentler, more sensual movements). Its 
diversity depends on aspects of music, choreography (structured or spontaneous), 
geography (local schools) and content (festive and dramatic). (UNESCO, 2010, pp. 
4-5)”  
Hayes (2009) has argued with regards to 20th-century historical accounts of 
flamenco that they not merely differ in the mapping of its evolution, but also serve as 
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a form of representation which “constitutes the reader as a subject of ideology” (p. 
43). She bases this argument on Althusser’s (1971) idea of a tautological 
relationship between ideology and the subject, whereby ideology according to her 
may be understood as “the process by which the individual locates him or herself in 
a field of relationships, including the family, religion, law, and culture” (Hayes, 2009, 
p. 43). She cites Althusser as saying that “the peculiarity of ideology is that it is 
endowed with a structure and functioning such as to make it a non-historical reality, 
i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are 
immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history” (in Adams 
and Searle eds, 1986, p. 240; cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 44). Such ‘truths’ appear as 
constant and unchanging independent of material conditions, and hence Althusser 
ironically states: “Ideology has no history. (in Adams and Searle eds, 1986, p. 239; 
cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 44)” Hayes observes this in how historical discourses on 
flamenco dance compete in speaking ‘the authority of reality itself’ with regards to 
gender, race and class (Hayes, 2009, p. 46). Hence accounts of foreign flamenco 
aficionados also reflected “the social and political tensions that endow dancing 
bodies with their problematic corporealities” (Ibid., p. 73), echoing “the modernist 
dualities of masculine vs. feminine, expression vs. technique, and gypsy vs. 
Spaniard” (Ibid.). 
As with the general case of heritage, dance with all the conflicting values that it 
entails may also be discussed in a framework of human rights. Jackson and Shapiro-
Phim (2008) have argued that dance has a multi-layered power and hence may be 
used either to uphold or subdue the dignity of individuals and their civil, political, 
economic and cultural rights: “Dance holds the power to create a sense of 
community and shared perspective, displays sensuality and sexuality, embodies 
memories in a tangible medium, sustains and communicates cultural values that are 
held dear to a group, and expresses deeply felt emotions, including the agony of loss 
and the exuberance of life and/or transcendence of spirit. (p. xix)” While dance may 
be used to bridge diverse communities and to provide avenues for cultural 
expressions, it has also been subjected to artistic restrictions or used to promote 
repressive ideologies (Ibid., p. xv).  
Dance may therefore be used as a space of resistance, as seen in occasions where 
Iranian women have performed solo improvised dance, in a sign of defiance against 
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a regime where permission for such dance does not exist (Shay, 2008b, pp. 77-80). 
In Chile, the national dance cueca, which symbolises the romantic interlude between 
a man and a woman, has been re-created as cueca sola as a powerful metaphor for 
Chilean women to represent the detained and disappeared (Agosin, 2008, pp. 297-
298). But dance may also be used as a tool of subjugation of the individual, as seen 
in the example of animation politique, a compulsory activity of political enculturation 
in Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko, ostensibly drawing on dance from 
ancient Congolese traditions (Huckstep, 2008, pp. 51-52, 62). Citing the example of 
German modern dance during the Nazi period, Marion Kant (2008) would even raise 
the question of to what extent the manipulation of dancers as instruments, subjected 
to the will of the choreographer, may challenge our understanding of human rights by 
being a form of ‘practical imperative’ (p. 16).   
While this thesis does not take a rights-based argument as its point of departure, the 
issue of conflicting cultural values in the context of ethics will remain pertinent to the 
question of what constitutes intercultural dialogue. The next chapter will move on to 
explore how dance heritage may be used as a medium for intercultural dialogue, in a 
transcultural as well as a multicultural context of society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
317 
 
6. DANCE HERITAGE AS MEDIUM FOR INTERCULTURAL 
DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE 
This chapter will explore the use of dance heritage as a medium for intercultural 
dialogue, by contrasting two different approaches, one based on the transcultural 
model, and the other based on the multicultural model. This follows from discussion 
in preceding chapters with regards to the difference between these two models in 
their approach to intercultural dialogue. What has been outlined in still a generally 
under-theorised manner in the field of heritage will now be examined with a specific 
focus on dance as cultural heritage.  
The first section in the chapter will discuss intercultural dialogue in the specific 
context of dance as cultural heritage, under a transcultural model which may be 
understood in short as a strategy of overcoming differences in cultural identity. It will 
lead to questions as to whether one may be dealing with hybridity in cultural 
expressions and whether that may serve only to obfuscate cultural differences. The 
second section will consider intercultural dialogue in a multicultural model, whereby 
cultural differences in values and norms among different communities may have to 
be acknowledged. It will test the intercultural communication framework of Culture 
Assimilator in its potential and limitations as a heuristic approach for intercultural 
dialogue. The challenge is to adapt it in such a way so as not to stereotype the 
behaviour of members from a different cultural community for a sense of control and 
comfort in encountering the other, but instead simply to use critical situations as a 
basis to detect potential conflicts and learn about the rationality behind what are 
perceived as different cultural standards.  
Among other dance forms, examples involving Indian dance heritage will be 
highlighted in the first subsection in relation to a transcultural model for intercultural 
dialogue. This is to provide a contrast to the multicultural model of intercultural 
dialogue that follows in the next subsection, involving Indian dance heritage in 
Singapore. With the focus on Singapore as case study, this chapter will serve as the 
final test in this thesis on the hypothesis that dance as heritage can serve as a 
medium for intercultural dialogue, be it in the sense of promoting social cohesion or 
in the sense of liberal learning under the ideals of autonomy and value pluralism.  
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For the purpose here, intercultural dialogue with dance heritage as medium will refer 
to any interaction or exchange between people of different cultural communities, 
including artistes, spectators and participants, whereby one may achieve some form 
of intercultural learning or engage in some creative process through the medium of 
dance heritage. 
6.1 Dance as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Transcultural Model 
This section will review how dance heritage has been used in the globalised world in 
a way that transcends national, ethnic and cultural boundaries, and examine the 
assumption that this would contribute to a sense of social cohesion in an inclusive 
society, or to pluralism of values. It will consider the implications in various strategies 
of overcoming differences in cultural identity through dance, such as whether it might 
yet involve some form of essentialisation or dominance of a capitalistic logic, as 
dance heritage is taken out of its original context for theatrical effects.  
The theoretical basis here for a transcultural model in intercultural dialogue will 
largely refer to the work of Russian philosopher Mikhail N. Epstein. The significance 
of Epstein’s perspective may be appreciated not merely in terms of highlighting 
fluidity in cultural identity for individuals but also in the emphasis on creative 
interaction between cultural systems. As opposed to a multicultural framework, 
where “differences are often promoted for their own sakes, resulting in a kind of 
cultural levelling that may transform differences into their exact opposite, leading to a 
relativistic and cynical ‘indifference’ among cultures” (Berry and Epstein, 1999, p. 3), 
a transcultural approach aims instead to “assert the fundamental insufficiency and 
incompleteness of any culture and thus its need for radical openness to and dialogue 
with others” (Ibid.).  
This perspective may acknowledge multiculturalism as “right in asserting the natural 
origins and physical essences of existing cultures” (Epstein, 1999a, p. 85), but at the 
same time sees a complementary position in deconstruction from postmodern theory 
by serving to demystify such origins and essences. His argument follows the view of 
Mamardashvili (1992), who sympathises with multiculturalism as a form of liberation 
from a monolithic culture but stresses the right to live beyond one’s culture, to “take a 
step transcending one’s own surrounding, native culture and milieu not for the sake 
of anything else” (p. 336; cited in Epstein, 1999, p. 82). To Epstein, deconstruction, 
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“followed to its logical end, opens in its every object the capacity to endlessly 
reconstruct and redefine itself” (Epstein, 1999a, p. 80), but no escape or 
deterritorialisation would be possible without the initial territory of ethnicity, hence 
“[o]rigins need to be clearly stated in order to be vigorously transcended” (Ibid., p. 
83).   
In Epstein’s perspective, transcultural thinking is not meant to produce new 
categories of identity, but should move beyond the notion of identity, whether it is a 
single, double, multiple or hybridised identity (1999b, p. 94). He argues that while a 
person of mixed ethnic backgrounds or an immigrant might try to “substantiate 
his/her new identity through the synthesis of two or three cultural traditions” (Ibid.), it 
is problematic to understand what Homi Bhabha refers to as the ‘third zone’ in such 
a way, for “transculture questions the very principle of zoning” (Ibid.). He points out: 
“The attempts to annunciate still another zone or identity actually reinforces the 
traditional way of thinking ‘zones’ and ‘segments’ by dividing and multiplying this 
category rather than transcending it. (Ibid.)” It appears that Epstein is suggesting one 
may speak of the historic origins of cultural systems based on ethnicity, but sees no 
usefulness in any notion of cultural identity for individuals.   
The second thrust of Epstein’s transcultural theory involves pushing the principle of 
difference to the next stage of self-differentiation, following the work of Jacques 
Derrida on differance (Ibid., p. 97). Cultures are not considered here as enclosed 
and self-sufficient entities to be tolerated, but incomplete each on their own, such 
that the question at stake is “whether they can be creatively involved with one 
another” (Ibid.).Epstein calls this type of relationship ‘interference’, which may be 
taken as a maturation of self-differentiation (Ibid., p. 99).  
With these two components of transculturalism in mind, one may note how the idea 
of transcending one’s cultural identity has figured prominently as a major motif or 
strategy in existing discussion on how dance heritage may contribute to intercultural 
dialogue. One example is the book entitled Intercultural Communication and Creative 
Practice: Music, Dance, and Women's Cultural Identity, edited by Laura Lengel 
(2005). Noting that much work in intercultural communication has been limited by an 
essentialisation of culture and culture identity (Lengel, 2005, p. 11), she argues for 
introduction of perspectives from performance studies to explore the potential of 
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dance and music in overcoming differences, as dance and music “can have 
tremendously different cultural interpretations in the public versus the private sphere” 
(Ibid., p. 9). Insisting on the “fluid, constitutive nature” (Ibid., p. 11) of culture, she 
argues that cultural identity is multi-faceted, not synonymous with nation or national 
identity as how it tends to be essentialised in much of the discourse within 
intercultural communication (Ibid.), but instead encompassing differences in gender, 
ethnicity and class, which “all constitute one’s cultural heritage(s), and all unite to 
provide the essences of creative and communicative practices” (Ibid., p. 12). She 
cites Bhabha in arguing that “[p]erformance and creativity create spaces where one 
can explore the ‘inter’ or ‘in-betweenedness’ of culture and cultural identity” (Ibid., p. 
11).  
Albright (2005) adds to the argument by questioning if a multicultural model in the 
presentation of dance will provide any ‘authentic’ perspective of original cultural 
contexts. She cites the example of a 1990 Los Angeles Festival called “People of the 
Pacific” featuring everything from Korean Shamans, a Hawaiian dancer, Australian 
Aborigines to Javanese dance and a collaborative performance of the Mahabharata 
epic by Kathak and Bharata Natyam dancers including many trained in the Indian 
communities within the United States (p. 51). She says that despite programme 
notes and educational opportunities, “there was clearly no way one could possibly 
pin down an ‘appropriate’ – much less an ‘authentic’ – perspective on these 
performances” (Ibid., p. 52), and she wonders “[whether] having travelled across the 
Pacific to this monster of late capitalistic art engineering, many of these ‘traditional’ 
forms would ever again carry the same meanings, even in their original contexts” 
(Ibid.). She argues for deconstructing the notion of cultural context, given the current 
moment of global intersection where cultures are “rarely stable or knowable 
containers” (Ibid.). She hence sees it as a sensible strategy for dancers “to present 
their dancing bodies as sources of gendered, racial, and sexual identities that can 
disrupt traditional visions of culture and respective contexts” (Ibid.), and observes 
that dislocation has in fact often become a central theme among choreographers 
(Ibid.).  
Furthermore, Albright contends that in addition to cultural identity that may be 
represented in dance, there is also a ‘somatic identity’ involved, “the experience of 
one’s physicality” (Ibid., p. 53). It is this “slippage between the living body and its 
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cultural representation” (Ibid.), not just the token representation of culture or ethnicity 
through one’s physical body, that produces interesting work. A wonderful sense of 
liberation can hence be derived from the fluidity of exchanges in a choreography 
which “questions or challenges which cultures belong to which bodies” (Ibid., p. 53). 
Albright also invokes Judith Butler’s notion of a performative identity, whereby 
identity is seen as a process of ‘becoming’ that is continually in motion without 
beginning or end (Ibid., p. 57). An example cited is the 1995 ‘Reverdance’ 
performance by Congolese-Canadian dancer Zab Maboungou, in which she 
constantly varies her choreographic phrase and resists recognisable shapes and 
iconographic movements, thus disturbing the dynamic of the traditional gaze and 
also resists commodification, according to Albright (Ibid.). Albright’s perspective may 
hence be interpreted as being in line with Epstein’s philosophy of a transcultural 
model in intercultural dialogue, which aims not to produce a new identity as hybrid 
per se, but to engender differentiation and interference. 
However, one may have to be careful as to how the idea of interference may be 
applied to dance heritage as a form of intercultural dialogue. The discussion to 
ensue below will involve setting the idea of ‘interculturalism’ as advocated by Richard 
Schechner, as well as a more recent formulation of ‘world dance’, against Epstein’s 
ideal of transculturalism. It will be argued that ultimately one cannot omit the issue of 
power, such that no form of ‘fusion’ dance should be automatically equated with 
transculturalism and liberation without contextualising, and one should also be 
careful about privileging any particular idea of modernity as universal.  
The term 'interculturalism' was first coined in the 1970s by New York-based theatre 
director Richard Schechner, who founded ‘performance studies’ as an academic field. 
He set it in contrast to 'internationalism', as he “felt that the real exchange of 
importance to artists was not that among nations, which really suggests official 
exchanges and artificial kinds of boundaries, but the exchange among cultures” 
(Pavis, 1996, p. 42). He also compared it to multicultural performances, whereby 
each cultural or ethnic group retains its distinct features as pure forms, and fusion, 
which goes one step further by mixing elements of two or more cultures “to a degree 
that a new society, language or genre of art emerges (Schechner, 1991, p. 30; cited 
in Loots, 2005, pp. 38). Interculturalism, on the other hand, is described by him as an 
open-ended fashion of performances:  
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Interculturalism differs from both multiculturalism and fusion, Interculturaists 
refuse utopian schemes, refuse to cloak power arrangements and struggles. 
Instead, interculturalists probe the confrontations, ambivalences, disruptions, 
fears, disturbances and difficulties when and where cultures collide, overlap 
and pull away from each other. Interculturalists explore misunderstandings, 
broken messages and failed translations – what is not pure and what cannot 
successfully fuse. These are seen not as disasters but as fertile rifts of 
creative possibilities. Where multiculturalism falters, where fusion does not 
occur, interculturalism happens. (Ibid.) 
Schechner's writings on interculturalism, along with similar Western use of ritual and 
techniques in theatre drawn from Africa, Asia, Native America and elsewhere, have 
however been criticised by Bharucha (1990) for their “ambivalent ethics of cross-
cultural borrowings” (p. 13). He criticised Schechner’s ethnocentric assumptions in 
his idea of borrowing from other cultures thus stated: “People didn't question too 
much whether or not this interculturalism – this affection for Kathakali exercises, the 
precision of Noh drama, the simultaneity and intensity of African dance – was a 
continuation of colonialism, a further exploitation of other cultures. There was 
something simply celebratory about discovering how diverse the world was, how 
many performance genres there were, and how we could enrich our own  experience 
by borrowing, stealing, exchanging. (Schechner, 1982, p. 19; cited in Bharucha, 
1990, p. 14)” Bharucha (1990) considers it “a naïve and unexamined ethnocentricity” 
(p. 14) as “the borrowing, stealing and exchanging from other cultures is not 
necessarily an ‘enriching’ experience for the cultures themselves. (Ibid.)”. His 
criticism of interculturalism is echoed by Andree Grau, who notes:  
It would be naïve to see interculturalism as an overriding global phenomenon 
that transcends the differences of class, race, and/or history. The implications 
for interculturalism are not the same for people in impoverished countries as 
for people in technologically advanced societies.  
(Grau, 1992, p. 17; cited in Chakravorty, 2010, p. 274)  
If Bharucha’s concerns with equitability in cultural exchange under ‘interculturalism’ 
touches on issues of group rights or the need of respect for cultural meanings in the 
heritage of performing arts, it is not surprising that a more sympathetic view, as 
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expressed by Loots (2005), would come from a more liberal position to focus on how 
such intercultural performances provide a strategy “to celebrate the power of the 
body to resist hegemony” (p. 37). She also defends Schechner against Bharucha’s 
severe criticism by citing the former’s own acknowledgement of the “immense 
difficulty of making and understanding art that draws on many traditions without 
privileging any” (Schechner, 1991, p. 136; cited in Loots, 2005, p. 28). In reference to 
Foucault’s (1981) articulation on the body as a site of struggle for meaning and 
power, she sees a need to challenge the racially constructed ownership of dance, 
whereby ‘black dancing bodies’ for instance may be held back in cultural stereotypes 
of traditional and ritual dance while black women may not yet find a voice and space 
to articulate their concerns of racial victimhood (Loots, 2005, pp. 34-36). She cites 
the example of Jayesperi Moopen, a female Johannesburg-based choreographer of 
Indian descent, who has attempted to make black male dance practitioners learn the 
complex movements of Bharatha Natyam and let them work alongside classically 
trained Indian female dancers. Even though the work may seemingly remain 
‘multicultural’ in Schechner’s definition as it has not invented any new language, 
Loots argues that Moopen has managed to ‘probe the confrontation’ between South 
African and Indian cultures (Ibid., p. 39) by challenging cultural stereotypes in 
classical Indian dance. She also cites the work Untitled (1998) by Jay Pather, which 
makes references to his cultural heritage as Diaspora South African Indian through 
the costumes for two male dancers and their chanting and singing, but also creates 
ambiguity with notions of racial, gender and cultural identities (Ibid., p. 42).  
In comparing the above two positions on ‘interculturalism’ as promoted by Schechner, 
one may return to the two aspects of a transcultural model in intercultural dialogue 
as outlined by Epstein and assess the implications for dance heritage. The question 
pertaining to the first aspect would be how such interculturalism helps to transcend 
cultural identities. For Loots, the point is not to create any hybrid identity out of the 
dancing body which “wears the embodiment, through colour and sex, of much of our 
physical identity” (Ibid., p. 44), but to confront the past and present of dance history 
or heritage through articulation, “to disrupt and rest closed and narrow definitions of 
who we are so that we can produce discourses that challenge the normalised and 
naturalised power relations around issues of race, gender and culture” (Ibid.). In 
other words, the significance of interculturalism in Loots’ view lies not in the creation 
324 
 
of hybrid forms visually, but in the context of struggle against the power of social 
structures governing identities which may be embodied in the dancing body. To wit, 
one does not seek to transcend cultural identities for its own sake, or one may end 
up reinforcing them as the reified subject in the ‘attempts to annunciate’, as Epstein 
has pointed out.  
Further to this, an issue relating to the second aspect of Epstein’s transcultural 
model would be the question of creativity. Here, one needs to query whether 
creativity may be equated with the production of visual spectacles relying on the mix 
and match of traditional dance forms as a new privileged mould of aesthetics.    
The concerns of Bharucha with interculturalism in theatrical practice come in fact 
from similar premises, as seen in his critique of Lear, an intercultural production 
which premiered in Singapore in 1999, incorporating performance traditions drawn 
from different parts of Asia such as Noh, Chinese opera, Silat, Thai dance and so on. 
Bharucha contextualises it against a concept that parallels transculturalism, namely 
the quest for an ‘Open Culture’ as envisioned by Kuo Pao Kun, Singapore’s paternal 
figure in the theatre scene and prominent cultural commentator, whereby ‘language’ 
and ‘race’ as conflated in Singapore’s official policy can be detached (Bharucha, 
2000, p. 12). Kuo exhorts Singaporeans to abandon their status as ‘cultural orphans’ 
under the predicament of living with fragments of their inherited ethnic cultures while 
kept apart from other communities in the multiracial state (Kuo, 1998, p. 53; cited in 
Bharucha, 2000, p. 11), to “leave the orphanage to start creating a new cultural 
parentage for themselves. History has proved that there is no way they could 
reconnect back to their former parent cultures per se. However, having lost their own 
– cut loose and therefore set free – they have thus become natural heirs to all the 
cultures of the world. (Ibid., p. 61; cited in Bharucha, 2000, p. 12).   
Lear, a production which saw a $1.5 million budget supported by the Japan 
Foundation Asia Center as chief investor, and the appreciation of Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong as its Chief Guest of Honour, was directed by Ong Keng 
Sen, who considers Kuo as his mentor (see Bharucha, 2000, pp. 8, 17, 19) but is 
otherwise known for his performance training at Tisch School of the Arts in New York 
University, with influence of Schechner. To Ong, Shakespeare’s ‘universality’, which 
apparently persuaded Japanese financial support in the intercultural adaptation, was 
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not as important a consideration as his ‘neutrality’ in the context of Asia, compared 
with say an adaptation of Ramayana with an intercultural cast from Southeast Asia, 
where ownership of the epic would be deeply contested (Ibid., p. 27). But Bharucha 
criticises that the production saw a “reduction of the characters into abstractions, 
essences, and archetypes” (Ibid., p. 28), and elsewhere a reduction of “the Noh actor 
to an exotic oddity from an intercultural, high-tech version of the Phantom of the 
Opera” (Ibid., p. 32). One saving grace to him would lie in the power of virtuosity in 
traditional Noh performance, ironically underscored in the ‘death-fall’ scene of the 
Old Man, with “the actor’s tenacious hold on to the innermost secrets of his tradition, 
whose juxtaposition with a heterogeneity of foreign elements oddly serves to 
heighten its inner focus and energy” (Ibid., p. 33).  
Bharucha’s ultimate critique of interculturalism in a work like Lear, based on two 
primary aesthetic principles adopted by Ong as ‘juxtaposition’ and ‘rupture’, is that it 
becomes a “surrender to spectacle” (Ibid., p. 37), in the sense of what Guy Debord 
has theorised as ‘the society of spectacle’, whereby the essential character of the 
spectacle is “a negation of life that has invented a visual form for itself” (Debord, 
1995, p. 14; cited in Bharucha, 2000, p. 37). The underlying assumption for Ong 
seems to be that there is no other choice but to ‘consume the Other’, which 
Bharucha sees as “self-congratulatory, in so far as it legitimises the absence of any 
real respect for the Other, who can never be regarded on equal terms” (Bharucha, 
2000, p. 44).  
However, one may further analyse the significance of the production by 
contextualising it against the state ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ in Singapore. Wee 
(2007) sees an inclination of Ong in creating a New Asia contesting the global West 
(p. 134), that easily falls into trap of echoing the PAP government’s ‘Asian values’ 
discourse (Ibid., p. 135). While Ong, who has also initiated an ambitious intercultural 
research and performance programme of workshops and classes known as the 
Flying Circus Project, speaks of the need for artists to entre other Asian cultures for 
a vision of a larger Asian instead of merely Singaporean culture, he also emphasises 
that the Lear production is still Singaporean because he is Singaporean – seemingly 
a suggestion that he as Singaporean “possesses some knowledge of intercultural 
negotiations [and that] local ‘intra-Asia’ experiences lead to the possibility of a larger 
intra-Asian imagination” (Ibid.). But what one sees in Lear, held together by the 
326 
 
English language despite an otherwise multilingual script, is arguably a result of 
modernisation/’Westernation’ in Asian-Singapore that has also allowed Ong to 
become a ‘global cosmopolitan’ – a “rational, capitalist West in Singapore that has 
re-inscribed Ong’s Asian-Chinese ‘roots’ “ (Ibid., p. 138). That prevents him from 
decentring “the modern rationality that is part of contemporary Singapore” (Ibid., p. 
139).  
A critique of dance performance privileging spectacle of the ‘Other’ might also have 
been levelled at the globalised creative processes in a dance production like Duty 
Free (2002), premiered in Berlin and choreographed by Jutta Hell and Dieter 
Baumann, involving two dancers from China, two from Estonia, one from Canada 
and one from Germany (Foellmer, 2004, pp. 90-92). Citing Foucault’s model of the 
‘heterotopia’, the idea of places which are utopian yet present, real yet unreachable 
at the same time, Foellmer argues that the dancing body similarly becomes a mixed 
site, a place where the local and the global overlap (Ibid., p. 90). Watching the 
performance, one sees the dancers sometimes performing ethnic dance movements, 
sometimes moving in some kind of synchronisation, sometimes copying and 
transforming one another’s movements; it is hard to say if the dance movements 
belong to specific cultures, yet the dancing bodies are apparently present and 
representing four distinct cultural spheres (Ibid., pp. 93-94). One sees a constant 
‘tightrope walking’ between the local and the global, with flashes of identities now 
and then, but seemingly ‘free’ from any sense of social order (Ibid., p. 95). Foellmer’s 
conclusion seems ambivalent, as he approves of it questioning the very ontological 
premises of the ‘local’ (Ibid., p. 85) and sees cultural identity as contingent like ‘knots’ 
which are in-between (Ibid., p. 90), yet concedes that the performance ultimately 
reflects the very idea of globalisation itself with all its social and economic model of 
functioning (Ibid., p. 95) 
Ploebst (2004) argues that a kind of ‘intercultural intra-culturalism’ involving constant 
crossing of the boundaries of oneself has already become the reality for dancers and 
choreographers as seen in Europe (p. 156); the challenge for creative artists is to 
come up with concepts that go against the grain of the entertainment industry, and 
for choreographers to keep crossing the boundaries in cultures of dance without 
losing one’s centre (Ibid., p. 157). He cites the production of Total Masala Slammer 
(2001) by Michael Laub, in which Kathak dancers are integrated in a hodgepodge of 
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dance, music and film cultures, with references to Bollywood movies and Goethe’s 
story of Werther. He compares its artistic strategy to that of Dadaism, which had a 
political significance in its anti-authoritarian approach towards the idea of freedom, in 
contrast to the imagination of freedom in Laban’s expressionist dance forms under 
an ideal of purity, which eventually became a closed monocultural system serving 
elitism and totalitarianism in Nazi-era Germany (Ibid., p. 154).  
A similar form of interculturalism, involving the mixed media of dance and 
architecture, has been analysed by Briginshaw (2009) on the example of Shobana 
Jeyasingh’s Duets with Automobiles (1993). The work involves three female Indian 
dancers performing a mixture of dance vocabulary from contemporary dance and 
classical Bharata Natyam, and filmed in juxtaposition with three London office 
buildings with connotations of power, money and masculinity. Briginshaw cites 
Bhabha’s idea of ‘inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity’ (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 
38-39; cited in Briginshaw, 2009, p. 107) to analyse how the choreography and 
filming invest the city spaces and dancing bodies with power and possibilities of new 
meanings as well as identities (Briginshaw, 2009, p. 108).  
While ‘interculturalism’ denotes a practice in performing arts whereby dance may be 
used creatively for theatrical effects or to negotiate identities embodied by the 
dancing bodies, there has been a more recent movement focusing on dance as 
manifestations of culture. It is dubbed ‘world dance’ in the US college circles, as 
promoted by UCLA’s Department of World Arts and Cultures – a department formed 
in the 1990s by fusing the dance department with the ‘ethnic arts’ programme 
(Foster, 2009, p. 2). The emphasis appears to be more on pedagogical practices, 
where dancers may learn to appreciate ‘world dance forms’ from Odissi, Hula to 
Samba, categorised by geopolitical identifiers, or by socio-functional markers such 
as Javanese court dance, Tibetan temple dancer, Brazilian Orixa dances (Savigliano, 
2009, p. 180). The term ‘world dance’ “intimates a neutral comparative field wherein 
all dances are products of equally important, wonderfully diverse, equivalently 
powerful cultures” (Foster, 2009, p. 2). But in considering this as another modality for 
intercultural dialogue through dance, there are still questions as to how the colonial 
history that produced ethnicities as such continue to operate, and indeed what “has 
been constructed for dancing through the use of the term ‘world dance’ “ (Ibid., p. 3) 
generally.  
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The formulation of World Dance has to be understood as a phenomenon of global 
culture and analysed as a construction of knowledge. It “is a representation, a 
relatively new way of putting together, conceptualising, and validating ‘other dances, 
rather than a plain discovery of their presence in the world” (Savigliano, 2009, p. 
164). It “operates through disciplinary techniques that reshape the ‘other’ dances’ 
presentational and disciplinary techniques, along with the beliefs and values 
associated with them” (Ibid.). In short, Savigliano suggests that World Dance is 
discursive practice that may be understood along Foucauldian lines as a way of 
‘ordering things’ and ‘disciplining’ bodies and pleasures (Ibid., p. 166), and it begs 
the question of legitimation in validating inclusions and exclusions of people and their 
practices, to take a perspective of Spivak (1993; cited in Savigliano, 2009, p. 166). 
The teaching of ‘world dancers’ to appreciate a world dance “requires one to ascribe 
to a worldview composed of culturalist interpretations imposed from above” 
(Savigliano, 2009, p. 180), that “while representing the triumph of the global, always 
re-installs a reconfigured local call” (Ibid.), making World Dance a site of convoluted 
‘otherness’ (Ibid., p. 181). Although choreography under this framework allows for 
fusion dances from Chinese Hip Hop to Senegalese Butoh, World Dance as a 
practice entails “a compound of cultural relativism values and collectionist interests” 
(Ibid., p. 175) that introduces contested distinctions in the idea of the ‘traditional’, 
while at the same time choreography with its capability of capturing movements is 
claimed as a strategic tool of the West with its ballet/modern/postmodern continuum 
(Ibid., pp. 175-177).   
In relation to the issue of otherness created through the power of classification in the 
‘worlding’ of dance, the question of global consensus in cultural diversity is 
discussed by Hammergren (2009) with the specific example of Indian dance. She 
cites the performance tours of Ram Gopal in Sweden in the 1940s, arguing that it is 
“the transnational dissemination of [a] cultural modernity that creates a multi-sited 
geography” (p. 20), in this case a new-found ideal of ‘peace on earth’ in Sweden 
following the Second World War in which the collective national image is tarnished 
by Nazi collaboration (Ibid.). She hence observes how a dance critic named Idestam-
Almqvist (1949) wrote in a newspaper article on Ram Gopal’s performace, arguing 
that the dancer was presenting a modern Indian ‘ballet’ that could compete with 
Western ballet: “In that critic’s opinion Gopal’s dances are not authentic, but also this 
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criterion itself is deemed unproductive… Indian dance is too multifaceted to be 
adequately represented by any one coherent and common dance form… [Indian 
dance and classical ballet] both build on a variation of expressive forms, have roots 
in different folk dance traditions, and neither should be conceived of as 
anthropological museum displays, but rather as free, innovative, artistic creations. 
(Ibid., p. 19)” In this text, the idea of cultural modernity appears to be in need of 
equal, global artistic value mirroring the image  of a world of united and equal nations 
(Ibid., p. 21). Gopal himself incidentally also propagated similarly modernist 
arguments in his career, that instead of dances that are mechanical, lifeless and 
tiresome, he wanted to “prune traditional dances of all repetitive movement” in order 
to create something understandable to Indian audiences of his time (Gopal, 1957, pp. 
52-54;cited in Hammergren, 1999, p. 29).  
In contrast to Ram Gopal who spoke of being Westernised due to a diasporic identity, 
Lilavati Devi, a Sweden-based dancer formerly from his company, built her persona 
based on a biographical narrative of a bloodline linked to the caste system with 
childhood memories of Hindu rituals; despite suggestions that she had European 
origins, her artistic work drew on a mythologised persona of her being Indian 
(Hammergren, 1999, pp. 23-26). In her unique combination of Asian exoticism and 
Western modernism, she somehow expressed suspicion about non-Indian students 
wanting to perform Indian dances professionally in ‘original’ form. Hammergren 
suggests that this is a “will to break with a nationally located, patriarchal practice and 
the reinstating of a past with deep roots in religion and nation” (Ibid., p. 25), and 
explains it with Stuart Hall’s (1994, pp. 393-394) description of a doubling in identity, 
with shared essence and continuity of the past on one hand, and rupture and 
transformation on the other.  
Hammergren argues here with Foucault’s concept of heterotopia that definitions of 
coherence are often hard to achieve, with the problem not lying in how things are 
incompatible but in the assumed locus for classification, when the topos itself keeps 
shifting (Ibid., p. 30) For Gopal, his ‘modern’ spirit might well have been Indian as 
much as European (Ibid., p. 29). Hammergren cites Bhabha who advocates to resist 
“the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation” (2004, p. 248), since cultures are 
too incommensurable to be placed in one system (cited in Hammergren, 2009, p. 17). 
Based on Bhabha’s argument, an attitude that ‘all cultures are equal’ would be a kind 
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of cultural pluralism that places different cultures in the same timeframe, and hence 
an ethnocentric form of cultural modernity; the use of European ballet as a norm in 
this case may also be a claim of universality, instead of accepting that cultural 
knowledge is context specific (Ibid., p. 21). 
Savigliano proposes that the practice of World Dance would need to be immersed in 
a discussion of ethics based on postcolonial critique and a philosophy of 
intersubjectivity along the line of Levina’s proposition to decentralise the self 
(Savigliano, 2009, p. 183). Identity politics, she argues, may otherwise be turned 
from a source of mobilisation for the disempowered into an ideological device of 
what Hardt and Negri (2000) call the Empire (see Ibid.). She point outs that it seems, 
after Althusser and Foucault, “impossible to conceptualise a subject outside 
subjectification and the disciplinary introjection of the juridico-ethical machine”. (Ibid.) 
Finally, she proposes to experiment with the notion of ‘neighbours’ as instances of 
proximity for permanent negotiation in the encounters among others, following the 
work of Zizek, Santner and Reinhard (2005), investigating “what is happening when 
we enter into the proximity of the other’s desire” (p. 4; cited in Savigliano, 2009, p. 
184). She imagines this as dancers giving up translatability as practitioners of 
different dances, installing “partially articulated neighbourhoods of movements ather 
than discrete dance forms and traditions” (Savigliano, 2009, p. 186), and “outdoing 
the New Age attitude that reduces the Other to a mirror-image or to a means of self-
realisation and self-enrichment” (Ibid.). 
One may stop here with regards to the issue of cultural difference in a transcultural 
framework. But there remains the aspect of creativity, for which a perspective in 
psychology can provide an additional dimension, by considering dance as a process 
than a product. According to Vygotsky’s developmental framework, the creativity 
process includes imagination and ‘play’ as an expression of meaning making, which 
is the construction of knowledge into understanding with others, within or across a 
variety of contexts and codes (Vygotsky, 1986; cited in John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 
12). Creativity is hence a transformative activity where emotion, meaning and 
cognitive symbol (John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 12). Vygotsky has written in The 
Psychology of Art (1925) early in his career that art may be seen as both an effect 
and effector of emotions, as it “introduces the effects of passion, violates inner 
equilibrium, changes will in a new sense, and stirs feelings, emotions, passions and 
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vices without which society would remain in an inert and emotionless state” (p. 249; 
cited in John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 13). He also expresses the view that creativity is 
part of social life: 
Art is the social within us, and even if its action is performed by a single 
individual it does not mean that its essence is individual… art is the social 
technique of emotion, a tool of society which brings the most intimate and 
personal aspeccts of our being into the circle of social life… it would be more 
correct to say that emotion becomes personal when every one of us 
experiences a work of art: it becomes personal without ceasing to be social… 
(Vygotsky, 1925; cited in John-Steiner, 2010, p. 14)  
Oreck and Nicoll (2010) have further applied Vygotsky’s psychological concept of the 
zone of proximal development (ZPD) to provide a model for dialogue in dance. They 
cite Vygotsky (1925) in saying that the act of artistic creation cannot be ‘taught’, that 
the teacher’s role is instead a cooperative one to help students “organise the 
conscious processes in such a way that they generate subconscious processes” (p. 
256; cited in Oreck and Nicoll, 2010, p. 108). ZPD is defined in Vygotsky’s theory as 
the distance between the problems a student can solve independently and his 
capabilities under more competent teachers and peers, and this zone in the arts, 
Oreck and Nicoll (2010) argue, cannot be determined (p. 108). They argue that in the 
arts, “the teacher and mentor may possess greater experience but is not the expert 
in what the student has to express” (Ibid., p. 109). They cite Lakes’ (2005) 
observation to bemoan the irony that while founders of modern dance broke from 
tradition to express their individual visions, many training methods that these 
pioneers developed become tradition-bound themselves and offer few opportunities 
to develop their own vision and style (in Oreck and Nicoll, 2010, p. 112). In 
conclusion, they stated principles for dance dialogues as follows: 
1. Everyone has the capacity for artistic creation in dance. 
2. Children and adults move through developmental stages of artistic activity 
through social interaction and internal dialogue. 
3. Teachers and mentors must be open to the possibility that they cannot 
imagine what and how their students and mentees are about to create. 
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(Ibid., p. 122) 
One may argue that the challenge in intercultural dialogue with a transcultural model 
is to go beyond the effects of intertextuality in using dance heritage as a part of 
artistic creations transcending cultural identities, to achieve a kind of intersubjectivity 
between dancers and an audience of a different cultural community. Intersubjectivity 
has been described by Calvin Shrag (1972) as ‘being with the other’, with two 
existential qualifications – the possibilities of alienation and community (p. 146; cited 
in Fraleigh, 1987, p. 58). In this regard, Sartre has spoken in Being and Nothingness 
(1965) of three ontological dimensions of the body, between the body known to ‘me’, 
the body of the other known by ‘me’, and apprehension of the own body known by 
the other; in his bleak outlook, he has suggested that one is unable to see oneself as 
others do, while being powerless to their gaze (cited in Fraleigh, 1987, pp. 59-60).  
However, Fraleigh would contend, citing Gabriel Marcel’s (1952) work in describing 
the body as a ground for communion. She paraphrases it thus: “When I realise that 
my body is not something that I possess, an object to be manipulated, but rather that 
mystery that I am, the path is opened for me to also regard the bodily lived existence 
of others as I regard my own. Then authentic community and creative 
intersubjectivity become possible. (Fraleigh, 1987, p. 60; emphasis in original)”  
Directing this general discussion of transculturalism back to a focus on the use of 
traditional dance in the Singapore context, one has to be aware that under the 
‘global’ cultural policies of the PAP government, the local arts and cultural industry 
are strategically placed in line with the overarching concerns of economic 
globalisation. Transcultural works in the performing arts with their international 
potential in outreach may hence possibly be placed on a higher hierarchy over 
traditional art forms such as Indian classical dance in their purist forms. Chong (2011) 
has observed how under the National Arts Council’s mechanism of ‘meritocracy’ in 
grants policy, relying on ‘objective criteria’ such as ‘professionalism’, Chinese opera 
troupes occupy a peripheral position relative to contemporary English-language 
position (p. 131); the appeal to heritage for legitimacy in maintaining identity does not 
translate into much official recognition in the form of funding (Ibid., pp. 133-134). 
Middle-class theatre practitioners of the English-educated community, on the other 
hand, possess a kind of cultural capital of their artistic habitus in the form of literary 
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skill, as Chong argues, that allows them a privilege to indulge in what Bourdieu 
(1993) would call the ‘practices of distinction’ and to resist the conservatism of civil 
servants tasked with censorship (Chong, 2011, p. 157). Even while cast as a 
progressive artist and portrayed as deviant and often subversive under what 
Althusser would term as ideological state apparatus, one would enjoy special 
treatment, being “seen as someone who needs to be indulged or tolerated in 
capitalist Singapore” (Ibid., p. 158) and thus is likely to overcome state didacticism, 
or at least reserve the privilege to secure higher-level state grants than traditional 
artists (Ibid., p. 167). 
Under such social differentiation, intercultural dialogue of a transcultural model, as 
products of creative arts, may have a tendency of being channelled to more 
privileged venues and platforms of Singapore as a global city, whereas traditional 
arts appear to be relegated for intercultural dialogue in a more conservative 
multicultural model of arts education in community venues and public schools, which 
will be discussed in the following section.  
More specifically with regards to Indian classical dance, this is not to say that there 
have not been artistic attempts at intercultural works on initiatives of artistes rooted 
in the community, but most have largely retained the integrity in form of Bharatha 
Natyam or other regional styles of classical Indian dance while adapting literature 
from other cultures, and it should not be assumed incidental that they have by and 
large been left out of international platforms such as the Singapore Arts Festival. 
Choreographed by Cultural Medallion recipient Santha Bhaskar, Manohra (1995), an 
adaptation of a Thai fairy tale incorporating some elements of Thai dance, marked 
the last time any local Indian dance company was featured at the prestigious event 
for more than a decade thereafter. The same choreographer has also produced 
Rasa and Dhwani (2003), which reflects a nationalist discourse in its uses of local 
poetry in four official languages as the literary basis for choreography, and has 
choreographed for Vibrations (2007), an experimental work incorporating light, video 
and dramatics interventions. Young Artist Award recipient Meenakshy Bhaskar has 
choreographed a Yaatra series, experimenting with western orchestral music and 
flamenco music while dealing with contemporary themes.  
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The dependence on NAC annual grants which generally uses professionalism and 
innovation of Western arts as benchmark, along with the need to keep attracting a 
younger and more cosmopolitan audience, might have provided part of the impetus 
to keep staging more ‘creative’ or ‘innovative’ productions, as dance practitioners of 
the Indian community as an ethnic minority fear being marginalised. 
 
6.2 Dance Heritage as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Multicultural 
Model - Adaptation of the Culture Assimilator 
6.2.1 Cultural Differences between Chinese and Indian Communities in 
Singapore in the Practice of Dance Heritage  
 
The preceding section has discussed intercultural dialogue through dance as 
imagined in a transcultural model, focused on transcending differences in cultural 
identity and promoting creativity in dance-related expressions. This section in 
contrast will discuss intercultural dialogue through dance in a multicultural model, 
where differences in cultural identities tied to dance heritage are recognised. 
Dialogue in this model may hence be imagined as a process of ‘intercultural 
understanding’ whereby cultural differences may be respected.  
In reality, ‘intercultural dialogue’ in dance heritage imagined in a multicultural model 
should not be assumed as therefore immune to appropriation for visual spectacles in 
the same manner as in a transcultural model. However, the focus here will be on arts 
education programme and more ‘community’ events where ‘tolerance’ or ‘racial 
harmony’ rather than creative production are the order of the day. Hence the 
investigation will centre on how intercultural learning may be activated in such 
contexts which involve cross-cultural situations of interaction.  
The discussion of examples here takes its cue from the concept of ‘critical incidents’ 
in cross-cultural situations, which is key to the Culture Assimilator approach for 
intercultural competence training, applying the concept to situations involving Indian 
classical dance in Singapore where cultural differences in the practice of dance as 
heritage may lead to conflicts or misunderstandings in scenarios of arts education or 
organisation of local community events. This involves an adaptation of the existing 
approach, and is hence neither aimed at producing training manuals to prepare 
individuals’ cognitive skills in adapting to a different cultural environment, nor 
designed to characterise people of a different community according to certain traits 
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of behaviour under the name of ‘cultural standards’, as the limitations or issues with 
such an approach in relation to the goal of intercultural dialogue have already been 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead of assuming as the German proponent of the 
Culture Assimilator approach Alexander Thomas does, that problems in 
misunderstanding or tension are due to differences in unconscious, internalised 
dispositions known as ‘cultural standards’, it will be argued that any ‘cultural 
differences’ claimed by the external observer should be a source for contextualising 
instead of essentialising. 
What may arguably be achieved with this conceptual tool in relation to cultural 
heritage shall therefore be to identify possible sites of conflict and to contextualise 
the prototypical differences in practices across cultural or socio-cultural systems in 
order to generate knowledge for mutual understanding, where one recognises how 
knowledge of the ‘other’ culture is also dependent on social construction of the 
culture of the self. Following the arguments of Archer (1996), culture is not to be 
understood in a Parsonian manner as an integrated system of internalised values, 
but instead as a system of meanings where contradictions may exist, and as a result 
of historical development of the socio-cultural system. The question of cultural 
difference will hence be dealt with here by considering dance heritage as part of the 
knowledge in a cultural system, with a specific example of Indian classical dance 
compared to similar expressions in Chinese culture, in a pseudo-etic approach. 
Additionally, by way of a discussion on ideology with perspectives of cultural studies, 
it will be analysed as to how a construction of cultural differences as such may 
potentially serve to reify the culture of the Indian minority (and by extension of the 
argument, the Malay minority as well) as being less modern than Chinese culture 
associated with the dominant ethnicity and the prevailing ideology in Singapore.     
The approach of intercultural communication, with its construction of cultural 
differences, needs to be problematized here in its view of a lifeworld limited by the 
interlocutors’ cultural backgrounds, while assuming conditions of relative political 
symmetry (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 185). From a phenomenological perspective, such 
‘cultural differences’ are in fact social constructions arising from subjective 
consciousness in the encounter with the Other (Dreher, 2007, p. 148). In 
characterising ‘cultural differences’, the task in intercultural communication is merely 
to find easy answers for pragmatic purposes of day-to-day life, as opposed to an 
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ethnological approach which does not provide such simple answers as it seeks to 
explain the relation between culture and individual actions (Moosmüller, 2004, p. 45). 
With such an approach, one needs to take caution in avoiding danger with the 
concept of ‘cultural difference’ being used by institutions of the state to decide the 
fates of some minority cultural communities through stereotyping (Roth, 2009, p. 79). 
The highlighting of cultural differences may be meaningful in the politics of 
multiculturalism as part of a process “whereby each culture is respected and 
protected in its dialogue with all others” (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 172), but these 
cultural differences also need to be de-abolutised in the critical process (Ibid.), and 
this is where Derrida can offer insights in helping to identify ideological practices in 
‘communicative distortion’ in institutionalised structures, by way of a deconstructive 
critique (Ibid., pp. 176-177).  
As a discussion on how the study of critical interaction situations may help provide 
ways of dealing with cultural differences, this section will proceed as a point of 
departure with a summary of how the Culture Assimilator approach has been thought 
to be useful for intercultural learning. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the Culture 
Assimilator has been claimed as having positive effects in intercultural 
communication on cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects. The approach would 
be to compile critical interaction situations into a manual to train participants in 
recognising different possible interpretations of actions; one may be psychologically 
better prepared through such exercises to deal with a different cultural environment; 
one may thus be trained to behave flexibly and appropriately according to a different 
set of cultural norms; additionally, one may be able to ‘understand’ a different value 
orientation, or be ‘reflexive’ on cultural differences in value orientation.   
An application of such an intercultural communication framework to dance heritage 
would arguably be useful on a pragmatic level of avoiding conflict or 
misunderstanding during cross-cultural situations, as one learns to contextualise any 
unexpected or incomprehensible form of action to the values and norms of a different 
dance heritage, and to respect cultural differences in such values and norms. 
However, whereas behaviour of people from a different culture is ultimately 
dependent on individuals as well as on the norms stemming from socialisation, 
dance ‘heritage’ in a ‘community’ by definition already involves norms in practices 
that are more or less determined by institutionalisation though there remains some 
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polysemy in interpretation of meanings. In an ethnographic approach the most 
effective way of research on the norms in the heritage practice would just be to 
interview the ‘gatekeepers’. Hence an approach of random sampling in the Culture 
Assimilator, which investigates ‘cultural standards’ as norms with slight variations in 
national cultures otherwise assumed to be homogeneous, would not be so fruitful, 
unless one adapts it to take into account regional differences or differences across 
generations.   
Furthermore, if one were to imagine this framework as an approach to help promote 
‘intercultural understanding’ on a higher level, not in terms of the lifeworld of day-to-
day situations but in terms of intercultural dialogue where there can be learning 
between cultures as different systems of values and meanings, the challenge would 
lie in how knowledge on cultural differences may be discussed to help one respect 
diversity rather than to stereotype people of a different cultural community. The 
limitation in a framework of Culture Assimilator fixated with the notion of ‘cultural 
standards’, even as one qualifies that such standards in culture as orientation 
system are produced in the course of history and continue to develop (Thomas, 2011, 
p. 112), is that in its pragmatic outlook that characterises ‘national cultures’ for the 
same purpose of convenience as one would characterise an Unternehmenskultur or 
work culture of an organisation, with an instrumental focus on the now. To adapt the 
knowledge from critical incidents for ‘intercultural understanding’ in cultural heritage, 
one would have to appreciate that the sense of history or the past for the cultural 
community concerned should be the main subject. 
One must give a cultural community due recognition that their sense of continuity in 
history may be richer than any single imagination of an essence in the culture as 
embodied in members of the culture. In considering dance heritage as a medium for 
intercultural dialogue, the aim should not be an attempt to ‘understand’ the general 
value orientation of a certain cultural community based on expressions of their dance 
heritage as evidence, but instead  an attempt to appreciate the values and meanings 
associated with the dance heritage by contextualising it within its cultural system or 
socio-cultural system as extensively as possible, such that any easy dichotomy of 
cultural differences can be deconstructed. In other words, one may attempt a cross-
cultural study of dance heritage, but this should not be taken as a basis for a 
comparative study of two cultures. To use a Culture Assimilator as a tool for finding 
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references for intercultural dialogue, it may be more meaningful to use the cross-
cultural situations as basis for discussion of ‘intercultural standards’, instead of 
deriving ‘cultural standards’ which would be easy answers from the external observer 
that freeze a community in time. 
Further to that, one may argue that while critical incidents may serve as reference to 
discuss how norms of ‘intercultural dialogue’ should be negotiated, any description of 
cultural differences that tend to essentialise would have to be deconstructed. The 
approach here will be to begin with a list of critical interaction situations involving the 
reception of Indian classical dance by the Chinese community in Singapore. Based 
on these situations, a few themes on value orientation will be constructed, borrowing 
from dimensions of value orientation based on works of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
(1961), Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1992). Any dichotomy of cultural difference 
between the Indian and Chinese communities in Singapore based on dance heritage 
will then be deconstructed through further contextualising, such that any placing of 
various cultural communities on a hierarchy based on the ideology of the Asian 
modern in Singapore may be challenged.    
In the lack of interviews with Chinese informants in Singapore on their experiences 
of critical situations involving Indian classical dance, this researcher is listing a 
number of such critical situations based on observations from his own experience of 
an arts administrator and facilitator who has been worked in arts education and 
event organisation involving Indian classical dance in the period between 2005 and 
2010. This will then be followed by an attempt to construct and deconstruct cultural 
differences based on dance heritage, with a little help from a cross-cultural history of 
dance. The following are samples of critical interaction situations:  
1) Chinese event organiser contacts Indian dance group to arrange a 
performance for an evening event with a member of parliament as guest-of-
honour. The group declines after hearing that the performance is to take place 
during dinner. 
 
2) Chinese event organiser requests Indian dance group to arrange for a 
performance by a group of dancers. But the dance group only sends a solo 
dancer. 
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3) Chinese event organiser requests for Indian dance group to present a ‘vibrant’ 
dance performance for a performance at a shopping mall. But the dancer 
performs an item that is full of incomprehensible hand gestures and the 
expressions do not look all very ‘happy’.  
 
4) Chinese event organiser requests for a performance by an Indian dance 
group that features male and female dancers, preferably with a romantic 
theme of love instead of religious theme. But the item provided does not seem 
to match expectations.  
 
5) A school teacher arranges for an Indian dance group to conduct a dance 
workshop at the school as part of the arts education programme, in a secular 
setting for a multicultural group. The instructor starts by teaching the students, 
who are of mixed cultural and religious backgrounds, to perform a ritual that is 
apparently Hindu.      
 
6) A school teacher at a Christian mission school has engaged an Indian dance 
group to stage a performance as part of the arts education programme, and 
enquires shortly before the show as to whether there may be religious content 
in the programme. The dance group assures it is not religious but the dance 
apparently makes references to mythological story of Hindu origin. 
 
7) A school teacher requests for an Indian dance workshop whereby students 
can be trained in creativity in dance expressions within two sessions. The 
instructors who conduct the workshop simply teach basic steps and make the 
students practise without much improvisation. 
 
8) Chinese event organiser requests for an ‘innovative’ dance item from an 
Indian dance group as part of a special festival event. The dance group 
provides an interesting synopsis for the programme, but the dance still looks 
no different from the usual and the costumes are also nothing out of the 
ordinary. 
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Based on the above critical situations, the following themes have been identified, 
whereby Indian classical dance may be stereotyped: (A) Spirituality or Religiosity 
versus Secularism; (B) Individualism versus Collectivism; (C) Tradition versus 
Modernity.  
But before going further with this discussion on cultural differences, it would be 
useful to appreciate the significance of Indian classical dance as a form of ‘intangible 
cultural heritage’, with the help of the first Relevance Criterion in the 2003 Intangible 
Heritage Convention. Referring to the definition for intangible cultural heritage in 
Article 2 of the Convention, this criterion in the nomination form stipulates that it 
should be among ‘practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills’ which 
the community ‘recognises’ as part of its cultural heritage, that it is ‘transmitted from 
generation to generation’ while being ‘constantly recreated’, that it provides ‘a sense 
of identity and continuity’, not to mention that it is not incompatible with requirements 
of human rights mutual respect and sustainable development. This by no means 
suggests that there is any likelihood of Indian classical dance in Singapore being 
nominated one day if ratifies the convention, unless its local dance community 
makes such important contributions in shaping its expressions, for cultural heritage 
in this globalised world is ultimately still imagined as national achievements, not 
transnational resources for local communities. Incidentally, India as state party to the 
Convention has used it so far for the safeguarding of dance-related art forms which 
are lesser known: Kutiyattam and Mudiyettu of Kerala, Kalbelia folk songs and 
dances of Rajasthan, Ramlila in northern India, and Chhau dance in eastern India. 
This leaves out the eight major classical dance forms of India originating in different 
regions, as already recognised by Sangeet Natak Akademi, the national academy for 
music, dance and drama: Bharatanatyam of Tamil Nadu, Kathak of Uttar Pradesh, 
Kathakali of Kerala, Kuchipudi of Andhra Pradesh, Manipuri of Manipur, Mohini 
Attam of Kerala, Odissi of Odisha and Sattriya of Assam. This suggests that there 
are already adequate platforms for appreciation of these eight classical dance forms, 
though appreciation levels may still vary widely, for instance with Sattriya which has 
only been included in November 2000 (The Hindu, 27th February 2011).  
For the case study here on Singapore, the focus will be on the south Indian classical 
dance form of Bharatanatyam, which is most prevalent of all among the Indian 
population in Singapore partly because it is historically associated with the regional 
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culture of Tamil Nadu, which is where most of Singapore’s earlier migrants from 
India originated, as reflected by the choice of Tamil as one of Singapore’s four 
official languages since half a century ago. Secondly, Bharatanatyam has attained 
national status in popularity in India and abroad, such that it is commonly practised 
by dancers of a south Indian background generally. Frequently used in national 
occasions such as the National Day Parade in Singapore to represent the Indian 
community as part of the CMIO formula, its recognition as a cultural symbol or 
‘heritage’ of the ‘Indian community’, alongside Kathak for the North Indians or 
Bhangra dance for the Sikhs where available, would be unproblematic for the 
majority Singaporean Indians of the Hindu faith, though the attitude towards it by the 
Muslim or Christian Indians may still require further study. Classical dance forms in 
India are largely associated with the Hindu faith due to their origins in religious 
practices and the references to Hindu mythology in the sung poetry and the enacted 
drama, hence it may be that a non-Hindu would accept Bharatanatyam being used 
as a cultural artefact to represent the Indian community alongside Chinese and 
Malay dance forms, while refraining from practising the dance form personally. (From 
this writer’s observation of Singapore’s professional and amateur artistes in Indian 
classical music and dance through personal contacts, there are also Bharatanatyam 
dancers of the Christian faith, but one may be under pressure from the pastor to 
refrain from its practice, or one may be able to draw the line personally and refrain 
from performing it at a temple event, though watching such performances at a 
temple per se is fine. There are also Muslim or Sikh musicians who do not find it 
problematic to perform songs of Hindu origins, by treating it simply as traditional 
songs.) In short, how a community ‘recognises’ a cultural heritage as its own may 
involve more complexity than it sounds. 
The issue of identification aside, there should be no doubt however as to how much 
‘expressions’ and ‘skills’ are involved in the learning of the Bharatanatyam dance 
form and how its mastery provides a sense of cultural achievement. The dance 
involves a rich repertoire of items in specific structures, with combinations of different 
segments based on three categories of expressions in classical concept of Indian 
dance: nritta, nritya, natya. Nritta refers to pure rhythmic dance without evocation of 
emotions; nritya refers to dance with footwork as well as some expressions of 
emotions; natya refers to dance drama incorporating various elements of hand 
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gestures and facial expressions. In fact, dance items composed of pure rhythmic 
movements or nritta as such is more the exception than the rule. Much of 
Bharatanatyam involves not only precision in postures and rhythmic movements but 
also a form of mime using a highly codified language of mudras or hand gestures, 
which makes it different to understand and appreciate for the uninitiated. In that 
regard, ‘knowledge’ in the dance form as an intangible heritage may be quite 
exclusive to the dance community with its connoisseurs, although general references 
to Hindu mythology, such as iconic gestures depicting stories of the heroic Rama 
with the bow and arrow and the playful Krishna with the flute, would be relatively 
accessible to the audience. Audience reception would also make an interesting study. 
There may be a tendency, for instance, for one to attend an arangetram - a solo 
performance by an amateur dancer, which is organised like a social occasion, rather 
than forking out money to pay for a professional or artistic dance production. 
An arangetram, literally meaning a ‘stage debut’, is a performance by a dance 
student after at least several years of training. As O’Shea (2007) has observed, 
Bharatanatyam provides diasporic South Asian communities with a potent symbol of 
cultural identity and continuity due to the ‘conjunction’ established by dancers and 
supporters between “nationality, spirituality and feminine respectability” (p. 54). The 
arangetram is less often the launch of a dance career than a source of family pride 
before an audience consisting of friends, relatives and business associates; it is also 
seen as a rite of passage into adulthood (Ibid.: 154-155). For the diasporic Indian 
community in Singapore just as elsewhere, it has become a sign of achievement, for 
not all children or youths sent to learn Bharatanatyam in weekly classes would 
eventually have the time and perseverance to master the dance adequately through 
additional one-to-one tutelage, or enjoy the privilege of financial support from the 
family to stage an arangetram, which consists of a complete elaborate repertoire 
known as the margam. The most basic items of a margam are Alarippu, 
Jathiswaram, Sabdam, Varnam, Padam and Thillana. Of these, Alarippu and 
Jathiswaram are pure rhythmic dance, belonging to the Nritta category. Shabdam 
belongs to Nritya, as it incorporates poses, hand gestures and facial expressions 
that evoke Hindu deities. The centrepiece of a performance would be a Varnam, 
usually about 30 to 45 minutes in duration, alternating between Nritta, Nritya and 
Natya; a typical story would describe a deity as the object of love for a female 
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character, depicting her pangs of love and longing for union. This is followed in the 
second half by items like Padam, which belongs to Natya. What serves as a finale 
would then be the Thillana, which is a joyful, rhythmic piece which brings the dance 
performance to its conclusion. The codification of Bharatanatyam into this margam 
format is attributed to the Tanjore Quartet, four brothers employed as dance masters 
in the court of the Maratha king Serfoji at Thanjavur in early 19th century.  
As a graduation ceremony, the dance performance would significantly incorporate 
the paying of tribute to Lord Shiva as Nataraja or Lord of Dance on a much adorned 
altar at downstage left (audience right), while the live musicians are typically placed 
at downstage right (audience left). It also concludes with the dance student receiving 
blessings from the guru, and engaging in speeches of mutual thanks with guru, 
parents, family and friends. While an average arangetram performance would last 
around two hours, there are also extreme cases where, by including more than one 
costume change, slide shows of one's coming-of-age, speeches by relatives and 
associates, not to mention the virtually obligatory tea reception during the 
intermission, it may last as long as four hours.   
There is definitely a strong sense of ‘continuity’ associated with the practice of 
Bharatanatyam, even if much of that involves continuity in mythological time. Dance 
gurus like to trace the lineage of Bharatanatyam all the way to a mythological origin 
in Lord Brahma, creator of the universe. Bharatha Muni, the sage who lived 2000 
years ago and wrote Natya Shastra, a classic Sanskrit treatise on the art of dance 
and theatre, was said to have it bestowed as a fifth Veda created by Brahma. As 
Priya Srinivasan describes in an ethnographical account of the speech by a dancer 
at her arangetram, there is a fervent sense of community bound together by the 
language of dance that is considered integral to Indian cultural and religious tradition:   
She began by thanking ‘aunty’, meaning her guru who was sitting on stage 
right with the musicians, explaining that it was ‘aunty’ who had taught her 
about Indian culture and tradition. She knew she was dancing for the Gods 
and that this was a divine form she had been given. Like dancers of 2000 
years ago in India, she was continuing to practice Hinduism in her own small 
way. 
       (Srivinivasan, 2009, p. 70) 
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Of course, no one knows for sure how the dance identified today as Bharatanatyam 
would exactly be performed 2,000 years ago, even if classical literature from that era 
may have given interesting indications that some elements or concepts of the dance 
have persisted from then till today. It is not an uninterrupted history in any case. 
What is known is that much of the vocabulary of its dance movements as known 
today is derived from Sadir, a solo dance form performed by temple and court 
dancers in pre-colonial and colonial South India, while the choreographic themes 
reference temple sculpture and religious ritual (O’Shea, 2007, pp. 26-27). The 
dramatic content of this dance often involves expressions of religious devotion 
accompanied by sung poetic texts in an erotic idiom, as developed from the Bhakti 
movement – a convention of devotional worship that seeks spiritual attainment 
through a personal and affectionate relation with a deity (pp. 26, 113). The narrator 
in such dramatic poetry is typically the main female character, longing for the return 
of the divine lover and recalling the good times together. Sadir was incidentally 
performed by courtesans known as devadasis (literally ‘female devotees of God’) 
who were affiliated with particular temples and courts (p. 4).   
During the Victorian period of British colonial rule, the non-domestic lifestyle of the 
devadasis was denounced as prostitution and their ritual activities as superstition, 
under the anti-nautch (literally ‘anti-dance’) movement launched in 1892 (Ibid.). The 
agitation may be seen as a misunderstanding on the part of the campaigners, a 
rejection of the validity in dance expressing religious experience through sexual 
metaphors, as well as a conflation of choreographic content with sexuality of the 
practitioners (p. 114). The socio-political background was that of a “colonial conflict 
[…] between the multiplicity of Hindu religious traditions and British Protestantism” 
(Ibid.). In any case, when the dance form was revived in the 1930s and rechristened 
as Bharatanatyam, it was aligned with the political discourse of independence and at 
the same time there was a shift in social context: middle-class girls and women of 
the Brahmin caste were turning to the dance practice, thus elevating the 
respectability of Bharatanatyam (p. 5). A key figure then was Rukmini Devi, who 
founded the Kalakshetra dance institution and thereby formalised the training of 
Bharatanatyam in the form of dance classes in place of the informal gurusishya or 
guru-disciple mode of instruction (p. 41). Hailing from a Tamil Brahmin family but 
influenced by nationalist activism as well as social causes of the Theosophical 
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Society at the time, Rukmini Devi had originally intended to learn dance from the 
famous ballerina Anna Pavlova whose performance she had watched in Bombay; 
while that never materialised, Pavlova left a great impact on her by encouraging her 
to combine her devotion towards dance, spirituality and nationalism (Ibid., p. 38). In 
1935, at the suggestion of E. Krishna Iyer, the dancer, promoter and critic who 
another key figure in reviving Bharatanatyam with a nationalist agenda, Rukmini Devi 
approached devadasi dancers and started her training under Mylapore Gowri Ammal 
(Ibid.). She then gave her debut concert, which although not a formal arangetram, 
launched a dance career as a respected public figure against the anti-nautch elites 
of Madras, and in 1936 she founded Kalakshetra (Ibid.).   
While Rukmini Devi is credited as a pioneer in validating Bharatanatyam, critics have 
also celebrated another figure, Balasaraswati, who saw herself as safeguarding the 
artistic legacy of the devadasis (pp. 47-48). They diverged in various aspects not 
only in the training but also the performance of Bharatanatyam, including the 
articulation of movements as well as stage presentation. In O’Shea’s perspective: 
“Whereas Rukmini Devi preferred the clarity and dramatic force of multiple 
performers carrying consistent roles, Balasaraswati emphasised the challenges 
offered to the solo dancer by the lyric mode’s shifting characterisation. (p. 49)”   
In any case, while the association of Bharatanatyam with ‘traditional’ Indian culture 
led to a significant effect in boosting its prestige and popularity especially among the 
diasporic communities, dancers trained in Bharatanatyam, both in India and beyond, 
continue “to distinguish themselves from their peers by creating choreography that is 
original” (pp. 57-58).  As it has been pointed out by Chennai-based dancer Padma 
Subrahmanyam, best known for her research on karanas as fundamental units of 
dance movements described in the Natya Shastra,  
the so-called traditional concert of Bharatanatyam is by itself a product of the 
changing time. The presentation has gone through enormous changes in the past 
forty or fifty years. Hence, it is easy to imagine the changes that could have taken 
place in the last 300 years and the last 3000 years. Who could say which is 
original, pure and authentic.  
      (1979, p. 92; cited in O’Shea, 2007, p. 59) 
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O’Shea would also cite the original and innovative work of choreographers like 
Toronto-based Hari Krishnan and British-based Shobana Jeyasingh to demonstrate 
how one may challenge the imagination of a tradition as “inherently fixed” (p. 65). 
Katrak (2013) argues that there is a Contemporary Indian Dance which has evolved 
in the 20th century, with pioneering work by Uday Shankar who opened up a hybrid 
genre rooted mainly in Bharatanatyam and Kathak, or by Chandralekha who rejected 
the religious iconography of classical Bharatanatyam in favour of abstract 
movements, not to mention transnational choreographers later including Anita 
Ratnam and Hari Krishnan who reinvent religious icons and mythological stories to 
connect with contemporary and even feminist relevance (p. 47). 
However, it has to be added here that choreographers working in the idiom of 
Bharatanatyam may face a dilemma, for there is much richness in the expressions of 
the dance that is tied to the lyrics and musical structure of classical songs in the 
Carnatic music tradition as well as the references to scenes from mythological 
stories. ‘Breaking free’ from these conventions would also mean sacrificing such fine 
details. Hence choreographers who are well-versed in this dance idiom may not gain 
a sense of achievement by re-inventing the dance in a way that would risk losing the 
character of the dance form with its aesthetic attributes. Nonetheless, there have 
always been attempts by Singaporean choreographers working in the 
Bharatanatyam idiom to update their work in order to find contemporary relevance, 
such as Santha Bhaskar’s People Get Connected (2006) which features a new 
‘mudra’ denoting the handphone as part of its general theme of communication, that 
gives her artistic license to include the classical poem Meghaduta by 5th-century 
Sanskrit playwright Kalidasa alongside contemporary and non-Indian literature as 
references for the dances. Another production of hers, entitled Vriksha (2009), 
adapts the local play The Silly Little Girl and the Funny Old Tree by Kuo Pao Kun for 
a theme of environmental protection; in this work (which this writer witnessed 
personally through involvement as a dancer), Bharatanatyam hand gestures are 
used more sparingly and in a more naturalistic manner in depicting the life force of 
the forest or the personification of evil forces. If these works, as reflections on the 
forces of modern technology and deterioration of natural environment, may be 
interpreted as an attempt to reconcile between the heritage of Bharatanatyam dance 
vocabulary and concerns of the contemporary world, the focus of another 
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Singaporean choreographer, Nirmala Seshadri, would in her own words be dealing 
with the asymmetry in the “primary expression of patriarchy in Bharatanatyam [being] 
the objectification of the woman for the pleasure of men” (Seshadri, 2011, p. 2). For 
instance, in her evolving work Crossroads (2002-2008) in collaboration with 
Kalakshetra-trained dancer Neewin Hershall, she incorporated Ashtapadi by 13th-
century Sanskrit poet for its erotic depiction of the love between Radha and Krishna 
in Hindu mythology, in a multidisciplinary exploration “with a suggestion of androgyny 
through movement, costume, and visual art” (Ibid., p. 6). 
The above account of Bharatanatyam as an artistic expression in India and in 
Singapore should help to underscore the point that Bharatanatyam as a dance 
heritage should not be understood simply as a cultural artefact representing an 
archaic spirit. It should also not be understood simply as being transmitted through 
the generations and recreated through historical periods representing a collective 
spirit of its community such that one imagines there is no autonomy under 
institutionalised norms of the heritage practice. Instead, the significance of its 
created norms has to be appreciated against the context of nationalist struggle 
against colonial rule and affirmation of the Indian community in identity and continuity 
against the context of migration by the Indian diaspora. How the artistic expressions 
evolve into a plurality of forms is a matter of how individual artistes interpret and 
react to the world. When one speaks of the dance heritage as being ‘constantly 
recreated’, one has to be careful not to reify the agency of change as being a single-
minded institution of the community. There is more than one way to interpret the 
social values, aesthetic values and spiritual values of the dance as heritage. 
One may now come to the identified themes of ‘cultural differences’ to discuss if 
such constructions are indeed helpful for management in a diversity of dance 
heritage. 
 
(A) Dance Heritage as Ritual – Religious/Spiritual versus Secular Expressions 
As suggested in the discussion above on the historical development of 
Bharatanatyam, there is much ambivalence in its cultural significance, between the 
religious or spiritual aspect and the artistic aspect. For an intercultural context in 
Singapore, it shall be argued here that the most appropriate way to deal it would be 
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to respect the choice of any member of the Indian community that associates the 
classical dance form with spiritual meanings, without having to make any 
generalisation that Indians are more naturally inclined towards ritualised actions than 
others due to their ‘internalised dispositions’. 
Due to its historical origin, the Bharatanatyam dance vocabulary has much character 
of religious rituals in it. It is even often argued that the spiritual aspect is an integral 
part of the aesthetics in Bharatanatyam. One may cite for instance the Natya Shastra, 
or even the classical Sanskrit playwright Kalidasa, in describing the religious function 
of natya as an ocular offering to please the gods. In addition to the concept of rasa, 
literally meaning essence or flavour, which is central to Indian aesthetic theory in the 
performing arts, specifically referring to the navarasa or 9 emotions expressed in 
dance, the idea of bhakti is also often cited as considered pivotal to the art. This is 
particularly so coming from the perspective of the devadasi tradition as represented 
by Balasaraswati, for whom the state of the devotion and the practice of the dance 
art are one and the same in spiritual experience of bhakti (Knight Jr., 2010, p. 28). 
The ideal is for the ego to be subjugated and the dancer surrendered to divinity as 
part of the dance as it inspires a similar sense of spirituality in the audience.  
One cannot assume that this spiritual significance in Indian classical dance is clear 
to a Chinese audience in Singapore. They may not generally be aware that the 
Indian dance community makes a huge distinction between Bharatanatyam as a 
classical dance, and folk dances such as Kummi, a traditional harvest dance which 
involves women dancing in circles with rhythmic clapping, not to mention ‘cinematic 
dance’ such as Bollywood which is frowned upon as cheap entertainment. Whereas 
words like balei wu for ballet or tufeng wu or folk dance, distinguishing the classical 
and folk traditions in the West, may be straightforward concepts to the Chinese, 
there is only one umbrella term yindu wu which is commonly used to refer to any 
kind of Indian dance, classical, folk or popular. Incidentally, if one surveys websites 
hosted in People’s Republic of China, one would find the term yindu wu often 
confused with belly dance, probably due to similarity in costume that they see in 
Hindi-language Bollywood films. On the other hand, local Singaporean Chinese may 
identify ‘Indian dance’ with their impression of Tamil movies which typically feature 
scenes of South Indian villages apart from urban settings; there is in fact a slightly 
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dated cliché, annoying to Singaporean Indians, which describes ‘Indian dance’ as 
‘running around the coconut tree’. 
This lack of distinction between Indian dance as a classical art and as folk 
expression also becomes a source of misunderstanding. To many Bharatanatyam 
artistes, it is insulting to be asked to perform during a dinner event, be it in a hotel 
ballroom or in state-run venues known as the community centre in Singapore, as 
they find it disrespectful of the art. This contrasts with the Chinese practice of 
watching Chinese opera at street festivals or tea houses, where the idea of eating 
during performances is perfectly unproblematic unless one is at a formal theatre 
setting. Underlying this may also be the assumption that only arts of Western origin 
or of international standing as contemporary practice, such as Western classical 
music or ballet-based contemporary dance, need to be accorded the formality of 
theatrical rules, whereas any form of Indian dance drama, Chinese opera or Malay 
music and dance are merely ‘folk music’ or ‘ethnic dance’ for the masses. Female 
dancers in Bharatanatyam incidentally may also frown at performing the commercial 
setting of a shopping centre where events such as Singapore HeritageFest are held, 
as opposed to performing in a theatre or a temple, where a line between high art and 
entertainment can be drawn. It has to be emphasised that such problems cannot be 
understood simply as one between Chinese and Indian Singaporeans with different 
internalised dispositions in ‘orientation systems’. There may also be Indian 
Singaporeans involved in the organising of state-supported ‘grassroots events’ who 
are not sensitive to the sensibility of artistes in classical Indian dance; hence it is a 
matter of power structure influencing the norms.  
In the other extreme in the ‘understanding’ of Indian culture, one may also easily 
assume that Indian classical dance is religious, as opposed to Chinese dance or 
Malay dance. One may base this contrast on the observation that Indian dance 
practitioners insist on rituals like the ‘namaskaram’ before and after a performance or 
a dance lesson, whereby one touches the ground with the hands and then touches 
one’s forehead, which they may explain as a sign of submission or respect to Mother 
Earth. One also observes after all that whereas Indian dance is often performed at 
Hindu temples for religious festivals, music and dance are known to be discouraged 
in conservative Islamic beliefs and may be avoided by the Malays during the fasting 
month of Ramadan. Hence a classification of Indian dance and even ‘Indian culture’ 
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in general as being religious and ritualistic, may seem useful knowledge for a 
differentiated approach in managing diversity in Singapore’s cultural practices.  
But there is a difference between sensitivity and respect for a community’s beliefs 
and practices, and stereotyping the community as being exceptional in its behaviour. 
The contrast made between Indian/Hindu culture and Malay/Muslim culture above is 
in fact too stark. One popular traditional dance form for the Malays in Malaysia and 
Singapore happens to be Zapin, which is believed to have been brought to the 
region in the 14th century by Muslim missionaries from the around the region of 
Yemen, as a means to spread the religion. What constitutes as the Malay heritage of 
dance in Singapore would also a complicated topic on its own. In the 1950s, various 
old Malay folk or social dances were rearranged in Singapore into an eclectic fusion 
of Malay and European dances for Ronggeng dance stage of cabaret Bangsawan 
theatre performances and dance artistes since then have continued to mix and 
create new dances from existing pan-Malay repertoires of Inang, Masri, Joget, Asli 
and Zapin (Mohd Anis, 2003, p. 10-11). It is problematic to essentialise, for the 
development of Malay performing arts in Singapore is also influenced by external 
factors, such as the demise of a cosmopolitan Malay film industry that was 
flourishing in 1950s and 1960s until political changes around 1963 along with decline 
of the trade unions forced major film director and actor P. Ramlee to leave Singapore. 
The 1950s incidentally saw much cross-cultural collaborations involving ethnic 
dances of the Chinese, Malay and Indian communities, inspired by the idea of a 
‘Malayan’ identity, in the time of an anti-colonial movement partly tied to leftist 
agitation. Hence the Bhaskar’s Academy of Dance notably staged a Bharatanatyam 
rendition of the Chinese folk tale Liang Shan Bo and Zhu Ying Tai, also known as 
Butterfly Lovers, using costumes adapted from Chinese opera and Indian music 
imitating the Chinese pentatonic scale. It played at the premium venue of Victoria 
Theatre for the duration of a week in 1958, with the support of Chinese middle 
schools in mobilising students as audience, despite the absence of endorsement by 
the PAP which would later seek to create a distinctive Singaporean culture through 
concerts entitled Aneka Ragam Rakyat or People’s Variety Show from 1959 to early 
1960s featuring traditional dances of different ethnicities (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 
88). Hence even in early nation-building days of Singapore, the significance of 
Bharatanatyam was not limited to being a ‘Hindu’ dance. 
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It would furthermore be problematic to mark Indian culture as being religious and 
ritualistic simply based on an impression of its Indian dance expressions, with an 
assumption that there is no equivalence of such in Chinese culture. If one traces 
Chinese history as far back as the pre-Confucius era, one would note that back in 
the Western Zhou dynasty (1100-770 BCE), dance was used by the royal court for 
important worship and ceremonies. The “Six Dances” recorded in the class treatise 
included dances like the “Yunmen”, used for homage to the God of Heaven, the 
“Xianchu”, for sacrifice to the God of Earth, the “Shao”, used for homage to the Gods 
of the Four Cosmic Directions, and so on (Wang, 1985, p. 11). Apart from the 
religious dances, the royal court also held the ‘Civilian Dance’ in praise of the 
political rule, as well as the ‘Martial Dance’ to display the kingdom’s military might 
(Ibid., p. 14). Apart from these, there were also folk dances from minority groups 
which became popular in the court as well. It was in the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE) 
that dance is described by scholars as reaching its golden age in China, as the 
borders of the empire were extended to Central Asia. Of the “Ten Books of Music” 
for dance compiled during the reign of Zhenguan (637-642 CE), only two as 
performed at banquets were of the Han nationality, the rest originated from regions 
beyond such as Korea, India, Samarkand and so on (Ibid., p. 50). In the later 
dynasties, especially by the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), due to the boom of urban life 
and rise of the middle class, performing arts such as Chinese opera became popular, 
and the art of dance became absorbed into Chinese opera (Ibid., p. 78). What were 
featured at religious processions then were folk dances such as the Yangge, as well 
as the Lion Dance among others which have since remained popular in Chinese 
culture. Hence if one may note interpret it as being due to historical circumstances 
that dance for religious rituals did not develop into an important art form in Chinese 
culture. Instead, the most important high art in pre-modern China would happen to 
be traditional opera, which incorporates dance into theatre rather than theatre into 
dance as in the case of Indian culture. But lion dance, if it may be classed as a form 
of dance despite the visual focus on the props of the lion head and body, is itself a 
highly ritualised form of practice.  
Catherine Bell (2009) has incidentally challenged the prevalent view in Western 
society of ritual “as a matter of special activities inherently different from daily routine 
action and closely linked to the sacralities of tradition and organised religion” (p. 138). 
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There is in fact a whole range of ritual-like activities, whereby the Anjali in South Asia 
with the hands clasped in a prayer position before the chest with a slight bow may be 
understood simply as a form of formalism (p. 142), whereas the way the President of 
the United States takes the oath of office by placing the left hand on the Bible may 
also clearly be seen as deriving from Christian ritual and Christian values (p. 156). 
There is hence no ground for placing cultures in hierarchy in terms of disposition 
towards rituals just because one culture has ritual-like actions concentrated in its 
dance expressions.  
It is also inadequate for the sake of intercultural dialogue to speak of ‘cultural 
standards’ in the practice of Indian dance heritage for flexibility in adaptation. There 
should arguably be common understanding of ‘intercultural standards’, such that one 
may have to refrain from imposing any ritual, while interpreting it in a religious 
manner, on people of a different cultural or religious community, even if one 
personally is not inhibited by any taboo in with assimilating rituals that originate in 
another cultural or religious community. In any case, the easiest way of resolving the 
differences in Singapore is simply not to make any issue out of it, like a tacit 
agreement as ‘intercultural standard’ for harmony. There is certainly no need for 
participants to interpret any teaching of ritual-like gesture in dance expression as 
proselytising, just as there is no need for an instructor to explain the importance of 
such gestures in an overtly religious manner. It is a desire to seek ‘original’ or 
‘standard’ meanings of such gestures in the culture, while misreading the motivation 
in its articulation, that may lead to dissatisfaction. 
One simplest way to reach ‘intercultural understanding’ between Chinese and Indian 
practice of dance heritage is to acknowledge that the latter there is much spiritual 
value attached to Indian dance heritage, whereas Chinese dance heritage only 
involves social value. The above historical perspective has served to provide a little 
explanation of this difference in the context of the respective socio-cultural systems, 
without suggesting that there are ‘cultural differences’ embodied in members of the 
two cultures.   
(B) Dance Heritage as Social Cohesion – Individualism versus Collectivism  
An attempt to contrast Indian and Chinese cultures on a scale of individualism 
versus collectivism, on evidence of practices in dance heritage, would make an 
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interesting discussion. This discussion is postulated based on possible perceptions 
of Indian culture stemming from an event organiser finding the predominance of solo 
performance in Indian classical dance incomprehensible or difficult to appreciate, or 
finding it frustrating that Indian dance companies are not able to provide a wider or 
more innovative range of repertoire, as one compares with the repertoire available in 
Chinese dance. 
While the tradition of solo performances in Bharatanatyam has already been 
explained earlier by way of the devadasi tradition of spiritual devotion, one needs to 
add the pragmatic consideration that Bharatanatyam costumes are very elaborate, 
not to mention the accessories and makeup which add up to a long time in 
prepration, partly due to 20th-century reforms to render dignity to the dance practice. 
Hence it is not easy to mobilise dancers to volunteer for performances. Furthermore, 
Bharatanatyam being highly sophisticated, individual showcases tend to be favoured. 
Apart from proper stage productions, only more major events such as the National 
Day Parade would find it easy to mobilise group dancers.  
To appreciate the contrast on the second point, one needs to understand the modern 
development of Chinese dance against the context of a political exercise in People’s 
Republic of China to integrate different nationalities despite the dominance of the 
Han nationality. If one were to observe development following the Cultural 
Revolution where a very limited number of modern Chinese operas and ballets were 
allowed, one would note a very interesting imagination of cultural integration 
reflected in major creative dance dramas such as Rain of Flowers on the Silk Road, 
which emerged in 1979 as tribute to 30th anniversary of the People’s Republic of 
China (Ibid., pp. 106-107). This work was inspired by dance poses depicted in 
murals of Dunhuang along the Silk Road. Other dance drama included Princess 
Wencheng, which was a story to represent good relations between Han Chinese and 
Tibetans in the past thousand years (Ibid., p. 108). Such major dance ballets have 
formed a pattern of creative work, alongside the repertory pieces that are supposedly 
representative of minority cultures in China. In Singapore, Chinese dance groups 
used to be influenced by the Chinese Art Troupe which visited from communist 
China in 1947, before the British colonial government restricted movements between 
China and Singapore; local dance groups then learnt from Chinese dance films in 
the early 1960s, until it was possible for choreographers to visit China in 1980s 
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(Chua, 1997, pp. 173-179). Since then, greater influence in dance training and 
choreography from China has been possible, though the audience at large may well 
find dances from China alien to them as they are very remote to urban and modern 
Singapore (Ibid., p. 183).  
Chinese dance in Singapore has not only followed trends of development in China 
where ballet has been blended into ‘Chinese classical dance’, dance forms of other 
nationalities in China, such as the Tibetan, the Mongolian and the Thai minorities, 
have also been distilled or reinvented into standard repertoires. Chinese dancers 
tend to learn and perform a wide range of such repertoires in a piecemeal manner. In 
the context of the Indian dance community however, each of the seven and eight 
regional dance forms is not only linked to different regional identities but also highly 
sophisticated in its own way, each with different basic postures and styles in 
movements and expressions. Hence unlike the piecemeal approach in Chinese 
dance, it is highly unlikely for one to learn across different dance styles. One should 
also not forget that similar regional divides exist among the Chinese community with 
Chinese opera sung in different dialects or languages.  
Apart from reifying the Indian or South Asian community as one that is fragmented, it 
may also be possible for an event organiser in search of visual spectacles to assume 
that Indian dancers are lacking in ‘individualism’ on account of costumes and dance 
movements appearing to be following age-old patterns. Without going into a 
discussion of psychology in visual perception here, one may respond by noting that 
the formal features of postures and fixed units of sequences known as adavus in 
Bharatanatyam may have given this impression. Similar comments might have been 
made with ballet for someone who does not find its movements appealing. The 
difficulty in appreciating the musical structure and the interaction of Bharatanatyam 
movements with the music may also contribute to a lack in interest. But where 
individualism in creative dance choreography is concerned, that would require a 
good grasp of the musical structure and dance vocabulary for credibility, not to 
mention additional factors such as institutional or financial support. 
However, if one were to borrow the construct of individualism-collectivism as 
discussed by Hofstede (1991), whereby individualism refers to the tendency for 
everyone to look after himself or herself and the immediate family, whereas 
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collectivism pertains to integration into cohesive in-groups with unquestioning loyalty 
(cited in Allik and Realo,  2004, p. 32), one may claim both tendencies in the practice 
of Bharatanatyam, for the pride of the family and for one’s Indian or Hindu identity at 
the same time. Perspective may again shift if one follows the argument of Oyserman, 
Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) that individualism involves personal uniqueness 
while collectivism involves duty to the in-group and maintenance of harmony (cited in 
Ibid., p. 33). It is complicated as cross-cultural psychologists appear to have adopted 
the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ in discussing how the tension between the 
individual and the collective is solved differently in ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultures 
(Ibid.). Allik and Realo have also linked this construct to the concept of social capital, 
as defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) in terms of resources in institutionalised 
relationships, and by Robert Putnam (2000) in terms of social networks and norms of 
reciprocity. They note that whereas one may take a communitarian point of view to 
see individualism as a destruction of social capital, one may also follow a 
Durkheimian perspective in considering individualism as precondition for growth of 
social capital through voluntary cooperation and partnership (2004, p. 34).  
One can only stop here by acknowledging that there seems no basis to draw any 
conclusion based on perceptions of such cross-cultural situations involving dance 
heritage, and proposing that it would be more useful to adopt a more open-minded 
and flexible approach in organisation of multicultural dance events as an 
‘intercultural standard’ in respecting differences, instead of placing cultures in 
hierarchy based on their value in creating visual spectacles under a banner of 
national identity or cashing in on cosmopolitan vibrancy.  
(C) Dance Heritage as Learning – Tradition versus Modernity 
Indian dance practitioners learn Bharatanatyam in a very formalised and 
systematised manner, whereby they have to memorise the Sanskrit names of 
mudras or symbolic hand gestures – 28 single-hand gestures and 24 combined hand 
gestures, Sanskrit names of different postures and head or eye movements, and so 
on. This may be described as a traditional style as opposed to a utilitarian style 
among “systems of discourse” (Scollon, Scollon and Jones, 2012, p. 171). However, 
there is no need to stereotype and dismiss any such discourse as a form of what 
Edward T. Hall used to call ‘high-context’ culture, on basis of anxieties from 
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someone from another culture who has not been clued into the relevant cultural 
context. Traditional styles of communication exist in any culture.  
In an Indian dance workshop, an instructor may have the tendency to teach non-
Indian students in a similar manner which is not proven to be effective in a cross-
cultural context. If this is done mechanically, it may possibly risk losing attention and 
interest of students and it also may not be considered optimum under the aims of 
such arts exposure programme. Indian dancer teachers who are attuned to the 
traditional gurusishya mode of teaching may sometimes assume submission of 
students to instructions of the teacher as an essential part of the value system to be 
inculcated in a ‘holistic’ learning of the dance heritage as a whole way of life. This 
may of course also be an integrated approach that exists somehow in teaching of 
other traditional art forms.  
One needs not conclude that any form of teaching using traditional categories of 
concepts would therefore not be effective, for these may always be reinterpreted 
according to contemporary purposes of instruction. The demonstration of how the 
nine rasas or emotions are expressed using dance gestures and facial expressions 
in the stylistic forms of Bharatanatyam, or other classical Indian dances for that 
matter, may be inspiring as arts education if there is more time for interaction with 
students, instead of rushing through a complete demonstration without allowing time 
for students to digest. Coomaraswamy (1918, p. 32) has long argued that the rasa 
theory may be understood as an approach in appreciating how beauty is felt through 
empathy or Einfühlung, involving the analogy of taste. 
The pertinent question is also whether the educational authorities and the particular 
educational institutions are clear about whether such arts education programmes 
should serve merely as a chance for interaction across cultures, or whether Indian 
classical dance is desired to serve other educational purposes such as helping non-
Indian students to expand their imagination in the arts, rather than experiencing 
dance training that follows a particular cultural heritage. It would not be so fruitful 
here to describe ‘cultural standards’ in training styles of any dance heritage. The 
challenge based on a future-oriented outlook would lie in clarifying goals of learning 
specific to cross-cultural dance education, with ‘intercultural standards’ once again 
as the proposed keyword.  
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By deconstructing the above three themes of ‘cultural differences’ that might 
otherwise be perpetuated by stereotyping subjective experiences of cross-cultural 
situations, one demonstrates that an attempt to derive characterisation of any 
cultural community based on critical incidents using a Culture Assimilator approach 
would not be sound, as it does not even involve cross-cultural study of behaviour 
where one may claim to reproduce situations of similar social contexts for members 
of each cultural community. Furthermore, in addition to the three themes mentioned 
above which are based on critical incidents from the point of view of an ego 
observing the other, there are two additional themes which may be identified, that 
are not captured in such a Culture Assimilator approach, because it reflects the 
perspective of the less dominant cultural community: 
(D) Dance Heritage and Nature – Mastery versus Harmony 
Much of the richness of Bharata Natyam as a traditional dance form lies in the use of 
elaborate hand gestures and mime as part of its dance expressions. In fact, the 
presence of such theatrical elements arguably makes the description of Bharata 
Natyam as dance somewhat inadequate from a pseudo-etic point of view of the 
Chinese, for it should then rightly belong to a category that lies somewhere between 
dance in the Chinese understanding and ‘Chinese opera’ (which in turn places such 
importance on stylised and codified movements that it does not correspond to ‘opera’ 
in the sense of Western classical music).  
This may explain why the easiest way to appreciate Bharata Natyam or general 
‘Indian dance’ alike in the Chinese imagination, would be to extract from it some 
popular items as ‘peacock dance’ or ‘snake dance’, whereby dancers reduce the 
narrative and the abstract components of the sophisticated dance expressions to 
highlight naturalistic movements in imitation of these animals. For grand events such 
as national occasions, special costumes would be made for such items. These 
hence constitute virtually a ‘transcultural’ mode of creativity disguised as a 
‘multicultural’ representation, and may in fact be part of quasi-commercial events for 
tourism. The distinction between Indian classical and folk dance often becomes 
irrelevant for dancers in such ‘innovations’. 
One recent example of such ‘intercultural’ dance productions would be the 2013 
Chingay parade – a street procession that originated in the Chinese Spring Festival 
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celebrations but have over the years lost its religious and community significance as 
it evolves into a carnival showcasing local and foreign cultural performances and a 
ticketed event costing as much as S$60 for the best seats. As a production entitled 
Fire in Snow in February 2013, the parade has featured a segment of ‘Indian dance’ 
entitled ‘Snake Kingdom’ (Narpani Pearavai. 7th March 2013), to mark the Chinese 
Year of the Snake.  
Indian dancers who train in Bharata Natyam are also often involved in such 
performances in major occasions such as the National Day Parade. The artistic 
direction for the Youth Olympic Games opening ceremony in August 2010 makes an 
especially interesting study on representation of Singapore’s ‘multi-racial’ society. In 
a welcome dance item, the Malay dancers are placed first in the sequence on 
centrestage, as if acknowledging their status as the indigenous population; they 
seem to be playing the chief host to a national and international audience as they 
begin dancing in costumes of noble yellow and gold colours, carrying props of betel 
nut containers (Olympicsingapore2010, 15th August 2010, 02min 18sec) to a song 
with the words Selamat Datang (Welcome).  Then come the Chinese dancers from 
the flanks in costumes of auspicious red and yellow colours, carrying lanterns in 
auspicious red (Ibid., 02 min 44 sec). Meantime the Indian dancers can be seen 
(Ibid., 02min 40 sec) emerging out of the dark from behind into a formation upstage 
centre , after having to tread through water (an artificial pool which gets the dancers’ 
feet all wet), which possibly signifies that they are descendants of a migrant society. 
They are clad in a shiny outfit of opulent yellow and purple with an artificial foldable 
‘plume’ behind to make them look like peacocks. But soon centrestage gives way to 
dancers representing the Eurasian and the Peranakan Chinese communities, who 
are dressed in the most colourful costumes from traditional to modern, supported by 
Chinese lion dancers who are similarly in multiple colours. The song meantime 
reaches a climax as it segues from a local Malay folk tune to a rap in English.  
A Singapore audience watching the whole sequence may get the impression that the 
sequence also represents a progress from the traditional to the modern, from the 
original Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic identities to a new hybridised identity, 
which is nonetheless dominated by the Chinese. While the last aspect is quite 
natural as it reflects the reality of the Chinese population being the majority, it is a 
little unfortunate that Indian dancers are cast in the cliché of an animal dance once 
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again, like how the Malay dancers tend to evoke life in the rural villages, echoing a 
discourse that associates them with the ‘fishing village’ that Singapore once was 
before modern development with the advent of the British and the Chinese. Hence 
ethnic dance even as a well-meaning representation of ethnic identity may often play 
into stereotypes in the minds of the audience as well. More creativity is required to 
avoid such problems of stereotyping.  
Another interesting phenomenon with the use of dance to represent multicultural 
Singapore is how such events as Chingay and Racial Harmony Day have turned into 
carnivals with a logic of spectacle as well as a political hierarchy where dancers of 
parades representing the vernacular cultures are followed by leaders of grassroots 
organisations and then at the apex by the cabinet ministers or members of 
parliament or corporate events (Goh, 2013, pp. 235-236).  
(E) Dance Heritage and Gender - Masculinity versus Femininity 
The use of dance heritage to represent ethnic identity in Singapore also comes with 
a gender bias. The favouring of Bharata Natyam as cultural symbol of the Indian 
population, especially the Tamil population, also means that male Indians tend to be 
left out, except for the Sikh population which is represented by the Bhangra dance 
performed by men.  
As such, the most important dance spectacle featuring Tamil males would be the 
annual Thaipusam street procession, except the feature of body piercing means that 
it is not for the faint-hearted, though it has become a major tourist attraction. The 
authorities also seem to frown upon the high volume of percussion and playback 
music that participants produce, as attempt as reported in the press was made by 
the police with the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB) to enforce a music ban in 2011, 
prompting M. Ravi, a human rights laywer, to file a summons against the HEB 
guidelines for violating the rights of religious minorities (Wong, 2011).  
There is yet another traditional dance form performed by South Indian men, known 
as the Dappan Koothu, but any acknowledgement of this as dance heritage would 
remain problematic. While this is a free and energetic form of folk dancing that the 
younger generation of Tamil population in Singapore is increasingly identifying with 
especially since it has been much featured in popular songs of Tamil movies of 
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recent years, it is still rejected by the elite society for being associated with a lower 
caste and with its original function as a funeral dance. In Malaysia, the national oil 
company Petronas had to apologise and pull out a music video featuring the dance 
to mark Deepavali celebrations in November 2012, after angry viewers complained 
that it did not reflect Indian culture and was inappropriate for the festive occasion 
(Business Line, 7th November 2012). This underscores the fact that social value of a 
‘dance heritage’ is not always shared by an ethnically defined community, not to 
mention the question of aesthetic value that may be used as a yardstick. 
   
6.2.2 Dimensions of Intercultural Learning with Indian Classical Dance 
as Medium 
This section aims to discuss some of the dimensions of intercultural learning where 
cultural heritage of dance is involved as the medium of intercultural dialogue. The 
preference to speak of intercultural learning as a process, instead of ‘intercultural 
competence’ as a whole set of skills and related aspects under the framework of 
intercultural communication, has partly been argued in Chapter 3. The consideration 
of dance being a form of art completes the argument, as the framework of ‘effective’ 
intercultural communication generally assumes an overriding objective of individuals 
in adapting to a different environment for specific utilitarian goals already, whereas 
intercultural dialogue involving the arts would be more appropriately seen as a 
process of learning under the premise of respect for cultural diversity.   
The challenge for intercultural dialogue, considered here as a form of liberal learning, 
would hence not be discussed in terms of personal goals in knowledge and skills, but 
instead in terms of the attitudes, which would be classified under the ‘affective’ 
aspects in a framework of intercultural competence alongside cognitive and 
behavioural aspects. It shall be argued here that the main aspects of the challenge in 
intercultural learning, in overcoming cultural differences, may be discussed in terms 
of ‘empathy’ in the understanding of a different socio-cultural system and ‘open-
mindedness’ in appreciating the symbolic communication as part of a different 
cultural system. One makes no claim of these two affective aspects being exhaustive, 
but considers them as possible solutions to two questions: Firstly, how may one 
learn to ‘understand’ the culture of a different community as a socio-cultural system? 
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Secondly, how may one develop a positive attitude towards symbols and values in a 
different cultural system? 
A focus on these two attitudes or affective aspects would arguably be most pertinent 
for the challenge of intercultural dialogue, amidst a nebula of intercultural 
competence referring very generally to a whole complex of abilities among 
individuals “that are required to perform effectively and appropriately when 
interacting with others who are linguistically and culturally different from oneself” 
(Fantini, 2009, p. 458), whereby ‘effective’ reflects the outsider’s or presumably ‘etic’ 
view of one’s own performance in the target culture, whereas ‘appropriate’ reflects 
the insider’s or ‘emic’ view of how one’s behaviour may be perceived (Ibid.). A 
concept of ‘intercultural learning’ based on a framework of intercultural competence 
under the Culture Assimilator approach would have focused on effective functioning 
through integrating a different ‘orientation system’ in a field of action, such that 
‘intercultural understanding’ through appropriate attribution of others’ actions is also 
premised on serving the development of ‘intercultural competence’ in such 
functioning (Thomas, 1988; Thomas, 2003b, pp. 142-147), as discussed in Chapter 
3. Such frameworks of intercultural competence have been designed to help 
individuals cope with a different cultural environment for temporary purposes of 
business, study or otherwise, based on the assumption that people have generally 
internalised particular dispositions in their behaviour based on meanings and values 
in their own cultural systems, that they would not be able to communicate effectively 
across cultures. As discussed in Chapter 4 however, one may also observe a 
transcultural society where people naturally communicate and function with 
meanings and values of more than one cultural systems. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
with an approach of the Culture Assimilator, one may adopt a kind of flexibility in 
action without any attempt at judgment or resolution on issues of differences in 
cultural values between different socio-cultural systems – which may in fact suggest 
a retreat from intercultural dialogue. That is due to a narrow definition of ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ in terms of ‘effective and appropriate’ intercultural communication. 
However, in the context here, where respect for cultural diversity in heritage and the 
arts is the premise, a more meaningful definition for intercultural dialogue would 
involve ‘intercultural learning’ in a different sense, as a form of dialogic learning 
drawn on theorists such as Dewey and seen as part of the democratic or public good 
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for individuals and groups, “[functioning] in the same way as dialogue among 
individual interlocutors in any learning community” (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 168).  
One may indeed argue that the prerequisites of dialogue and the prerequisites of 
education are the same insofar as they share the same horizontal dimension in 
embracing all humanity and achievements of mankind and the same vertical 
dimension in exploring reasons for choices in actions and policies (Kazepides, 2012, 
p. 84). These include respect for all, cooperation, care, open-mindedness and all 
other virtues that may be summarised by the Greek work philanthropos (Ibid., p. 80) 
It may hence be argued that the high point in any learning is not learning the 
knowledge of propositions that ‘something is the case’, or learning the skills of ‘how 
to do something’, but learning the attitudes of how to be a certain kind of person 
(Ibid.). This would include, for genuine dialogue, what Oakeshott in his philosophy of 
liberal learning calls ‘intellectual virtues’, such as “disinterested curiosity, patience, 
intellectual honesty… doubt… sensibility” (Oakeshott, 1989, pp. 60-62; cited in 
Kazepides, 2012, p. 80), whereby learning entails “acquiring the ability to feel and to 
think, and the pupil will never acquire these abilities unless he has learned to listen 
for them and to recognise them in the conduct and utterances of others” (Ibid.) 
One may now proceed to discuss the relevance of empathy and open-mindedness to 
intercultural dialogue, with the specific example on dance heritage. To begin with, 
the concept of empathy or Einfühlung may be traced back to its use in the context of 
aesthetics with romantic thinkers around 1800 such as Herder and Novalis (Stueber, 
2006, p. 6) Herder in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele (1774) 
has imagined empathy in terms of a quasi-perceptual act distinguished from mere 
inferential processes, as the ability ‘to feel into everything, to feel everything out of 
himself’’ (cited in Ibid.). Under the romantic movement, the ability to empathise with 
nature was tied to a pantheistic metaphysics as well as a critique of a modern 
society organised according to the rational principles of science (Ibid., p. 7). But it 
was Theodor Lipps who eventually used empathy as a concept central for 
philosophical and psychological analysis of aesthetic experiences, to explain the 
non-inferential and quasi-perceptual character of such experiences. Aesthetic 
experiences were understood by him as perceptual encounters with external state of 
affairs that cause internal resonance, projected into and felt as a quality of the 
perceived object (Lipps, 1903; cited in Stueber, 2006, p. 7). Lipps held that the 
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projective mechanisms of empathy are based on an innate human tendency of motor 
mimcry, as already noted by psychologist Adam Smith (1853), and speculated that it 
it is still present despite being inhibited by external circumstances such as cultural 
conditioning (see Stueber, 2006, pp. 7-8). This concept of empathy was further 
developed by Edmund Husserl and his student Edith Stern in their explication of 
intersubjectivity between individuals recognising one another as being minded (Ibid., 
p. 9). Thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition also used similar terminology such as 
mitfühlen or nacherleben to refer to a means of understanding other minds (Ibid., p. 
11). But whereas Lipps seemed interested in questions like how one may recognise 
the emotional state of another through facial expressions, they were more interested 
in the epistemic means for justifying the interpretation of utterances and actions of 
others, including an evaluation of significance in the context of historical narratives 
(Ibid., p. 11). In an attempt to take into account the complex of psychological aspects 
along with philosophical considerations with regards to the understanding of others’ 
behaviour, Stueber (2006) makes a distinction between ‘basic empathy’, as 
mechanisms of inner imitations according to Lipp’s conception (p. 20), and 
‘reenactive empathy’, as referring to the “folk-psychological ability to understand the 
behaviour of other agents in more complex terms” (Ibid., p. 152).On reenactive 
empathy, he takes a cue from Collingwood (1946) who suggests that our 
understanding of how a thought - which is more than some internal mental state - 
can be a reason for someone’s reason for actions, is possible only if we are able to 
integrate them as thoughts into our own cognitive perspective by imagining them as 
our own thoughts that could be reasons for our own actions (Ibid., p. 162).   
The application of the empathy concept to dance can be traced back to Titchener, 
who was responsible for adapting into English the Greek term empatheia for what 
Vischer called Einfühlung in aesthetics. Titchener distinguished between a mental 
nod to an argument using the ‘mind’s muscles’ and the actual physical nod activated 
by the ‘body’s muscles, such that kinaesthetic along with other forms of information 
served to convey meaning, with empathy consisting in the act of reproducing in one’s 
mind the kinaesthetic image of the other, synthesising physical and emotional 
experience (Foster, 2011, p. 128). In the 1930s, John Martin attempted to develop a 
theory of communication in dance, initially using the word ‘metakinesis’ to correlate 
physical movement and psychic accompaniment, but later referring to a process of 
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‘inner mimicry’, suggesting that watching dance depended on the integration of 
motional and emotional systems (Ibid., p. 156). Choreographer Yvonne Rainer who 
travelled to India in 1971 used the term ‘kinetic empathy’ to describe her experience 
of witnessing a solo dance performance depicting the Ramayana character Nala. For 
her, ‘kinetic empathy’ consisted of an immediate mimetic capacity of physical 
articulation, divorced from emotion (Ibid., p. 163). Whereas the representation of 
emotions on the face of the Indian dancer was apparently universally recognisable, 
the hand gestures did not ‘mean’ anything to her, yet she was able to respond by 
mimicking their energising and charismatic motions, which gave her a sense of 
power (Ibid.).    
Recalling the arguments of McFee (1992) as cited in Chapter 5, such appreciation of 
a dance heritage would be merely aesthetic but not artistic, for dance as an art form 
has a conventional and historical character and has to be understood in context of its 
rules which have to be learned. Dewey (2008) has made similar arguments in his 
theory of art, citing that the aesthetic standing of the Parthenon comes about as the 
work becomes an experience for a human being, but whoever wants to go beyond 
personal enjoyment and “to theorise about the aesthetic experience embodied in the 
Parthenon must realise in thought what the people into whose lives it entered had in 
common, as creators and as those who were satisfied with it, with people in our own 
homes and on our own streets” (p. 297). 
Stueber (2006) has also acknowledged the need of theoretical information to 
understand the world of another culture, as there are limitations to the use of 
empathy as a strategy to re-enact another person’s thought. Empathy basically 
involves “an act of the imagination, that is, an act of using our own cognitive 
machinery as it is defined right here and now, in order to interpret other agent’s 
behaviour in folk-psychological terms and to gain information about another person’s 
mind” (p. 210). This is different from immersing oneself into another culture, in what 
Bourdieu would describe as a habitus with embodied and practical know-how, for 
one’s cognitive system cannot be assumed to be flexible beyond restraint (Ibid.). 
One needs to reflect on what in the hermeneutic tradition has been called the 
‘prejudicial structure of understanding’ (Gadamer, 1989), whereby “grasping the 
content of an utterance or a thought requires it to be integrated into our own 
culturally and historically contingent perspective on and conception of the world – 
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including our preconceptions regarding the world of the interpretee – from which we 
as interpreter are never able to abstract” (Ibid., p. 205). Stueber accounts for 
limitations in capacities of empathy by way of how we as people would “regard 
beliefs and norms that we are emotionally attached to as being essential to our own 
identity, our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and our conception of the 
fundamental parameters for our relation to the world and other human beings” (Ibid., 
p. 213). To overcome these limits, one has to supplement the strategy of empathy 
with additional theoretical information, such that interpretation eventually has to be 
an open-ended process of interplay between re-enactment, cognitive extrapolation 
and theory proper (Ibid., pp. 216-217).    
A theoretical perspective in a cross-cultural discussion of dance heritage such as 
what is demonstrated in previous section would hence be arguably helpful in 
understanding Indian dance heritage within its cultural context, without having to  
turn into unnecessary cultural stereotyping of the associated community. The same 
argument may hold for negative as well as positive stereotyping, for there may also 
be a tendency for a Chinese spectator enamoured of Indian classical dance to 
essentialise spirituality in Indians, when there is no ground for placing Indians, 
Chinese or people of any other cultural background in a hierarchy of spirituality. One 
should understand culture as achievements of a community but not as embodied in 
each member of the community.  
As suggested in the previous subsection, one also needs to avoid contrasting a 
cultural practice like Indian classical dance with Chinese dance, ballet or 
contemporary dance in a hierarchy from the traditional to the modern. Under a 
perspective such as Habermas’ project of modernity which places great value on 
autonomy of the modern individual, or perspectives of dominant ideology theorists, 
one may assume that any dominant culture is unitary like dominant social interests 
that may be associated with it (Archer, 1996, p. 64). This means that the “logical 
content, structure and potentiality of the Cultural System is granted no autonomy 
from the Socio-Cultural level which is causally responsible for it” (Ibid., p. 65). 
Habermas argues for three domains of reason corresponding to three autonomous 
‘validity-spheres’ in the modern world. He says: “The cultural rationalisation from 
which the structures of consciousness typical of modern societies emerge embraces 
cognitive, aesthetic expressive and moral-evaluative elements of the religious 
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tradition. With science and technology, with autonomous art and the values of 
expressive self-presentation, with universal legal and moral representations, there 
emerges a differentiation of three value spheres, each of which follow its own logic. 
(Habermas, 1984, pp. 164-165; cited in Harrington, 2000, pp. 84-85)” With the 
connection of moral and religious values with aesthetics values in Indian classical 
dance through an emphasis on evoking bhakti or devotion in the performance, there 
is a threat of the dance heritage being placed on a lower rank under a banner of 
modernity with a narrow conception of secularity. 
Habermas, who has incidentally been accused of betraying Western preconceptions 
in an abstract universalism, has tried to absolve of such charges by way of the idea 
of an ‘ideal speech situation’ for any culture’s value orientations to be argued out 
(Harrington, 2000, p. 100). Such conditions for collective dialogue to ensure 
consensus without constraints may arguably end up with a circularity between the 
ideal conditions for emancipation and the practical or temporal conditions of it 
(Archer, 1996, p. 69). But assuming that emancipation is the subject where a 
dialogue on the artistic values of Indian classical dance is concerned, one may still 
consider Habermas’ argument, against neoconservative critics, that artistic value of 
beauty, sublimity and innovation cannot be disjoined from socially silenced human 
needs (Boucher, 2011, pp. 63-65). It may then be argued, for instance, that the 
learning of Indian classical dance is actually an empowering experience for the 
female gender in a male-dominated society, and democratising for a community that 
has long privileged the religious Brahmins in cultural practices.   
The other dimension in intercultural learning to be discussed here is open-
mindedness. Open-mindedness according to Dewey’s thinking is one of the 
fundamental aims of education. It may be argued from a liberalist perspective as “an 
intellectual virtue that involves a willingness to take relevant evidence and argument 
into account in forming or revising our beliefs and values, especially when there is 
some reason why we might resist such evidence and argument, with a view to 
arriving at true and defensible conclusions. … The attitude of open-mindedness is 
embedded in the Socratic idea of following the argument where it leads and is a 
fundamental virtue of inquiry. (Hare, 2004, online)”  
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From a psychological perspective, open-mindedness is a kind of attitude, and 
attitude may be defined as a psychological tendency to evaluate an entity with some 
degree of favour or disfavour (Jonas et al, 1994, p. 776). An attitude as such is 
dependent on one’s expectancy, the subjective probability of attribute one 
subscribes to an object, and one’s value, one’s evaluation of the attribute (Ibid., p. 
777). Attitude change may generally be induced by incentives, such as monetary 
incentives, taxation or legal sanctions, but the offering of incentives may also result 
in a more negative attitude towards a certain behaviour, due to the so-called 
‘overjustification effect’ (Ibid., pp. 783-785). The issue of attitude here in relation to 
cultural heritage may be discussed in relation to prejudice between different 
communities, which may be discussed in social psychology with social identity theory. 
In social anthropology, it has been discussed that sensitivity to social boundaries 
may find symbolic expression in ritual form. As Cohen (1985) has noted, “[t]he 
symbolic expression and affirmation of boundary heightens people’s awareness of 
and sensitivity to their community (p. 50)”. Hence the association of Indian classical 
dance with the Indian identity in Singapore, as embodied in the dancing body, may 
well lead to an attitude of defence or rejection by non-Indians such as Chinese 
members of the society. One needs to bear in mind the problem of racism against 
Indians by the majority Chinese population in Singapore: “The body and colour of the 
skin becomes the point of reference for ridicule, insult and verbal abuse. 
(Velayutham, 2007, p. 4)” The association of the dance heritage with Hindu practices 
may in fact also lead to rejection among Christian members of the Indian community.  
Hence the challenge in the use of Indian classical dance as medium for intercultural 
dialogue may also require an open-minded attitude that accepts a polysemic nature 
of the dance heritage whereby it is dance movements may be appreciated on their 
own without making an issue out of associations with ethnic or religious identity.   
The aspect of open-mindedness in intercultural dialogue would arguably also go in 
line with Parekh’s (2000) justification of cultural diversity based on the appreciation 
that “no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full 
range of human possibilities” (p. 167). R.E. Young (1996, p. 144) highlights that 
Winch’s remarks on the wisdom of learning from other cultures have been cited with 
approval from Habermas. Habermas has ventured so much to suggest: “Can’t we 
who belong to modern societies learn something from understanding alternative, 
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particularly premodern forms of life? Shouldn’t we, beyond all romanticising of 
superseded stages of development, beyond exotic stimulation from the contents of 
alien cultures, recall the losses required by our own path to the modern world? (1984, 
p. 65)” This may provide a balance to an assumption of intercultural dialogue, 
whereby a modern understanding of rationality as group adaptation to change 
according to Habermas’ as well as Dewey’s thinking (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 131), is 
over-privileged.  
Intercultural learning, as R.E. Young argues, may be considered as a democratic or 
public good which accrues initially to individuals and eventually to cultural groups 
(Ibid., p. 168). Against Hayek’s liberalist argument, that the public domain should be 
coupled with the market as an apparatus to optimise decisions amidst irreducible 
value pluralism. Young argues that commodification would see a result whereby 
“rational, democratic expression of difference in life-values including cultural 
difference is reduced to who has the most marketing power” (p. 169). In the case of 
Singapore, a minority culture such as that of the Indian community would be easily 
marginalised.  
As part of Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy whereby the world itself refers to 
“experience as appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying” (1934, p. 46; cited in Greene, 
1998, p. 56), “art in its form, unites the very same realisation of doing and 
undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy” (p. 48; cited in Ibid.). Greene argues that 
Dewey’s perspective anticipated Ryle’s (1949) refutation of the Cartesian myth of the 
‘Ghost in the Machine’ when he stated:  
In making mind purely immaterial (isolated from the organ of doing and 
undergoing), the body ceases to be living and becomes a dead lump. This 
conception of mind as an isolated being underlies the conception that esthetic 
experience is merely something “in mind,” and strengthens the conception 
which isolates the esthetic from those modes of experience in which the body 
is actively engaged with the things of nature and life. It takes art out of the 
province of the live creature. 
    (Dewey, 1934, p. 264; cited in Greene, 1998, p. 58) 
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Contrasting Dewey’s idea of engaged aesthetic experience with E.D. Hirsch’s (1987) 
idea of background knowledge as ‘cultural literary’, Greene argues that the crux for 
Dewey was not a ‘rich and developed background’ explanation, but the 
encouragement of active learning that involved questioning, inferring, making 
judgments and imagining (1998, pp. 63-64) instead of following “ready-made rules 
and precedents” (Dewey, 1934, p. 304; cited in Greene, 1998, p. 72).  
The question then with Indian classical dance is, how may a non-Indian learner 
appreciate it beyond understanding its social value or ‘function’ of heritage as 
providing the Indian community a sense of continuity and identity? It would be 
argued here that intercultural learning here may involve an understanding of cultural 
symbols and meanings associated with the dance not just per se but also how its 
aesthetic values may be associated with a whole philosophy of life. Whether or how 
one takes the Indian philosophy away as reference for reflexivity on general ethics 
related to autonomy, community and spirituality (Shweder et al, 2003) would be up to 
the individual’s judgment and imagination. 
One may learn for instance that in Indian philosophy, there is a concept of art 
associating it with Yoga, as “mental concentration… the overlooking of all distinction 
between the subject and the object of contemplation; a means of achieving harmony 
or unity of consciousness” (Coomaraswamy, 1918, p. 21). This plays an important 
part in Indian thought, whereby even the lesser crafts may constitute a practice or 
acharya analogous to samprajnata yoga in its single-minded attention, as 
Coomaraswamy observes, citing (Ibid.) the philosopher Sankaracharya’s remarks in 
commentary to the Brahma Sutra that “the arrow-maker perceives nothing beyond 
his work when he is buried in it; but he has nevertheless consciousness and control 
over his body, both of which are absent in the fainting person”. He also cites 
Sukracharya in observing that the practice of visualisation is identical in worship and 
in art, for instance when the worshipper recites the dhyana mantram to describe the 
deity while forming a corresponding mental picture (Ibid., p. 22). Coomaraswamy 
suggests that there would be psychological basis in such imagination in terms of 
aesthetic principles, citing the principle of thinking, self-identification with object of art 
work and vividness of the image (pp. 22-23). He cites Croce’s Aesthetic in the 
remark that externalisation of an art work “implies a vigilant will, which persists in not 
allowing certain visions, intuitions, or representations to be lost” (see Ibid., pp. 23). 
370 
 
He argues that the primary purpose in Hindu art is neither self-expression nor 
realisation of beauty: “To him the theme was all in all, and if there is beauty in his 
work, this did not arise from aesthetic intention, but from a state of mind which found 
unconscious expression. (p. 25)” Where Bharatanatyam or any other classical Indian 
dance form is concerned, one has to acknowledge that this had its origin as Hindu 
art and hence shares the same philosophy, but the dance has emphatically also 
evolved beyond its religious functions. Given such duality, one may do well to 
consider Geertz’s perspective of religion as a cultural system consisting of symbols 
(1973, p. 90), and to add that such symbols may also be appreciated in our 
postmodern world in a secular context simply for their aesthetic values.  
The idea of beauty in Indian thought may be encapsulated in the basic concept of 
rupa or form, which refers to static geometric form as well as movement which follow 
principles of rhythm and internal harmony (Sharma, 1990, p. 26). Rupa as a vital 
form provides the manifest (vyakta) order of the unmanifest (avyakta), whereby the 
latter as the outpouring of life may be understood as equivalent to ‘elan vital’ 
according to Bergson (Ibid.). Scholars in Indian aesthetics such as Kapila Vatsyayan 
would hence consider dance, in its vitality, in its manifestation of the flow and 
essence of life, as the core of Indian art (cited in p. 27). Sharma (1990) has also 
argued that there is a specificity to Indian aesthetics, as spirituality is related to 
materiality in the Indian context in a way that one does not see in the Western 
context. Whereas Western art favours some form of mimesis, “Indian art is anti-
representation” (p. 29). He adds: “Transcendence, or going beyond is a dynamic 
quality of rupa (Ibid.).” 
There is no need to delve further in the philosophy of Indian aesthetics for the 
purpose here. Suffice it to say that the use of Indian dance heritage as medium for 
intercultural dialogue in arts education programme at public schools may miss out a 
lot on cultural values and meanings, if the learning outcomes are not clear, or if one 
focuses by default on dry historical knowledge or technical instruction of dance steps. 
Another issue to consider is the tendency in Singapore’s financial support of arts and 
culture to subjugate it as one cluster of the creative industries following the UK 
definition, alongside design and media; arts and culture would cover everything from 
performing arts to visual arts and literary arts, along with museums and heritage 
sites (Ooi, 2011, p. 121). Measured against similar indicators as the media and 
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design clusters, fine arts practitioners are hence “inevitably pressed to become more 
economically productive with their creativity” (pp. 121-122). What impact this may 
have on the educational factor in performing arts and heritage remains to be 
investigated. The impetus to import foreign talents for the cultural industry may 
possibly undercut interest in nurturing local talents, in dance as with other arts. There 
may also be a tendency in a McDonaldisation of heritage, for instance where schools 
request traditional dance groups to teach creative methods of choreography to 
children in just one or two sessions, with no regard at all for traditional values 
associated with the dance form.  
Citing Bateson’s (1972) concept of the ‘double bind’ between the abstract and the 
concrete concerning play and therapy for the child, Spivak (2012) has proposed that 
“the training of the imagination that can teach the subject to play – an aesthetic 
education – can also teach it to discover (theoretically or practically) the premises of 
the habit that obliges us to transcendentalise religion and nation” (p. 10). She traces 
the question posed by a double bind of mind and body to Schiller in On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man, where he suggested the Spieltrieb of art as a balancing act could 
save society (p. 19).  
In short, the kind of intercultural learning that this thesis supports as a concept of 
intercultural dialogue involves a form of liberal learning that is open-minded to the 
cultural diversity for their intrinsic value rather than instrumental value, and 
empathetic towards a different perspective coming from a different cultural 
community. It is not to be understood as a form of ‘intercultural competence’ where 
one’s interest is egoistical and instrumental, focusing on one’s survival in another 
environment through effective and appropriate communication. The purpose is not to 
objectify another culture in search of predictability in their behaviour, but instead to 
strive to appreciate a different form of rationality even if one may decide to stay true 
to the priorities in one’s own value system. One needs to resist any essentialisation 
of cultural differences, that tends to place different cultures in a form of hierarchy.  
Baecker (2000) would even suggest replacing the term intercultural competence with 
cultural competence (kulturelle Kompetenz), arguing that instead of othering any 
culture based on its origin and the idea of disposition, in a colonial mode, one should 
simply think of all cultures as part of the Weltgesellschaft (pp. 30-32). But a 
discerning use of method of the Culture Assimilator or Intercultural Sensitiser, in 
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scrutinising and deconstructing any cultural difference that is perceived, may help to 
ameliorate negative attitudes towards another cultural community. 
The use of the concept ‘intercultural learning’ here is hoped to capture the value of 
autonomy in experiencing the world as well as the politics of recognition for a cultural 
community as the other. Explored here specifically in reference to the use of dance 
heritage as medium for intercultural exchange, it does not claim to exhaust all 
meanings of intercultural dialogue. This thesis would in fact argue that any 
intercultural exchange, that privileges a dance heritage in its role of ‘civilising’ the 
people and providing a kind of cultural capital, also needs to be balanced by a 
multicultural representation to mark equality among the communities, as well as a 
creative transcultural approach that helps to articulate a common humanity 
transcending differences in language and religion, without privileging any 
assimilation in one single direction. Dialogue should be a two-way affair. 
To round up this chapter, one may provide a little perspective on how a philosophy of 
intercultural dialogue in building community may yet be meaningful in the context of 
Singapore. In an imagination of intercultural dialogue based on Levinas’ new 
conception of the ethical, departing from a model based on Kant, it would be argued 
that the Self is not the source of meanings in the world, and that it is Other who is the 
source of one’s reason and obligation (see Zylinska, 2005, pp. 14-15). It is an idea 
whereby discourse has to come from the other, opening to the suffering of the other 
in his ‘infinite alterity’, because “[i]t is not I, it is the other that can say yes. From him 
comes affirmation; he is at the commencement of experience” (Levinas, 1969, p. 93; 
cited in Zylinska, 2005, p. 14). To Levinas, the beginning of morality involves a 
preoccupation for the Other, to be willing to do good, to serve, to the extent of self-
sacrifice (see Bauman, 1995, p. 60). Taking moral responsibility as such entails 
treating the Other not as a specimen of a species but as unique, and thereby 
elevating oneself to similar uniqueness and dignity: “At the moment I am responsible 
for the Other, I am unique. I am unique as far as I am irreplaceable, in as far as I am 
chosen to respond. (in Poirie, 1987; cited in Bauman, 1995, p. 60)”  
If such an imagination of morality be considered too idealistic, it would least of all be 
anything conceivable in Singapore, if surveys on Singapore’s ‘national’ values, 
epitomised by the word kiasu, are anything to go by: it has been suggested in a 
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survey among 2000 Singapore residents, based on the Seven Levels of 
Consciousness model conceived by Richard Barrett (1997), that Singaporeans 
consider their own society as competitive, self-centred and elitist (Chan, 24th August 
2012; Clothier, 6th September 2012). The coinage of kiasu, also highlighted in the 
survey as an attribute, literally means ‘the fear of losing out’ in the Chinese dialect of 
Hokkien, has been variously interpreted as a negative complement of 
competitiveness or an obsessive desire of value for money; while argued as an 
attribute not unique to Singapore, it has been suggested that “[w]here competition 
encourages calculated risk taking, kiasuism calls for uniformity” (Ho et al, 1998, p. 
359).  
If Singaporeans can indeed be generalised as kiasu, which manifests itself in 
competitive, selfish, calculating, greedy behaviour yet with an aversion to risk at the 
same time (Ibid., pp. 363-364), it may have positive implications for the continuing 
stability of the Singapore society under the state ideology of a ‘multiracial 
meritocracy’ that is oriented towards a neoliberal economy. At the same time, such 
individualism may have negative implications for their ‘cultural competence’ towards 
a cosmopolitan community. In one perspective, there may be signs of progress, for 
example in a shift of Singapore’s civil society from a vertical relation of advocacy in 
“appeal to higher authority” (Koh and Soon, 2012, p. 95) – to put it in very non-
threatening words - to a more horizontal peer-to-peer relation, as citizens become 
more vocal (Ibid.). But one should not be misled by such an upbeat account to ignore 
the persistent patriarchal and authoritarian control over a feminised, “politically 
emasculated public sphere” (Tan, 2001, p. 118; cf. Tan, 2010) – civil society 
engagement in UN processes of human rights and in civil and political rights and 
democratic expression has long been constantly suppressed in state-controlled 
mainstream media (Chia, 2012, p. 23). Seen in such light, globalisation in Singapore, 
with its multi-faceted manifestations of migration trends, economic challenges and 
struggle in the new media, may yet prove to be a double-edge sword of more social 
change to come. 
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7. CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With a transdisciplinary approach exploring different dimensions of ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ – as a policy approach and as a process of exchange or communication, 
this thesis has put forward two different models of intercultural exchange involving 
the use of cultural heritage as a medium for exchange, considering dance as an 
example of heritage. The two models, differentiated on the factor of salience in 
cultural identity, are namely multiculturalism and transculturalism, the former 
emphasising respect and mutual understanding for cultural diversity among different 
communities, the latter promoting creative engagement to overcome differences in 
cultural identity. As suggested in arguments of the penultimate chapter, these two 
approaches are not postulated as mutually exclusive, but instead may be seen as 
complementary. 
This conclusion will serve to reframe this analysis with its interconnecting themes of 
intercultural dialogue, heritage and pluralism on the example of dance heritage in 
Singapore, in order to recognise limitations in the study here of culture which has 
admittedly such a multiplicity of aspects, and thereby to provide recommendations 
for further research.  
The analysis of intercultural dialogue as mentioned has been made by relating it to 
considerations of the political dimension in cultural policy and the psychological 
dimension of processes in face-to-face communication. On the political and ethical 
level, it considers the underlying goals and ideals of intercultural dialogue as an 
ideology in building social cohesion and upholding the values of freedom and 
democracy, between arguments of liberalism and communitarianism; on the 
psychological level, it considers the aspects of knowledge, attitude and behaviour 
towards a different culture particularly in the social process of interaction. While 
applying these perspectives to cultural heritage as medium for intercultural dialogue, 
one also has to take into account that in practice, the multiple uses of heritage in a 
globalised world involves different mechanisms and indeed ideologies tied to political, 
economic and cultural motivations. Hence it is not a simple case of one ideal type of 
intercultural dialogue being superior over another, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 by 
testing the implications of both models on the example of Indian classical dance in 
Singapore. 
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Nevertheless, if there is any recommendation that may be made towards cultural 
policies as part of the conclusions here, it would be one leaning ultimately towards a 
liberal philosophy in intercultural learning as discussed in Chapter 6, for which one 
may overcome perception of cultural differences by appealing to aspects like 
empathy and open-mindedness - not simply as intercultural competencies in a 
normative sense, but in terms of their psychological basis in relation to heritage as a 
cultural tool. Bearing in mind the limitations of the analysis in this thesis based on 
theoretical formulation without primary data, the conclusions would also point the 
way towards further research on such aspects of intercultural dialogue involving 
cultural heritage as a medium, which may inform policies targeted at projects of 
social cohesion.  
It would be useful here to start by recapitulating the arguments in the thesis, by 
reconnecting discussion in the first half on general concepts of culture and 
intercultural dialogue, with their application to the specific contexts of heritage and 
dance in the second half, keeping in mind the main objectives of research in this 
thesis in studying these three aspects: intercultural competence for intercultural 
dialogue between different cultural communities; dance as cultural heritage; and 
Singapore as case study for intercultural dialogue between transcultural and 
multicultural models.   
A good place to start would be the basic concepts of culture, for which Chapter 2 of 
this thesis has provided an overview based on various disciplinary perspectives from 
anthropology and sociology to cultural studies. A major theme which has 
underscored much research interest in anthropology and sociology on culture has 
been the contrast between traditional or primitive societies and modern societies. 
The tension between an attempt to explain the challenge of culture as ‘civilisation’, in 
terms of different stages in evolution of mankind, and an attempt to appreciate 
diversity without any assumption of a fixed path in linear progress, may be traced 
back to the contrasting views between Tylor and Boas. The former emphasised the 
psychic unity of mankind from a developmental perspective, whereas the latter 
stressed that no culture is inferior to another and the same action may have a 
different reasoning across different cultural contexts which needs to be understood 
on its own terms, in a perspective which may too simplistically be described as a 
form of cultural and moral relativism. The difficulty for Boas in finding historical and 
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psychological explanation in cultural variation left a legacy and a vacuum, which in 
the work of Ruth Benedict developed into a view that sees different cultures as 
distinct from one another in a way analogous to personality. A different approach 
would be taken by Levi-Strauss, who shares Boas’ rejection of biological and 
evolutionary theories on cultural variation, but emphasises based on a structuralist 
perspective that despite differences in symbolic systems, there is an underlying 
‘deep structure’ among all cultures that is universal. 
Against such postulating of culture as psychic system, there is another current in 
anthropology which gives primacy instead to culture as social life. This is namely the 
functionalist perspective, which in its crudest formulation by Malinowski would 
reduce ‘primitive’ culture to biological or utilitarian terms of subsistence and sexual 
drives – a view which Levi-Strauss refutes by demonstrating how the ‘savage’ mind 
is also capable of ‘disinterested thinking’. In the more refined formulation by 
Radcliffe-Brown, however, social life, including the aspect of ‘cultural tradition’, is not 
constituted of biological needs but of social institutions or established norms. Shifting 
attention from anthropology to sociology, the quintessential functionalist would be 
Durkheim, whose sets about seeking an explanation to how social order is achieved 
in industrial and pre-industrial society, and finds the answer in shared values and 
norms. Talcott Parsons expands on this functionalist perspective to study social 
action, with a particular interest in developing pattern variables between ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’ societies. But despite the sophistication of his model, he follows the 
basic premises of Durkheim in the concept of institution, as a complex of roles and 
expectations in the social system, and the concept of internalisation, whereby 
sentiments supporting the common values are learned and acquired as ‘dispositions’. 
Along with this assumption that serves to explain social order, Parsons also 
channels Weber’s discussion of value rationality and social action into a framework 
to study ‘value orientation’ in social action. In so doing, he deviates from Weber’s 
view that the pursuit of ultimate ends leads not to a single good but to value 
pluralism, and also from the premium that Weber places on the rationality of ethical 
standards as beliefs, whereby action motivated by values and resistant to the 
moulding of interests is set apart from instrumental action.  
Parsons’ solution for the problem of ‘double contingency’ – how the ego and the alter 
are able to anticipate each other’s expectation and action – would also eventually be 
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criticised by Luhmann. Luhmann would argue that the double contingency should not 
be eliminated by postulating values and norms, if social interaction is to be 
conceived as an encounter between autonomous systems. He would also replace 
Parsons’ idea of culture as the source of a normative order, with an idea of social 
systems as a sui generis reality. But meantime, Parsons’ theoretical framework of 
culture, which practically incorporates psychologism into a functionalist perspective, 
has created a legacy with many followers in the practice of intercultural 
communications which finds application in international business and educational 
exchange among other things. The interest for culture in intercultural communication 
would lie in ascertaining the norms of behaviour in another ‘culture’ for the practical 
purposes of ‘effective’ and ‘appropriate’ communication. Needless to say, the 
instrumental knowledge on culture produced in this field, as scrutinised in this thesis 
with the example of the ‘Culture Assimilator’ of ‘Intercultural Sensitiser’ approach, is 
understandably different from what might have been generated in, say, Geertz’s 
semiotic approach in ethnography, which seeks to interpret culture as a system of 
meanings through ‘thick description’, to reconstruct ‘the actor’s point of view’ instead 
of providing simple causal attribution for their actions.     
One main thread of investigation in this thesis has been to examine in what ways the 
perspective of intercultural communication may contribute to the discussion of 
intercultural dialogue, specifically on the use of cultural heritage such as dance as a 
medium for dialogue. The assumption in this perspective here, as seen in the 
example of the Culture Assimilator framework discussed in Chapter 3, is that the 
challenge of intercultural dialogue is mainly one of communication. More precisely, it 
is one of making accurate attributions of intentions in the speech or action of persons 
representing a different ‘culture’, based on observations of critical incidents in cross-
cultural situations, ‘confirmed’ with secondary sources in ‘experts’ who would ideally 
be familiar with both cultures. Another assumption in this framework, in the 
reinterpretation by German social psychologist Alexander Thomas, is that one can 
derive ‘cultural standards’ to characterise the unfamiliar culture as a form of 
‘intercultural understanding’. A further assumption of his is that such understanding 
as a process of ‘intercultural learning’ will also stimulate appropriate action as one 
assimilates a different ‘orientation system’ of action, hence activating other aspects 
of intercultural competence such as flexibility in action.  
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As discussed in Chapter 4, such postulation of cultures in a Parsonian framework, as 
separate and distinct orientation systems which can be observed from actions in 
cross-cultural situations, may be discussed under a multicultural model for 
intercultural dialogue. The general limitations of this framework as such have already 
been listed at the end of Chapter 3, thus one needs only to summarise two key 
points from there: firstly, this approach sets out with the assumption that any tension 
or misunderstanding in critical incidents may be attributed to ‘cultural differences’, 
and ignores the possibility of attributing it to other social factors such as class or 
gender, to personality or to special circumstances; secondly, following a Parsonian 
framework of intercultural communication, this perspective of intercultural dialogue 
does not deal with challenges of differences in value rationality which may need to 
be explained or debated, only with differences in value orientation of individuals’ 
actions presumed to be representative of their cultural communities which need to be 
described for one’s adaptation.  
By testing this framework of Culture Assimilator involving the concepts of cultural 
standards and intercultural competence, on intercultural dialogue in Singapore with 
Indian dance heritage as a medium, some further conclusions are made as follows:  
1. There is no ground for deriving ‘cultural standards’ of another community 
based on differences in the practice of any cultural heritage relative to one’s 
own community, as using cross-cultural situations as basis for such 
characterisation is not sound, due to the existence of circumstantial factors in 
one’s action. 
2. With any attempt of characterising a community in terms of cultural standards, 
one may be tempted to formulate it in the form of cultural differences based 
on themes like ‘Ritualistic versus Secular’, ‘Individualism versus Collectivism’, 
or ‘Tradition versus Modernity’, as seen in the example of Indian dance 
heritage from a Chinese perspective. This would constitute a form of 
stereotyping.  
3. If one is to speak of the ‘intercultural competence’ of reflexivity, it needs not 
mean that one has to relativise the value system in one’s or the other’s 
community as being subjective and arbitrary, one just needs to reflect on 
whether one is placing one’s and the other community on some form of 
hierarchy. 
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4. Instead of ascertaining ‘cultural standards’ in another community through such 
observations of behaviour, it would be more useful to formulate ‘intercultural 
standards’ in the use of a cultural heritage as part of intercultural dialogue. 
There may be ‘cultural standards’ in terms of institutionalised ideals in a 
community, but that would be more objectively ascertained from the discourse 
of the community. 
5. If one is to speak of the intercultural competence of ‘flexibility’, it needs not 
mean that one has to compromise one’s own values and norms, one just 
needs to consider whether there is more than one way to interpret the values 
and norms of the other community such that both may be accommodated in a 
more creative way. As for flexibility in norms of intercultural exchange, it 
should be understand as a matter for deliberation between cultural groups, 
not simply as a quality of the individual.  
6. There are issues of essentialisation or appropriation in the use of cultural 
heritage such as dance for intercultural dialogue, which may be omitted from 
the perspective of one trying to ‘understand’ an unfamiliar culture. This is not 
captured by a Culture Assimilator approach unless the other cultural 
community is given a voice. 
7. The Culture Assimilator approach privileges the need of one desiring to 
construct knowledge on an unfamiliar culture in order to find orientation in 
dealing with it. It has little control over the affective aspect, such as whether 
one decides to show respect for the other culture.  
8. The Cultural Assimilator is silent on how the ‘intercultural competence’ of 
empathy may be developed in context of the arts such as in dance heritage. 
9. The ‘intercultural competence’ of open-mindedness in the framework of the 
Culture Assimilator tends to be imagined as teleological for some purpose of 
cooperation, when it should arguably involve the desire to understand and be 
understood in intercultural dialogue through cultural heritage. 
10. The study of critical incidents in cross-cultural situations would best be used in 
the ‘original’ Culture Assimilator method of intercultural learning that is 
situation-specific, without making generalisations that reify the other culture.  
Generally, if one considers the Culture Assimilator as an heuristic tool of intercultural 
communication that may help promote intercultural dialogue in terms of open 
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exchange on the basis of respect and mutual understanding, it is apparently 
asymmetrical in approach as it prioritises on the need of one party seeking a sense 
of control, instead of giving the ‘other’ culture a voice. This is problematic and would 
have to be compensated on the second instance through surveys and interviews 
with members of the other community. The construction of knowledge on other 
cultures based on such a paradigm of intercultural competence may therefore be 
criticised in the perspective of cultural studies as perpetuating a similar power 
structure as the old model of anthropology, whereby the ethnographer representing a 
modern culture is assumed to understand the primitive culture of a community even 
better than the community itself. Given that this framework has also sought 
legitimation in Luhmann’s systems theory, Luhmann’s perspective on communication 
would incidentally remind us that our ‘understanding’ of other communities is 
ultimately just a construction in our own minds. It would also be hardly an 
improvement to go from an optimism that an approach of intercultural communication 
can help one ‘understand’ other cultures, to a cynicism that says since everything is 
a construction, then one is justified to construct ‘cultural standards’ as pragmatic 
knowledge to slot other cultures into predictable patterns of thoughts and behaviour.  
From the disciplinary perspective of psychology itself, taking a social constructionist 
perspective according to Gergen (2001) does not obliterate the need for empirical 
science, as mentioned in the introductory chapter; Faye (2012) has further argued 
that taking a naturalist-pragmatic approach in human sciences means that claims 
should be validated scientifically through epistemology in natural sciences, without 
implying that human intentions should simply be explained with brain sciences. It has 
to be made clear that the Culture Assimilator is by no means to be understood as a 
tool for cultural analysis. That in psychology has witnessed a ‘crisis in social 
psychology’ as announced by Armistead (1974) in the 1970s, challenging the 
domination of experimentalism and universal cognitivism; apart from the 
development of cultural psychology already mentioned, discursive psychology as 
represented by the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) in studying cultural texts, not 
to mention Althusser’s channelling of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ as interpellation whereby 
the Cartesian idea of a fixed conscious self is deemed illusory – which in turn has 
been critiqued considering the need to understand historical specificity of cultural 
practices (see Walkerdine and Blackman, 2008, p. 67ff)   
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As ‘intercultural psychology’, the framework of Alexander Thomas is also limited due 
to its assumption of distinct and different cultural systems in cross-cultural situations.  
Considering this as part of intercultural studies that cover intercultural 
communication and intercultural education, this thesis has also pointed out that there 
are more ways to conceptualise intercultural learning. On its own, one may qualify 
the Culture Assimilator or the Intercultural Sensitizer simply as a heuristic approach, 
for an early developmental stage in intercultural dialogue, to kick-start the process of 
interaction in cultural exchanges by giving people a little sense of control in 
navigating through cultural differences. If one does not find any motivation to go 
further in intercultural dialogue, at least there can be minimisation of conflicts through 
conforming contingently to a different set of norms which are situational. In that 
sense it serves as a tool to maintain cordial relations between members of different 
cultural community. Hence one needs not rule out such production of knowledge 
altogether for being too egoistical and instrumental. However, accepting a principle 
of intercultural dialogue as exchange among equals should imply that one also has 
to start problematising any stereotyping construction of the ‘other’. As already 
discussed in Chapter 3, cross-cultural situations, apart from serving as references to 
minimise conflicts, should in fact most ideally be used to deconstruct cultural 
differences based on one-sided perspectives. This is therefore exactly what has 
been done in Chapter 6 with the example of Indian dance heritage, against any 
essentialising from a Chinese perspective. Respect for another culture and its norms 
needs not mean imagining members of the culture as people without their own free 
will. 
For application to a multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, one should consider 
the investigation of critical incidents as remaining useful as reference for further 
research. But apart from that, such application of the Culture Assimilator may tend to 
make unnecessary assumptions by explaining people as products of their culture. It 
also misses out on an important premise of intercultural dialogue as an exchange 
between equals, namely the recognition of the other not only as a member of a 
community from which one derives one’s rationality in cultural values, but also as an 
individual who is autonomous in choosing and expressing one’s point of view. 
Furthermore, it tends to focus on understanding culture as a socio-cultural system, 
as a product of history which results in certain norms of behaviour, instead of 
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understanding culture as a system of meanings which can accommodate different 
interpretations, without necessarily having a consistency that rules over the minds of 
members of its community. One may argue in fact that a broader definition of 
‘intercultural competence’ should include the latter form of knowledge, which would 
facilitate interaction and bonding across cultures.     
A multicultural model of intercultural dialogue through a medium of cultural heritage 
should in short seek to understand the meanings and values associated with the 
place, the object or the performance, placing emphasis on respect for the choice of 
the other to be different in view or practice - as long as it does not infringe on 
anybody’s rights. This model has been contrasted in this thesis with a transcultural 
model of intercultural dialogue, with emphasis on overcoming differences in cultural 
identity through creative interventions. By no means does this thesis argue that one 
model is superior to the other and making the other model redundant. In fact, it is 
argued that with a concept of intercultural learning as liberal learning from other 
cultures as part of an appreciation of cultural diversity, the distinction between a 
multicultural and a transcultural model, predicated on the salience of differences in 
identity, would become irrelevant from an individual’s perspective. Under premises of 
social cohesion based on mutual respect, mutual understanding and a common 
sense of belonging through interaction, one may also argue that both approaches 
are needed to some extent, in order not to place one culture over another in 
importance, for dialogue needs to be two-way. In fact, the strength of any form of 
arts, be it literary, visual or theatrical, in promoting intercultural dialogue, should 
arguably lie in its ability to transcend such easy divides between multicultural and 
transcultural models, between seeing a fellow human being as member of a different 
community and as an autonomous individual that is part of the world at large, 
between seeing a community as unique and seeing it as constantly evolving as part 
of the world. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that both models of 
intercultural dialogue may equally be exploited by some other ideology for national 
propaganda or cultural production of a neoliberal economy, and hence may virtually 
be indistinguishable, especially if the only key difference between the two is 
assumed to be the emphasis on multiplicity or hybridity of cultural identities. 
What qualifies as intercultural dialogue? Does it mean any interaction or exchange 
between two different cultural communities is necessarily good? Or does it have to 
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be measured by the value of some creative hybrid product resulting from it, as some 
arguing for a transcultural approach may insist? This thesis refrains from making any 
value judgment in the differentiation between two models. It only starts by inferring 
the different possibilities based on a constructivist perspective of transcultural and 
multicultural systems, using the model of Luhmann’s theory of self-referential 
systems. It is subsequently on the basis of perspectives from cultural studies and 
postcolonial theory that one criticises the construction of knowledge on any culture 
as the ‘other’. 
Furthermore, the considerations here are centred on the communicative aspects of 
intercultural dialogue as exchange involving the medium of cultural heritage, tested 
on the example of dance as heritage. It has not attempted a review of some of the 
major perspectives in intercultural dialogue, that would have explored issues of 
aesthetics or moral values in depth. One perspective which could otherwise have 
been discussed more extensively is Levinas’ ethical philosophy on the Other as the 
source of morality.   
The role of dance heritage in intercultural dialogue has thus been discussed mainly 
in terms of its contribution towards appreciation of cultural diversity. The treatment of 
dance as a subject in this thesis is principally oriented towards the perspective of 
dance as communication and as embodiment of cultural values, as relevant to the 
use of dance for intercultural dialogue, while considering how dance is socially 
constructed as a form of cultural heritage. The initial discussion of dance in Chapter 
5 however is rooted in perspectives of social anthropology, in order to bring it in line 
with the general discussion of culture in Chapter 2. It is subsequently not surprising 
that some of the problematic views in early anthropological perspectives on dance 
also echo the problems of general anthropological views on culture, for example the 
explanation of ‘primitive’ cultures and dance forms as biological or psychological 
phenomena, or in terms of personality like in the perspective of Ruth Benedict.  
What followed was a functionalist perspective, which as Drid Williams points out, 
brings little insight to the understanding of dance, beyond an acknowledgement of its 
social value as being universal. Such universality of social structure arguably 
becomes banal, as just a step of improvement from the view of dance as a biological 
or psychological phenomenon. The challenge in the appreciation of a dance form as 
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heritage would be after all be the question of whether one can be empathetic of its 
aesthetic value and spiritual value even as one does not share similar taste in beauty 
or hold the same religious belief. A perspective on dance based on symbolic 
anthropology, notably with Victor Turner’s idea of social drama, would arguably 
provide more insight in ‘translating’ the meanings of dance as well as demonstrating 
the dynamism and polysemic nature of dance.  
As dance is analysed as a category of heritage in this thesis, there has also been an 
attempt to connect the two by considering heritage in general as a cultural tool of 
memory and ritual, which serves to explain how dance communicates meanings and 
values as heritage. An additional topic is the discussion of how heritage such as 
dance and in general may be a form of what Hobsbawm refers to as ‘invented 
tradition’. 
After intercultural dialogue and dance, the third main aspect in this thesis has been 
Singapore. This thesis was incidentally embarked on at a time when Singapore, 
known for its draconian measures in media control, was beginning to acknowledge 
internal issues of racism, as highlighted by the April 2010 visit of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance. Meantime, Singapore held its General Elections in May 
2011, when support for the ruling party slid to 60 per cent, and voices of dissent in 
the social media suggested the increasing presence of foreign talents and foreign 
labour as a factor of anxiety. As the thesis went into its final stage of writing, 
Singapore had witnessed a unprecedented protest of thousands in February 2013 
against a population white paper signalling a further neoliberal migration policy, 
sparking off concerns of xenophobia, amidst anti-globalisation calls of ‘Singapore for 
Singaporeans’ as expressed in one placard. The discourse on race and culture has 
evidently become more complicated than an issue of ‘Indians’ or ‘Malays’ versus 
‘Chinese’, as seen for example in the distinction made between local Indians and 
foreign talents or foreign labour from South Asia, articulated in a Tamil television 
forum of Idhayam Pesugirathu (Series 2, Episode 7, 28th February 2013) debating on 
the issues of employment and quality of living. It might be mentioned that such 
expressions of local sentiments are not a patch on xenophobic remarks in the social 
media of local Chinese against new migrants from People’s Republic of China, and 
on some notable occasions with remarks in the reverse direction.  
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All this tension suggests not only that the essentialising constructs of ‘race’ in guiding 
Singapore’s public policies have become a travesty in realities of the globalised 
nation, but also that a discussion of ‘intercultural dialogue’ may risk being limiting in 
its ideology if interpreted in a narrow way that essentialises cultures according to 
simple categories of race or religion. Cultural communities may in fact be more 
complicated than what boundaries drawn along the symbols of cultural heritage may 
suggest, as Chapters 4 to 6 have demonstrated in reference to Singapore’s CMIO 
formula of reducing ethnic and cultural diversity to a simplified classification of race. 
An assumption that a Singaporean’s identity is defined by the sum of his or her racial 
or cultural roots in the family’s land of origin a couple of generations ago, plus his or 
her participation in Singapore’s economic success, may seem like an ‘open’ and 
flexible concept to facilitate the welcoming of foreign talents for Singapore’s 
development, while providing the veneer of a Singapore core as CMIO. But it is an 
overly simplified view that denies the authenticity and worth of the local identity, 
which invites local Singaporeans to ‘call the bluff’, and may add on to local 
resentment. As mentioned in Chapter 4, race relation is also a form of class relation, 
and racist sentiments are often triggered off by issues of employment, housing and 
inflation. As Chapter 2 discussed, social cohesion as a sense of shared belonging is 
also related to issues of inequality and disparity, and Singapore happens to have an 
alarming income inequality currently as indicated by the Gini coefficient. This 
suggests that these are social problems beyond misunderstanding between 
culturally defined communities, and need to be dealt with through economic 
measures. An interesting trend to watch is how Singaporeans complain of job 
discrimination against locals in the increasingly competitive job market. 
Singaporeans who express xenophobic sentiments may hence refute that these are 
‘irrational’ sentiments, as it may also be argued as expression of survival instincts. 
The unfortunate phenomenon in the social media is that xenophobic sentiments and 
criticisms against the PAP government’s neoliberal population policy may be hard to 
disentangle from each other. With the most recent move by the government to 
introduce a licensing regime that allows them to delare news websites or blogs as 
illegal, it may be killing two birds with one stone, but as Chapter 4 suggests, this 
marks the latest signal of Singapore’s rejection of liberalism in the open exchange of 
views, which is the other main component in the approach of intercultural dialogue. 
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What role can cultural heritage play in relieving such tensions? It may be limited, but 
then again it may be better left for further research than speculation. It may be 
necessary to mention however that intangible cultural heritage tends to be 
associated with ethnic identities and may fail to represent the local identity, which 
means this has to be handled sensitively. To the locals, who are experiencing 
increasing loss of physical cultural heritage in the city due to urban development 
which is catering to more immigration while feeding a neoliberal economy that may 
not benefit locals, an emphasis on intangible heritage, which new citizens from China 
or India may appear to better identify with than old citizens, can well feel like a form 
of neo-colonialism. It does not help when the minister for national development 
describes local heritage as a matter of ‘memories’, for which the new generation can 
simply “create their own”, if local citizens do not feel represented in these decisions.  
Where the local community in dance heritage or other performing arts is concerned, 
the question may be whether heritage is treated as finished products as part of a 
creative industry, with productivity indicators in terms of economic output taking 
precedence over nurturing of local talents. Another question is how much recognition 
is given to the historical development of local culture. There is arguably a need for 
more historical research on local development of Indian classical dance and dance 
expressions of the Chinese and Malay communities alike, along with their cross-
cultural collaborations, in order to correct a skewed perspective of culture as 
essence over culture as achievement of creative outputs.  
Such aspects of social and cultural dynamics, which might be explored in an 
approach that takes a cue from Sorokin’s work, have not been amply explored in this 
thesis which has focused on scrutinising a Parsonian framework. An approach like 
this also would have important implications for how ‘intangible heritage’ such as 
performing arts may generally be understood - in the course of this PhD research, 
the concept of ‘intangible heritage’ has incidentally been studied alongside other 
frameworks such as folklore and indigenous knowledge, but any comparison has 
been left out of the thesis since the focus is on dance heritage as a form of 
communication, not on the idea of ‘safeguarding’. The 2005 UNESCO Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions would similarly 
have gone beyond the scope of this thesis, though dance in a transcultural model 
may also be considered in that framework. But as part of a discussion on 
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intercultural understanding here, one may emphasise, in the words of Tariq 
Ramadan (2012, p. 146), that traditions are “by definition, never static nor closed”. 
This is not to be taken to mean that the past is hence irrelevant, for it is through 
memory or a concept of ‘meaningful time’ (Ibid.) that a tradition communicates its 
values, as Chapter 5 has discussed citing theoretical perspectives of Assman and 
Lowenthal among others, though the meanings of expressions may also change 
through dialogue with the Others while forms remain. In the example of 
Bharatanatyam for instance, it is ironically the suppression of the dance as 
decadence and superstitution under British colonial rule that led to its reinvention as 
a symbol of nationalism.   
As a second wider implication, the analysis on dance heritage in this thesis suggests 
that a ‘transcultural’ model of intercultural dialogue, circumventing or even 
suppressing the issue of cultural identity, may not offer itself as the panacea for all 
problems related to cultural differences. The example of dance heritage echoes 
concerns elsewhere that while expressions of postmodernism may serve as a move 
away from what Lyotard calls ‘metanarratives’, such expressions of creativity may 
also fall into habits of what Jameson calls a ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’, as 
Chapter 6 demonstrates. A multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, meantime, 
may risk being given to essentialisation, and therefore have to be balanced with a 
transcultural approach as well as be deconstructed with the help of some historical 
perspective, as Chapter 6 has demonstrated.  
Thirdly, where the use of such heritage for cultural exchange is concerned, there 
would also be a need to discuss the issue of equitability in ‘intercultural dialogue’ 
whereby there may not only be one-sided appropriation of heritage for the purpose of 
staging spectacles for the creative industry, but also the issue of rights and welfare 
for artistes as practitioners, who may be engaged by event organisers to perform at 
various occasions on semi-voluntary basis in the name of intercultural dialogue, 
community service or other forms of nationalist propaganda. 
In short, this thesis takes the perspective, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that 
intercultural dialogue on any medium of cultural heritage is still generally under-
theorised. One important aspect that was not adequately addressed in the space of 
this thesis is the need for multi-faceted values of natural and cultural heritage to be 
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negotiated in a pluralistic manner in a globalised society, in terms of common public 
good. Without deliberation on such the multi-vocality and plurality of heritage value, 
thus handing the state a default licence to privilege selected symbols of nationalism 
unilaterally, much heritage may be lost with the neoliberal developmental state of 
land-scarce Singapore, under a model of what Zizek would refer to as ‘authoritarian 
capitalism’. 
On the issue of pluralism, the discussion of dance heritage for intercultural learning 
in Chapter 6 has suggested that values of a heritage may be multi-vocal, from social 
value, aesthetic value to moral value, not to mention spiritual value. The last often 
poses a challenge, as one view in the project of modernity may be less sympathetic 
towards such traditions. In fact, an important aspect in this thesis also lies in 
deconstructing a hegemonic discourse of a ‘modernised’ community over a 
‘traditional’ community. As pointed out in Chapter 2, modernisation as manifested in 
the globalised world today is too often interpreted by default as the instrumental 
rationality of capitalism.  
The challenge in building a cosmopolitan community among a diverse and globalised 
population such as Singapore, with active participation by people regardless of ‘race’, 
language or religion, may partly be seen as finding cosmopolitan ‘intercultural 
standards’ for mutual respect and mutual understanding like a kind of communicative 
ethics. But a discourse of ‘intercultural’ dialogue needs to be guarded from obscuring 
economic and political issues in social cohesion through democratic participation, for 
it tends to divert attention to an imagination of fundamental cultural differences, such 
that intercultural competence is presumably all that society needs. As the 2008 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue underscores, democratic participation should 
also be included as competence for dialogue. In Singapore, what one needs is the 
rule of law as institutional mechanism of democracy to defend the common good in 
issues such as environmental sustainability and the quality of life, beyond a 
corporatism of interests that may render a romantic picture of co-existence in ‘racial 
harmony’, yet emasculates the people politically. Any such romantic picture evoked 
in visual spectacles of dance or other art forms should not make one forget more 
pressing issues of social cohesion and human rights in Singapore or the region for 
that matter. The controversial ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted on 18th 
November 2012 is notably flawed with an Article 6 on ‘balance’ between rights and 
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‘responsibilities’ and an Article 7 on particularities of ‘regional and national contexts’ 
(ASEAN, 19th November 2012).     
Recalling Parekh’s argument in this thesis, intercultural dialogue is ultimately about 
the challenge of cultural and value pluralism which needs to be greeted by a robust 
form of democracy. Understood as a process of democracy with the perspective of 
Laclau, intercultural dialogue may in theory allow one to dislodge any claim of 
universalism, or regionalism for that matter – such as ‘Asian values’, but it still 
involves a competition of different groups to find representation with their 
particularisms of values. What Mouffe reminds us with the friend-enemy thesis of 
Carl Schmitt however, is that one must not overlook the reality of antagonism; in 
order to save a state from discredit in its duty of ethic, and yet avert conflicts, the 
way to go would be to emphasise commonality. Culture heritage as such may also 
be a site of struggle, as one engages in a dialogue or a ‘dance’ with the Other, to use 
the word now as a metaphor. In a normative sense, one has to learn to be careful 
not to step on the Other’s foot. But perhaps through some creative but sensitive use 
of cultural heritage, one may yet rediscover enchantment in the world. 
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